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INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 


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AUGUSTANA . LIBRARY . PUBLICATIONS 

NUMBER 10 


THE DANEGELD IN FRANCE 



EINAR JORANSON, Ph.D. 

INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 


PUBLISHED 

BY AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
AUGUSTANA COLLEGE AND THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS 



ROCK ISLAND, ILL. 

AUGUSTANA BOOK CONCERN, PRINTERS 
1923 




AUGUSTANA LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS 


No. 

1. The Mechanical Composition of Wind Deposits, by Johan 
August Udden. 

2. An Old Indian Village, by Johan August Udden. 

3. The Idyl in German Literature, by Gustav Albert Andreen. 

4. On the Cyclonic Distribution of Rainfall, by Johan August 
Udden. 

5. Fossil Mastodon and Mammoth Remains in Illinois and Iowa, 
by Netta C. Anderson, 

and 

Proboscidean Fossils of the Pleistocene Deposits in Illinois 
and Iowa, by Johan August Udden. 

6. Scandinavians Who Flave Contributed to the Knowledge of 
the Flora of North America, by Per Axel Rydberg, Ph. D.; 

and 

A Geological Survey of the Lands Belonging to the New York 
and Texas Land Company, Ltd., in the Upper Rio Grande 
Embayment in Texas, by Johan August Udden. 

7. Genesis and Development of Sand Formations on Marine 
Coasts, by Pehr Olsson-Seffer, Ph. D., 

and 

The Sand Strand Flora of Marine Coasts, by Pehr Olsson- 
Seffer, Ph. D. 

8. Alternative Readings in the Hebrew of the Books of Samuel, 
by Otto H. Bostrom, Ph. D. 

9. On the Solution of the Differential Equations of Motion of a 
Double Pendulum, by William E. Cederberg, Ph. D. 



CONTENTS 

Bibliography ... 

Introduction . 

PART I. 

The Danegeld During the Reign of Charles the Bald 


chapter (840-877) 

I. The Danegeld of 845. 26 — 38 

II. The Danegeld of 853. 39—44 

III. The Danegeld of 860-861. 45—58 

IV. The Danegeld Paid by Robert the Strong in 862. 59—61 

V. The Danegeld of 866. 62 — 92 

VI. The Two Danegelds of 877. 93—110 

VII. Summary of the Causes which Forced Charles the Bald to 

Resort to the Danegeld. Ill — 117 


PART II. 

The Danegeld After 877. 

The Danegeld Paid for Carloman in 884. 118—140 

Payments Made to the Danes in Connection with the Siege 

of Paris (886-887). 141—152 

Odo’s First Danegeld (889). 153—157 

Odo’s Second Danegeld (897). 158—162 

Rudolph’s First Danegeld (923-924). 163—170 

Rudolph’s Second Danegeld (926). 171—174 

Summary of the Reasons for the Payment of Danegeld 

After the Time of Charles the Bald. 175—179 

PART III. 

Local Danegeld: Ransom. 


XV. Ransom of Places . 180—184 

XVI. Ransom -of Persons . 185—188 


VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 

XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 



PART IV. 

General Summary and Conclusions. 

XVII. The Institutional Character of the Danegeld. 189—204 

XVIII. The Results of the Danegeld: Its Effect on the Political 

and Economic Development of France. 205—219 
























4 


CONTENTS 


APPENDICES. 


CHAPTER 

I. When and Where Was the Assessment For the Danegeld 


Paid to the Vikings of the Seine in 877 Prepared?. 220 

II. The Two Tax Documents of 877 and the Capitulary of 

Kiersy . 230 

III. The Danegeld in Frisia. 236 


IV. The Danegeld in Lorraine and the East Frankish Kingdom 239 

V. The Danegeld in Brittany. 


PAGE 

-229 

-235 

-238 

-247 

248 







BIBLIOGRAPHY 


All works cited in this dissertation are included in the following list. 
Certain others that have a more or less general relation to the subject as a 
whole or to some important part of it have also been included, but many 
secondary works that were found to be of slight value have been omitted. 
It is confidently hoped that no printed source supplying information either 
direct or indirect on the Danegeld in France has been overlooked. 


ABBREVIATIONS 


AA. SS. 

Coll, de text. 

Forsch. z. d. Gesch. 


Jahrb. d. d. Gesch. 


M. G. H., SS. 

-, SS. RERUM MeROV. 

-, LL. 

-, Epp. 

-, Poet. Lat. 

Mon. hist. Brit. 

Rev. Hist. 

SS. r. G. 


J. Bollandus (ed.), Acta sanctorum. 

Collection de textes pour servir d Vetude et d 
Venseignement de Vhistoire. 

Forscliungen zur deutschcn Geschichte. Heraus- 
gegeben von del* liistorischen Commission bei 
der koniglich bayerischen Akademie der Wissen- 
schaften. Gottingen, 1S60 ff. 

Jahrbucher der deutschen Geschiclite. Published 
under the auspices of the Munich Academy. 
Berlin and Leipzig, 1S62 ff. 

Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores. 
Monumenta Germaniae historica, Script ores 
rerum Merovingicarum. 

Monumenta Germaniae historica, Leges. 
Monumenta Germaniae historica, Epistolae. 
Monumenta Germaniae historica, Poetae Latini 
medii aevi. 

Monumenta historica Britannica. 

Revue Historique. Paris, 1834 ff. 

Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scliola- 
rum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis re- 


cusi. 

The other abbreviations used in this work will, it is believed, be self- 
explanatory. 


COLLECTIONS OF SOURCES, REGESTA, ETC. 

Baluze, Etienne, ed. Capitularia regum Francorum. Reedited by P. de 
Chiniac. 2 vols. Paris, 1780. 

Bohmer, J. F. Die Regesten des Kaiserreiclis unter den Karolingern, 7 51 — 
918. Revised edition by E. Miihlbacher and others. Innsbruck, 1908. 

-. Regesta chronologico-diplomatica Karolorum. Frankfort-am-Main, 

1833. 









6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bollandus, J., and others, edd. Acta sanctorum. Editio novissima by J. 
Carnandet. Paris, 1863 ff. 

Bouquet, M., and others, edd. Recueil des historiens dcs Gaales et de la 
France. Paris, 1840 ff. 

Catalogue general des manuscripts des bibliothdques publiques de France. 
Paris, 1885 ff. 

Collection de documents inddits sur Vhistoire de France. Publid par le sovns 
du ministre de Vinstruction publique. Paris, 1835 ff. 

Collection de textes pour servir d Vdtude et d Venscigncment de Vhistoire. 

Published by the Libraires des Archives nationales et de la Societe 
de l’Ecole des chartes. Paris, 1886 ff. 

Du Cange, Charles du Fresne. Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis. 

New edition by L. Favre. 10 vols. Niort, 1883—1887. 

Duchesne, A., ed. Historiae Francorum scriptorcs. 5 vols. Paris, 1636—1649. 
Gale, T., ed. Historiae Britannicae, Saxonicae, Anglo-Daniae, scriptores XV. 
2 vols. Oxford, 1691. 

Geschichtschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit. Second edition by W. Wattenbach. 
Berlin and Leipzig, 1884 ff. 

Guizot, M. F., ed. Collection des memoires relatifs a Vhistoire de France. 
31 vols. Paris, 1824—1835. 

Kemble, J. M., ed. Codex diplomaticus aevi Saxonici. 6 vols. London, 1839— 
1848. 

Mansi, J. D., a*id others, edd. Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima col- 
lectio. 31 vols. Florence and Venice, 1759—1798. 

Migne, J. P., ed. Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina. 221 vols. 
Faris, 1844—1864. 

Monumcnta Germaniae historica. Edited by G. H. Pertz and others. Folio 
series : Berlin, 1826—1874 ; quarto series: ibid., 1876 ff. 

Monumenta historica Britannica. Edited by H. Petrie assisted by J. Sharpe. 
London, 1848. 

Muhlenbacher, E. See Bohiner, Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs, etc. 
Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in it sum scholarum ex Monumentis Germa¬ 
niae historicis recusi. Hanover, 1839 ff. 

Sirmond, J., ed. Capitula Caroli Calvi et successorum aliquot Franciae regum. 
Paris, 1623. 


NARRATIVE SOURCES 

Abbo (monk of St. Germain-des-Pres near Paris). De bellis Parisiacae urbis 
adversus Xormannos libri III. M. G. H., Poet. Lat., IV, part i, 
pp. 72—122. 

Ado. Chronicon. M. G. H., SS., II, pp. 315—329. 

Adrevaldus Floriacensis. Miracula sancti Benedicti. H. G. H., SS., XV, 
pp. 474—497. 

Aimoin of Fleury. Historiae Francorum libri V. Edited by J. Nicot. Paris, 
1567. 

Aimoin of St. Germain. Miracula sancti Germani. AA. SS., May, VI, pp. 
786—791. 







BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Albericus monachus Trium Fontium. See Chronica Albrici. 

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. Edited with notes, etc., by C. Plummer. 2 vols. 

(Vol. I: text, appendices, and glossary; vol. II: introduction, notes, 
and index.) Oxford, 1892—1890. 

Annales Anglo-Saxonici. M. G. H., SS., XIII, pp. 103—120. 

Annales sancti Benigni Divioncnsis. Ibid., Y, pp. 37—50. 

Annales Bertiniani. Edited by G. Waitz. SS. r. G. Hanover, 1883. 

-. Edited by Abbe C. Dehaisnes (Les Annales de Saint-Bertin et de 

Saint-Vaast). Paris, 1871. 

Annales sanctae Columbae Senonensis. M. G. H., SS., I, pp. 102—109. 
Annales Fuldenses. Edited by F. Kurze. SS. r. G. Hanover, 1891. 

Annales sancti Germani minores. M. G. H., SS., IV, pp. 3—1. 

Annales Maximiniani. Ibid., XIII, pp. 19—25. 

Annales Mettenses. Duchesne, Hist. Franc, scriptores, III, pp. 262—333. 
Annales necrologici Fuldenses. M. G. H., SS., XIII, 161—218. 

Annales Nivernenses. Ibid., pp. 88—91. 

Annales Rotomagenses. Ibid., XXVI, pp. 490—506. 

Annales Vedastini. Edited by Abbe C. Dehaisnes (Les Annales de Saint-Ber¬ 
tin et de Saint-Vaast). Paris, 1871. 

Annales Xantenses. M. G. II., SS., II, pp. 219—235. 

Asser. Gesta Aelfredi rcgis. Ibid., XIII, pp. 120—122. 


Chronica Albrici monaclii Trium Fontium a monacho novi monasterii Hoiensis 
interpolata. Ibid., XXIII, pp. 631—950. 

Chronicon Britannicum. Bouquet, VII, pp. 221—222. 

Chronicon Fontanellense (sive s. Wandregisili). M. G. H., SS., II, pp. 301— 
304. 

Chronicon Hermanni contracti. Bouquet, VII, pp. 232—237. 

Chronicon sancti Maxentii. Ibid., p. 228. 

Chronicon monasterii sancti Sergii Andegavensis. Ibid., p. 53. 

Chronicon N amnetense. Edited by R. Merlet (La Chronique de Nantes). 
Coll, de text. Paris, 1896. 

Chronicon sancti Neoti. Gale, Historiae Brit., Sax., A.— D., scriptores, I, p. 
155. 

Chronicon Normannorum. M. G. H., SS., I, pp. 532—536. 

Chronicon sancti Petri Vivi Senonensis. Bouquet, IX, pp. 32—36. 

Chronicon Sigeberti. Ibid., VII, pp. 249—253. 

Chronicon Sithiense sancti Bertini. Ibid., pp. 266—270. 

Chroniques de Saint-Denis. See Grandes chroniques de Saint-Denis. 


Dudo. De moribus et actis primorum V ormanniae ducum. Edited by J. Lair 
(Mdmoires de la Socidte des antiquaires de Normandie. Serie III, 
t. 3). Caen, 1865. 


Einhard. Annales. M. G. H., SS., I, pp. 135—218. 

-. Vita Karoli imperatoris. Edited by H. W. Garrod and R. B. Mowat 

(Einhard's Life of Charlemagne). Oxford, 1915. 

Ermentarius. Miracula sancti Filiberti. M. G. H., SS., XV, pp. 298—303. 
Ethelwerdi chronicon. Ibid., XIII, pp. 122—123. 

Flodoard. Annales. Edited by P. Lauer. Coll, de text. Paris, 1905. 
-. Historia Remensis ecclesiae. M. G. H.. SS., XIII, pp. 409—599. 






8 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Florentius Wigorniensis monachus. Chronicon ex chronicis. Mon. hist. 
Brit., I, pp. 522—644. 

Folcwin. Gesta abbatum sancti Beftini Sithiensium. M. G. H., 88 ., XIII, 
pp. 607—634. 

Grandes chroniques de 8aint-Denis. Bouquet, VII, pp. 125—151. 

Hariulf. Chronique de Vabbaye de 8aint-Riquier. Edited by F. Lot. Coll, 
de text. Paris, 1894. 

Helmold. Chronica Slavorum. M. G. H., 88., XXI, pp. 11—99. 

Henry of Huntingdon. Historiae Anglorum libri VIII. Mon. hist. Brit., I, 
pp. 689—763. 

Hildegar of Meaux. Vita sancti Faronis. Bouquet, VII, pp. 356—358. 

Hincmar. Annales. See Annales Bertiniani. 

-. Opera. Migne, Pair. Lat., CXXV, CXXVI. 

Liutprand. Antapodosis. Edited by E. Diimmler (Liutprandi episcopi Cremo * 
nensis opera omnia). SS. r. G. Hanover, 1877. 

Loup (Lupus) of Ferrieres. Epistolae. Edited by G. Desdevises du Dezert. 
(Lettres de 8ervat Loup). Paris, 1888. 

Miracula sancti Bavonis. Bouquet, VII, p. 153, note a. 

Miracula sancti Bertini. Ibid., pp. 380—381. 

Miracula sancti Dionysii. Ibid., p. 365. 

Miracula (Translatio) sancti Gcrmani in V ormannorum adventu facta [845] 
(written by a monk of St. Germain-des-Pres on the command of 
Abbot Ebroin). M. G. H., 88., XV, pp. 10—46. 

Miracula sancti Martini abbatis Vertavensis. Ibid., 88. rerum Merov., Ill, 
pp. 564—575. 

Miracula sancti Richarii. Ibid., 88., XV, pp. 916—919. 

Monachus Sangallensis. De gestis Karoli Magni libri II. Ibid., II, pp. 
731—763. 

Nithard. Historiarum libri IV. Ibid., II, pp. 649—672. 

Paschasius Radbertus, abbas Corbeiensis. In threnos sive lamentationes 
Ieremiae libri quinque. Migne, Patr. Lat., CXX, cols. 1059—1255. 

Poeta Saxo. Annales de gestis Caroli Magni imperatoris libri quinque. M. 
G. H., 88., I, pp. 227—279. 

Regino. Chronicon. Edited by F. Kurze. 88. r. G. Hanover, 1890. 

Richer. Historiarum libri IIII. Edited by G. Waitz. 88. r. G. Hanover, 
1877. 

8ermo de relatione corporis beati Vedasti a Bellovaco ad proprium locum, 
facta idibus Iulii mensis. M. G. H., 88., XV, pp. 402—404. 

Thegan. Vita Hludovici imperatoris. Ibid., II, pp. 585—604. 

Vita sancti Faronis. 8ee Hildegar of Meaux. 

Vita sancti Romani abbatis Autissiodorensis. Bouquet, IX, p. 135. 

W ulfstan. Homilies. Edited by A. Napier (Wulfstan, Sammlung der ihm 
zugeschriebenen Homilien ncbst Untersuchungen iiber ihre Eclitheit). 
Berlin, 1883. 





BIBLIOGRAPHY 


9 


DOCUMENTARY SOURCES 

Hreviarium missorum Aquitanicum [789]. M. G. H., LL. Sectio II, t. i, pp. 
65—66. 

(Japitiila excerpta in conventu Carisiacensi coram populo lecta [877]. Ibid., 
t» ii, pp. 361—363. 

Capitula synodi Bellovacensis. Ibid., pp. 387—388. 

Gapitulare Carisiacense [June 14, 877]. Ibid., pp. 355—361. 

Capitulare missorum in Theodonis villa datum secundum , generate [805]. 
Ibid., t. i, pp. 122—126. 

Capitulare Vernense [884]. Ibid., t. ii, pp. 371—375. 

Cartulaire de Vabbaye de St. Sauveur de Redon. Edited by M. A. de Courson 
(Collection de documents inedits). Paris, 1863. 

Clotharii II Edictum [614]. M. G. H., LL. Sectio II, t. i, pp. 20—23. 

Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta [July, SOI]. Ibid., Sectio II, t. ii, pp. 
301—302. 

Edictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico [877], Ibid., pp. 353—354. 
See infra, appendices i and ii. 

Edictum Pistense [June 25, 864]. Ibid., pp. 310—328. 

Epistola synodi Carisiacensis ad Hludowicum regem Germaniae directa. Ibid., 
pp. 427—441. 

Irminon. See Polyptyque de Vabbe Irminon. 

Libellus proclamations ad versus Wenilonem [June 14, 859]. M. G. H., LL 
Sectio II, t. ii, pp. 450—153. 

Pippini Capitulare Aquitanicum [768]. Ibid., Sectio II, t. i, pp. 42—13. 

Polyptyque de Vabbd Irminon, on denombrement dcs manses, des serfs, et des 
revenues de Vabbaye de Saint-Germain-des-Pres sous le r&gne de 
Charlemagne. Edited with prolegomena by B. Guerard. (Documents 
de la Society de Vhistoire de Paris). 2 vols. Paris. 1844. (In the 
new edition, by A. Longnon [Paris, 1S86—1S95], Guerard’s prolego¬ 
mena have been reprinted without change.) 


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-. Reckerches sur la cdldbritd de la ville de Paris avant les ravages 

des Normands. Ibid., XV (1738—1740), pp. 656—091. 





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Dowell, Stephen. A History of Taxation and Taxes in England from tho 
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Dummler, Ernst. Geschichte des ostfrdnkischen Reiches. (Jahrb. d. d. 
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Eckel, A. Charles le Simple. (Bibliotheque de VEcole des Hantes Etudes. 
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Falke, J. Die Geschichte des deutschen Handels. Leipzig, 1859. 

Favre, E. Eudes, comte de Paris et roi de France (882 — 898). (Bibliotheque 
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Flach, J. Les origines de Vancienne France. 4 vols. Paris, 1886—1917. 

Freeman, E. A. The History of the Norman Conquest of England. 6 vols. 
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Essays, First Series, fourth edition, pp. 212—256. London, 1886. 

Fustel de Coulanges, N. D. “Les articles de Kiersy, 877.” In the same 
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11 

institutions politiques de Vancienne France. Edited by C. Jullian. 
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Gfrorer, A. F. Geschichte der ost- und westfriinkischen Carolinger vom Tode 
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Glasson, E. Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France. 8 vols. 
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(1898), pp. 1—54. 

von Kalckstein, Iv. “Abt Hugo aus dem Hause der Welfen, Markgraf von 
Neustrien.” Forsch. z. d. Gesch., XIV, pp. 37—131. Gottingen, 1874. 

-. Geschichte des franzbsischen Konigtums unter den ersten Cape- 

tingern. (Only the first volume of this work has ever been pub¬ 
lished.) Leipzig, 1877. 

-. Robert der Tapfere, Markgraf von Anjou, der Stammvater des 

Kapetingischen Hanses. Berlin, 1871. 

Keary, C. F. The Vikings in Western Christendom. A. D. 789 — 888. London, 
1891. 

Lapotre, A. UEurope et la Saint-Siege & V&poche carolingienne. Premiere 
partie: Le pape Jean VIII (872 — 882). Paris, 1895. 

Lauer, P. Robert Ier et Raoul de Bourgogne, rois de France, 923 — 936. 

(Bibliotheque de VEcole des Hautes Etudes. Fasc. no. 188.) Paris, 
1910. 

Le Moyne de la Borderie, A. Histoire de Bretagne. Continued by B. Pocquet. 

5 vols. Paris and Rennes, 1896—1913. 

Levasseur, E. La population frangaise. 3 vols. Paris, 1889—1892. 

Levillain, L. “Etude sur les lettres de Loup de Ferrieres.” Bibliotheque de 
VEcole des chartes, LXII (1901), pp. 445—509; LXIII (1902), pp. 
69—118, 289—330, 537—586. 

-. “Une nouvelle edition des lettres de Loup de Ferrieres.” Ibid., 

LXIV (1903), pp. 259—283. 

Lippert, W. Geschichte des westfrdnkischen Reiches unter Konig Rudolf. 
(Dissertation.) Leipzig, 1886. 

Longnon, A. Atlas historique de la France. 2 vols. (Maps and text.) Paris, 
1885—1889. 

Lot, F. Etude sur le rdgne de Hugues Capet. (Bibl. de VEcole des Hautes 
Etudes. Fasc. no. Ilf7.) Paris, 1903. 






12 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Lot, F. “La grancle invasion normande de 856—862.” Bibl. de VEvole des 
chaftes, LXIX (190S), pp. 1—62. 

-. “La Loire, V Aquitaine et la Seine de 862 il 866. Robert le Fort.” 

Ibid., LXXYI (1915), pp. 473—511. 

-. “Le monastere inconnu pille par les Normands en 845.” Ibid., 

LXX (1909), pp. 433—146. 

-. “Melanges carolingiens. II. Le pout de Pitres.” Le Moyen Age, 

IX (1905), pp. 1—27. 

-. “LTne annee du regne de Charles le Chauve. Annee 866.” Ibid., 

VI (1902), pp. 393—438. 

Lot, F., and L. Halphen. Le regne de Charles le Chauve (8)0 — 877). Pre¬ 
miere partie (850 — Sol). (Bibl. de VEcole des Hautes Etudes. Fasc. 
no. 165). Paris, 1909. 

Luchaire, A. Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France sous les 
premiers Capdtiens (9S7 — 1180). 2 vols. Second edition. Paris, 1891. 

-•. Manuel des institutions frangaises, pdriode des Capetiens directs. 

Paris, 1892. 

Maitland, F. W. The Constitutional History of England. Cambridge, 1909. 

-. Domesday Boole and Beyond. Three Essays in the Early History 

of England. Cambridge, 1897. 

Marion, M. De Normannorum ducum cum Capetianis pacta ruptaque socie- 
tate. (Dissertation.) Paris, 1892. 

Mayer, E. “Zuin friilimittelalterlichen Miinzwesen uiid der angeblichen Karo- 
lingischen Bussreduktion.” Vierteljahrschrift fur Social- und Wirt- 
schaftsgeschichte, XIII (1916), pp. 337—360. 

Montelius, O. Kulturgeschichte Schicedens von den altesten Zeiten bis zum 
elf ten Jahrhundert nach Christi. Leipzig, 1906. 

Muller, Sophus. Nordische Altertumskunde. German transl. by O. L. Jiriczek. 
2 vols. Strassburg, 1879—1898. 

Neilson, N. Customary Rents. (In Oxford Studies in Social and Legal His¬ 
tory, ed. by P. Vinogradoff, II, no. IV). Oxford, 1910. 

von Noorden, C. Hinkmar, Erzbischof von Rheims. Bonn, 1863. 

Palgrave, Sir Francis. History of Normandy and England. 4 vols. London, 
1851—1864. 

Parisot, R. Le royaume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens, 858 — 923. Paris, 
1898. 

Prenzel, A. Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung unter den Karolingern von der 
Mitte des achten bis zum Ende des neunten Jahrhunderts. Erster 
Teil. (Dissertation.) Leipzig, 1887. 

Prou, M. Les monnaies carolingiennes. (Catalogue des monnaies frangaises 
de la Bibliotlieque Nationale.) Paris, 1896. 

-. “De la nature du service militaire du par les roturiers aux Xle 

et XHe siScles.” Rev. Hist., XLIV (1890), pp. 313—327. 

Richter, G., and H. Kohl. Annalen des frdnkischen Reichs im Zeitalter der 
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Annalen der deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter von der Griindung 
des frdnkischen Reichs bis zum Enter gang der Hohenstaufen [to 
1137]. 4 vols. Halle, 1873—1898.) 










BIBLIOGRAPHY 13 

Roos, W. “The Swedish Part in the Viking Expeditions.” English Hist. 
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Roth, P. Geschichte des Beneficialwesens von den dltesten Zeiten his ins 
zelinte Jahrhundert. Erlangen, 1850. 

Round, J. H. Feudal England. London, 1895. 

-■ —. “Danegeld and the Finance of Domesday.” In P. E. Dove’s (ed.) 

Domesday Studies, I, pp. 77 — 142. 

Schrors, II. H ink mar Erzbischof von Reims: sein Leben und seine Schriften. 
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See, H. E. Les classes rurales et le regime domanial en France au moyen age. 
Paris, 1901. 

Seemann, F. Boso von Niederburgund. (Dissertation.) Halle a. S., 1911. 

Simson, B. Jahrbiicher des frdnkischen Reiches unter Ludwig dem Frommen. 
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Soetbeer, A. “Beitrage zur Geschichte des Geld- und Miinzwesens in Deutsch¬ 
land. Vierter Abschnitt: Geld- und Munzwesen im frankischen 
Reiche unter den Karolingern.” Forsch. z. d. Gesch., IV, pp. 241— 
354 ; VI, pp. 1—112. 

Sommerlad, T. Die wirtscliaftUche Tdtigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland. 
Vols. I—II. Leipzig, 1900—1905. 

Steenstrup, J. C. II. R. Normannerne. 4 vols. Copenhagen, 1870 — 1SS2. 

Stubbs, W. The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Develop¬ 
ment. 3 vols. (Vol. I is in the sixth edition, vol. II in the fourth, 
and vol. Ill in the fifth.) Oxford, 1S9G—1S97. 

Sveriges historia. See Hildebrand, E. 

Thompson, J. W. “The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century.” Journal 
of Political Economy, XXIII (1915), pp. 857 — 887. 

—-. The Decline of the Missi Dominici in Frankish Gaul. (University 

of Chicago Decennial Publications.) Chicago, 1903. 

Vander Linden, H. “Les Normands a Louvain (884 — S92).” Rev. Hist., 
CXXIV (1917), pp. 64—SI. 

Viollet, P. Histoire des institutions politiques et administrates de la 
France. 3 vols. Paris, 1903. 

Vogel, W. Die Normannen und das frdnkisclie Reich bis zur Grundung der 
Eormandie (799—911). Heidelberg, 1906. 

Vuitry, A. Etudes sur le regime financier de la France avant la revolution 
de 1789. 2 vols. Paris, 1877—1883. 

Waitz, G. Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. 6 vols. Vol. Ill in the second 
edition, Kiel, 1883; vol. IV in the second edition, Berlin, 1S85. (The 
other volumes are not referred to in this dissertation.) 

-—. Jahrbucher des deutschen Reiches unter Konig Heinrich I. (Jahrb. 

d. d. Gesch.) Third edition. Leipzig, 1885. 

TV arnkoenig, L. A., and P. A. F. Gerard. Histoire des Carolingiens. 2 vols. 
Paris, 1862. 

[Webb, P. C.] A short account of Danegeld, with some further particulars 
relating to William the Conqueror’s Survey. By a member of the 
Society of Antiquaries. London, 1756. 

Weinhold, Karl. Altnordisches Leben. Berlin, 1856. 

Wenck, W. B. Das frdnkisclie Reich nacli dem Vertrage von Verdun (8)3 — 
861). Leipzig, 1851. 







INTRODUCTION 


The political and economic importance of the English Danegeld 
has long been recognized . 1 Careful studies of its institutional 
character by competent scholars have yielded a vast amount of 
information concerning the rates at which the tax was levied, 
its incidence, how often it was exacted, and the machinery by 
which it was raised . 2 

As much can not be said for the Danegeld on the Continent . 251 
Until recently it has only been very briefly referred to in politi¬ 
cal, constitutional, and economic histories covering the ninth 
and early tenth centuries . 3 If it is true, that of late there has 
been a tendency to devote somewhat more attention to the sub- 

1 As early as 1756 Mr. P. C. Webb, a member of the London Society of 
Antiquaries, published a pamphlet entitled A short account of Danegeld, 
with some further particulars relating to William the Conqueror's survey. 
Considering the time at which it was written, Mr. Webb’s treatise must be 
regarded as a very complete and scholarly piece of work, and probably will 
long remain the starting point for every detailed study of the English Dane¬ 
geld (cf. Round’s estimate of its value in the work cited in the following 
note, pp. 77 ft.). Though Mr. Webb’s pamphlet is at present very rare, es¬ 
pecially in America, arrangements have recently been made for the prepara¬ 
tion of several photographic reproductions of the copy owned by Harvard 
University Library. 

2 Perhaps the most notable recent study of the English Danegeld is 
Round’s “Danegeld and the Finance of Domesday,” in P. E. Dove’s (ed.) 
Domesday Studies, I, 77-142. There is also a wealth of information on the 
subject in Maitland’s Domesday Booh and Beyond (consult the index s. v. 
Geld). Freeman, too, has given considerable attention to the Danegeld 
passim in the first two volumes of his Norman Conquest. 

2a For a discussion of the applicability of the term Danegeld to the tribute 
paid on the Continent, see infra, pp. 23-24. 

3 It seems unnecessary to support this statement by specific references to 
all the older works that deal with the later Carolingian period. They are 
all listed in the bibliography and are cited and referred to time and again 
in the following pages. Suffice it to say here that perhaps Clamageran 
(Histoire de Vimpot en France, I, 179 ff.) and Soetbeer (in one of his articles 
on Carolingian coinage, Forsch. z. d. Gesch., VI, 53-56 and passim ) recog¬ 
nized more fully that did any of the other writers of the last century the 
institutional and economic significance of the Frankish Danegeld. Yet even 
they devoted only a few pages to the subject. Neither of them furnished a 
complete statement of all the payments; nor was the information of either 
very accurate. Soetbeer was concerned almost exclusively with the influence 
of the Danegeld on the coinage; while Clamageran, in stating the principal 
provisions of the assessments for the Danegeld, did little more than trans¬ 
late and paraphrase some of the principal sources. 



INTRODUCTION 


15 


ject, 4 the fact remains that no complete account has yet appeared; 
and no attempt has been made, either to bring the Danegeld into 
relation with the general political and economic development of 
the later Carolingian period, or to estimate its influence on the 
institutions of the feudal age. It may be hoped, therefore, that 
the present work will at least serve to direct attention to an 
economic and political factor the significance of which has so 
far been overlooked or underrated by most scholars. 

While this dissertation is intended to be primarily a study of 
the Danegeld in France, with some account of the Danegelds 
exacted elsewhere on the Continent, it seems desirable, before 
taking up the discussion of the principal subject, to set forth in 
broad outline the leading features of the English Danegeld, and 
to compare it, in a general way with the tribute on the Continent, 
but more particularly with the Danegeld in France. 

The entry in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle for the year 991 5 6 
which states that Danegeld was then paid for the first time in 
England is certainly not accurate. Danegeld was promised, if 
not paid, in England as early as 865, according to the testimony 
of ^he same chronicle. 0 There were two payments in Alfred’s 
time. And Edred (946—55) “left money for this purpose as 
for a charitable and recognized object.” 7 Probably it is true that 
from 991 onward the English Danegeld was levied more system¬ 
atically than before. 

Until 1012 the Danegeld in England was paid in the form of 
tribute, as the purchase price of peace. But in that year the 
English began to employ the Danes as their mercenaries; and 
thereafter, down to the dismissal of the mercenary fleet and the 
abolition of the tax, by Edward the Confessor about the year 
1051, Danegeld was paid, not as tribute, but as a stipend to 

4 For example by Thompson, Flach, Lot, Vogel, and Dopsch, whose re¬ 
spective contributions to the subject will be noted infra in the proper places. 
To Professor Thompson belongs the credit of having estimated, more fully 
than anyone else heretofore, the influence of the Danegeld on the commerce 
and trade of France (cf. infra, chap, xviii and nn. 38-41). 

5 Ed. Plummer, pp. 126, 127. 

6 Ibid., pp. 68, 69. 

7 The quotation is from Plummer’s Notes to his edition of the Anglo- 
Saxon Chronicle, p. 174. In the same place will be found full references to 
practically all the evidence for the early English Danegelds (cf. infra, n. 13). 
See also Round, op. cit., 77 ff.; Maitland, op. cit., .3 ff; Webb, A short account 
of Danegeld. On the money left by Edred, see also Freeman, op. cit., I, 277, 
n. 1. 





16 


INTRODUCTION 


Danish mercenaries in English service. The later Danegeld, 
Trom the time of the Conqueror to that of Henry II — who 
appears to have collected it as such for the last time in 1162 — 
was not a Danegeld in any proper sense, but simply a royal tax, 
“an ordinary financial expedient.” 8 

On the Continent the Danegeld appears somewhat earlier 
than in England. The first recorded payment was secured by 
the Vikings who swooped down on the Frisian coast in 810, four 
years prior to the death of Charlemagne. During the reign of 
Louis the Pious two similar payments (836, 837) were exacted 
from the Frisians, and there were still others in 846 and in 852. 
All these Frisian Danegelds, it may be noted, were distinctly 
local in character, and none of them was authorized by any 
emperor or king. On the contrary, Charlemagne and Louis the 
Pious emphatically disapproved of the payments. How the 
Frisians raised the amounts required of them cannot be deter¬ 
mined from the evidence in our possession. 

Before turning to the West Frankish, or French, Danegeld, 

% 

it may be well to state that tribute was paid also in the kingdom 
of Lorraine and in Brittany. Lorraine was forced to contribute 
on two occasions. In 864 Lothaire II, following the example set 
by Charles the Bald in 860—61, raised what appears to have 
been a stipendiary Danegeld, by levying a tax of four denarii 
on all the mansi of his kingdom. 10 In 882 Charles the Fat, after 
having besieged the Northmen at Elsloo for some time, finally 
came to terms with the invaders and agreed among other things 
to pay them a large sum of money. The latter he raised, not by 
taxation, but by drafts on the treasuries of certain churches. 11 

8 Round, op. cit., 79 ff.; cf. Maitland, op. cit., 3-4. Plummer makes the 
following significant statement (Notes, p. 174): “[The Danegeld], imposed 
like the income-tax originally as a war measure, was continued, like the 
income-tax, as an ordinary financial expedient.” This, it will be found, is 
not true of the French Danegeld considered as a tax levied by the state. 
On the disappearance of the English Danegeld “as a distinct item of account 
in the Pipe Rolls,” see Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, I, 500, 623. 
Round has shown (Feudal England, p. 500) that “the last occasion on which 
Danegeld eo nomine was levied was in 1162.” However, there can be no 
doubt that the old tax was continued under a new name (Stubbs, op. cit., 548, 
623-24; Maitland, Constitutional History of England, 67-68; Neilson, Custo¬ 
mary Rents, in Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, ed. by P. Vino- 
gradoff, II, no. IV, p. 119). 

9 On the whole subject of the Frisian Danegeld, see infra, appendix iii. 

10 It is true that in 864 the Vikings received not only Danegeld, but also 
large quantities of food supplies. See infra, appendix iv. 

11 See ibid. 




INTRODUCTION 


17 


Though it is uncertain whether the Vikings ever secured a gen¬ 
eral tribute in Brittany, there are some instances of the payment 
by the Bretons of local Danegeld. 12 

In the West Frankish kingdom Danegeld was paid oftener, and 
for a longer period of time, than anywhere else on the Continent. 
The first exaction took place in 845, and the last recorded tax for 
the Danegeld was levied in 926. Between those dates there were 
twelve, or possibly thirteen, payments. 

Ordinarily the West Frankish Danegeld was tributary. In 
that form it was paid more often than even the English tribute. 
If we may trust the records, tributary Danegeld was paid in 
England not more than nine times; 13 in France it was paid ten 
or possibly eleven times. From 1012 to 1051, as we have seen, 
the English Danegeld was stipendiary rather than tributary. It 
was then paid, not as the purchase price of peace, but as a com¬ 
pensation to the Danes whose fleet had entered the English serv¬ 
ice. The West Frankish monarchs never permanently engaged 
the Vikings as mercenaries. In 860—61, however, Charles the 
Bald temporarily employed one group of Vikings to expel an¬ 
other; and in 862 Robert the Strong, the vice-regent in Neustria, 
engaged a Viking army to aid him against the Bretons. The 
Danegelds paid on those occasions may perhaps be regarded as 
stipendiary in nature. But they are the only examples we have 
of this type of Danegeld in France. 

The amounts of the Danegeld were in England much higher 
than in France. Even when exacted in the form of tribute, the 
English Danegeld ranged from 10,000 to 48,000 pounds; 14 and 
as a stipend it sometimes exceeded 80,000 pounds. 15 The highest 
Danegeld in France, that of 884, did not amount to more than 
12,000 pounds. It should be noted, however, that we have no 

12 See infra, appendix v. 

13 In 865 (?), 872, 876, 991, 994, 1002, 1007, 1009, and 1011-12. For dis¬ 
cussion and bibliography on these payments, see Plummer, Notes, pp. 84, 89, 
90, 173-75, 178, 181, 185, 189; see also the discussion of Freeman in the 
places cited infra, n. 27. Cf. Hodgkin (Hist, of England from the Earliest 
Times to the Norman Conquest, pp. 381-82), who fails to note the payments 
before 991 and inaccurately classifies the Danegeld of 1014 as a tribute. 

14 See the references in the preceding note. A local Danegeld of 3,000 
pounds was paid in East Kent in the year 1009. 

15 For example in 1018, when Cnut the Great collected a total sum of 
83,000 pounds. See Maitland, Domesday Book and Beyond, p. 3; Round, 
“Danegeld and the Finance of Domesday,” loc. cit., p. 80; Plummer, Notes, 
pp. 201-2. 

Dane geld. 2. 



18 


INTRODUCTION 


figures for any English Danegeld prior to that of 991, which, 
according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, amounted to only 
10,000 pounds. 16 Perhaps, therefore, the earlier English pay¬ 
ments — roughly contemporary with the Frankish — were not 
so large as those of the later tenth or early eleventh century. 17 
The high sums of the later period point unmistakably to a larger 
supply of money, and of silver, the purchasing power of which 
must in the meantime have decreased somewhat. 18 

As regards the methods by which the tributary Danegeld was 
raised in England, little is known save that usually a tax was 
levied for the purpose. 19 It may be presumed, however, that the 
methods employed to raise the Danegeld when it was a stipend 
and when, still later, it had become one of the regular revenues 
of the state, represent a development of earlier practices. 20 A 
comparison of these later English methods with what is known 
of the Frankish methods reveals the fact that they were, if not 
identical in every detail, at least very similar in their essential 
features. 

Though it is true that on certain occasions the West Frankish 
Danegeld had to be made up in part by drafts on the treasures 
of the church, ordinarily it was, like the English Danegeld, 
raised by taxation. Just as the ordinary tax unit in England 
was the hide, 21 so that on the Continent was the mansus. In 
both countries the nobles or great landholders appear to have 
been held responsible for the taxes levied on the tenures of their 
dependents as well as for those laid on the demesne lands. Also 
it is probable that, in England as well as in France, the peasantry 
were forced to contribute not only what was due from their 

16 It may have been higher; cf. Plummer’s Notes, p. 175. 

17 It is interesting to note that the money left by Edred for the purposes 
of the Danegeld (supra, n. 7) did not amount to more than 1,600 pounds. 
Perhaps this was not intended to be more than part of a Danegeld. Charles 
the Pat, however, was able to buy off the Vikings who were besieging Paris 
in 886 for only 700 pounds; it is true that he also had to permit them to 
accumulate plunder in Burgundy during the following winter. See infra, 
chap. ix. 

18 The contrary view of Hodgkin (op. cit., p. 382) is based on what in my 
opinion is a false assumption; namely, that all or most of the money paid 
as tribute left England. Doubtless a very considerable part of it was used 
up by the Vikings in trade while they remained in England (cf. infra, chap, 
xviii and nn. 38-41). 

19 See Freeman, op. cit., I, 289 and n. 1; Maitland, op. cit., 391. 

20 Cf. Plummer, Notes, p. 174; Maitland, op. cit., p. 4. 

21 Stubbs, op. cit., I, 622; Round, op. cit., 82 ff.; Maitland, op. cit., 5, 120 
ff., 357 ff. 



INTRODUCTION 


19 


own holdings, but also that which was due from the demesnes, 
and which in justice ought to have been contributed by the lords 
out of their own resources. Moreover, the lords in both lands 
seem to have collected from their peasants a total amount which 
was far in excess of the sum for which they (the lords) were 
held responsible by the king, or the state. 22 In other words, the 
money collected from time to time as Danegeld was probably 
never at any time paid over in full either to the officers of the 
crown or to the Danes. Very probably a considerable portion 
of it remained with the lords and their officials. In many cases 
the exaction doubtless came to be regarded, partly as a tax for 
the benefit of the state, but partly also as a source of seigneurial 
revenue. 23 

The English Danegeld, according to the Domesday Survey, was 
exclusively a land tax. 24 The West Frankish Danegeld, on the 
other hand, was levied not only on holdings of land and the 
seigneurial income from land, but also on the personal property 
of merchants and priests and even, it would seem, on the incomes 
of priests. Moreover, it was on one occasion exacted from ordi¬ 
nary freemen in the form of heerbann. This latter provision 
leads me to belive that the legal basis of the Danegeld in France 
was the king’s right to demand military service, and that in 
theory the West Frankish Danegeld was levied, not as a tax, but 
as a substitute for military service. Whether this holds true of 
the English Danegeld has been nowhere definitely stated, though 
certain indications to that effect are not wanting. 25 

In France the policy of paying Danegeld appears to have been 
on most occasions the policy of the magnates, seldom that of the 
king. Ordinarily the king was forced to resort to the Danegeld 
by reason of the attitude of his magnates. They seem to have 
preferred paying tribute to offering armed resistance. Probably 
the chief reasons for this were the following: (1) the military 
superiority of the Vikings; (2) the desire of the magnates to 

22 On the English methods of assessment and collection, see Maitland, op. 
dt., 24-25, 54-55, 121 ft. 325-26, and passim. 

23 Cf. ibid., p. 121. 

24 See supra, n. 21. 

25 Cf. the following statement of Round (op. cit., p. 121): “I would even 
throw out the suggestion that . . . just as it was possible to ascertain from 
the number of hides at which a town was assessed, the quota of military- 
service for which it was liable, so it might be possible from its military 
service to infer its assessed hidage.” See also Maitland, op. cit., 160, 161 and 
n. 3. 



20 


INTRODUCTION 


weaken, or at least to prevent the strengthening of, royal power; 
(3) the heavy drain on the resources of the magnates when they 
took the field against the enemy; (4) their want of public spirit; 
and (5) the profits they derived in collecting the Danegeld from 
their dependents. This, of course, does not wholly relieve Charles 
the Bald and his successors of all responsibility in the matter of 
the Danegeld. That the ambition of the French monarchs to 
annex neighboring territories, or to compel distant vassals to 
recognize their suzerainty, sometimes induced them to neglect 
the defense of the realm and to rely on the venality of the 
Vikings, is undeniable. But it must be insisted that this does 
not in more than a few cases explain even in part why it became 
necessary to buy off the invaders. On far the majority of occa¬ 
sions when Danegeld was paid, the attitude of the magnates was 
the determining factor. 

As regards responsibility for the Danegeld, it is obvious that 
a comparison between France and England can be drawn only 
if we limit that comparison, so far as the latter country is con¬ 
cerned, to the tributary Danegeld. Even so, it is perhaps best 
not to attempt too much. Some things are clear, however. 
Neither the English nor the French monarchs were exclusively 
responsible for the policy of buying peace from the Vikings. 
Though Ethelred (II) the Redeless has, inaccurately and very 
unjustly, been declared the inaugurator of the Danegeld in Eng¬ 
land, it is certain that he did not on his own initiative enter into 
negotiations with the Vikings in 991. That was done “by the 
advice of Archbishop Siric . . . and the two aldermen, iEthel- 
weard and iElfric, who besought the king that they might pur¬ 
chase peace for their respective districts. . . . Clearly then the 
lay lords must share with the archbishop the responsibility for 
the treaty.” 26 What holds true for the payment of 991, apparent¬ 
ly also holds true for the remaining tributary Danegelds in 
England. They were paid on the advice and with the consent 
of the magnates assembled in the witan. 27 On one occasion it 
appears that the king was not consulted in the matter at all. 28 

The West Frankish Danegeld was levied by the king — some¬ 
times, but not always, after consultation with the magnates — 
in fact as a direct extraordinary tax, but in theory as a substitute 

26 Plummer, Notes, pp. 173-74. Cf. Freeman, op. cit., I, 277-80. 

27 Ibid., 289, 313 and n. 5, 333, 344-45, 350-55. 

28 In 1012; ibid. 353. 



INTRODUCTION 


21 


for military service. Considered as a tax, and distinguished 
from such customary taxes as the annua dona, censum, tributum, 
etc., it was virtually the only impost of its kind during the Caro- 
lingian period, 29 and may be regarded as in most ways an inno¬ 
vation in Carolingian public finance. Similarly, the English 
Danegeld was perhaps the only true tax of the Anglo-Saxon 
period. It appears to have been levied “by the king with the 
counsel of the witan.” 30 

In England the collection of Danegeld was continued, for vari¬ 
ous reasons, after the Viking invasions had ceased; and a strong 
monarchy was able eventually to transform this tax into a 
regular source of royal revenue. In France Danegeld was not 
levied by the crown after 926. Locally, however, the West 
Frankish Danegeld probably survived in its abuses. Undoubt¬ 
edly the local authorities often raised “Danegeld” on their own 
account, sometimes perhaps to buy off a group of Vikings, who 
otherwise would have subjected their district to plunder and 
devastation, but at other times for purposes of a different nature 
and having no relation whatever to the Vikings. In other words, 
the need of buying immunity from the Northmen very probably 
became one of the various pretexts under which the seigniors 
levied the illegal and unjust exactions that are so often referred 
to in the documents of the later ninth century and thereafter. 
On this basis I have attempted to show in the following pages 
that the Danegeld must have been an important influence in the 
establishment of the seigneurial right to tax the unfree peasants 
at will and in the development of the arbitrary taille; indeed, 
I have even gone so far as to indicate a certain, more or less 
attenuated, relationship between the Danegeld on the one hand 
and some of the earlier feudal aids on the other. 

The contemporary terminology for the Danegeld varies con¬ 
siderably not only as between England and the continent but 
also as between different sources for the same country; and even 
in one and the same document or narrative account there is no 
strict uniformity in terminology. In the West Frankish sources 
the tributary Danegeld is usually referred to as tributum; 31 but 

29 A single exception to this statement is noted infra, chap, xvii and n. 52. 

30 Stubbs, op. cit., I, 118, 148; Maitland, Const. Hist., 58, 92. Cf. Dowell, 
History of Taxation and Taxes in England, I, p. 11. 

31 Infra, chap, i, n. 26; chap, v, n. 65; chap, vi, nn. 17, 19, 47, 97; chap. 




22 


INTRODUCTION 


other names are also applied to it, as census 32 munus 33 pecunia 
pro pace, 3 * pensum 35 The stipendiary Danegeld is called locari- 
um or dona 33 Exactio is the ordinary name for the tax levied 
to raise Danegeld in France; 37 but often it is called con j edits 38 
and sometimes conlatio , 39 Nothing like the word “Danegeld” 
ever occurs in the sources that have to do with the Continent. 

Turning to England, we find the curious phenomenon that the 
term “Danegeld” does not appear in any document or narrative 
account until long after it had lost what may be presumed to 
have been its original meaning: tribute paid to the Danes. In 
the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle the tributary Danegeld is almost 
always called gafol (or gavol) ; 40 and the equivalent in the Latin 
chronicles and documents is usually tributum or stipendium . 41 
The stipendiary Danegeld is given several different appellations 
in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, such as gyld (and strang gyld) , 42 
gafol, 43 heregiold (and here gyld) : 44 all of which are rendered in 
Latin usually as census or tributum, 45 The “accepted” or “tech¬ 
nical” term for the later royal impost is said to have been geld, 
or, in Latin, geldum regis. 46 As far as Freeman 47 knew, “the 
single appearance of the word [Danegeld] in Domesday,” was 
the earliest instance of its use. Plummer, 48 however, has called 
attention to an earlier occurrence of the term in a charter of 

viii, nn. 39, 76, 82; chap, ix, n. 73; appendix i, nn. 2, 3. 

32 Infra, chap, i, n. 45; chap, iii, nn. 36, 39; chap, v, n. 163. 

33 Infra, chap, i, n. 45. For the expression, “Dani munerati,” see chap, 
vi, n. 15; chap, x, n. 16. 

34 Infra, chap, i, n. 45. 

35 Infra, chap, v, n. 136. 

36 Infra, chap, iii, n. 54; cf. appendix iv, n. 1. 

37 Infra, chap, iii, n. 32; chap, vi, n. 114; appendix 1, n. 2. In the tenth 
century we have the phrase, “exactio pecuniae collaticiae”; see chap, xii, n. 
18; chap, xiii, n. 17. 

38 Infra, chap, v, nn. 62, 136; chap, vi, nn. 44, 74. 

39 Infra, chap, v, n. 65; cf. supra, n. 37. In one place the word expensis 
also seems to refer to such taxes or contributions; see infra, chap, i, n. 46. 

40 See ed. Plummer, pp. 127, 128, 133, 138, 142. In Wulfstan’s Homilies 
(ed. Napier, p. 162) it is referred to as “scandlice nydgyld.” Cf. Hodgkin, 
op. cit., 381, n. 1. 

41 See for example Florentius Wigorniensis, CUronicon ex chronicis, Mon. 
Hist. Britannica, I, pp. 580, 581, 583, 585, 587; Plummer, Notes, p. 89; Kem¬ 
ble, Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici, No. 303. 

42 Ed. Plummer, pp. 145, 160, 162. 

43 Ibid., pp. 154, 155. 

44 Ibid., pp. 161, 173. 

45 See for example Henry of Huntingdon, Historic Anglorum, IV, Mon. 
Hist. Brit., I, pp. 757, 758; Florentius Wigorn., Chron., ibid., p. 589. 

46 Round, op. cit., p. 86; Plummer, Notes, p. 219. 

47 Op. cit., II, 615. 

48 Notes, p. 219. 


I 



INTRODUCTION 


28 


Edward the Confessor giving exemption “of daenegelde.” There 
it must have been applied to the stipendiary Danegeld. Even so, 
it will be agreed, our only evidence that “Danegeld” originally 
meant “tribute paid to the Danes,” is the word itself. In the 
sources of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, documentary as 
well as narrative, the word is used sometimes to describe the 
stipends paid the Danes during the first half of the eleventh 
century, but more often to designate the tax levied for the sup¬ 
port of the English government from the time of the Conqueror 
to that of Henry Plantagenet. The fact is that the word “Dane¬ 
geld” does not appear in any of the sources that are contem¬ 
porary with the period in which Danegeld was paid as a tribute. 
In spite of that fact, however, historians have not used the word 
“Danegeld” exclusively for the stipends and the royal tax. They 
have also referred to the tributes as “Danegeld.” The result is 
that the word Danegeld has acquired three meanings: tribute, 
stipend, tax . 49 Whether this is fortunate or unfortunate, it 
would now be useless to quarrel with what has become settled 
usage. Furthermore, this usage serves a very useful purpose; 
it indicates the relationship between one of the regular English 
taxes of the twelfth century and the original tribute to the 
Danes. 

But can the term “Danegeld” properly be applied to the 
Frankish tribute? Obviously, there is nothing about the word 
itself which would preclude its being used to designate tribute 
paid to the Danes elsewhere than in England. On the other 
hand, it might be misleading to apply a different name to the 
tribute in each of the various countries in which it was exacted. 
From what has been said above it is clear that on the Continent 
and in England tributes were paid under similar circumstances, 
and with a similar object in view, to the same race of invaders ; 50 

49 One might go a step farther and say that in the general sense of a tax, 
“Danegeld” may mean an impost for any one of three different purposes: 
(1) to raise tribute; (2) to raise a stipend for mercenaries; and (3) to 
raise revenue for the state. Hogdkin’s view (op. cit., p. 381), that the term 
Danegeld ought to be used only in the sense of the tax, but not as referring 
to the payment of the tribute itself, is probably correct in strict theory, but 
it would be hopeless to attempt to follow it out in practice. 

50 It seems hardly necessary for the purposes of the present discussion to 
enter upon the much debated question as to the relative numbers of Danes, 
Swedes, and Norwegians, respectively, in the Viking armies that operated 
in western Europe during the ninth and tenth centuries. Steenstrup’s view 
(Normannerne , I, 128-63; II, 319-26), that the leading element and by far 
the majority of the Vikings in both France and England were Danes, seems 



24 


INTRODUCTION 


and that these tributes were raised by similar methods. They 
are examples of what may be regarded as practically the same 
thing in different places. Why, then, should they not be desig¬ 
nated by the same name ? 51 I may add that this terminology has 
already been to some extent sanctioned by usage. Freeman used 
it over a generation ago; 52 and it has been followed more than 
once in recent publications. 53 

In this dissertation a distinction has been made between gen¬ 
eral and local Danegeld. By the first is meant the tribute or 
stipend that was raised throughout considerable portions of the 
West Frankish realm by, or with the consent of, the central 
authority — the king. The object aimed at, though not always 
attained, by the payment of general Danegeld was either the 
complete removal from the realm of one or more groups of 
Vikings or, in the tenth century, the cessation of hostilities on 
the part of the Normans. Local Danegeld, as the name implies, 
was paid by the local authorities, to save towns, churches, and 
monasteries from destruction, or to ransom prisoners from 
captivity. 

The treatment in the following pages of the general Danegeld 
is intended to be exhaustive. Each payment has been studied in 
detail with a view to determining (1) the reasons for it, (2) the 
methods by which it was raised, and (3) the effect it may have 
produced. Summaries of the causes that led to the payment of 
Danegeld in France are given, for the reign of Charles the Bald 
in chapter vii, and for the subsequent period in chapter xiv. The 

now to be quite generally accepted even by Norwegian scholars (see e. g. 
Bugge, Viking erne, I, pp. 28-29), though there is still considerable difference 
of opinion as regards the nationality of individual Viking leaders, for ex¬ 
ample Rollo. Also, it is practically settled that none of the various Viking 
expeditions were undertaken exclusively by men of the same nationality; 
that probably in every expedition all three Scandinavian countries were rep¬ 
resented to a greater or lesser extent (ibid.; see also Roos, “The Swedish 
Part in the Viking Expeditions,” English Hist. Review, 1892, VII, 209-23). 
On the other hand, the Frankish and English chroniclers in most cases could 
not, or at least did not, distinguish between Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes. 
To them, all the Scandinavians were Nordmanni or, in England, Dani. Cf. 
Vogel, Die Normannen und das frdnkische Reich, pp. 20-24. 

51 Though Maitland (op. cit., p. 518) refrained from applying the term 
“Danegeld” to the Frankish tax, he suggested that the latter may have been 
the model of the English Danegeld. If that is true, it furnishes an addi¬ 
tional reason for referring to both taxes by the same name. 

52 See for example op. cit., I, p. 176; and “The Early Sieges of Paris,” in 
his Historical Essays, First Series, p. 243. 

53 See Vogel, p. 255; Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth 
Century,” Journal of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, pp. 867, 874. 



INTRODUCTION 25 

information we have on the methods used to raise the tribute, 
and on its institutional character, is brought together in chapter 
xvii. In chapter xviii is presented an estimate of the general 
effect of the Danegeld on the political and economic development 
of France. The two chapters on local Danegeld (xv, xvi) are 
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; and what is 
said in the appendices concerning the Danegeld in Frisia, Lor¬ 
raine, the East Frankish kingdom, and Brittany, is little more 
than a brief statement of the established facts in each case. In 
appendix i, I seek to prove that the Danegeld of 877 was assessed 
at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, 877, and not at Com- 
piegne on May 7 of that year, as heretofore believed; and in 
appendix ii an attempt has been made to establish the relation 
of the two tax documents of the year 877 to the famous Capitu¬ 
lary of Kiersy. 


\ 


PART I. 


The Danegeld During the Reign of Charles the Bald 

( 840 — 877 ). 

CHAPTER I. 


The Danegeld of 845. 

In March, 845, 1 a Viking fleet of 120 ships, 2 under the Danish 
chief Ragnar, 3 entered the Seine and began slowly to ascend that 
river toward Paris. Probably several stops were made on the 
way, and the surrounding districts with their churches, monas¬ 
teries, and villae, were thoroughly plundered and devastated. 4 
Taken completely by surprise, the population of the invaded 
regions utterly abandoned every thought of resistance. 5 Even 
the military leaders, counts and seigniors, did not so much as 

1 Annales Bertiniani, 845, ed. Waitz, p. 32: “mense Martio.” Cf. Miracula 
sancti Germani in Normannorum adventu facta, c. 2, M. G. H., SS., XV, 10. 
Aimoin (Miracula sancti Germani, I, c. 1, AA. SS., May, VI, 787) must be in 
error when he places the expedition in 846. All the other sources agree that 
it was in 845. 

2 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “naves centum viginti.” Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: 
“copiosus exercitus Normannorum . . . cum valido navium apparatu.” 

3 Annales Xantenses, 845, M.G.H., SS., II, 228; Chronicon Fontanellense, 
845, ibid., p. 302; Miracula sancti Richarii, I, c. 11, ibid, XV, 917; Miracula. 
s. Germani, c. 20, ibid,, p. 14. This may have been the famous Ragnar Lod- 
brok of the Norse sagas. See Vogel, Die Xormannen und das frdnkische 
Reich, 105; Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 81, ff. 

4 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 3, p. 10; Mirac. s. Richarii, loc. cit.; Ann. Bert., 
loc. cit. 

5 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Ubi [i. e. at the mouth and along the lower 
course of the Seine] non invento populo ut antiquitus moris erat, qui eis 
bellando resisteret.” This seems to be a reference to the coast guard for¬ 
merly maintained by Charlemagne and to some extent by Louis the Pious, 
but neglected by Charles the Bald, whose attention during the early years 
of his reign was fully occupied by other matters. Aimoin, loc. cit.: “nemine 
sibi resistente.” Cf. Vogel, 54-57, 61, 71, 80-87, 95, 96. On the coast guard, 
see also Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century,” Jour¬ 
nal of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, 860, n. 1. 




CHAPTER I 


27 

attempt to make a stand against the enemy. 6 Seized with un¬ 
reasoning fear, they prepared only for flight. 

The Vikings may have halted long enough in Rouen 7 to become 
convinced of the inability of the Franks effectively to oppose 
them and of their own superiority over the Christians in the 
matter of military tactics and prowess. 8 Thus encouraged, the 
marauders continued and extended their depredations, mean¬ 
while advancing slowly and cautiously in the direction of Paris. 9 
At the news of their approach 10 the population of the city and its 
environs, laymen and ecclesiastics, fled to safety, taking with 
them their treasures and the bodies of their saints. * 11 The king, 
Charles the Bald, was not at hand, and it was felt that there was 
no one who might be depended upon to give protection against 
the invaders. 12 Not until the Northmen had reached a certain 
place known as Karoli-venna (Charlevanne) , 13 did Charles take 

6 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 3, pp. 10-11: “Ibique [i. e. at Rouen] similiter non 
reperto exercitu qui contra eos bella committeret. . . . Omnes enim princi- 
pes bellatorum qui ipsam incolebant terram . . . magis se ad fugiendum 
quam resistendum, nimia perculsi formidine, preparabant.” Vita Faronis, 
c. 122, Bouquet, VII, 357: “nullo resistente.” Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “nullo 
penitus obsistente.” Aimoin, loc. cit.: “regionis Principes ... ad bellan- 
dum pigros timidosque.” Miracula sancti Bertini, Bouquet, VII, 381: “omnis 
pene nobilitas istius terrae praeter paucos quos opum ac fundorum copia et 
castellorum vel munitionum fiducia detinuerat post dominos suos vel quo- 
cumque tutius eis videbatur discedebant.” 

7 Cf. Vogel, 84, 105. A sojourn of at least several days in Rouen is in¬ 
dicated by the author of the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 4, p. 11, and by Aimoin, loc. 
cit.; cf. Chronicon Britannicum, 846, Bouquet, VII, 221. It is not impossible 
that the hagiographical writers in describing this and the immediately pre¬ 
ceding events have confused them with the events of 841. The same may be 
said of the Ghron. Britannicum, the chronology of which is confused. 

8 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Normanni . . . christianum populum ad 
bellandum pigrum atque inertem fore putantes . . . nemine resistente. . . . 
Cumque cernerent quoniam pugnando nullus eis resisteret, etc.” 

9 Ibid.: “Parisyus pedetentim propinquare coeperunt.” 

10 Ibid., c. 5: “Nos vero cum iam certi essemus, missis nostris sepius nun- 
tiantibus, quod nostras devenirent in partes, etc.” 

11 The bodies of St. Denis and other saints interred in the monastery of 
St. Denis were exhumed like the rest, but Charles the Bald, when he came 
up, forbade their translation (ibid., c. 8, p. 12). According to one account 
(ibid., cc. 5, 7, pp. 11, 12), a goodly part of the wealth of the churches and 
monasteries was rescued from the hands of the Vikings. Cf. Mirac. s. Rich - 
arii, loc. cit. 

12 Charles the Bald was sojourning at Compiegne and St. Quentin just 
then (Lot and Halphen, Le regne de Charles le Chauve, 131 and n. 1). Eb- 
roin, the abbot of St. Germain-des-Pres, at this time was absent from his 
monastery, having gone to Aquitaine for the purpose of aiding Charles in 
pacifying that country (Mirac. s. Germani, c. 5, p. 11). The population of 
Paris, especially the ecclesiastics, appears not to have expected help from 
any quarter under those circumstances and, hence, prepared to seek safety 
in flight. 

13 For the location of Karoli-venna, see Vogel, 105; Lot and Halphen, op. 
cit., 134, n. 2. 



28 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


any measures to check their advance, but then, it is alleged, the 
entire military force of his kingdom was summoned to arms. 14 

This resort to what may be termed a levee en masse was not 
altogether successful. A large number of Franks obeyed the 
royal command, but not all. 15 The fact that part of those sum¬ 
moned failed to come, is to be explained, partly by the suddenness 
of the Viking raid, which precluded the bringing up of troops 
from any distance, and partly perhaps by the unwillingness of 
some Franks to fight against the Northmen. 16 The troops col¬ 
lected by Charles seem, however, to have outnumbered the army 
of the Vikings, and their military equipment is said to have been 
better than that of their opponents. 17 Charles himself appears 
to have been fully determined to engage the enemy, and he is 
reported to have declared himself willing to risk his life, if need 
be, in the defense of the church. 18 He divided his army into two 

14 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 12, p. 12: “Contra quos [Normannos] . . . Karolus 
adveniens, iussit, ut omnis exercitus regni sui ad bellandum eductus illuc 
conflueret.” This can hardly be interpreted to mean the military strength of 
the entire western realm; regni sui in this case probably includes only the 
territories directly subject to Charles, i. e. Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy. 
Cf. infra, n. 47; Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 134, n. 2. 

15 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Multus quidem et innumerabilis populus 
venit, sed non totus, ut iusserat, affuit.” See the following note. 

16 Ibid.: “copiosum exercitum sed non omnem ad pugnandum volun- 
tarium, etc.” Aimoin, loc. cit.: “Karolus quia propter subitaneum eorum 
ascensum ex toto non poterat, convocata aliqua sui exercitus parte, etc.” 

17 In the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 2, p. 10, the army of the Vikings is re¬ 
ferred to as “copiosus exercitus Normannorum”; but that group of Vikings 
which attacked the Frankish division on the south bank of the Seine, is 
described (ibid., c. 12, p. 12) as “nudos ac pene inermes atque paucissimos 
homines.” Since the Danish fleet numbered 120 ships, and each vessel 
carried anywhere from forty to seventy men, the army of the Vikings prob¬ 
ably consisted of not less than 4,800, nor more than 8,400, men (cf. Vogel, 
37-39). For the size of the Frankish army, see the two preceding notes. 
The author of the Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit., calls one division of the Frank¬ 
ish army “infinitus exercitus”—a hyperbole, of course. This writer, ibid., 
also refers to the military equipment of the Franks: “Christianus populus 
galeatus et loricatus, scutorum ac lancearum munimine tectus.” The Vita 
Faronis, loc. cit., is somewhat obscure: “Quantum ibi attraxerit hoc regnum 
populum cum rege Karolo suo nequicquam, terra eum vix sustinente, coe- 
lumque sub pelle sua obumbrante, incertum nobis scire miramur numerum.” 
Chronica Albrici, M. G. H., SS., XXIII, 734: “occurreret eis [Nortmannis] 
Karolus rex cum exercitu equitum et peditum.” Thus there were knights 
as well as footsoldiers in the army of Charles. That the Frankish power of 
defense had been very much weakened by the civil wars which culminated 
at Fontenay, and that the Danes knew this and intended to make use of the 
opportunity, is indicated by the Chronicon Sithiense, Bouquet, VII, 267: 
“Nortmanni ... in Franciam veniunt quam sciebant debilitatem per illud 
bellum cruentissimum inter fratres, etc.” Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 134, n. 
2, doubt the possibility of collecting an “innumerable people” in so short 
time, unless indeed this “people” consisted of inexperienced footsoldiers. 

18 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 12, p. 12: “Karolus . . . qui pro defensione s. Dei 
ecclesiae mori paratus erat, etc.” Aimoin, loc. cit.: “[Karolus] erat, uti 



CHAPTER I 


29 


divisions, the larger of which was to remain with him to defend 
the monastery of St. Denis, while the other, and smaller, division 
was ordered to cross the Seine and hold the south bank of the 
river. But all those who had been ordered to go across did not 
obey the command, perhaps by reason of disloyalty to the king. 19 

About this time the Danes terrified the Christians by executing 
a number of captives under their very eyes; and when some of 
the Vikings a few days later leaped out of their ships to engage 
that division of the Frankish army which was stationed on the 
south bank of the river, the Franks fled before them precipitately 
and in utter confusion, without so much as striking a blow. 20 

This poor performance of one of his divisions seems to have 
convinced Charles that the Frankish levies were inferior to the 
Northmen, and that it would be unwise to risk a further engage¬ 
ment. 21 He therefore retreated with what remained of his hastily 
collected army toward the monastery of St. Denis, which he 
determined to defend and protect at all costs. 22 

The Vikings, more confident than ever of their military superi¬ 
ority, hastened on to Paris, before which they anchored on 

• 

adolescens, animo armisque strenuus . . . pugnaturus accessit.” Ann. Bert., 
loc. cit.: “Quibus [Normannis] cum Karolus occurrere moliretur.” Vogel’s 
picture, p. 106, of a monarch on his knees before the altar of St. Denis, trem¬ 
bling with fear, etc., seems out of harmony with the statements just quoted. 
We may also note, in passing, that if Charles made a vow at this time, it was 
at the suggestion of Hincmar the priest, for the latter was not elected arch¬ 
bishop of Rheims until in April. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 135 and n. 
2, 143; Diimmler, Geschichte des ostfranlcischen Reiches, second ed., I, 282. 

19 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “non omnes quibus iussum fuerat abierunt, 
non plenam, ut putamus seu credimus, circa eum fidem servantes.” Since 
Aimoin, loc. cit., indicates that the division on the south bank of the Seine 
was smaller than the other, Diimmler’s statement (op. cit., I, 282), that 
Charles divided his army into two halves, is not quite accurate; at least they 
were not equal halves. Vita Faronis, loc. cit.: “Cumque non tantam auda- 
ciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes fluminis bello ob- 
sedissent, etc.” 

20 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit. According to Aimoin, loc. cit., the attack of 
the Danes preceded the execution of the captives. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. 
cit., 135, n. 4; Vogel, 107. 

21 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Karolus . . . praevalere suos nullatenus posse 
prospiceret.” 

22 Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “Karolus . . . cernens quod gestum erat, 
qui pro defensione s. Dei ecclesiae mori paratus erat, tristis et merens ac 
delicata pectora tundens recessit.” Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.: “Karolus cum 
exercitu . . . non potuerunt prohibere eos, quin Parisius . . . intrarent . . . 
et Karolus apud monasterium s. Dionysii resedit.” Aimoin says, I, c. 1, 
p. 788, that when the people were slipping away from him, Charles decided 
to defend St. Denis because he had been specially commended by his father 
to this saint. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 135, n. 3, 136, n. 1. 



30 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


Saturday, March 28, 845. 23 The next morning, which happened 
to be Easter, they entered and occupied the now deserted city 
together with the neighboring monastery of St. Germain-des- 
Pres on the south bank of the Seine. 24 

Having reached their goal, 25 the Danes soon gave evidence of 
a willingness to come to terms with the Franks. They dispatched 
envoys to Charles the Bald at St. Denis, offering to quit Paris 
and the kingdom of Charles in return for the payment of 
tribute. 26 

The reasons for this policy on the part of the Danes are not 
far to seek. Their object at this time was to secure plunder 

23 Mi?'ac. s. Germani, c. 14, p. 13: “[Normanni] cursu prepropero sabbato 
sancto paschalis solemnitatis Parisyus venerunt.” Chron. Fontanellense, loc. 
cit.: “Ragneri . . . cum classe sua . . . usque Parisiis accessit, ac in vigilia 
s. paschae, i. e. 5. Kalend. Aprilis, eandem urbem intravit.” Ann. Bert., loc. 
cit.: “Loticiam Parisiorum, nullo penitus obsistente, pervadunt.” Cf. in- 
nales Fuldenses, 845, ed. Kurze, p. 35; Chronicon Sigeberti, Bouquet, VII, 
249. 

24 Just how long the Vikings remained in Paris cannot be accurately 
determined; according to the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 20, p. 14, it was only a 
short time—“paucis diebus.” The various miraculous events which they are 
said to have experienced during their sojourn in the monastery of St. Ger- 
main-des-Pres, and elsewhere, need not be described or discussed here. They 
are related in full by the author of the Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit., pp. 13-16. 

25 Cf. Lot and Halphen, op cit., 133, 134, n. 1. 

26 Mirac. s. Germani, c. 20, p. 14: “[Normanni] legationis causa missos 

suos ad regem . . . dirigunt Karolum, ut eos cum pace et absque inter- 
necione sui ad propriam unde venerant redire permitteret patriam.” Aimoin, 
1, c. 10, p. 789: “Interea simulato languore, [Normanni] legationis causa 

dirigunt ad . . . Karolum, ut eos cum pace fideles suscipiens, ad propriam 

dato Regni tributo redire permitteret patriam.” Vogel, 110, n. 3, claims 

that in the passages just quoted the hagiographical writers wilfully mis¬ 

represented the true course of events in the interests of their patron saint, 
to whose intervention they wished to ascribe the deliverance of the realm 
from further devastation. He insists that “nicht von den Normannen, son- 
dern von Karl ging das Anerbieten zu Verhandlungen aus,” and bases his 
opinion on the statements in the Annales Bertiniani, the Annales Xantenses, 
the Vita s. Faronis, and the Chronica Albrici. I shall quote here the perti¬ 
nent passages in these sources in the order indicated. “Karolus . . . 
praevalere suos nullatenus posse prospiceret, quibusdam pactionibus et 
munere septem milium librarum eis exhibito, a progrediendo compescuit ac 
redire persuasit.”—“Alia pars eorum Normannorum Galliam petierunt, 
ibique ceciderunt ex eis plus quam sexcenti viri. Sed tamen propter desi- 
diam Karoli dedit eis multa milia ponderum auri et argenti ut irent extra 
Galliam; quod et fecerunt.”—“Cumque non tantam audaciam in pectore con- 
cepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes fluminis bello obsedissent, consilium 
inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo 
copiosissimo terrae.”—“dederunt rex Karolus et populus Normannis pecu- 
niam multam, et reversi sunt in terram suam.”—So far as I can see, the 
last three of these statements throw no light whatever on the question as to 
who first suggested the payment of tribute. The words “a progrediendo 
compescuit ac redire persuasit,” in the Annales Bertiniani, at first sight do 
give the impression that Charles the Bald took the initiative. But it must 




CHAPTER I 


31 


rather than to conquer territory. 27 But in point of fact Paris 
had not proved as fruitful a field of plunder as the Vikings had 
anticipated. The inhabitants of the city and its environs, par¬ 
ticularly the ecclesiastics, had been forewarned of the impending 
danger, and had been able to remove to places of safety at least 
a very large part of their money and valuables before the arrival 
of the Northmen. 28 It is clear, that the latter were not satisfied 
with the amount of booty thus far secured, and that they were 
determined to have more if that were possible. 29 To attempt 
plundering operations in the vicinity of Paris was not advisable, 
owing to the presence of the king’s army at the monastery of 

be remembered that they are a very compressed form of statement, and as 
such they really do not contradict the much more detailed accounts of the 
hagiographical writers. It is certainly true that Charles by accepting the 
terms of the Northmen did restrain the latter from advancing and did per¬ 
suade them to return, even if the Northmen had taken the first step on the 
path of negotiation. As will be pointed out in the text, it is not probable 
that the Vikings really intended to make any further advance; but, of course, 
they did not reveal their actual plans to the Franks. They simply ex¬ 
ploited the existing situation to the full. Vogel is doubtless right when he 
says that the hagiographical accounts were written for the express purpose 
of glorifying the miraculous powers of St. Germain. But it does not neces¬ 
sarily follow that the writers of those accounts have given a totally false 
presentation of the course of events. They may have mistaken or falsified 
the motives of the Northmen—and this may explain why the first author of 
the Miracula failed to mention the tribute—while giving a substantially 
correct and truthful account of their acts. It probably was more or less of 
a mystery to the Franks, why the Vikings had not continued farther up the 
Seine, why they had changed their plans so soon and offered to retire in 
return for the payment of tribute. Cf. Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.: “quati- 
nus a finibus christianorum tarn cito discedere vellent [Normanni].” The 
hagiographical writer himself admits that he was not aware of what he 
regards as the real reason for the changed policy of the Vikings (the pesti¬ 
lence, etc., sent by St. Germain) until it was revealed to him more than four 
years after the event by Count Cobbo. Only with the aid of Cobbo’s story 
was he able to clear up the mystery as to the motives of the Vikings and to 
exalt the powers of his patron saint. There is, then, in the opinion of the 
present writer, no sufficient reason for rejecting the hagiographical account 
of the course of events, the details of which are, not contradicted, but passed 
over in silence by all the other sources. Cf. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 138, 
whose view is similar to that of Vogel. The latter’s faith in the accuracy 
of the Annates Bertiniani, by the way, is not unswerving; see infra, chap, ii, 
n. 11. 

27 It was not until after the middle of the ninth century that the Vik¬ 
ings began to establish themselves in fortified camps, where they sojourned 
at first only during the summer, but later throughout the winter also. Cf. 
Vogel, 38, 39, 127, 260, 261. The fact that the Vikings on this occasion were 
willing to depart on the payment of tribute proves, of course, that they had 
no territorial ambitions as yet; or, in any case, that their principal object 
was the acquisition of money and treasure. After the Vikings under Oscar 
had sacked Rouen, in 841, and had secured the desired amount of booty, they 
put to sea in order to avoid an encounter with the Frankish levies moving 
against them. Cf. Vogel, 83-85. 

28 See supra, n. 11. 

29 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “a progrediendo compescuit.” 



32 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

St. Denis. 30 They might, indeed, have ascended to some other 
point on the Seine and continued operations from there; but at 
best this would have been a perilous adventure with an unde¬ 
feated Frankish army left in the rear. 31 Neither of these courses 
would be necessary, if instead the Franks could be induced to 
pay tribute. Accordingly, the Vikings chose what they must 
have regarded as the wiser policy. 

It is not unlikely that the demand for tribute had been accom¬ 
panied by a threat to proceed farther inland in case of refusal. 32 
What the Vikings would have done if their demand had been 
refused, remains problematical. It is improbable that they had 
any serious intention of carrying out their threat, for that would 
have permitted the Franks in the meantime to bring up reen¬ 
forcements and to take various measures to cut off the retreat 
of the Vikings. 33 However that may be, it is certain that the 
threat of Ragnar and his associates was effective, and that their 
offer was accepted by the Franks. 

These considerations seem a sufficient explanation of the policy 
adopted by the Northmen, even though they are not mentioned 
as such by the contemporary writers. According to the hagio- 
graphical account, a mortal disease, to which the Vikings fell 
prey while they were sojourning in Paris, and which seriously 
depleted their ranks, was the real reason why they entered into 

30 See supra, n. 22. When plundering operations were to be undertaken, 
the Vikings would scatter in all directions and leave only a small guard at 
their ships (Vogel, 38, 39). This, of course, could not be done with a hos¬ 
tile army in the vicinity, which, while the Vikings were absent from their 
ships, might have seized or destroyed the latter, thereby cutting off the pos¬ 
sibility of retreat. 

31 Vogel admits, p. 105, that even the ascent to Karoli-venna was a daring 
exploit fraught with many dangers. Yet up to that time there had been no 
resistance whatever. 

32 Cf. supra, n. 29. 

33 In my opinion, no small part of the success of the Vikings on this 
occasion must be ascribed to their capacity for bluffing the Franks, who 
doubtless believed that the freebooters would have ascended farther up the 
Seine to plunder and devastate, if their offer had been refused. It would 
have been practically impossible for the Franks to prevent them from so 
doing. The real strength of the Vikings lay in their superior mobility. 
In their ships they could easily outdistance their pursuers, especially if, 
as has been asserted, the majority of the latter were footsoldiers (Lot and 
Halphen, op. cit., 134, n. 2). It is true, as pointed out above in the text, 
that the Franks might have opposed the Vikings on their return—they 
might conceivably have been able to cut off their retreat—but in the mean¬ 
time other places would have been plundered or destroyed. The latter con¬ 
sideration must have been one of the chief reasons why the Franks accepted 
the offer of the Vikings; it was better to pay tribute than to expose the 
country to the possibility of further devastation. 



CHAPTER I 


33 


negotiations with Charles the Bald. 34 If there is any element of 
truth in this story, all that can be said of it is that it gives a 
supplemental reason for the offer of the Northmen. There can 
be little doubt that the Vikings would have acted as they did, 
even if their ranks had not been thinned by the ravages of a 
disease. 35 

Charles the Bald, though at first unwilling, was finally induced 
by certain of his magnates to accept the offer of the Northmen. 
The magnates in question are accused of having accepted bribes, 
which may or may not be true. 36 In any case, the magnates 
probably were not anxious to engage in battle with the Vikings 
after what they had already seen of the outcome of such war¬ 
fare. 37 It is generally admitted that the West Frankish nobles 
and seigniors of this period were narrow, selfish, and unpatri¬ 
otic. 38 To them, the payment of tribute must have seemed the 
most convenient method of securing the removal of the Vikings. 
The magnates well knew that if the king, in order to raise the 
tribute, should find it necessary to resort to taxation, it would 
be easy for them to evade the impost by shifting its burden on 
the peasantry. 39 

34 Mirac. s. Germani, cc. 19, 20, p. 14. 

35 These words of Aimoin, I, c. 10, p. 789, help to explain the “contradic¬ 
tion” referred to by Vogel (p. 110, n. 3): “Interea simulato languore, lega¬ 
tions causa dirigunt ad . . . Karolum, etc.” The Vikings were past masters 
in the art of deception. Cf. Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 22-28, 366-67; 
Vogel, 175-77. 

36 Aimoin, loc. cit.: “Rege quidem nolente, Principibus tamen quibusdam 
(ut fatebatur) muneribus laesis, etc.” Vita Faronis, loc. cit.: “Cumque non 
tantam audaciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes flumi- 
nis hello obsedissent, consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per 
omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo copiosissimo terrae.” Vogel, 110, n. 3, 
seems to believe that it was Charles, and Charles only, who wished to pay 
tribute, and that the magnates exercised no influence on him at all in this 
matter. He asserts, but of course cannot prove, that the story of the brib¬ 
ing of the magnates was invented by Aimoin solely for the purpose of white¬ 
washing Charles. The author of the Vita Faronis, however, does not agree 
with Vogel. A few lines before the passage quoted above, he says: “terra 
eum LKarolum] vix sustinente”; and, according to the same writer, it was 
the Franci —which certainly does not mean only the king—who chose the 
disastrous policy of paying tribute. Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 138, n. 3, 
accept with some modifications the statement of Aimoin. 

37 See supra, nn. 6 and 16. Ragnar is reported to have described the 
Franks to King Horich of Denmark in the following manner (Mirac. s. Ger¬ 
mani, c. 30, p. 16): “populum . . . plus omnibus aliis ad dimicandum tre- 
mentem ac pavidum.” 

38 Cf. Diimmler, I, 213-15, 221-23; Vogel, 82-83, 90-91, 95-97; supra, nn. 
6, 8, 19. 

39 According to See (Les classes rurales et le regime domanial en France 
au moyen age, 92, 116) and Flach (Les origines de Vancienne France, I, 
341-43), the burden of taxation in this period always fell ultimately on the 
lower classes of the population, i. e. poor freemen, coloni, and serfs. 

Dan eg eld. 3. 



34 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

As for Charles the Bald, he probably came to realize that the 
army which had been collected, nobles and freemen alike, was 
not to be depended upon and that, in any case, it was not large 
enough to inflict a decisive defeat on the Danes. 40 And even if 
it had been possible, there would have been no time to collect and 
bring up more troops; for in the meantime the Vikings might 
have proceeded to plunder and devastate other places farther up 
the Seine and its tributaries. 41 On the whole, therefore, it was 
safer and more prudent to agree to the payment of tribute than 
to expose the country to further devastation or to build any 
hopes on the very doubtful issue of an engagement with the 
doughty Vikings. 42 

A preliminary understanding having been reached and the 
tribute agreed upon in principle, Ragnar and the other Viking 
chiefs were conducted to the headquarters of Charles the Bald 
in the monastery of St. Denis, 43 where a formal and definitive 
treaty was concluded. 

According to the terms of this treaty, the Northmen agreed 
to evacuate the kingdom of Charles and never to enter it again, 
unless perchance as friends and allies; 44 in return for which 
Charles agreed (1) to allow the Vikings to depart in peace, i. e. 
without molesting them in any way on the return journey, and 
(2) to pay them as tribute the sum of 7,000 pounds in silver 

40 Vogel’s statement, p. 110, “Konig Karls Heer hatte sich inzwischen 
noch bedeutend verstarkt” is purely gratuitous and contrary to the facts as 
indicated by the sources. Aimoin, I, c. 1, p. 788, claims that the people were 
slipping away from Charles: “populo ... a se labente.” That part of 
Charles’s army which was to have defended the south bank of the Seine had 
been routed and scattered, and it is very unlikely that this loss had been 
compensated for by the arrival of reenforcements. There is certainly noth¬ 
ing which proves their arrival. Just how large the Viking army was cannot 
be accurately determined, but it probably numbered not less than 4,800 men 
(cf. supra, n. 17). The statement in the Annales Xantenses, loc cit., that 
more than 600 Vikings fell at this time, is not corroborated by any other 
source, and, like several other statements in these annals, is at least inac¬ 
curate. The writer’s information on the events in the West Frankish king¬ 
dom was probably scant and of the hearsay variety. This also explains why 
he attributes the payment of the tribute to Charles’s “sloth.” 

41 That Charles did not have sufficient time to collect an army equal to 
the occasion, is asserted by Aimoin; see supra, n. 16. 

42 According to the Annales Bertiniani, Charles perceived that his men 
would not be able to prevail over the Northmen; see supra, n. 26. 

43 Miracula s. Germani, c. 20, pp. 14-15; Aimoin, I, c. 10, p. 789. 

44 Aimoin, loc. cit.: “nequaquam ulterius vel fines sui regni, nisi fortasse 
auxiliatores, intrarent aut contingerent.” Cf. the similar statement in the 
Mirac. s. Germani, c. 20, p. 14. Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Karolus [Normannos] 

. . . a progrediendo compescuit ac redire persuasit.” Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit.: 
“ut irent [Normanni] extra Galliam.” 



CHAPTER I 


35 


(and gold?). 45 Nothing being stipulated as regards the booty 
already in the possession of the Vikings, it follows that they 
were permitted to keep that. 

The evidence as to how this first Danegeld in the West 
Frankish kingdom was raised is very incomplete. There are, 
however, strong indications that it was obtained by means of a 
general tax 46 levied especially in Francia, which was the invaded 
region, and probably also in Neustria and Burgundy. 47 The mag¬ 
nates, or perhaps the missi, appear to have collected sums of 

% 

45 Aimoin, loc. cit.: “ut Karolus eos [Normannos] cum pace fideles sus- 
cipiens, ad propriam dato Regni tributo redire permitteret patriam.” Mirac. 
s. Germani, loc. cit.: “si [Karolus] eos [Normannos] inlesos abire permit¬ 
teret, etc.” The Miracula does not mention the tribute. Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: 
“quibusdam pactionibus, et munere septem milium librarum eis [Norman- 
nis] exhibito.” Ann. Fulclenses, loc. cit.: “[Normanni] tarn ab ipso [Karolo] 
quam incolis terrae accepta pecunia copiosa cum pace discesserunt.” Cf. 
Annales Mettenses, 845, Duchesne, H. F. 8., Ill, 302. Ann. Xantenses, loc. 
cit.: “[Karolus] dedit eis [Nortmannis] multa milia ponderum auri et ar- 
genti.” Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.: “pecuniam multam.” Paschasius Radber- 
tus, Lamentationes Ieremiae, Migne, Patr. Lat. CXX, col. 1220: “censum 
plurimum.” Chronicon Hermanni contracti, Bouquet, VII, 233: “accepta 
magna pro pace pecunia.” Cf. infra, n. 55. 

46 Cf. Vogel, 111; Wenck, Das frdnkische Reich nach dem Vertrage von 
Verdun, 124, n. 2. That the Danegeld was raised by means of a general tax 
seems likely for the following reasons: (1) the Vikings appear not to have 
left the Seine until late in June or early in July (see infra, n. 53); (2) the 
Annales Fuldenses and the Annales Mettenses say, “tarn ab ipso [Karolb] 
quam incolis terrae accepta pecunia copiosa,” while the Chronica Albrici 
has, “dederunt rex et populus Normannis pecuniam multam”—which indi¬ 
cates that the Danegeld was contributed at least in part by the people; (3) 
Loup of Ferrieres, in a letter to Hincmar of Rlieims written shortly after 
the levy of the Danegeld, speaks of “his expensis quae maiores nostri con- 
gregaverunt” (see infra, n. 48); (4) after his return to Denmark, Ragnar is 
said to have boasted that he had laid the entire kingdom of Charles under 
tribute (see infra, n. 55); (5) Paschasius Radbertus (see the preceding 
note) speaks of “ censum plurimum.” 

47 At least that would seem to follow, if the entire kingdom of Charles 
was subjected to tribute (cf. the alleged boast of Ragnar referred to in the 
preceding note). Aquitaine and Brittany of course escaped the Danegeld 
altogether, for Charles the Bald had not been able effectively to assert his 
authority in either of those countries (see Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 72 ff., 
84 ff., 112 ff., 126, 130, 149 ff.; and cf. Dummler, I, 244 ff., 248). In fact he 
was forced to recognize the independence of Pippin the Younger in Aqui¬ 
taine in June or July, 845 (Lot and Halphen, 149 ff.; Dummler, I, 288 ff.) 
and that of Nominoe in Brittany in the summer of 846 (Lot and Halphen, 
166-67; Dummler, I, 297 f.). The rebel Lambert, who had allied himself 
with Nominoe, might well have prevented the collection of any royal tax in 
the counties (pagi) of Anjou, Maine, and Nantes (Lot and Halphen, 75 ff., 
117 ff.; Dummler, I, 244, 247, 289). In Septimania (Gothia) and the Spanish 
March the authority of Charles the Bald had been at least in part restored 
during the spring of 844 (Lot and Halphen, 97 ff., 120, n. 1; Dummler, I, 
246); but owing to their remoteness from the invaded portion of the realm 
and also to the inadvisability of immediately burdening them with taxes, it 
seems very doubtful that any Danegeld was collected there. We may assume 
that Francia had to furnish the major portion of the tribute, since it was 



36 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


money from the great landholders, 48 who probably obtained these 
sums by levying extraordinary taxes on the peasants and others 
subjected to their authority. 49 Did the king demand from each 
landholder a specific sum proportionate to the number and value 
of his holdings? Such at least was the plan according to which 
many later Danegelds were raised, 50 and, lacking evidence, we 
may conjecture that a similar plan was used on this occasion. 
We know that merchants and priests were taxed for some of the 
later Danegelds, 51 and that at certain times even the treasuries 
of the churches had to be emptied in order to raise the sums 
demanded. 52 Were any such measures necessary in 845? That, 
too, must be left to conjecture. 

To determine accurately the length of time required to raise 
this tribute is out of the question. Since in all probability the 
Danegeld was not paid before June — it may have been paid 
much later — we may assume that two months or more elapsed 
before the entire yield of the tax was in the hands of the royal 
officials. 53 

the invaded district; and it is probable that the neighboring parts of Neus- 
tria and Burgundy also were taxed, for the royal authority was maintained 
in those regions by the itinerant missi. (Note the following in a document 
of Charles the Bald for the year 845: “missis nostris per universum im- 
perium nostrum discurrentibus.”—Bouquet, VIII, 482. Loup of Ferrieres 
tells us that he was a missus in Burgundy in the year 844. Cf. Levillain, 
“Btud.e sur les lettres de Loup de Ferrieres,” Bibl. de V6cole des chartes, 
LXIII, 75-78, 116-17; Thompson, Beeline of the Missi Dominici in Frankish 
Gaul, 8-9). Eastern Neustria certainly contributed, as is evident from the 
testimony of Loup, who was abbot of the monastery of Ferrieres in the 
extreme eastern part of Neustria (see the following note). 

48 Loup of Ferrieres, Epistolae, XLII, ed. Desdevises du Dezert, p. 116: 
“hoc turbulente Reipublicae tempore, his expensis quae maiores nostri con- 
gregaverunt.” This seems to be a reference to the Danegeld. Desdevises du 
Dezert dates this letter for the beginning of the year 846, but Levillain, op. 
cit., p. 88, has demonstrated that it was written late in August, or in Sep¬ 
tember, 845. 

49 This method of raising taxes and other contributions was very com¬ 
mon at the time (see supra, n. 39); and there can be little doubt that the 
Danegeld, too, was obtained in this way. Cf. infra, pp. 81 ff. 

50 See infra, chap. xvii. 

51 See ibid. 

52 See il)id. 

53 In the Ann. Bertiniani, 845, pp. 32, 33, the departure of the Vikings 
from the Seine is not mentioned directly after the negotiation of the treaty 
providing for the payment of tribute. Between the description of these two 
events Prudentius refers among other things to the treaty by which Charles 
the Bald recognized Pippin the Younger as the almost independent ruler of 
Aquitaine. Accordingly we may believe—for there is no reason to suppose 
that Prudentius here departed from his habit of rough adherence to chrono¬ 
logical sequence—that the Vikings did not quit the Seine until after Charles 
had concluded the treaty with Pippin, which event took place late in June 
or early in July (Lot and Halphen, op. cit., 149 and n. 3; cf. Diimmler, I, 




CHAPTER I 


37 


Having received the tribute money, the Vikings in truth sailed 
out of the Seine, but they could not resist the temptation to 
plunder and devastate a number of places on the seacoast. 54 After 
various adventures and experiences they eventually returned to 
Denmark with their booty. The hagiopraphical account repre¬ 
sents Ragnar proceeding to King Horich, to show him the vast 
amount of gold and silver he had brought with him, and to boast 
not only that he had captured the wealthy city of Paris but also 
that he had subjected the entire kingdom of Charles to tribute. 55 

What happened to Ragnar and his associates later, is largely 
a matter of speculation and need not detain us long. It may be 
true that this particular group of Vikings fell prey to a mortal 
disease of some kind, which prevented any of them from ever 
enjoying the fruits of their expedition. 56 But what of that? The 
success of their bold enterprise probably interested their country- 

289). Even after allowance has been made for a possible interval of several 
weeks between the payment of the Danegeld and the final departure of the 
Vikings, the date of the payment can hardly be placed prior to the begin¬ 
ning of June. That the total proceeds of a tax levied in March (cf. supra, 
nn. 23, 24) could have become available before June, i. e. in less than two 
months, does not seem probable (cf. Lot and Halphen, 139, n. 1). 

54 Whether these operations really constituted a violation of the treaty 
just concluded, cannot be determined, for we do not know the exact location 
of the devastated region. If it was outside the West Frankish realm, the 
Northmen were of course not guilty of any breach of faith. Ann. Bert., 845, 
p. 33. Cf. Vogel, 111 and n. 3; Levillain, op. cit., pp. 90 ft.; Lot and Halphen, 
op. cit., 139, n. 1. 

55 Aimoin, I, c. 12, p. 789: “Ragenarius Dux, . . . ante profanum Horich 
Nortmannorum Principem cum ingenti superbia veniens, ostendit ei quod 
secum hinc asportaverat aurum argentumque multum: dixitque quod opina- 
tissimam Parisius civitatem captam haberet; . . . insuper et quod omne 
Karoli Regnum sibi ratione tributi subjugatum haberet.” The Mirac. s. 
Germani agree substantially with Aimoin, except that they do not mention 
the tribute. The Ann. Bertiniani, Toe. cit., tell of a misfortune which befell 
the Vikings on their return journey and of its influence on King Horich of 
Denmark; cf. Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit. Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.: “[Nor- 
manni] reversi sunt in terrain suam.” 

56 According to the Mirac. s. Germani, c. 31, p. 16, those Vikings who 
finally got back to Denmark either died of disease or were executed by King 
Horich, who thereby hoped to prevent the pestilence from spreading. Four 
Vikings were said to have escaped the king, but it was believed that they 
too died very soon. Cf. Aimoin, loc. cit.; Vogel, 112; Steenstrup, op. cit., I, 
97-104. The Ann. Bertiniani, loc. cit., tell us that King Horich, after he had 
learned of what was regarded as the judgment of God on the followers of 
Ragnar, sent envoys to Louis the German, offering to free all Christian cap¬ 
tives and to restore the stolen treasure so far as possible. His envoys did 
in fact appear at the court of Louis the German in October (Ann. Fuldenses, 
loc. \cit.) and he may have freed the captives (Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit; 
Mirac. s. Germani, c. 30, p. 16; Aimoin, I, c. 13, p. 790), but whether he ever 
returned the treasure is not known. If any treasure actually was returned, 
it very probably was the booty obtained by Horich’s own men in the sack 
of Hamburg this same year, and not that which w T as brought to Denmark 
by Ragnar. Cf. Vogel, 100-2, 114-15. 



38 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

men vastly more than the mystery of their death. For these 
pioneers had made a veritable discovery, 57 a discovery full of 
fascination for the Viking spirit and pregnant with dire con¬ 
sequences for the fortunes of the Franks. 

Charles the Bald’s policy of paying tribute was to prove hardly 
a palliative, much less a cure, for the malady with which the 
West Frankish kingdom had become afflicted. In point of fact, 
this first Danegeld had revealed to the freebooters of the North 
certain very important facts concerning the western realm of 
the Franks: prosperous economic conditions, lack of prepared¬ 
ness against invaders coming by sea, and inability or reluctance 
to fight on the part of the aristocracy — on the whole, a most 
satisfactory state of affairs from the Viking point of view. The 
first Danegeld, therefore, did not deter other Vikings from 
adopting the methods and continuing the operations of Ragnar’s 
men; on the contrary, it encouraged and invited them to emulate 
their example. 58 . 

57 It is true that the Vikings had, before this, been levying tribute in 
Frisia (see infra, Appendix III), but the Frisian payments were of a local 
character and probably were small as compared with those secured in the 
West Frankish kingdom. It was the West Frankish kingdom and England 
that were destined henceforth chiefly to attract the Vikings. 

58 The following in the Vita Faronis, loc. cit., is significant: “Franci . . . 
consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula, 
dato tributo copiosissimo terrae.” Paschasius Radbertus, loc. cit., also ap¬ 
pears to have realized that the Danegeld never would bring security against 
Viking raids. 




THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 89 


CHAPTER II. 


The Danegeld of 853. 

After his first payment of tribute, in 845, Charles the Bald did 
not again resort to the Danegeld until 853. 1 While there can be 
little doubt that Danegeld was actually paid in the latter year, 
it must be admitted that our information concerning the payment 
and the circumstances that made it necessary is very scant. 

On October 9, 852, a large fleet of Danish Vikings, led by the 
two chieftains Sydroc and Godfrey, son of Harold, entered the 
Seine and ascended that river beyond Rouen as far as Augustu- 
dunas. 2 Though an army made up exclusively of West Franks 
had succeeded in expelling another group of Vikings from their 
lodgment on the lower Seine earlier in the same year, 3 Charles 
the Bald did not deem it advisable to move against the undoubt¬ 
edly larger force under Sydroc and Godfrey 4 without some 
auxiliaries. He therefore appealed for aid to his elder brother, 
Lothaire I, with whom he happened to be at this time on a 
friendly footing. 5 

Having mobilized their available fighting strength, 6 the royal 
brothers advanced with their armies toward Jeufosse, to which 
place the Northmen had in the meantime ascended, and where 
they had established themselves for the winter. 7 The Franks 

1 Favre (Eudes, comte de Paris et roi de France, p. 223) inaccurately 
states that the Danes were bought off in 852. The following discussion will 
make clear that the Danegeld was paid in 853. 

2 Ann. Bertiniani, 852, ed. Waitz, p. 42 and note g); Clnron. Fontanel- 

lense 852, SS., II, 304; cf. Ann. Fuldenses, 850, ed. Kurze, pp. 39-40. 

For the location of Augustudunas, see Vogel, 134, n. 3. 

3 Ciiron. Fontanellense, 851, p. 303; Ann. Bert., 851, p. 41. Cf. Vogel, 133. 

4 The Ann. Bert., 852, do not mention Sydroc, but refer, p. 42, to the forces 
collected by Godfrey in Denmark as “manus valida,” and to his fleet as 
“multitudo navium.” The size of the contingent under Oscar, which the 
Franks had expelled in June, 852, is nowhere indicated; but since a West 
Frankish army ventured to engage these Vikings and forced their with¬ 
drawal from the Seine, it is safe to conclude that their number was small 
compared with that of the followers of Godfrey and Sydroc. 

5 Ann. Fuld., 850, p. 40: “Ad quorum [Nordmannorum] expulsionem Hlu- 
tharius in auxilium vocatus.” Ann. Bert., 852, p. 42; Clnron. Fontanellense, 
852, p. 304. Cf. Diimmler, I, 347-49; Vogel, 134. 

6 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “occurrentibus Lothario et Karolo cum omni suo 
exercitu.” 

7 Clnron. Fontanellense, loc. cit.: “Nortmanni aqua freti deputatam sibi 
hiemem exegerunt in loco qui vocatur Ghivoldi fossa.” For the location of 
the latter place (Jeufosse), see Vogel, 135, n. 1. 



40 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

invested both banks of the Seine at this point, 8 but they probably 
did not succeed in completely isolating the Northmen. 9 However 
that may be, it is certain that the siege was continued through 
the winter into the next year (853), and that an attack by storm 
was eventually proposed. But this plan proved incapable of 
execution, because the army of Charles the Bald for some reason 
refused to fight. 10 Charles therefore opened negotiations with 
Godfrey and was able to conciliate him by making certain con¬ 
cessions the nature of which is not entirely clear. * 11 After this 
pact had been made it appears that Godfrey and his men retired 
from Jeufosse. 12 

The treaty with Godfrey did not, however, secure the with¬ 
drawal of Sydroc and the other Danes. Rather it made them 
more troublesome; they now began to pillage, burn, and make 
captives, without restraint. It was not until early in March that 
the Vikings were induced to desist from these operations. 13 The 
inducement appears to have come in the form of an agreement 

8 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “utramque ripam . . . obsident.” Cf. the preceding 
note. 

9 That seems to be implied in the words of the Chron. Fontanellense 
quoted in note 7, supra. Certainly the Vikings could not have remained in 
Jeufosse throughout the winter unless in the meantime they had been able 
to secure provisions. The statement, infra, n. 12, that they pillaged more 
freely after the departure of Godfrey, implies that the Franks had not been 
able wholly to prevent them from pillaging in the preceding period. 

10 Ann. Fulcl., loc. cit.: “Hlutharius . . . cum sibi pugnandum esse cum 
lioste putaret.” Ann. Bert., 853, p. 42: “nolentibus qui ex parte Karoli erant 
inire bellum.” 

11 Ibid.: “Karolus . . . Godefridum quibusdam pactionibus sibi conciliate 
Ann. Fuld.. loc. cit.: “Karolus clam mutato consilio Godafridum cum 
suis in societatem regni suscepit et* terram eis ad inhabitandum dele- 
gavit.” Vogel, p. 135, is inclined to accept the testimony of the Annals of 
Fulda in this case despite the erroneous chronology of those annals; he be¬ 
lieves that Prudentius, by reason of a desire to shield Charles the Bald, did 
not tell the whole truth in the Annals of St. Bertin. This view, it must be 
admitted, is certainly tenable; but Vogel’s distrust of the statements of 
Prudentius in this case, does not harmonize with his great faith in the 
accuracy of what that writer said for the year 845 on a similar subject (see 
supra, chap, i, n. 26). Why should Prudentius have withheld in 853 the 
kind of information which he did not hesitate to divulge in 845? Is it not 
possible that what he says for 853, instead of being intentionally “verbliimt,” 
is simply a concentrated form of expression and in that respect very similar 
to his entry for 845? Vogel thinks also that the Danegeld of this year (853) 
was paid to Godfrey; for a discussion of this question, see infra, n. 24. 

12 That Godfrey and his men left before the other Vikings, is clearly 
implied in the following statement (Ann. Bert., loc. cit.): “Ceteri Danorum 
usque ad mensem Martium inibi absque ulla formidine residentes, cuncta eo 
furiosius quo liberius diripiunt, cremant atque captivant.” 

13 See the preceding note. Since Charles the Bald signed a diploma at 
Kiersy on March 21 (Bouquet, VIII, 522), it seems probable that he had 
come to an agreement with the Danes earlier in the month. 



CHAPTER II 


41 


by Charles the Bald to pay tribute. That monarch had for the 
second time found it necessary to resort to the Danegeld because 
his men were not willing to risk a determined onslaught against 
the Vikings. 14 

This reluctance to fight on the part of the West Franks, seems 
very strange, especially when contrasted with the apparent 
willingness of Lothaire’s men to engage the enemy. 15 Were the 
West Franks lacking in courage? It is difficult to convince one¬ 
self of that, in view of the fact that they had attacked and 
routed a group of Vikings in the spring of the previous year 
(852). 16 Were the Danes so superior in numbers that it was 
hopeless to engage them? That may, indeed, have been the case 
sometimes, 17 but seems improbable in 852—853, when they were 
confronted by two Frankish armies, that of Lothaire as well as 
that of Charles. 

The most satisfactory solution of this rather knotty problem 
will probably have to be sought in connection with the relations 
existing between Charles the Bald and his magnates. It was 
upon the latter that Charles really had to depend, if he was to 
have an army at all. The resisting part of the West Frankish 
army at this time consisted, not of the freemen fighting on foot, 
but of contingents of mounted knights, each under the leader¬ 
ship of some magnate or seignior. 18 If, therefore, the army of 
Charles the Bald refused to enter into conflict with the Danes, 

14 See infra, n. 24; cf. supra, chap, i, nn. 19, 22. 

15 Cf. supra, n. 10. 

16 Cf. supra, n. 3. Of course, it cannot be denied that when taken by 
surprise or outnumbered, the Franks usually fled before the Vikings; but 
since the Vikings ordinarily did likewise under similar circumstances, that 
really proves nothing. What we wish to know is why the Franks refused 
to fight when that .would apparently have been the wiser thing to do. In 
the winter of 852-53 the Frankish armies had come to Jeufosse for the 
purpose of fighting; Lothaire and his men never thought of anything else, 
if we may believe the Annals of Fulda, 850, p. 40. It seems anomalous to 
think that the West Franks refused to fight, simply because they were more 
cowardly than their neighbors. 

17 On many occasions the success of the Vikings was largely due to their 
superior mobility, which enabled them to reach their destination before a 
Frankish army could be summoned to oppose them, nay before anyone knew 
of their approach. See Vogel, 43 and n. 3; cf. infra, chap. vii. 

18 Baldamus, Das Hcerwesen unter den spdteren Karolingern, in Gierke’s 
Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, IV, pp. 17 ff., 
60 ff., and passim; Roth, Geschichte des Beneficialwesens, pp. 415-16. Vogel, 
p. 13, calls attention to the fact that the most energetic and successful re¬ 
sistance to the Vikings was made by the people of those regions where the 
system of commendation and vassalage was least developed, i. e. by the 
Frisians and the Saxons. 



42 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

we understand that this was due to objections raised probably 
not so much by the ordinary freemen as by the magnates and 
seigniors. And since it is improbable that the Franks were 
either cowardly or outnumbered on this occasion, we must per¬ 
force conclude that the unwillingness of their leaders to engage 
the Vikings was due to the fact that they had no interest in 
driving them off. 

But why not? Because the expulsion of the foreign enemy 
would have enabled the monarch to give his undivided attention 
to the reduction of the power of the aristocracy; a power which, 
since the days of Charlemagne, had never ceased to make inroads 
on the prerogatives of the crown. There can be no doubt that 
Charles the Bald wished to increase, or at least to rehabilitate, 
the power of the monarch. In this effort he was supported by 
most of the higher clergy, who recognized in him the protector 
of their interests and their property against the greed and un¬ 
scrupulous avarice of the lay nobility. 19 The lay nobles, or at least 
a large number of them, bitterly opposed the policy of Charles 
and, in order to gain their point, were willing, not only to make 
indirect use of the Viking invasions, but even to ally themselves 
with the Northmen when necessary. 20 If sometimes these mag¬ 
nates were not averse to securing the removal of the Vikings by 
the payment of Danegeld, it was probably because they them¬ 
selves did not have to bear the burden of the tax levied to raise 
the tribute, and because in collecting the impost from their peas¬ 
ants they were able to retain a considerable part for them¬ 
selves. 21 

When this general situation is kept in mind, the apparent 
helplessness of the West Frankish armies before the Vikings 
becomes more intelligible. We begin to understand that the 
Danegeld was often the only means whereby the king might hope 
to rid his realm of the invaders from the North. 22 Also, we may 
perhaps be able better to appreciate the attempts that have 

19 Fustel de Coulanges, Les transformations cle la royautc pendant Ve- 
poche carlovingienne, 640-66; Diimmler, I, 222, 295, 380-81. 

20 Ibid., 381 and n. 1, 412-16, 420-21; cf. Vogel, 151-52. 

21 See supra, chap, i, nn. 39, 49. 

22 This seems to have been understood by Lothaire, who, despite the fact 
that his expedition had proved useless, remained on very friendly terms 
with Charles. Evidently Lothaire realized that Charles had done the only 
thing possible under the circumstances. Cf. supra, nn. 10, 11, 16; infra, n. 27. 




CHAPTER II 43 

recently been made 23 to clear Charles the Bald of the old charges 
of cowardice and pusillanimity. 

The amount of the Danegeld of 853 is unknown, and very little 
can be said concerning the method by which the tribute was 
raised. All we know is, that the king prescribed certain con¬ 
tributions to the Northmen, and that these had been paid before 
April 22, 853. 24 It would seem that the contributions were fur¬ 
nished chiefly if not exclusively by the prelates of the church. 25 

The Vikings had ceased plundering probably early in March; 
but they did not sail out of the Seine until in June or July. 26 
In the meantime Lothaire I had returned home from what must 
have seemed to him a fruitless expedition. 27 

23 For example by Lot and Halphen in Le regne cle Charles le Chauve; 
even Vogel (see especially pp. 256-57) has at least to a certain extent ven¬ 
tured to depart from the traditional German point of view as represented 
by Diimmler and others. 

24 Capitulare Missorum Suessionense, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 267: 
“Inbrevient [missi] . . . quid etiam Nortmannis per nostram commendatio- 
nem sive sine nostra commendatione datum sit.” It is true that this clause 
does not appear in all the extant manuscripts of the capitulary, and that 
the editors of the Monumenta have relegated it to the obscurity of a foot¬ 
note. But the clause is included in most of the manuscripts, and whether 
it ever was an integral part of the capitulary, is a matter of only secondary 
importance for our purpose. In any case, the words in the clause prove 
beyond peradventure that Charles had ordered contributions to be made to 
the Northmen. If the clause was part of the capitulary, the contributions 
must have been made before the capitulary was issued, i. e. before April 22, 
853. Since the Danegeld had probably been agreed upon early in March (cf. 
supra, n. 13), there was ample time to raise the tribute before the issuance 
of the capitulary.—I cannot share the view of Vogel, p. 135, that the Dane¬ 
geld was paid to Godfrey. It is not likely that he received both lands and 
money. Moreover if the Danegeld was paid to Godfrey, what did the other 
Danes receive that induced them to cease plundering in March? Baldamus, 
op. cit., p. 29 and n. 71, assumes that the quotation given at the beginning 
of this note refers to land, but the context does not bear out his interpreta¬ 
tion. 

25 This may be inferred from the position in the capitulary of the clause 
referred to in the preceding note; it follows directly after a provision re¬ 
quiring the prelates to submit an inventory of the property of their churches. 
The clause indicates also that some of the payments to the Northmen had 
been made without royal authorization. These may have been voluntary 
contributions to the sum promised by the king; but more probably they 
were payments made directly to the Danes, in the form of ransom, by indi¬ 
vidual churches or monasteries, which thereby escaped pillage or destruc¬ 
tion in the period before Charles came to terms with Sydroc and his fol¬ 
lowers. 

26 According to the Chron. Fontanellense, loc. cit., in June; but according 
to the Ann. Bert., loc. cit., in July. 

27 Vogel, p. 136, seems to imply that Lothaire returned home immediately 
after Charles had come to an understanding with Godfrey (see supra, n. 
11); but the Annals of St. Bertin, 853, p. 42, give the impression that he 
did not depart until after the Danes had ceased plundering in March (see 
supra, n. 12), and this impression is not weakened by the vague and chrono- 



44 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


While the Danegeld of 853 apparently secured a temporary 
removal of the Vikings from the Seine, 28 it did not prevent them 
from continuing their devastations with increased fury on the 
Loire in the same year; 29 and within three years Sydroc had 
returned to the Seine. 30 It is impossible to determine whether 
the Vikings by virtue of these operations were guilty of bad 
faith, for we do not know the terms on which they had accepted 

the Danegeld. 31 

- % 

logically inaccurate statement in the Annals of Fulda, 850, p. 40. We have 
no certain indication that Lothaire was back on his own soil until July 3, 
when he signed a diploma at Teodonis villa (Bohmer-Miihlbacher, Die Reg- 
esten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern [1908], p. 475, no. 1159) 

28 Sydroc may have gone to Ireland at first. The so-called Annales Inis- 
fallenses, 853, O’Connor, Rerum Hibernicarum scriptores veteres, II, 34, 
Codex Dubl. (quoted by Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 113, n. 5), state that 
two brothers, Sitricus and Ibarus, came with an expedition to Ireland in 853. 
However that may be, Sydroc was again operating in the West Frankish 
realm before very long; he was there at least as early as the summer of 
856 (see infra, p. 45 and nn. 1-3). 

29 See Vogel, 137 ff. 

30 Supra, n. 28; cf. Vogel, 150 ff. So far as known, Godfrey did not return 
to the Seine, and he is not mentioned in the sources after 855 (Vogel, 408). 

31 Cf. supra, n. 24. 



THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 45 


CHAPTER III. 


The Danegeld of 860—861. 

In the year 860 Charles the Bald for the third time found it 
necessary to have recourse to the Danegeld in order to secure 
the removal of Viking invaders from his realm. 1 Since the 
summer of 856 2 the Seine had been continuously occupied by 
several large forces of Danes, who under the leadership of Bjorn 
and others 3 had established and fortified themselves on the 
island of Oscellus, in the Seine, near Jeufosse. 4 From this place 
they subjected the whole valley of the lower Seine to plunder 
and devastation without mercy. 5 Paris itself was invaded, 6 
and only those monasteries and churches escaped pillage or 
destruction for which the ecclesiastics were willing to pay large 
sums of ransom money. 7 The payment of ransom, moreover, 
did not in all cases save a place from being ultimately destroyed. 8 

Throughout the year 857 the king was unable to offer any 
resistance whatever to the Vikings, owing to the fact that the 
nobles of Aquitaine and Neustria were in revolt. 9 And by the 
close of that year many of the magnates in Francia had made 
common cause with the insurgents to the south of the Seine. 10 
The rebels were in communication with Louis the German, who 

1 The most complete and certainly the most satisfactory discussion of the 
great Viking invasion of France which began in 856, is that of Lot (“La 
grande invasion normande de 856-862,” Bibl. de Vccole des chartes, 1908, 
LXIX, 5-62). In describing the events leading up to Charles the Bald’s 
agreement to pay Danegeld in 860, I find myself more in harmony with the 
conclusions, and in particular the chronology, of Lot than with those of 
Vogel (153-55, 160-71, 179-88). 

2 Lot, op. cit., p. 5, n. 1. 

3 Sydroc came first, on July 18, 856; Bjorn arrived on August 19, of the 
same year; and another band probably entered the Seine early in 858. 
Sydroc left the Seine in 857. See ibid., 7, 18. 

4 Ann. Bert., 856, pp. 46-47. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 6, n. 4, pp. 11, 25, n. 5. 

5 Ann. Bert., 856-61, pp. 46-54. Cf. Lot, op. cit., pp. 11 ff. 

6 Paris appears to have been invaded twice within the space of a few 
months, first on December 28, 856, and again in the spring of 857. See Lot, 
op. cit., p. 11, nn. 3, 4. Lot proves, ibid., p. 12, n. 1, that the Northmen 
invaded not only the environs, or faubourgs, of Paris on these occasions, 
but the Cite itself. Cf. Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth 
Century,” Journal of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, p. 864, n. 7. 

7 Ann. Bert., 857, p. 48; Aimoin, Mirac. s. Germani, II, c. 10, AA.SS., May, 
VI, p. 793. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 12 and n. 1, p. 13 and n. 4; and see infra, 
chap, xv and nn. 11, 12. 

8 Lot, op. cit., pp. 18, 21, n. 1, p. 36, n. 1. 

9 Ann. Bert., 857, p. 47. 

10 Ibid,, p. 48. 



46 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


secretly supported them, and who probably was even then re¬ 
volving in his mind the project of invading the territories of 
his brother. 11 In spite of these threatening conditions, Charles, 
in the spring of 858, succeeded in winning back at least part of 
the disaffected nobles; 12 and with the aid of his nephew, Lo- 
thaire II, the king now undertook to expel the Vikings by force 
of arms from their camp at Oscellus. 13 This fact should be 
emphasized, for it goes to show that Charles did not always 
prefer diplomacy and tribute to fighting, as some scholars would 
have us believe. 14 Indeed, why should he? 

The Viking camp on the island of Oscellus was besieged by 
the armies of Charles and Lothaire for some twelve weeks, and 
there is reason to believe that the Danes might have been brought 
to terms if Charles had been permitted to continue the opera¬ 
tions. 15 That, however, was precisely what the lay magnates 
of the West Frankish realm wished by any and every means 
to prevent. And since this attitude on the part of the nobles 
is characteristic of them in the period under discussion, it is 
worth while to inquire into the reasons for it. 

The nobles realized that if Charles triumphed over the Vikings, 
he would be in position to stamp out the revolt in his realm. 
This accomplished, he would hardly fail to follow up his ad¬ 
vantage ; he would proceed to consolidate and magnify the royal 
power at the expense of the privileges and independence of the 
aristocracy. 16 And the nobles well knew that in an undertaking 


11 See Calmette, “Etude sur les relations de Charles le Chauve avec Louis 
le Germanique et l’invasion de 858-859,” Le Moyen Age, 1899, III, 128 ff. 
Cf. Diimmler, I, 412 ff.; Lot, op. cit., pp. 16, 17. 

12 M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 295, no. 269; Libellus proclamationis 
adversus Wenilonem, c. 5, ibid., p. 451. Cf. Calmette, op. cit., 137, n. 3; Lot, 
op. cit.., 23, 25. 

13 Ann. Bert., 858, pp. 48, 50; Chron. Fontanellense, 855, M.G.H., SS., II, 
304. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 24 ff.; Vogel, 164. The attack of the Vikings on the 
two monasteries of St. Denis and St. Germain-des-Pres at Easter, and their 
capture of the abbots Louis of St. Denis and Gauzelin of Glanfeuil, of course 
strengthened the king in his determination to expel the Vikings. Immense 
sums of ransom money had to be paid the Danes for the release of these 
captives, Louis of St. Denis in particular. On this see infra, chaps, xv, xvi; 
cf. Lot, op. cit., pp. 19, 20. 

14 See for example Vogel, 106, and Diimmler, I, 428, III, 55, 58. 

15 Aimoin, Translatio ss. Georgii, Aurelii et Nathaliae ex urbe Corduba 
Parisios, II, c. 5, Mabillon, Acta sanctorum, saec. IV, part. II, p. 53 (quoted 
by Lot, op. cit., p. 28, n. 3): “sed et victoriam, pro dolor!, veluti jam prae 
manibus susceptam.” Cf. Vogel, 164; Lot, op. cit., p. 30, n. 2. 

16 Ann. Fuld., 858, pp. 49-50. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 24 and n. 4; von Kalck- 
stein, Robert der Tapfere, Markgraf von Anjou, 43 ff. 



CHAPTER III 


47 


of this nature the king would probably have the almost undivided 
support of the higher clergy, who looked to him to protect the 
property of the church against the encroachments and spolia¬ 
tions of the lay magnates. 17 The attitude of indifference or 
negligence on the part of the lay nobility as regards the Viking 
invasions, may be explained by the fact that the magnates suf¬ 
fered little or nothing from the ravages of the Northmen at 
this time. Since the operations of the Vikings were chiefly 
directed against towns, churches, and monasteries, i. e. against 
the possessions of the king or the clergy, the magnates were 
quite willing by their inactivity to play into the hands of the 
Danes, particularly if in so doing they might hope to force the 
hands of their opponents, the clergy and the crown. 18 

It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the revolt among 
the nobles began to gain ground again in proportion as Charles 
pressed the operations against the Danes with more vigor and 
determination. 19 Many of the fideles who had thus far proved 
loyal to the king now joined the ranks of the insurgents. Charles 
had hardly gotten the siege operations under way, when repre¬ 
sentatives of the disaffected nobility of the western realm ap¬ 
peared at Frankfort, imploring Louis the German to rescue 
the West Frankish kingdom from the “tyranny” of his brother. 
Easily persuaded to undertake an invasion which he had pro¬ 
bably been planning for some time, Louis prepared to act at 
once, and by September of the same year (858) he had entered 
West Frankish territory. 20 After that the loyalty of the army 

17 Calmette, op. cit., 136-37, 147-49; Diimmler, I, 434-35, 290-95; Thomp¬ 
son, Decline of the Missi, pp. 11-12. 

18 This attitude of the West Frankish nobility is well set forth by Gfrorer 
in his Geschichte der ost- und westfrankischen Carolinger, I, 281 ff. It is 
true that there is plenty of evidence which indicates that the Vikings plun¬ 
dered the rural estates, i. e. the villae and the mansi, as well as the towns 
and the ecclesiastical establishments. But the villae and mansi in question 
must have been, in the majority of cases at least, those of the church, for 
these were most likely to be left without defenders. It is not conceivable 
that the lay nobles would have been as indifferent as they were regarding 
the expulsion of the Vikings, if they had suffered from the devastations of 
the freebooters to the same extent as the church and the crown (a passage 
from the Miracula s. Bertini is very illuminating on this point; see supra , 
chap, i, n. 6, end). On the contrary, it is highly probable that the magnates 
often regarded the Vikings as their allies. See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, 
p. 284, c. 3; p. 286, c. 1. Cf. Diimmler, I, 420 ff. 

19 Ann. Bert., 858, p. 50: “Interim comites ex regno Karli regis Ludoicum 
Germanorum regem, quern per 5 annos invitaverant, adducunt.” Cf. Cal¬ 
mette, op. cit., p. 137; Lot, op. cit., 26 ff. 

20 Ann. Bert., 858, p. 50. Cf. Calmette, op. cit., 137-40. 



48 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


besieging Oscellus began rapidly to wane. Discovering evidence 
of treason and treachery on every hand, Charles finally gave up 
the siege and took hasty measures to secure himself against 
falling into the hands of his hostile brother. 21 

Louis the German’s invasion of the West Frankish kingdom, 
which had as its ultimate object the dethronement of his brother, 
need not be described here. 22 The invasion ended in fiasco, 
and on January 15, 859, the king of the East Franks deemed it 
advisable to begin a somewhat precipitate retreat back to his 
own territories. 23 Meanwhile, however, the West Frankish reb¬ 
els, by securing the intervention of Louis in their behalf, had 
furnished the Danes with an opportunity to ravage the basin of 
the Seine unchecked. 24 After the expulsion of his brother, Char¬ 
les was for a long time unable to take any measures against the 
Vikings; 25 most of the magnates continued to exhibit the spirit 
of refractoriness; 26 and the discouraging if not dismaying ex¬ 
periences of the king at the siege of Oscellus must have deterred 
him from attempting a new offensive against the freebooters. 
These, in consequence, waxed ever bolder in their work of pillage 
and devastation. 27 

Meanwhile, in the summer of 859, another group of Vikings, 
under Weland, had entered the Somme and were now ravaging 
the districts in that vicinity. 28 The situation was becoming 
critical. All of western and northern Francia was menaced by 
the Northmen. A large number of the ficleles were still in re¬ 
volt, and as yet good relations between Charles and his brother 
had not been reestablished. 29 Though the king in his predic¬ 
ament put forth special efforts to bring some of the magnates 

21 On this see Lot, op. cit., 27-28; Calmette, op. cit., 140. 

22 On the invasion of Louis the German, see ibid., 140 ff.; Cf. Diimmler, 
I, 430 ff. 

23 Ann. Bert., 859, p. 51; cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 30. 

24 Ibid. 

25 Ibid., p. 31. 

26 Calmette, op. cit., 149 ff. 

27 The only resistance offered to the Danes at this time came from cer¬ 
tain groups of peasants between the Seine and the Loire. These peasants, 
however, were not sufficiently well organized to be successful in their under¬ 
taking, and they were soon cut to pieces or dispersed. Ann. Bert., loc. cit.; 
cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 32, n. 2, pp. 33 ff. 

28 Ann. Bert., 859, p. 52; cf. Lot. op. cit., p. 38. Presumably these Vik¬ 
ings were under the leadership of Weland, though in point of fact he is not 
mentioned until 861 (Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55). 

29 Lot, op. cit., 40. 



CHAPTER III 


49 


of Neustria back to allegiance, 30 this move appears to have been 
only in part successful and in any case did not materially im¬ 
prove the situation as a whole. Fortunately, however, the two 
groups of Vikings respectively infesting the basins of the Seine 
and the Somme, were not on friendly terms with each other. 
Early in 860 the latter group made a proposal to Charles 31 which 
under the existing circumstances must have been very welcome 
to him. In return for the payment of a tribute of 3,000 pounds 
of silver, they offered to move against the Vikings of the Seine 
and either expel them or annihilate them. 32 Though there were 
those who regarded it as precarious policy to enter into relations 
of this nature with the Vikings, 33 Charles probably felt that he 
had nothing to lose and consequently accepted the offer of We- 
land’s freebooters. 

It will be noted that the Danegeld to which Charles had now 
agreed was of a different character than those paid by him here¬ 
tofore. In 845 and also in 853 the king had entered into direct 
negotiations with the particular group of Vikings that he wished 
to remove from his realm and had paid them a certain amount 
of money as the price of their evacuation of Frankish territory. 
But now Charles engaged one group of Vikings as his mercen¬ 
aries and agreed to pay them for the services they were about 
to render in driving out another group. 34 This Danegeld there¬ 
fore, was stipendiary rather than tributary in character. Even 

30 Lot, 40-41. Bishop Wenilo of Sens, the only one of the higher clergy 
who had supported the cause of Louis the German, was reconciled to Charles 
before the close of 859 (Ann. Bert., 859, p. 53). 

31 I cannot agree with Lot (op. cit., 41, n. 3) when he says that the initia¬ 
tive to these negotiations may have come from Charles. Lot himself ad¬ 
mits (ibid., 49, n. 1) that the Somme Vikings were determined to enrich 
themselves in the kingdom of Charles. The fact that they took hostages 
before departing to England in the spring (see infra, n. 39), indicates that 
the Vikings wished to hold Charles to his agreement and, therefore, that 
their interest in the contract was greater than the king’s. Nothing is said 
of any hostages retained by Charles; evidently he regarded them as unnec¬ 
essary (cf. infra, n. 43). Vogel, p. 179, seems to agree with Lot. 

32 Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53: “Karlus rex inani Danorum in Somna consis- 
tentium pollicitatione pellectus, exactionem . . . fieri jubet; nam idem Dani 
promiserant, ut, si eis tria milia librarum argenti pondere examinato tri- 
bueret, se adversus eos Danos qui in Sequana versabantur ituros eosque inde 
aut expulsuros aut interfecturos.” 

33 By referring to the offer of the Somme Danes as “inani . . . pollicita¬ 
tione” (cf. supra, n. 32), Prudence, the author of the second part of the 
Annals of St. Bertin, reveals that he was one of those who disapproved of 
the policy of Charles. 

34 Lot, op. cit., 50, nn. 1, 2, compares Weland and his companions to the 
Swiss and German mercenaries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Vogel, p. 179, likens them to the foederati employed by the Romans. 

Danegeld. 



50 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

if Weland and his men had agreed, as they probably had, that 
they themselves would quit the realm after they had forced the 
Seine Vikings to withdraw, 35 the money they received must be 
regarded as a payment for definite services to be rendered and 
not simply as the price of their own withdrawal; essentially 
it was not a tribute but a stipend. Stipendiary Danegelds, it 
is well known, were very common in England at a later period; 35 * 
but for the West Frankish kingdom only two payments of this 
kind have been recorded, the other one being the Danegeld of 
862, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 

Finding it necessary to resort to taxation in order to raise 
the sum named by Weland, the king ordered an exaction to be 
levied on (1) the church treasuries, (2) all holdings of land 
designated as mansi, and (3) the property of all merchants, 
even the poorest. Though the rates of the tax are not specified, 
we know that an inventory was to be taken of the houses and 
the movables of the merchants, in order to determine the amount 
each of these ought to pay. 30 Charles probably intended to 
collect the exaction only in those parts of his realm which were 
directly subject to his authority, viz. Francia, Neustria, and 
Burgundy. 37 As for Aquitaine, that had long been regarded 
as a separate kingdom 38 and in any case was not plundered from 
the Seine; which makes it very doubtful that this Danegeld was 
levied there at all. 

But it proved impossible or seemed inadvisable to raise the 
entire amount of the Danegeld by the time agreed upon. 39 The 

35 Lot states, op. cit., 52, that Weland had promised Charles not only that 
he would expel the Vikings of the Seine but also that he and his companions 
would depart. The basis for the latter statement appears to be these words 
from the Life of St. Faro (c. 126, Bouquet, VII, 357): “Ita quoque est ab illis 
actum, et fide vana illorum acceptum est promissum, ut discedendo utraeque 
partes jam ultra nescirent finium nostrorum introitum.” 

35a Cf. supra, pp. 15, 17. 

36 Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53: “Karlus rex . . . exactionem de thesauris ec- 
clesiarum et omnibus mansis ac negociatoribus etiam paupertinis, ita ut etiam 
domus eorum et omnia utensilia adpreciarentur et inde statutus census ex- 
igeretur, fieri jubet.” 

37 Lot, op. cit., 41, seems to think that the Danegeld was to be levied only 
in Francia, but gives no reason for this opinion. It appears legitimate to 
conclude that the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald (cf. the following 
note) was to be taxed, since there is no statement to the contrary. Cer¬ 
tainly the removal of the Danes would affect Neustria as much as Francia, 
and even Burgundy would become more secure as a result. 

38 Cf. supra, chap. i. n. 47. Charles, the son of Charles the Bald, had 
been crowned king of Aquitaine in 855 (Diimmler, I, 455). 

39 Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53: “Dani in Somna consistentes, cum eis non dare- 



CHAPTER III 


51 


reasons for this can only be conjectured. In the first place, 
the territories on either side of the Seine must, as a result of 
the numerous payments of ransom money and the immense 
booty obtained by the Danes on Oscellus in the recent years, 
have been nearly emptied of resources. 40 In the second place, 
a considerable number of the magnates involved in the recent 
revolt against Charles were probably still more or less hostile; 41 
and we may suppose that until these had become reconciled to 
the king they were not likely to lend him any aid in raising the 
Danegeld. Whatever the reasons, Charles certainly was unable 
to conclude his bargain with the Danes of the Somme at the 
appointed time. 42 The latter, however, instead of breaking off 
relations with the king, took hostages from him and then, in 
the early spring (860), departed for England. 43 The fact that 
the Vikings demanded hostages signifies unquestionably that 
they meant to hold Charles to his contract, though they were 
willing to allow him more time for procuring the sum agreed 
upon. 44 

After an absence of over a year, 45 Weland, towards the end 
of the spring of 861, 46 returned to France, ready to fulfill his 
engagements with Charles the Bald and to demand his compen¬ 
sation. 47 In the meantime the Vikings encamped on the island 

tur supradictus census, receptis obsidibus, ad Anglossaxones navigant.” 
Soetbeer (Beitrdge zur Geschichte cles Geld- und Miinzwesens in Deutschland, 
in Forsch. z. d. Gesch., VI, 54, 55) seems to have overlooked the passage 
just quoted, and thus arrives at the unwarranted conclusion that the Dane¬ 
geld of 861 was a new tribute, levied and collected after that of 860. He 
may have been misled, in part at least, by the erroneous dating of a docu¬ 
ment dealing with the Danegeld of 877. Cf M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 353. 

40 See supra, nn. 5, 7, 13; Lot, op. cit., p. 13, n. 4, pp. 18, 19. 

41 The following statement does not appear in the Annals of St. Bertin 
until 861, p. 55: “pene omnes qui nuper a Karolo ad Hludovicum defecerant 
ad Karolum revertuntur et ab eo familiaritate et honoribus redonantur.” 

42 Cf. supra, n. 39. 

43 See Lot, op. cit., 41, n. 6. 

44 Cf. supra, n. 31. There may have been another reason why the Danes 
took hostages. In this way they prevented Charles from attempting to expel 
the other group of Danes from Oscellus in the meantime; if Charles had 
succeeded in doing that independently of the Somme Danes, the latter would 
have lost not only the money promised them as Danegeld but also the booty 
which they hoped to compel the Danes on Oscellus to disgorge and share 
with them (cf. infra, n. 63). Whether or not any such considerations en¬ 
tered the minds of Weland and his followers, it is quite certain that Charles, 
for the present at least, had no thought of commencing a second siege of 
Oscellus. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 49, n. 1. 

45 Ibid. 

46 Ibid., n. 2. 

47 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55: “Dani qui pridem Morinum civitatem ineen- 
derant de Anglis revertentes, duce Welando cum ducentis et eo amplius 



52 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

of Oscellus had made another raid on Paris and had ascended 
the Seine as far as Melun, to which they set fire. 48 Weland’s 
fleet of over two hundred ships now proceeded up the Seine and 
laid siege to the Viking stronghold on Oscellus. 49 By this time 
almost all those nobles who deserted Charles in 858 had returned 
to allegiance, 50 a fact which may at least in part explain why 
the officials of the king now succeeded in obtaining the sum 
which it had proved impossible or impracticable to raise during 
the early months of the preceding year. And that is not the 
whole truth. In point of fact, Charles paid much more to the 
Danes in 861 than he had promised them in 860. The reason 
for the augmentation of the tribute can only be surmised, for 
there is not the slightest attempt at explanation in our sources. 51 
It seems probable that Weland’s army had been increased in 
numbers during its absence, and this may have been urged in 
justification of a higher price for its services. 52 In any case 
there was nothing for Charles to do except to pay what was 
demanded, if he wished to save his realm from plunder and 
devastation. 53 Accordingly, instead of receiving only 3,000 
pounds of silver, the sum originally agreed upon, Weland and 
his men were paid 5,000 pounds of the precious metal and in 


navibus per Sequanam ascendunt et castellum in insula quae Oscellus dici- 
tur a Normannis constructum et eosdem Normannos obsident.” 

48 Ibid., p. 54; Loup of Ferrieres, Epistolae , CXXVII, ed. Desdevises du 
Dezert, p. 211. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 46. 

49 See supra, n. 47. 

50 See supra, n. 41. 

51 It is true that the amounts of Danegeld demanded in 860 and 861, re¬ 
spectively, are not stated by the same writer; Prudence furnishes the fig¬ 
ures for 860, and Hincmar those for 861; yet I can find no reason to suppose 
that either committed an error on this point (Ann. Bert., 860, p. 53; 861, 
p. 55). 

52 The quotation given at the end of this note seems to indicate that some 
further negotiations took place between Charles and Weland before the latter 
laid siege to Oscellus, and very probably these negotiations had to do with 
the higher stipend demanded by the Vikings for their services. Lot, op. 
cit., 48, n. 1, credits Charles with having taken the initiative to these nego¬ 
tiations as well as to those of the preceding year (cf. supra, n. 31). I find 
it difficult to agree with Lot in either case because (1) our sources attribute 
the initiative to the Danes on both occasions; (2) those sources—the Annals 
of St. Bertin (Prudence) for 860, and the Miracles of St. Riquier for 861- 
are independent of each other; and (3) the Vikings under Weland had an 
interest of their own in the continuation of the negotiations. Cf. Vogel, 183 
Mirac. s. Richarii, II, c. 16, M.G.H., SS., XV, 918: “Qui [i. e. quidam Ansleicus 
de propagine Danorum progenitus, christianitatis sumens insignia, contuber- 
nalis palatii d. Karoli regis] dum legationem praedictorum Danorum, quos 
hactenus vis marina in Anglorum sedibus detinet, pro suis negotiis d. regis 
orabundos clementiam duceret, ac inde cum congruis responsis redirent, etc.” 

53 Ann. Bert, (see the following note): “ne depraedaretur.” 



CHAPTER III 53 

addition were furnished with large quantities of grain and 
cattle. 54 

Presumably this Danegeld had been procured partly from the 
proceeds of the general tax prescribed in 860 55 and partly per¬ 
haps by additional levies. 56 While a considerable part of the 
tribute doubtless came from the church treasuries, it must be 
assumed that the bulk of it was obtained from the proceeds of 
the extraordinary taxes levied on the mansi and on the property 
of the merchants. The holders of the mansi were probably also 
required to contribute the supplies of cattle and grain demanded 
by the Northmen. 

Unfortunately, our sources give no details with reference to 
how the various taxes levied for the purposes of this particular 
Danegeld were collected. It is, however, not improbable that 
the method employed on subsequent occasions, and concerning 
which we have considerable information, represents a develop¬ 
ment of an earlier practice. On this basis we may assume that 
the method of collecting the Danegeld for example in 866 or 
in 877 did not differ essentially from that which was employed 
in 860—861. 57 This would mean, that the great landholders — 
the ecclesiastical and lay seigniors — were held responsible by 
the king for the taxes levied on the mansi within their domains 
or their jurisdiction; that the amount of money which each 
seignior was expected to furnish, would vary according to the 
number of mansi over which he exercised any sort of control; 
and that the officials of the great seigniors — their ministeriales 
— forced each holder of a mamus to contribute toward the Dane- 

54 Cf. supra, n. 32. Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55: “Ad quorum obsidentium vide¬ 
licet loearium quinque ruilia libras argenti cum animalium atque annonae 
summa non modica de regno suo, ne depraedaretur, exigi Karolus praecepit.” 
Vita s. Faronis, Bouquet, VII, 357: “Priores [Nortmanni] vero a sequentibus 
Nortmannis, obsessi, nomine regis Caroli sunt devicti, statutis tamen donis 
gravissimis auri et argenti ex regno, immensaque adhibita ad haec pro ob- 
sidione prioris multitudinis victus abundantia.” It will be noted that ac¬ 
cording to the hagiographer, the Danegeld was paid in both silver and gold. 
Some gold may possibly have been obtained from the church treasuries, but 
most of the Danegeld was probably paid in silver, for there was very little 
coinage of gold in this period. See infra, chap, xviii and n. 55; cf. Soetbeer, 
loc. cit., IV, 354; VI, 45 ff.; Guerard, ed., Polyptyque de Vabbe Irminon, first 
ed. [1844], I (Prolegomenes), pp. 129-30. 

55 Cf. supra, nn. 36-38. 

56 See supra, n. 54. 

57 A summary of what is known concerning the usual method of collect¬ 
ing the taxes levied for the purposes of the Danegeld, is given infra, chap, 
xvii. 



54 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

geld whatever he was able to pay. It is probable that the seig¬ 
niors paid their respective quotas to the counts or the missi. 
The latter may also have been charged with the collection of 
the taxes levied on the church treasuries. To whom the mer¬ 
chants paid their taxes is nowhere indicated. We know, how¬ 
ever, that merchants were under the special protection of the 
crown and that in return for this benefit they were obliged to 
make an annual, or biennial, contribution, consisting of a certain 
percentage of their profits, to the royal treasury. 58 It is not im¬ 
possible that those royal officials who received these regular 
dues of the merchants, also collected their taxes toward the 
Danegeld. 

That the raising of the Danegeld led to abuses and hardships, 
will surprise no one who is at all familiar with the customs of 
the period with which we are here concerned. 59 Beyond a doubt 
more money was collected from the tax-payers than was turned 
over either to the king’s officers or to the Vikings. 60 The fact 
that the Danes insisted on weighing the money before accepting 
it, 61 compelled the Frankish tax collectors to refuse all coins 
which were not of proper weight or fineness. It seems too, that 
the collectors declined to receive money which had been coined 
elsewhere than in the local mint; this practice was not in accor¬ 
dance with the wishes of Charles, but it was profitable to the 
counts and bishops who were in charge of the various mints of 
the kingdom, for they received a certain share of the revenue 
obtained through recoinage. 62 The Danegeld, therefore, so far 
from being an aid to the king in his efforts to secure the univer¬ 
sal acceptance within his kingdom of the money coined in each 
and all of the royal mints without distinction, rather encouraged 
the increasing tendency in the different localities to use only 
those coins which bore the stamp of the local mint. 

58 Cf. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, IV, second ed. [1885], pp. 
44, 45, 586. 

59 Cf. See, Les classes rurales et le reg. dom. en France, p. 92. 

60 Cf. infra, chap, xvii and n. 11. 

61 In 860 the Vikings had demanded 3,000 pounds of silver pondere exam- 
inato (supra, n. 32). Evidently they had reason to suspect not only the 
weight and fineness of the Frankish coins, but also the good faith of the 
Frankish officials in the process of weighing. See the following note. 

62 Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta [July, 861], M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, 
t. 2, pp. 301-2; cf. Soetbeer, loc. cit., VI, 4, 5, 7-9. A tendency to reject 
denarii which, though of proper weight and fineness, were for some reason 
deemed undesirable, is noticeable at least as early as the time of Charle¬ 
magne (M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 125, c. 18). Exactly what prompted 




CHAPTER III 


55 


The Vikings under Weland had embarked on an enterprise 
which proved eminently successful and highly profitable. With 
the aid of another group of their countrymen they were able to 
force the Vikings on Oscellus to capitulate and to hand over to 
them, out of the immense booty collected during a sojourn of five 
years in the heart of the West Frankish realm, 6,000 pounds in 
gold and silver. 63 Altogether, therefore, Weland and his men 
secured, through this undertaking alone, 11,000 pounds of the 
precious metals and, besides, large quantities of victuals. 

The Danes did not quit the West Frankish realm until March 
of the following year. It is true that they had descended to the 

persons to reject these denarii is not stated anywhere in the sources, and 
varying solutions of the problem have been offered by different scholars 
(See e. g. Prou, Les monnaies carolingiennes, Intro., pp. XXVI ff.; Soetbeer, 
loc. cit.; Dopsch, Wirtschaftsentio. cl. Karolingerzeit, II, 248-49, 303-4). To 
me the theory of Soetbeer seems the most satisfactory. Dopsch accepts this 
theory as a partial, but not an adequate, explanation of why good denarii 
were rejected; he then proceeds to invent another theory of his own (loc. 
cit., pp. 303-4) and insists that it furnishes the most important reason for 
the rejection of the good denarii. In my opinion, the new theory of Dopsch 
contains no solution whatever of the problem under consideration, and I 
have therefore adopted, and perhaps somewhat amplified, Soetbeer’s expla¬ 
nation, the validity of which is admitted by Dopsch. Soetbeer argues that 
the local authorities (counts, bishops, abbots, etc.) when they collected im¬ 
posts due in cash, frequently would accept only money coined in the particu¬ 
lar local mint which they controlled, because in this way they could materi¬ 
ally increase the business of recoinage at that mint, and thus augment their 
own income from this source. The consequence of this abuse of power on 
the part of the local authorities would be that private individuals would 
decline to accept every denarius which, though in other respects perfectly 
satisfactory, had not been coined in the local mint. This state of affairs 
must have been a serious hindrance to trade and commerce, and it probably 
threatened to undermine the universality of the royal coinage. Heavy pen¬ 
alties had therefore been imposed on those who refused a good denarius 
simply because it did not bear the stamp of the local mint. But the practice 
persisted in spite of the penalties and seems to have been extended as a 
result of the payments to the Northmen. After the exaction of the Danegeld 
of 860-61, it became necessary to mitigate the penalties for refusing other 
than locally coined denarii, and to advise the missi to be more lenient in 
the prosecution of those who violated the law; which proves not only that 
the missi had been guilty of oppression and extortion, but also that there 
were others who profited from the Danegeld besides the Vikings. Before 
864, there probably were a number of private and unauthorized mints in 
operation, the owners of which did not fail to utilize their advantages in 
connection with the levy of the Danegeld. At any rate the coinage edict of 
864 expressly forbade coinage anywhere in the entire West Frankish king¬ 
dom except at nine specified places (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 315, c. 12). 
Lot, op. cit., 50, n. 2, is certainly in error when he says that the Franks 
rejected the denarii in circulation, because they were of bad alloy. Penalties 
were imposed when one refused to accept a bonum denarium i. e. merum et 
bene pensantem, but it was perfectly legitimate to decline a bad denarius. 

63 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 56: “Obsessi . . . sex milia libras inter aurum et 
argentum obsidentibus donant eisque sociantur.” I understand this to mean 
that the besieged paid over, not all the money they had accumulated, but a 
considerable part of it—6,000 pounds. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 51-52. 



56 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


mouth of the Seine soon after the capitulation of the Vikings 
on Oscellus; but the approach of the stormy season made them 
reluctant about putting to sea, and they decided that it would 
be much more convenient to spend the winter in France. 64 Nego¬ 
tiations leading to an understanding with Charles on this point 
may have followed. 65 Be that as it may, it is certain that the 
Northmen reascended the Seine and that they were able to esta¬ 
blish themselves for the winter, without opposition, in various 
places along that river and its tributaries. 66 

About the same time that the Vikings were returning inland, 
Charles the Bald set out on his futile expedition to Provence. 67 
During the winter some of the Vikings could not resist the temp¬ 
tation to plunder. Charles, therefore, who meanwhile had re¬ 
turned from Provence, found it advisable to take the field against 
them early in 862. By prompt action and a piece of clever 
strategy, he succeeded in cutting off the retreat of an isolated 
group of the marauders, who had gone to attack Meaux, and as 
a result was able to bring pressure to bear on the rest. 68 Toward 
the end of February, 862, Weland swore fealty to Charles, and 
soon thereafter he persuaded all the Danes to descend the Seine 
a second time. At Jumieges they stopped long enough to repair 
their ships, but before the end of March the Northmen had left 
France, departing in various directions. 69 

The policy of engaging one group of invaders to drive out 
another in return for the payment of Danegeld, at least had not 
proved so signal a failure as some had predicted; 70 and we may 
well doubt whether, as things stood in 860, Charles could have 
removed the Vikings from his realm in any other way. 71 

The Northmen, as we have seen, did not depart with empty 
hands. On the contrary, they carried off what may be regarded 
as a by no means negligible portion of the available cash in the 
West Frankish kingdom. What effect did the passing of such 
large sums of money into the posesssion of an alien enemy have 

64 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 56. 

65 Such at least is the opinion of Lot, op. cit., 53. 

66 Ann. Bert., loe. cit. 

67 Ibid.; cf. Lot, op. cit., 53-54. 

68 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 57; cf. Lot, op. cit., 55 ff. 

69 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.; Aimoin, loc. cit., c. 13, p. 794. 

70 Cf. supra, n. 33. 

71 See infra, n. 75; cf. Lot, op. cit., 59. 



CHAPTER III 


57 


upon economic conditions in the invaded country? Unquestion¬ 
ably it would be a mistake to assume that the money taken by 
the invaders in the form of tribute and plunder represented a 
total loss to the Franks. While it is doubtless true that the 
Vikings were in the main parasites, who added little or nothing 
to the wealth or resources of the West Frankish kingdom, but 
instead used up a very considerable part thereof; on the other 
hand we must not fail to note that during the time they remained 
in Frankish territory these parasites must have expended large 
amounts of their ill-gotten gain in trade. Certainly, all the 
money paid to the Northmen did not leave the country. There 
is no indication that the Vikings who infested France at this 
period engaged in agriculture while they were there. Therefore 
they must have had to plunder or buy all their foodstuffs. Prob¬ 
ably they bought more of these than has commonly been sup¬ 
posed ; and it is certain that they purchased other things besides 
victuals. 72 In this way the Vikings of Oscellus doubtless used 
up some portion of the money they had obtained through num¬ 
erous payments of ransom and otherwise. 73 Even the followers 
of Weland must have disposed of some part of the Danegeld 
during the winter and spring of 861—862. Thus, there can 
be little doubt that, in spite of hostilities, a brisk trade was going 
on continually between the Franks and the Northmen so long 
as the latter remained in the country. This in itself must be 
regarded as an advantage, for it could hardly fail to give a 
new stimulus to the rather sluggish course of economic life 
during the early middle ages. 74 The Danegeld and the other 
payments to the Danes may have emptied many church treas¬ 
uries and may have borne hard on the poorer population, the 
peasantry in particular; 75 but, on the other hand, they brought 

72 In particular there were frequent sales of armor, weapons and horses 

to the Norhmen. See LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 321, c. 25. In this trade 

it appears that even ecclesiastics sometimes participated. Cf. Vogel, 207, n. 1. 

73 Still it must not be concluded that the Vikings disposed of all their 
money and plunder while they were sojourning in France. When the free¬ 
booters on Oscellus surrendered to Weland and his followers, they were able 
to pay the latter 6,000 pounds in gold and silver! And they probably had 
something left for themselves after that (cf. supra, n. 63). 

74 On this whole subject, see Thompson, “Commerce of France in the 
Ninth Century,” loc. cit., pp. 858-59, 865-68, 887; Vogel, 233 ff. 

75 That the Danegeld of 860-61 proved a heavy burden on the poorer pop¬ 
ulation is evident from the coinage regulations of 861 (cf. supra, n. 62). In 
these Charles almost apologizes for resorting to the Danegeld and declares 
that it was the only resort left to him as things stood at the time (see the 
quotations given infra, p. 83, n. 114, chap, xvii, n. 20). 



58 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

much more money into circulation, not only the money of the 
peasants, but also the hoarded treasures of the Church. 70 Let it 
be remarked too, that the usual amount of money in circulation 
during the ninth century must have been much larger than was 
until recently assumed. Those who are still inclined to put 
very strong emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the villa, or 
manor, of this period and on its economic independence of the 
outside world, would do well to remember that the Danegeld 
was paid in cash by the tax-payers 77 and that there are other 
evidences of the frequent use of money even by coloni and serfs. 78 

It would seem very strange indeed if the numerous payments 
of Danegeld had had no effect whatever on the mining of the 
precious metals, silver in particular. The only support for such 
a view would be the fact that our sources fail to supply us with 
information on the subject. In this case, however, as in most 
others, the argument from silence had better be studiously 
avoided. To the present writer it does not seem too bold to 
assume that as a result of the loss of specie through the pay¬ 
ment of Danegeld, and in order to keep a sufficient amount of 
money in circulation, the output of silver ore at the mines had 
to be considerably increased. 79 

Mention should also be made at this point of another matter, 
the full discussion of which must be reserved for the concluding 
chapter. From various bits of evidence it becomes clear that 
the Danegeld had a salutary effect on the quality of the West 
Frankish coinage. The fact that the Vikings insisted on weigh¬ 
ing as well as counting the money that was paid to them, must 
have discouraged the tendency to clip and to falsify the coins. 86 

76 Cf. Soetbeer, loc. cit., VI, 8, 54; Thompson, op. cit., p. 867. 

77 The argument of Dopsch (Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung cler Karolinger- 
zeit, II, 253-54, 305) on this point seems almost conclusive. Cf. Soetbeer, 
loc. cit., p. 54; infra, n. 78. Not only the Danegeld but also the old war 
taxes known as hostilitium and carnaticum (by this time converted into 
redevances) and various other manorial dues were probably in many cases 
paid in money. Cf. Guerard, op. cit., pp. 669-70 and n. 10. 

78 The various coinage edicts of Louis the Pious and Charles the Bald 
furnish incontrovertible evidence of the frequent use of cash money by all 
classes in this period. Practically all the coinage regulations are quoted 
and elucidated by Soetbeer, loc. cit., pp. 1-112. On the general subject of the 
money economy of the Carolingian period, see Dopsch, op. cit., II, 252, ff. 

79 Cf. Soetbeer, loc. cit., p. 56. 

80 Cf. supra, n. 61; see also infra, chap, xviii and nn. 56-61, especially n. 57. 



THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 59 


CHAPTER IV. 

The Danegeld Paid by Robert the Strong in 862. 

The various groups of Vikings referred to in the preceding 
chapter were in the spring of 862 forced by Charles the Bald 
to evacuate the West Frankish kingdom. As they left the Seine, 
these marauders separated into several fleets, 1 the respective 
destinations of which probably cannot, and for the present 
purpose need not, be determined. We must note, however, that 
the larger number of the Vikings proceeded from the Seine 
mouth directly to Brittany, where they were joined by another 
group of Northmen just returning from an expedition to the 
Mediterranean. 2 It appears that Duke Solomon, of Brittany, 
who was hostile to the Franks, engaged the Vikings from the 
Mediterranean as his mercenaries, to harry the region of the 
lower Loire. But the strategy of the Breton chief was frus¬ 
trated by Robert the Strong, now “duke,” and viceregent of 
Charles the Bald, in Neustria. Robert captured twelve of the 
Viking ships and killed all the Vikings on them save a few who 
escaped by flight. 3 Though this was an important success for 
the Franks, it did not solve their whole problem; 4 there were 
the Breton forces still to be reckoned with, and there was the 
possibility that Solomon might enlist also the Vikings from the 
Seine in his service. But Robert anticipated his Breton ad¬ 
versary in the matter of negotiating with the freebooters from 
the Seine. For a consideration of 6,000 pounds of silver the 
latter declared themselves willing to become his mercenaries 
and allies against Solomon. The Frankish leader promptly 
consented to these terms and sealed his bargain by exchanging 
hostages with the Vikings. 5 

Was Robert’s payment a Danegeld? To be sure, the money 
was not paid expressly in the form of tribute, nor directly for 

1 Supra, p. 56 and n. 69. 

2 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 57. Cf. Vogel, 178, 187-88; Lot, “La Loire, l’Aqui- 
taine et la Seine de 862 a 866,” Bibl. de Vccole des chartes, 1915, LXXVI, 
473, 477 and n. 3. 

3 Ann. Bert., 862, pp. 57-58. On the position of Robert, see Vogel, 190, n. 
1; Favre, Eudes, 4, 227 f.; von Kalckstein, Robert der Tap fere, 72, 152 ff. 
Cf. Lot, op. cit., 479, n. 3. 

4 Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 77. 

5 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 58: “Rotbertus autem Salomonem sustinere non val- 
ens, cum praefatis Normannis qui de Sequana exierunt, antequam eos Salo¬ 
mon sibi adversus eum adscisceret, [datis] utrimque obsidibus, in sex mili- 
bus argenti contra eundem Salomonem convenit.” Cf. Vogel, 191. 


/ 



60 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

the purpose of effecting the removal of the Vikings; it was paid 
rather as a stipend in return for the promised aid of the North¬ 
men against the Bretons under Solomon. If, however, Robert 
had failed to engage the Vikings from the Seine in the Frankish 
service, it is very probable — to Robert it must have been a 
foregone conclusion — that these, like their countrymen from 
the Mediterranean, would eventually have joined forces with 
the Bretons. In the latter case, Solomon would probably have 
undertaken a double invasion of the West Frankish realm, di¬ 
recting the Vikings to ascend the Loire on their ships while he 
with his Bretons proceeded to attack by land. Thus, in the end 
the Vikings would, as usual, have established themselves in a 
fortified camp, from which they could probably not have been 
dislodged save by the payment of tribute. 6 All this was avoided 
by Robert’s diplomacy, which, while it prevented Solomon from 
invading Frankish territory, also kept the Vikings busy in 
Brittany. 7 Therefore, since the payment of 862 really had the 
effect of temporarily keeping the Vikings out of the Loire reg¬ 
ion, there can be little objection to regarding it, like the pay¬ 
ment of 860—61, 8 as a stipendiary Danegeld. 

Our sources indicate neither whence nor how Robert obtained 
the Danegeld of 862. 9 But since the tribute of the preceding 
year, which did not amount to more than 5,000 pounds, 10 could 
be raised only by means of general taxation, * 11 it does not seem 
probable that a sum of 6,000 pounds could have been secured 
without the levy of taxes. Doubtless these taxes fell in large 
part if not exclusively upon the population residing within the 
limits of the territory subject to Robert’s authority, i. e. in 
Neustria. 12 

The Danegeld of this year had, as we have seen, been promised 
and arranged for by Robert the Strong, “duke” in Neustria. 13 
Though there is no reason to doubt that Charles the Bald fully 
approved of the sagacious expedient to which Robert had re- 

6 Cf. infra, n. 19. 

7 Vogel, 191-92. 

8 See supra, pp. 49-50 and nn. 32, 34, 35, 35a. 

9 All the information we have concerning this particular Danegeld, is that 
which is furnished by the Annals of St. Bertin (see supra, n. 5). 

10 Cf. supra, pp. 52-53 and n. 54. 

11 Cf. supra, p. 50 and nn. 36-38, pp. 53-54. 

12 Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 77, 152 ff.; Lot, op. cit., 477 and n. 3; Favre, 
op. cit., 5. 

13 Cf. supra, n. 5. 



CHAPTER IV 


61 


sorted, 14 it is none the less true that on this occasion it was one 
of the magnates, not the king, who found it necessary practically 
to buy off the Vikings. Thus we have here another illustration 
of the fact that responsibility for the policy of paying Dane- 
geld cannot be fastened exclusively upon Charles the Bald. 15 
As will be pointed out later in these pages, 16 the Danegeld was, 
by reason of a peculiar combination of circumstances, virtually 
a necessity during the reigns of Charles the Bald and several of 
his successors; a necessity from which, it would seem, there 
was no escape for any ruler, royal or otherwise, so long as con¬ 
ditions remained what they were in the latter half of the ninth 
century. 

The payment of 862, or rather the sequel to it, illustrates also 
the fact that the Danegeld never could be more than a temporary 
expedient in dealing with the Viking problem. By engaging the 
Vikings as his mercenaries and paying them a stipend, Robert 
had, indeed, for a time restrained the freebooters from ravaging 
Frankish territory and had also warded off a threatened in¬ 
vasion on the part of Solomon of Brittany; the latter, in fact, 
found himself so hard pressed by the coalition between Robert 
and the pagans, that in the spring of 863 he deemed it advisable 
to submit to the king of the Franks. 17 The establishment of 
friendly relations between Charles the Bald and Solomon, how¬ 
ever, appears to have ruptured the coalition of the Franks with 
the Vikings, for the latter began forthwith 18 to plunder and 
devastate the region to the south of the Loire. 19 Robert the 
Strong’s payment of Danegeld, therefore, brought security 
against the Vikings for hardly a year. 20 

14 Cf. Lot, op. cit., 477. 

15 Cf. the three preceding chapters. 

16 See infra, chap. vii. 

17 Ann. Bert., 863, p. 61. Cf. Vogel, 191-92, 197. Lot, op. cit., 478, under¬ 
estimates, it seems, the value of Robert’s compact with the Vikings. There 
can be no doubt that the latter by their operations in Brittany caused Solo¬ 
mon to abandon his plan of invading Neustria. Von Kalckstein, op. cit., 83, 
n. 2, calls attention to a passage in Regino’s Chronicle (866, ed. Kurze, p. 
91) which indicates that Charles the Bald was preparing to invade Brittany, 
but decided to enter into negotiations with Solomon when he saw that the 
Bretons were prepared to resist to the uttermost. If Regino’s statement 
contains any element of truth, it strengthens the view that the Viking op¬ 
erations had produced a diversion in Brittany; as a result of these opera¬ 
tions the offensive had passed from the Bretons to the Franks. 

18 I. e. directly after Solomon’s reconciliation with Charles the Bald. 
See Lot, op. cit., 480, nn. 1, 2. 

19 See Vogel, 197 ff.; Lot, op. cit., 479 ff. According to Lot, ibid., 480 
and n. 3, the Vikings established themselves in the lower Loire, on an island 
which they had occupied once before. 

20 From April, 862, to April, 863 (cf. ibid., 477, n. 3, 480, n. 1.) 



62 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

CHAPTER V. 

The Danegeld of 866. 

For some time after the departure of the Vikings from the 
Seine in March, 862, 1 the general course of events in the West 
Frankish realm points to a gradual but steady improvement in 
the position of Charles the Bald. 1 2 The Treaty of Coblentz (June 
5, 860), which definitively closed the hostilities engendered by 
Louis the German's invasion of the western kingdom in 858 
and re-established amicable relations between Charles and his 
brother, also probably helped to promote a better understanding 
between Charles and his ficleles; for after this treaty the rebel¬ 
lious and dissatisfied element among the West Frankish nobility 
could no longer look for support to their cause from the king 
of the East Franks. 3 Perhaps the best illustration of the in¬ 
creasing accord between Charles and the magnates is the co¬ 
operation that was possible at the Assembly of Pitres in June, 
864. 4 

The Edict issued at Pitres indicates a serious intention on 
the part of the king — an intention apparently shared and cert¬ 
ainly not opposed by the magnates — to enforce the laws and 
to correct or repress the numerous abuses and disorders pre¬ 
vailing in the land, many of which had grown out of the recent 
long drawn out occupation of the Seine valley by the Northmen. 5 
This Edict shows also that the king was determined to provide 
adequately against possible future invasion of his realm by the 
Northmen; 6 that he intended to place the country in such a 
state of preparedness as would be sufficient for any emergency. 
The measures taken by him with that end in view included not 
only a very emphatic restatement in the Edict of the obligation 
for all classes to render military service in defense of the realm ; 7 
they included also the project of building a fortified bridge at 

1 Ann. Bert., 862, p. 57; cf. supra, p. 56 and n. 69. 

2 Vogel, 204; cf. 188-90. 

3 Diimmler, I, 461. 

4 Edictum Pistense [June 25, 864], (A.), M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 311. 
Cf. Vogel, 203-8. 

5 Edictum Pistense, (B.), cc. 6, 7, 25, 31, loc. cit., pp. 313-14, 321, 323-24; 
.(C.), c. 1, p. 328. 

6 Ibid., (A.), c. 2, p. 311; (B.), cc. 26, 27, 37, pp. 321-22, 327-28; (C.), c. 
1, p. 328. 

7 Ibid., (B.), cc. 26, 27; (C.), c. 1. 



CHAPTER V 


63 


that point on the Seine where the above mentioned assembly 
met, i. e. at Pitres. 8 With the aid of this river fortification 
Charles hoped in the future to be able to prevent the Vikings 
from ascending the Seine. He appears to have placed a great 
deal of confidence in this means of defense; and we may admit 
that if it had been properly developed and completed, the scheme 
would probably have reduced very materially those advantages 
which the possession of ships gave the Northmen over the 
Franks. 9 

It is well known that the military superiority of the Vikings 
was due in no small measure to their superior mobility. This 
great mobility, in turn, depended largely if not exclusively on 
the remarkable rapidity with which they could propel their ships 
in the rivers, up stream or down. 10 Successfully to oppose an 
enemy thus equipped, the Franks would have needed a large 
and efficient fleet; but they possessed most of the time no fleet 
at all, and never any that was comparable to that of the Vik¬ 
ings. * 11 Unless, therefore, the Franks would build obstructions 
in their principal water courses, and thereby bar the passage 
of hostile fleets, they could hardly hope effectively to prevent 
the Vikings, either from making sudden surprise attacks on 
the large river towns, or from establishing themselves in fort¬ 
ified camps on islands in the rivers. And once the Vikings 
had secured a lodgment for themselves on an island, it was well- 
nigh impossible for the Franks to eject them; because even 
such an operation could not be successfully carried out save with 
the aid of a fleet. 12 

The adoption and development of the idea of a system of 
fortified bridges built at strategic points in the lower courses 

8 Edictum Pistense, (A), c. 2, p. 311; Ann. Bert., 864, p. 72. 

9 See Lot, “Melanges carolingiens. II. Le pont de Pitres,” Le Moyen Age, 
1905, IX, 1-6, 9. 

10 See supra, chap, i, n. 33; ii, n. 17. 

11 On this see Vogel, 36 and n. 1. The fleet employed by Charles the Bald 
at the siege of Oscellus in 858 (cf. supra, pp. 45-48), had been specially 
constructed for that purpose, and when Charles was forced to give up the 
siege his fleet fell into the hands of the Vikings. See Lot, “La grande in¬ 
vasion normande,” Bibl. de Vecole des chartes, 1908, LXIX, 28, n. 3. 

12 The Vikings referred to in the preceding note had maintained them¬ 
selves for five years—from 858 to 861—on the island of Oscellus, and their 
eventual dislodgment was the work, not of the Franks, but of two groups 
of their own countrymen who, of course, had adequate fleets at their dis¬ 
posal (cf. supra, p. 52 and n. 49, p. 55 and n. 63). For another illustration 
of the same thing, see Vogel, 148. 



64 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

of the rivers, therefore constituted a very important advance 
in the Frankish method of defense against the Viking raids ; 13 
a fact of which Charles himself was probably fully aware. 14 
Perhaps for this reason and for others to be mentioned presently, 
the king was inclined at the Assembly of Pitres, in 864, to be 
somewhat optimistic as regards the future. 15 Practically all 
the magnates had now returned to allegiance; 16 they had come 
in large numbers to the assembly 17 and had brought with them 
laborers, implements, carts, and beasts of burden, for the pur¬ 
pose of bringing to completion the work on the bridgehead at 
Pitres begun two years earlier. 18 The Aquitanians gave proof 
of their loyalty by delivering into the hands of Charles his 
nephew, the traitor Pippin, and even Solomon of Brittany pro¬ 
fessed his submission and allegiance to the king of the West 
Franks by paying the customary tribute. 19 From a survey 
of the general situation in June, 864, one might be led to the 
conclusion that whatever the Vikings might henceforth attempt 
on the Seine, there was in any case no likelihood that the king 
would very soon be placed in such straits as would make it neces¬ 
sary to buy off the foreign enemy by the payment of Danegeld. 
Yet Charles the Bald did find himself in just that plight less 
than two years after the Assembly of Pitres. 20 In order to 
ascertain the causes of this rather startling change in the sit¬ 
uation of the king, an attempt must be made carefully to analyze 
certain events that transpired in the meantime. 

Toward mid-July, 865, 21 Vikings had again found their way 
to the enticing shores of the West Frankish kingdom. Their 
fleet of fifty ships had without delay moved up the river Seine 

13 Vogel, 188-89. 

14 Edict. Pistense, (A.), c. 2, loc. cit., p. 311; Ann. Bert., 864, p. 72. Cf. 
Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., pp. 1, 2, 9. 

15 Edict. Pistense, (A.), cc. 1, 2, loc. cit. 

16 Ibid., c. 1: “non omnes . . . tarnen ex maicri parte observastis.” Cf. 
Vogel, 204. 

17 Edict. Pistense, loc. cit.: “pleniter et cum pace ad hoc nostrum placitum 
convenistis.” 

18 Ibid., c. 2; Ann. Bert., 864, p. 72. Cf. Vogel, 204 and n. 3; Lot, op. cit., 
pp. 1, 4 and n. 1. 

19 Ann. Bert., 864, p. 72. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 4. 

20 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81, and see infra. 

21 Annales Rotomagenses, 865, M.G.H., 88., XXVI, p. 494. Lot (op. cit., 
p. 5 and n. 1) appears to have overlooked the statement in the Annals of 
Rouen relative to the arrival of the Northmen; this, however, does not 
invalidate what he says in the note about the date when Charles left Attigny 
for Pitres. See infra, n. 25. 



CHAPTER V 


65 


as far as Pitres. 22 Beyond this point the freebooters had not 
yet advanced, probably because the partly constructed bridge¬ 
head 23 at Pitres made further progress temporarily impossible 
or inadvisable. The time and labor spent in previous years on 
the fortifications at Pitres had, therefore, not been wasted effort. 
Even in its state of incompletion, the bridgehead was capable 
of functioning for a considerable space of time as an effective 
obstacle in the path of the invaders. 24 Meantime, while the 
Vikings were being held in check, Charles mobilized an army 25 
and with it hastened to meet the enemy at Pitres. But, con¬ 
trary to what might be expected, no engagement took place. 
Perhaps the Franks, temporarily relying in the strength of their 
fortifications, decided it would be unnecessary to risk an open 
battle, or even a sally, so long as the bridgehead could inhibit 
the Northmen from advancing. The king, however, on the 
advice of his fideles, ordered two more fortified bridges to be 
built: one at Auvers on the Oise, and another at Charenton on 
the Marne; 26 the evident purpose of these measures being to 
prevent the Vikings from ascending the tributary streams, in 
the event that they should succeed in breaking through at Pitres 
on the Seine. Also, Charles arranged to have both banks of 
the Seine guarded, assigning this task to a certain Adalard and 
two relatives of the latter, Hugo and Berengar. 27 These various 
arrangements of the king seem to indicate some doubt on his 
part as to whether the fortifications at Pitres could permanently 
prevent the Vikings from continuing their course up the Seine. 
Yet we must believe that Charles did not apprehend any im¬ 
mediate danger; for, about the middle of the month of Septem¬ 
ber, he journeyed northward to Orville, to enjoy the pleasures 


22 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 78. 

23 Lot (op. cit., p. 5) and Vogel (p. 213, n. 4). agree that the fortifications 
at Pitres were not complete when the Northmen arrived in 865. 

24 It is difficult to find any other reason for the fact that the Vikings 
halted at Pitres, and the sequel shows that they had intended to advance 
much farther up the Seine. Lot admits (op. cit., p. 17) that in 885 the 
bridge at Pitres probably did function in the manner indicated. 

25 Lot (ibid., p. 5, n. 2, and p. 6) indicates that the Frankish army had 
been mobilized before the Northmen entered the Seine, and that upon the 
news of their arrival Charles at once set out from Attigny to Pitres. This 
appears unlikely in view of the fact that the Northmen entered the Seine in 
July, while Charles did not depart from Attigny before the middle of Au¬ 
gust. Cf. supra, n. 21. 

26 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 6. 

27 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79: “deputatis custodibus qui utrasque ripas custo- 
dirent, etc.”; ibid., p. 80: “Adalardo, cui custodiam contra Nortmannos 
[Karolus] commiserat, sed et suis propinquis Hugoni et Berengario, etc.” 

Dancgcld. 5. 



66 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

of the chase, 28 thereby indicating that he no longer regarded 
his own presence in the Seine region as essential. Did he 
believe that all necessary precautions against an advance on 
the part of the Vikings had now been taken? 

Whatever confidence Charles may have had in his measures 
of defense was soon put to shame. Hardly had he departed 
on his journey northward when the negligence of the guardians 
on the Seine became evident. They failed to place any of their 
forces on the north bank of the river, and therefore could not, 
or at any rate did not, prevent a detachment of about two hun¬ 
dred Vikings from proceeding to Paris for the purpose of secur¬ 
ing wine; moreover, they permitted these freebooters to return 
from their futile errand unscathed. It is true, however, that 
when, somewhat later, another band of five hundred Northmen 
attempted a raid to the south on Chartres, they were repulsed 
with losses by the Frankish forces stationed on the left bank 
of the Seine. 29 

What effect had the two incidents just described on the re¬ 
lations between Charles the Bald and his chief guardian on the 
Seine? Did Adalard’s failure to guard the right bank of the 
Seine lead the king to suspect disloyalty on the part of his 
fidelis? 30 And was the later repulse of the Vikings headed for 
Chartres, insufficient to allay the suspicion? 31 While our 
sources give no definite answers to these questions, they do 
furnish evidence of a growing estrangement between Adalard 
and the king. We know that in October, 865, shortly after the 
events referred to in the preceding paragraph, Charles the Bald 
secured, at a meeting with his brother in Cologne, the cancella¬ 
tion of the proposed marriage of Adalard’s daughter to the son 
of Louis the German. 32 This action on the part of Charles, wheth¬ 
er or not it may be interpreted as having been at least in part 
dictated by a desire to revenge the disloyalty of Adalard, could 
hardly fail to bring a crisis in the relations between the king 

28 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 79. 

29 Ibid. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 7, n. 4. 

30 Cf. Lot, “Une annee du refne de Charles le Chauve. Annee 866,” Le 
Moyen Age, 1902, VI, 435, n. 3, last sentence. 

31 It is possible that Adalard and his companions had been charged with 
the defense of only the right bank of the river, and that the defense of the 
left bank had been committed to others (Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 
p. 7); if so, there was all the more reason to doubt the good faith of Adalard! 

32 Ann. Bert., 865, pp. 79-80. 



CHAPTER V 


67 


and his ambitious vassal. If, as seems probable, these relations 
had been strained almost to the breaking point even before the 
actual cancellation of the marriage project, 33 then that event 
must unquestionably have been followed by a complete rupture. 34 
And the sequel of events will point to a deep causal relation 
between this rupture on the one hand and the ultimate collapse 
of Frankish resistance to the Vikings on the other. 

On the return from Cologne Charles was met by the news 
that the Vikings had entered the monastery of St. Denis on 
October 20, and that they had remained there for almost three 
weeks undisturbed by anyone. The marauders were said to 
have obtained a vast amount of booty from the monastery and 
then, after much devastation, to have returned to their camp, 
located only a short distance from St. Denis. 35 All of which 
signified that the Vikings had been able at last to break through 
the defenses at Pitres, and that the men appointed to guard 
the banks of the Seine — Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar — had 
for some reason failed to do their duty. Indeed it seems there 
had been no opposition whatever to the Northmen, not even an 
attempt to intercept them on their return from St. Denis. 36 

In the light of what we know about the relations between 
Charles the Bald and Adalard at this time, the meaning of these 
facts is clear. We may legitimately conclude that Adalard and 
his relatives had, by way of retaliation, purposely neglected the 
defense of the Seine in order to embarrass the king; that, there¬ 
fore, these magnates were largely if not exclusively responsible 
for the success of the Viking enterprise and, consequently, for 
the creation of a situation which was eventually to lead to the 
payment of another Danegeld. And these conclusions are 
strengthened by the fact that Charles, after his return from 
Cologne, divested Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar of their honores, 
on the ground that they had failed to render services of any 
value against the Northmen. 37 

33 See supra, n. 30. 

34 See Lot, op. cit., p. 7, n. 4. 

35 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 80; Annales sancti Germani minores, 865, M.G.H., 
88., IV, p. 3. Cf. Vogel, 214, n. 2. 

36 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 80: “[Nortmanni] sine contradictione cuiusquam 
ad castra sua . . . sunt reversi.” 

37 Ibid., p. 80; Ann. s. Germani minores, loc. cit. For further information 
on the general significance of the humiliation of Adalard, etc., see Vogel, 220, 
n. 3. 



68 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

The poor performance and bad faith of Adalard and his sup¬ 
porters did not induce the king to give up all thought of dealing 
with the Vikings in a military way. As already indicated, the 
Northmen were by this time firmly established on an island in 
the Seine near the monastery of St. Denis. 38 Charles seems 
to have determined if possible to prevent them from ascending 
farther up the river. He stationed guards ( scarae ) along both 
banks of the Seine, 39 and entrusted the direction of the opera¬ 
tions of defense to fideles in whom he probably felt he could 
repose confidence: Robert the Strong, Count Odo of Chartres, 
and certain others whose names we do not know. 40 Apparently 
satisfied of the sufficiency of these precautionary measures, the 
king presently repaired northward to Senlis, to celebrate the 
solemnities of Christmas. 41 

Again the faith of the king in the Frankish power of resistance 
and in the loyalty of his fideles was to be shattered. Early 
in 866 42 the Vikings moved up the Seine as far as Melun. The 
Frankish troops followed them, one column on each side of the 
river. At Melun the Northmen left their ships and launched 
an attack on that one of the Frankish columns, which seemed 
the larger and stronger, and which was commanded by Robert 
and Odo. 43 Contrary to what might have been expected of 
troops led by Robert the Strong, these men took to flight without 
striking a blow, and the Vikings, having loaded their ships with 
booty, returned safely to camp. 44 

This unfortunate adventure is so out of harmony with what 
is otherwise known of the career and the exploits of Robert 

38 Ann. Bert., 865, p. 80: “Nortmanni tertia decima Kalend. Novembris 
monasterium S. Dionysii intraverunt; . . . post multam depraedationem ad 
castra sua non longe ab eodem monasterio sunt reversi.” Cf. ibid., 866, p. 
81: “Nortmanni mense Iunio ab insula secus monasterium S. Dionysii 
movent.” 

39 Ibid., 865, p. 80: “dimissis custodibus contra eosdem Nortmannos”; ibid., 
866, p. 81: “scarae Karoli ex utraque parte ipsius fluminis [Sequanae] per- 
gunt.” Cf. Vogel, 214. 

40 Hincmar tells us (Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81) that Robert and Odo com¬ 
manded the larger and stronger of the scarae mentioned in the preceding 
note. The names of those who commanded the other scara are not given. 

41 Ibid., 865, p. 80. Towards the close of the year, the Vikings had lost 
some of their men as a result of various diseases which broke out among 
them. Knowledge of this fact led Charles to believe that there was no im¬ 
mediate danger to be feared. 

42 Lot, “Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 398, n 2 

43 Cf. ibid., 396, n. 4, 397. 

44 Ann. Bert., 866, pp. 80-81. 



CHAPTER V 


69 


the Strong, that one is tempted to inquire whether there may 
not have been special reasons for what happened on this occasion. 
It is well known that, in 861, very cordial relations had been 
established between Charles the Bald and Robert, and that in 
consequence thereof the latter had received not only large hold¬ 
ings of land but also the ducatum inter Ligerim et SequanamS 5 
From 861 to 865 Robert was practically ruler, and military com¬ 
mander-in-chief, of the district between the Seine and the Loire; 
and as such he rendered very distinguished and very valuable 
services by his campaigns against the Northmen and the Bret¬ 
ons, 46 respectively. But in 865 Charles divested Robert of the 
military authority, and also of certain holdings, in Neustria, 
to make room for his eldest son, Louis, surnamed the Stammerer. 
Presumably it was by way of recompense for what he had lost 
in Neustria, that Robert was granted the counties of Auxerre 
and Nevers in Burgundy. 47 Why Charles made this change can 
only be- conjectured. It is difficult to believe that it had been 
suggested or even approved of by Robert, whose position in 
Burgundy certainly did not give him the prestige and power 
which he had possessed as the lord and defender of Neustria. 48 
With more reason, the affair may be regarded as an indication 
that Robert had temporarily lost his influence with the king, 
and that the latter was now acting at the instigation of that 
party at his court which sought to advance the interests of Prince 
Louis. 49 In any case, the removal of Robert to Burgundy was 
a blunder — a blunder which Charles later found it necessary 
to correct so far as possible. 50 Meanwhile, after the dismissal 
of Adalard and his relatives, the king had summoned Robert 
to the defense of the Seine. 51 And we have seen how poor an 
account Robert gave of himself in the discharge of this com¬ 
mission. Though the scara commanded by Robert and Odo was 
the larger and stronger of the two Frankish divisions, it fled 
before the Vikings without striking a blow, and apparently 
Robert and Odo fled with it. 52 

45 Ann. Bert., 861, p. 55; Regino, Chronicon, 861, ed. Kurze, p. 79. Cf. 
Vogel, 189, 190 and n. 1, where further references are given on this point. 

46 Lot, “La Loire, l’Aquitaine et la Seine de 862 a 866,” Bibl. de Vecole 
des chartes, 1915, LXXVI, 473 ff.; Vogel, 190-92, 197, 198, 208-10. 

47 Ann. Bert.. 865, p. 79. Lot, op. cit., 497 and n. 7, 498. 

48 Ibid., 497, n. 7. 

49 Ibid., 498. 

50 Ibid., 501; id., “Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 400 ff. 

51 Cf. supra, nn. 37, 39, 40. 

52 Cf. supra, nn. 43, 44. 



70 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

By reason of the fact that we have no record of such or sim¬ 
ilar conduct on the part of Robert on any other occasion, some 
students of this period have been inclined to believe, either that 
Hincmar is guilty of exaggeration in reporting this event, or 
that the fiasco was due to a panic produced among the Frankish 
troops by the suddenness of the Viking attack; both of which 
views serve admirably to exonerate the character of Robert. 53 
It should be noted, however, that these explanations of the affair 
at Melun are based on an assumption: the assumption that Rob¬ 
ert’s attitude toward the king was still one of undiluted loyalty 
and perfect good faith. They fail to take into account the pos¬ 
sibility that Robert had been nettled by his removal from Neu- 
stria to Burgundy. It would seem indeed very strange, being 
exactly the opposite of what had happened in 858, 54 if Robert 
had now permitted himself to be superseded by Prince Louis, 
with entire good will and without exhibiting any signs of dis¬ 
satisfaction or taking any measures to secure rehabilitation. 
It appears much more probable that, though he continued to 
exhibit a more or less superficial loyalty in the royal service, 
Robert really was looking about for an opportunity to force 
Charles to reinstate him in the position he had formerly held 
in Neustria; a position whose importance was second only to 
that of the king himself. 55 Such an opportunity offered itself 
at Melun, and Robert knew how to exploit it. This interpre¬ 
tation of Robert’s discomfiture will be found in perfect accord 
with later events and on the whole seems much more satisfactory 
than those previously referred to. 

After the fiasco at Melun Charles gave up all hope of expelling 
the Northmen, and even of holding them in check, by military 
measures. That was evidently out of the question so long as 
he could not count on the loyal co-operation of the fideles; for 
without such co-operation it was impossible to secure forces 

53 von Kalckstein, Robert cl. Tapfere, 101; Vogel, 215; Lot, op. cit., 398, 
nn. 1, 3. Later, Lot evidently changed his opinion on this matter; see his 
“Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 9. n. 2. 

54 On this see von Kalckstein, op. cit., 52 if. 

55 Cf. Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit. In fact, the policy of Robert led 
precisely to the result indicated in the text. So far from losing the favor 
of the king after his disgraceful flight before the Vikings, Robert increased 
in that favor and became even more powerful and influential than he had 
been before he was transferred to Burgundy in 865. Cf. icl., “Une annee 

de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 400-2; von Kalckstein, op. cit., 102 ff.; infra. 
pp. 90-91 and notes. 



CHAPTER V 


71 


that would be equal to the task. 56 There remained, therefore, 
only one alternative for securing the removal of the Vikings, 
namely, the payment of Danegeld. Obviously it would be better 
to submit to this than to expose the country to further violence 
and devastation at the hands of the Vikings. Negotiations with 
the invaders were opened, 57 and Charles the Bald found it neces¬ 
sary to consent to what has usually been regarded as a disgrace¬ 
ful treaty. 58 That its terms were very humiliating may be ad¬ 
mitted, but responsibility for the treaty must be fixed on the 
disloyal and negligent magnates more than on the king. Charles 
had throughout the period of this invasion displayed considerable 
activity at least in devising and preparing various measures to 
hold the Vikings in check; but all his precautions had been 
rendered futile by the willful recreancy of those fideles to whom 
the operations of defense had been entrusted. 59 

t 

The Northmen agreed to depart from the West Frankish 
realm, 60 and presumably to refrain from further devastation 
and plundering, in return for a payment of 4,000 pounds of 
silver according to their (the Northmen’s) weight. 61 In ad¬ 
dition to this sum of money, the invaders may have demanded 
a certain quantity of wine. 62 The pact further included the 
following stipulations: slaves, who had been captured by the 
Northmen, but who ran away from them after the conclusion 
of the treaty, were to be either returned to the Vikings or re- 

56 Diimmler, I, 222 and n. 1; II, 107; Lot, “La grande invasion nor- 
mande,” loc. cit., 7, n. 4; Waitz, D. Yerfassungsgesch., Ill, 560-61; Prou, 
“De la nature du service militaire du par les roturiers aux Xle et XHe 
siecles,” Rev. Hist., 1890, XLIV, 314. 

57 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “Karolus cum eisdem Nortmannis . . . pacisci- 
tur.” 

58 Ann. Bert., ed. Dehaisnes, p. 154, note (a); Vogel, 215. 

59 Cf. supra, pp. 65 ff. 

60 This may be inferred from the fact that the Vikings made preparations 
for their departure while they were awaiting the payment of the tribute 
(Ann. Bert., 866, ed. Waitz, p. 81, bottom). 

61 Ibid., p. 81: “Karolus cum eisdem Nortmannis in quattuor milium libris 
argenti ad pensam eorum paciscitur.” The words, ad pensam eorum, seem 
to indicate that the money was to be weighed by the Vikings on their own 
scales. Evidently Prankish and Danish weights were not identical (cf. 
Soetbeer, “Beitrage z. Gesch. d. Geld- und Miinzwesens,” Forsch. z. d. Gesch., 
VI, 55-56. In 860, the Vikings had demanded 3,000 pounds pondere exami- 
nato (see supra, chap, iii, nn. 32, 61), which does not necessarily mean that 
Danish scales were used in the weighing. What Lot says on this subject 
(“Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 399, n. 1) is not to the 
point; see Soetbeer, op. cit., pp. 8, 9. 

62 At least the regni primores were required to furnish a coniectum 
toward the Danegeld tam in argento quam et in vino (see infra, n. 136). 



72 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

deemed at a price named by the latter; and if one of the North¬ 
men were killed, the Franks were to pay the amount of money 
(wergelcl) demanded for him. 63 

To raise the Danegeld, Charles levied taxes — though, as will 
be shown, it probably was not intended that they should be con¬ 
strued as taxes — on all the important kinds of property and 
resources 64 within his kingdom, which at this time included 
Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy. 65 It appears that four differ¬ 
ent assessments and collections were necessary before the entire 
sum demanded by the Vikings was forthcoming. 66 In the follow¬ 
ing discussion each of the assessments will be studied separately 
and in the order it was issued. 

By the first assessment, taxes were laid on all dependent hold¬ 
ings of land and on the property of merchants and priests, 67 
and the payment of the heribannus was required of all free 

63 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81. 

64 This statement is not intended to imply that all those who owned or 
were in possession of property or resources contributed in proportion to 
their ability to pay, or that there was no shifting of the burden of taxation; 
it refers solely to the manner in which, according to our sources, the taxes 
were distributed by the king. It is true that there is no specific mention, 
in any of the assessments, of demesnes or dominant holdings (mansi in- 
dominicati). But all owners or tenants of such property were at least free¬ 
men; and all freemen were required to pay the heerbann (see infra . n. 68), 
which, as we shall see, was in this case tantamount to a tax. Moreover, the 
demesnes included in the beneficiary holdings, or Jionores, of the fideles of 
the king were, at least in theory, directly affected by the last two assess¬ 
ments; see infra, pp. 87 ff. and nn. 136, 137, 143. It is true also that the 
comparatively scarce kinds of dependent holdings, as for example Mansi 
censiles and m,ansi lidiles, were ignored in all the assessments levied by the 
king. But, despite that, they probably did not escape taxation; see infra, 
n, 69 and cf. n. 124. 

65 Cf. supra, chap, iii, nn. 37, 38. Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “indicta per 
regnum suum conlatione ad idem exsolvendum tributum.” These words 
surely indicate that the tax was levied in the entire kingdom of Charles the 
Bald, including Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy, but not Aquitaine (cf. 
Lot, “Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 412 and n. 2), which 
was a separate kingdom (id M “La Loire, l’Aquitaine et la Seine,” loc. cit., 
496-97). Lot takes a different view (“Une annee . . . de Charles le 
Chauve,” loc cit., 400, n. 2), which is based on a supposed analogy between 
the Danegeld of 866 and that of 877. In 877 Neustria was, to be sure, not 
included in the assessment levied for the Danegeld demanded by the Vik¬ 
ings of the Seine; it applied only to Francia and Burgundy. But there was 
a special reason for the exclusion of Neustria from this assessment, namely, 
that the Neustrians were to raise another Danegeld for the Vikings of the 
Loire, a fact which is carefully pointed out by Hincmar (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 
135). For a fuller discussion of this matter, see infra, p. 98 and n. 38. If, 
however, it is reasonably certain that the tax of 866 had been levied by 
Charles throughout his kingdom, it is very doubtful that it could be col¬ 
lected everywhere. Cf. infra, pp. 89-90. 

66 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81; cf. infra, nn. 135, 136. 

67 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “de unoquoque manso ingenuili exiguntur sex 
denarii et de servili tres et de accola unus et de duobus hospitiis unus de- 





CHAPTER V 


73 


Franks . 68 Each mansus ingenuilis was assessed at six denarii , 
and each mansus servilis., at three ; 69 one denarius was demanded 
for each accola 70 and for every two hospitia 71 respectively. The 
merchants were required to contribute a tenth of all they pos¬ 
sessed ; 72 and the priests similarly were taxed on the basis of 

narius et decima de omnibus quae negotiatores videbantur habere; sed et a 
presbiteris secundum quod unusquisque habuit vectigal exigitur.” Cf. infra, 
n. 119. 

68 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “heribanni de omnibus Francis accipiuntur.” 
The Franci were the liberi homines, as is proved by the Edict. Pistense 
[864] ,(B.), c. 34, loc. cit., pp. 325-26, where the two terms are used synony¬ 
mously. They all owed military service, but since the time of Charlemagne 
the character and amount of this service had varied according to the re¬ 
sources of each one (iMd., cc. 26, 27, p. 321; cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 558 ff.). 
The amount of the heerbann had varied in a similar way (see infra, n. 75). 
The term Franci as employed by Hincmar in the quotation given at the be¬ 
ginning of this note must be taken to include not only ordinary freemen, 
but also those who possessed jurisdictional rights and were under obligation 
to lead the freemen, over whom they exercised such rights to the army 
muster (cf. Waitz, op cit., IV, 326 ff., 335, 459 ff., 597, 604; Guerard, ed., 
Polypi, d'lrminon, I, (Proleg.), pp. 212 ff.). In other words it must be 
assumed that the heerbann, as one of the taxes levied for the Danegeld of 
866, was due not only from freemen of lesser rank and fortune, but also— 
and at the standard rate of sixty solidi (cf. infra, p. 76)—from all seigniors 
who were laymen, including counts and other magnates. The king knew 
or ought to have known, through the reports of the counts and the missi, 
how many free Franks there were in each pagus, or county (Edict. Pis¬ 
tense, (B.), c. 27, loc cit., p. 321). 

69 Mansi, accolae, and hospitia, are the names applied to the tenures 
which, together with the mansus indominicatus on which they depended, 
made up a large estate, or villa. The holders of such tenures were, as a 
rule, either coloni or serfs; but in the ninth century the character of each 
tenure was fixed by custom, and did not depend on the condition of the 
tenant. Coloni might hold mansi serviles, and serfs, mansi ingenuiles. The 
real distinction between different kinds of dependent tenures was, at this 
time, economic. As a rule, more services and redevances were required 
from holders of ma?isi serviles than from those of mansi ingenuiles, regard¬ 
less of whether the actual tenant was a colonus or a serf (cf. See, Les 
classes rurales et le reg. dom. en France, 28-42, 45-68; Guerard, op. cit., 
233 ff., 277 ff., 577 ff.; Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, I, 212). Lot’s 
statement (“Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 399, n. 2), that 
the “ mansus ingenuilis est le manse tenu par un colon,” is inaccurate, for 
such tenures were often held by serfs. Cf. Vogel, 215, n. 2. The mansi 
lidiles and the mansi censiles are not mentioned by Hincmar as having been 
taxed. But he may have meant to include them in the mansi ingenuiles, 
from which they did not at this period essentially differ. The question is 
not of much importance, for these holdings were few in number at the time 
of Charlemagne, and were rapidly disappearing (See, op. cit., 38 ff.). 

70 Accola here means a tenure, not a person, as Lot seems to think (op. 
cit., 399, n. 3). Evidently the accola was estimated at about one third of the 
value of a mansus servilis. See Guerard, op. cit., 426, n. 2, 630 and n. 24. 

71 The hospitium, like the mansus and the accola, was a tenure. It is 
difficult to determine the character of the hospitium in any precise way, 
for it probably varied somewhat according to time and place. Here it is 
estimated at half the value of an accola. Cf. ibid., 627 ff.; See, op. cit., 63-65. 

72 In 860 the amounts paid by merchants toward the Danegeld had been 
proportioned to the value of their houses and movables. Cf. supra, chap, 
iii, n. 36. 



74 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


the value of their resources . 73 The heribannus, originally a 
fine amounting to sixty solidi in each case , 74 here appears to be 
tantamount to a tax. If, as seems probable, this heerbann was 
proportioned to the circumstances of those liable to pay it , 75 
we may justly regard it, like the other imposts of the first assess¬ 
ment, as in fact though not in theory a tax on property or 
resources . 76 

These rates of assessment — the most detailed and specific 
that have been thus far furnished — must now be subjected 
to closer scrutiny. It seems desirable to ascertain first what 
information they yield concerning the legal basis of the Dane- 
geld considered as an impost. The question as to how this form 
of taxation — unknown throughout the period preceding the 
reign of Charles the Bald — was legalized, is, it will be agreed, 
one of fundamental importance in the study of the Danegeld, 
and particularly in the study of its institutional development. 

Very significant from the viewpoint of such an inquiry is the 
obligation placed on all free Franks {Fraud) to pay the heri¬ 
bannus, or heerbann. Ordinarily and regularly, the heerbann 
of sixty solidi had always been and still was a fine levied on 
freemen who when summoned to the army failed to go . 77 But 
the heerbann with which we are here concerned cannot be con- 

73 See supra, n. 67. 

74 Brunner, op. cit., II, 213; cf. supra, n. 68. 

75 The heerbann had been so proportioned even by Charlemagne (Waitz, 
op. cit., IV, 557, n. 4), but in the later years of his reign Charlemagne seems 
to have exacted the full heerbann in each case (ibid., 564, n. 1). However 
that may be, it is certain that Charles the Bald in the year 864 exacted a 
heerbann proportionate to the resources of the freemen (Edict. Pistense, 
(B.), c. 27, loc. cit., p. 322), for he refers to the “discretionem, quae in pro- 
genitorum nostrorum, capitulo XIV continetur,” which is a restatement of 
the capitulary of 805 on this subject. See Baldamus, Das Heerwesen unter 
den spdteren Karolingern (in Gierke’s Enter suchungen z. d. Staats- und 
Rechtsgesch., IV), p. 36; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 564, n. 1; Migne, Patr. Lat., 
XCVII, 553; cf. infra, pp. 76-77. 

76 This statement is not intended to imply that military service, for the 
non-performance of which the heerbann was the regular fine, rested on the 
property. In principle and in legal theory, that had always been and doubt¬ 
less still was the obligation of every free man. Edict. Pistense [864], (B.), 
c. 25, loc. cit., p. 322: “ad defensionem patriae omnes sine ulla excusatione 
veniant.’’ Cf. Roth, Gesch. d. Beneficialwesens, 402. On the other hand, it 
cannot be denied that we have here an excellent illustration of how the 
principles and legal theories of an age lag far behind the facts of that ase. 
Cf. Brunner, op. cit., II, 202 ff.; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 538; Baldamus, op. cit., 
4-11. 

77 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 548, 557 ff.; cf. supra, n. 74. 



CHAPTER V 


75 


sidered a penalty for the non-performance of military service . 78 
It is rather a tax levied as a substitute for military service, and 
as such it resembles in some ways the feudal payment which 
in England was called scutage . 79 Accordingly, the liability of 
the Frankish freeman to pay this tax must have rested partly 
on his obligation to render military service at the summons of 
the king; and partly on a theory in law that the king might, if 
he chose, dispense with the personal services and exact instead 
what was regarded as the equivalent in money . 80 To indicate 
a legal ground, other than this, on which freemen might have 
been held liable to contribute toward the Danegeld, would be 
difficult if not impossible; since according to a very old and 
still at least formally valid principle, they could not be taxed 
on either their persons or their property . 81 

But the collection of the heerbann as a substitute for military 
service was, it should be noted, in all likelihood an innovation 
due to the exigencies created by the Viking invasions. For, 
to say the least, it is extremely doubtful that the predecessors 
of Charles the Bald had ever, in theory and principle, exacted 
the heerbann otherwise than as a penalty . 82 It is true, to be 
sure, that the possibility of evading active service in the field 
had always existed for every freeman who was able and willing 
to pay the heerbann . 83 It is true also, that in the past there had 

78 Cf. Baldamus, op. cit., 10. Examples are not wanting of an analogous 
use of the word somewhat earlier; see Brunner, op. cit., II, 212 and n. 41; 
cf. infra, n. 82. 

79 Commutation of military service into a money payment was not un¬ 
known even to the Romans. On the whole subject see Baldwin, The Scu¬ 
tage and Knight Service in England, 1-17; cf. Viollet, Histoire des institu¬ 
tions politiques et administratives de la France, II, 433-34. There is reason 
to believe that the Carolingians applied this principle regularly with respect 
to merchants. See Baldamus, op. cit., 40-60; and cf. infra, p. 86 and n. 127. 

80 Cf. Lot, “Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 399, n. 4; 
Viollet, op. cit., II, 433 and n. 6. 

81 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 112; Brunner, op. cit., II, 234; Viollet, op. cit., I, 323, 

82 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 575, n. 4. I cannot agree with Lot when he says 
(op. cit., 399, n. 4) that the Capitulary of Thionville of 805 (M.G.H., LL. 
Sectio II, t. i, p. 125, c. 19) perhaps offers an example of the commutation 
of military service into a money payment. The heerbann, according to that 
capitulary, was exacted as a fine for the non-performance of military duty 
(cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 557). Brunner, op. cit., II, 212, refers to a money 
payment, sometimes called heerbann, which was paid in lieu of the hostili- 
tium and carnaticum by the unfree peasants to their seigniors. This is, of 
course, not the same thing as the ordinary heerbann of the free Franks, 
which, so far as my observations go, was up to this time always paid, in 
theory at least, as a fine for the non-fulfillment of military obligations. 

83 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 575: “Auf die Strafe kam am Ende alles an. Wer 
diese zahlen wollte, konnte zu Hause bleiben.” 



76 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

been many abuses in the collection of the heerbann; frequently, 
no doubt, it had been exacted in cases where it was not legit¬ 
imately due. 84 Perhaps, therefore, what Charles the Bald had 
done was not at the time understood to be, or generally recog¬ 
nized as, an innovation. But, however that may have been, the 
collection of the heerbann as a tax did in fact introduce a new 
principle — a principle based on the legal fiction that the king 
had the right to demand from every freeman either personal 
military service or its money equivalent — in the future appli¬ 
cation of which the kings and the great feudal nobles, the latter 
being the real successors to the authority of the Carolingian 
monarchs, were to secure for themselves important financial 
resources. 85 

L 

Before dismissing the subject of the heerbann, attention must 
be directed once more 86 to the fact that this exaction had, even 
as early as the time of Charlemagne — when it was in theory 
regarded exclusively as a fine — sometimes been graduated in 
proportion, more or less, to the means of those who were liable 
to pay it. Thus, in 805 , freemen possessing movables 87 worth 
but one pound, paid a heerbann of not more than five solidi; 
others with movables worth two or three pounds, paid ten and 
thirty solidi, respectively; and only those whose personal proper¬ 
ty was valued at six pounds, paid the standard rate of sixty 
solidi. 8S This graduated scale of the heerbann of 805 is import¬ 
ant, in part because it illustrates the usual policy of Charle¬ 
magne, but more especially because it was also the scale adopted 
by Charles the Bald in 864 ; for we know that in the latter year 
Charles the Bald issued a capitulary which, in so far as it re¬ 
ferred to the heerbann, was virtually a restatement of the pro¬ 
visions of Charlemagne in 805. 89 It is true, however, that in 
864 Charles the Bald had levied the heerbann as a fine; was the 
tax, in 866, similarly graduated in proportion to the resources 
of the tax-payers? To this question it is not possible to give 
a conclusive answer. But since there is no reason to suppose 
that Charles the Bald had changed his policy in this matter 

34 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 579, n. 2; Brunner, op. cit., II, 165. 

85 See Borrelli de Serres, Recherciies sur divers services publics du XHIe 
au XVIIe siecle, 467-528. 

86 Cf. supra , nn. 68, 75. 

87 The fine could not be exacted in land or slaves: see Waitz, op. cit., IV, 
557, n. 3. 

88 Ibid., n. 4. 

89 Cf. supra , n 75. 



CHAPTER V 


77 


between 864 and 866, 00 it seems probable that the graduated 
scale applied to the heerbann as a fine in 805 and again in 864, 
was also followed in 866, when the exaction was levied, not as a 
fine, but as one of the taxes to raise the Danegeld. 

We have seen that the heerbann demanded for the Danegeld 
of 866 was in legal theory a money payment substituted for 
active military service. But what was the legal basis of the 
other taxes levied for the same purpose? Obviously it will 
not be improper, in attempting to find a solution of this problem, 
to proceed on the hypothesis that all the taxes for the Danegeld 
rested on the same basis; that they were all legalized on the 
ground that they were substitutes for the service of war. The 
conversion of this hypothesis into a well supported theory will 
involve the establishment in fact of the following points: (1) 
that each of the people whom the king held responsible for the 
taxes was regularly liable to an amount or a degree of military 
service which corresponded more or less to the sum of money 
now demanded from him for the Danegeld; and (2) that in the 
case of these taxpayers just as in that of the men from whom 
the heerbann was demanded, there were cogent reasons why 
the king should have desired to avoid undisguised taxation and 
preferred to exact the contributions on the ground that they 
were substitutes for military service. 

A glance at the distribution of the taxes for the Danegeld of 
866, according to the first assessment, will immediately reveal 
the fact that the bulk of these taxes had been levied on various 
kinds of dependent holdings — mansi ingenuiles, mansi serviles, 
accolae, hospitia — whose occupants belonged, for the most part, 
to the class of unfree peasants. But Frankish law did not re¬ 
quire, or at least had not heretofore required unfree persons — 
coloni, servi, and certain others of similar condition — to render 
personal military service in the field. That was an obligation 
which, in legal principle, rested only on freemen (franci) . 91 
Moreover, it must be admited that the unfree peasants, with 
exception of those who were attached to the royal domain, owed 
neither services nor payments, of any kind, to the king directly; 

90 The Edict. Pistense of 864 (see supra, n. 75) was intended to be an 
edict with general application for the future, and not only a temporary regu¬ 
lation for the current year. 

91 Brunner, op. cit., II, 202 ff.; Roth, op. cit., 392 ff.; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 
538. Of. supra, nn. 68, 76. 



78 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

they were under direct obligations only to their seigniors. 92 
Accordingly, if we assume for the moment that the taxes levied 
on the dependent holdings were legalized on the ground that they 
were substitutes for military service, we are obliged to conclude 
that this military service was not owed directly by the peasants 
actually occupying those holdings; but, on the same assumption, 
that it must have been thus owed by the seigniors in control of 
the great estates which included the dependent holdings of the 
peasants. 

From the seigniors, ecclesiastical as well as lay, the Frankish 
kings demanded very important services in time of war. Charle¬ 
magne had required of seigniors, in addition to what was incum¬ 
bent on them as freemen, a special and supplementary service 
commensurate with the jurisdictional rights they exercised and 
proportioned to the resources at their disposal. 93 While it may 
be true that some few of the seigniors had by the time of Charles 
the Bald been able to free themselves of this burden, there are 
not many such cases on record; 94 and it is safe to assume that 
most of the great landholders — bishops, abbots, and lay seign¬ 
iors — could, in principle at least, still be required to render 
their share of military service. 95 The special military obligation 
of a seignior included not only the duty to lead the freemen 
living within his jurisdiction, properly armed and equipped, to 
the place where the army was to be mustered ; 96 it included also 
that he furnish a certain number of oxen, wagons, and other 
war equipment, sufficient for the needs of his contingent of 
fighters. 97 The outlay involved in furnishing this materiel was 
supplied by the proceeds of certain annual war taxes (hostili- 
tium , carnaticum) levied by the seigniors on the holdings of their 
unfree tenants — chiefly on the mansi ingenuiles but also, in 
some cases, on the mansi serviles . 9S These taxes were collected, 
sometimes in kind and sometimes in money, once a year by the 

92 See, op. cit., 26 ff.; cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 625 and n. 2. 

93 Cf. supra, n. 68. On the special obligations of the seigniors, see Guerard, 
op. cit., 661; Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform, de la royaute, 519-23; 
Roth, op. cit., 409 ff.; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 621 ff.; Brunner, op. cit., II, 212. 

94 Guerard, op. cit., II, 675-77; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 583. 

95 Cf. Prou, op. cit., p. 323. 

96 See the letter of Charlemagne to Abbot Fulrad (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, 
t. i. 168), and cf. Roth, op. cit., 408. 

97 See the references cited supra, n. 93. 

98 See, op. cit., 92; cf. Roth, op. cit., 410, n. 97. 



CHAPTER V 


79 


ministeriales of the seignior." It may be admitted that Charle¬ 
magne had probably never required either all the freemen or all 
the seigniors to render military service each year, and that his 
successors had demanded this service from their ficleles and their 
subjects with much less frequency than Charlemagne; 100 but it 
must be insisted that none of the Carolingian monarchs had ever 
abdicated their right to it. Accordingly, the military obligation 
of the Franks, seigniors as well as ordinary freemen, remained 
during the reign of Charles the Bald, in principle and in law, 
essentially the same as it had been in the time of his grand¬ 
father. 101 

t 

Charles the Bald, accordingly, had a perfect legal right to de¬ 
mand from the various seigniors not only the regular military 
service due from them as freemen — though this was of course 
not due from ecclesiastical seigniors personally — but also, ex¬ 
cept in certain rare instances, the additional service due from 
them as seigniors. We have seen that Charles, in exacting the 
heerbann for the purposes of the Danegeld, had virtually claimed 
with respect to the military service required of freemen as such, 
the power to substitute for the specific performance of that serv¬ 
ice the payment of a money equivalent. 102 Why should he not 
have claimed the same power with respect to the additional serv¬ 
ices required of the seigniors? Indeed, was not that precisely 
what he did when he levied taxes for the Danegeld on all de¬ 
pendent holdings throughout his kingdom? On what other 
ground could such taxes have been legally justified? 103 To the 

99 Guerard, in tire Prolcgomenes to liis edition of the Polypt. d'Irminon, 
pp. 660-75, has the most complete discussion of these matters; for other 
references see supra, n. 93. 

100 Prenzel, Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung unter den Earolingern von 
der Mitte des achten bis zum Ende des neunten Jahrhunderts, Erster Teil, 
29-37. On the disinclination of the fideles of Charles the Bald to render 
military service, cf. Lot, “Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 
434, n. 3; Baldamus, op. cit., 50. 

101 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 572 ff., 581; cf. Brunner, op. cit., II, 202: “Da eine 
verfassungsmassige Aufhebung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht nicht erfolgte, 
hat sie theoretisch bis zur Auflosung der frankischen Monarchie bestanden.” 
See also Baldamus, op. cit., 13, 40, and passim. 

102 See supra, pp. 74 ff. 

103 It is perhaps unnecessary to insist that the Danegeld was never re¬ 
garded as part of the dona annua. In 877 the king clearly distinguished 
between these two payments by accepting dona annua at the close of the 
same assembly at which arrangements were made for raising the Danegeld 
of that year (Capitula cxcerpta in conventu Carisiacensi coram populo 
lecta [877], M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 363). The dona annua were ob¬ 
viously not interpreted as substitutes for military service; for we have evi¬ 
dence that they were in many cases required in addition to the military 



80 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

latter question it is, of course, very easy to reply that the Dane¬ 
geld was an emergency measure sufficiently sanctioned by the 
law of necessity. But if we are to remain content with such 
a reply, we must be willing wholly to eliminate from considera¬ 
tion the fact that the emergency referred to, an emergency 
which Charles was now endeavoring to terminate by the payment 
of tribute, had been created by certain disloyal magnates for the 
direct purpose of embarrassing, or forcing the hand of, the king; 
we must be willing also—and this is more important—utterly 
to ignore the inveterate and deep rooted aversion of the Frankish 
freeman, whether in high station or low, to the idea of being 
taxed. 104 

These magnates, ever intent upon increasing their power and 
prestige; these seigniors, jealously watchful of their rights and 
privileges; would they, who otherwise were chiefly interested 
in curtailing the prerogatives of the crown, now have consented 
to an augmentation of the royal prerogative such as it evidently 
had been assumed 105 that even ordinary freemen would never 
have countenanced? Would they have permitted the establish¬ 
ment of the principle that the king had, even though it were 
only in an emergency, the right of taxation? No scholar at all 
conversant with the character and ambitions of the West Frank¬ 
ish nobility in the latter half of the ninth century could for a 
moment think of answering this question in the affirmative. 
And Charles, we may believe, was well aware that an attempt 
to raise the Danegeld as an undisguised tax would have proved 
abortive. In order to insure even measurable* success for his 
policy, the king must have found it necessary so to interpret 
his method of raising the tribute as clearly to give the impres- 

service (Waitz, op. cit., IV, 108 and n. 1, 601). The king’s right to the 
dona annua, after they had lost their original voluntary character (cf. Fus- 
tel de Coulanges, op. cit., 502 ff.), was of course in the main based on cus¬ 
tom; though it is true that according to Hincmar, the church paid them 
“causa suae defensionis’’ (see infra, chap, xvii, n. 43), i. e. in return for the 
special protection given it. 

104 That the disloyal magnates—especially Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar, 
but also to some extent Robert and Odo—were really responsible for the 
emergency of 866 has been shown supra, pp. 65—71. For the general aims 
and policy of the West Frankish nobility in the time of Charles the Bald, 
see infra, pp. 114-15 and nn. 20, 21. On the Germanic principle that a free¬ 
man could not be taxed, see the references cited supra, n. 81, and cf. infra, 
chap, xvii and n. 58. 

105 That this assumption had been made is evident from the fact that 
the taxes required of the freemen for this Danegeld were disguised under 
the name of heribanni. 



CHAPTER V 


81 


sion that whatever else it might be, it was not really taxation. 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Charles had levied the 
Danegeld on holdings of dependent condition: mansi, accolse, and 
hospitia; not only those included within the royal domain but 
all such holdings throughout the realm. But, as we have seen, 
the king had no direct authority, financial or otherwise, over 
the unfree occupants of these holdings, unless they were attached 
to the royal domain. 106 Outside the royal domain the king and 
his officials entered into direct relations only with seigniors 
and freemen, not with the unfree population. The king had, 
in other words, no right to tax either the seigniors or their 
dependents. Obviously, therefore, the Danegeld would not in 
either of these cases have been legal if it had been levied in 
theory as a tax; and it has been shown above that illegal tax¬ 
ation would for various reasons have been practically impossi¬ 
ble. Accordingly there remains but one alternative: the neces¬ 
sary basis of the Danegeld assessments levied on the dependent 
holdings must have been the king’s right to demand military 
service from the seigniors; a right to which Charles the Bald, 
here as in the case of ordinary freemen, subjoined the corollary 
that the king might, if he chose, exact a sum of money in lieu of 
the actual service. 107 

At this point it may be proper to discuss a certain problem 
that arises in connection with the levy of the Danegeld on de¬ 
pendent holdings. The fact that the seigniors were, by the time 
of Charlemagne, in the habit of collecting certain annual war 
taxes ( hostilitium , carnaticum) from the tenants of their de¬ 
pendent mansi , has already been referred to. 108 In theory, the 
proceeds of these taxes were to be used by the seigniors to meet 
their military obligations to the king. But though the peasants 
were required to pay the tax each year, the seigniors rendered 

106 Cf. supra, nn. 65, 67, 91, 92. 

107 It may be added that this theory is not invalidated by the fact that 
in certain cases—they are comparatively rare—exemption from military 
service had been granted by charters of immunity (See, op. cit., 21 ff.; 
Brunner, op. cit., II, 294 ff.); for such immunity did not apply when a 
levee en masse was necessary to resist foreign invasion (Guerard, op. cit., 
676; Prou, op. cit., 323; Prenzel, op. cit., 46 ff.; cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 315, 
317, n. 3, 574, 575; on the origins of the levees en masse see Plach, Les orig. 
de Vane. France, I, 317-18; and cf. infra, n. 129). In an emergency such as 
that produced by the Viking invasion of 866 Charles had the right to call on 
all seigniors for either military service or a money equivalent (cf. supra, 
n. 80). 

108 See supra, p. 78. 

Danegeld. 6. 



82 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

• 

military service only when called upon to do so by the mon¬ 
arch; 109 and they were called upon much less frequently by 
Charles the Bald than they had been by Charlemagne. 110 It 
might therefore be conjectured, especially if the Danegeld was 
in law a substitute for military service, that the seigniors on 
this occasion were expected when they paid their respective 
quotas toward the Danegeld, simply to apply to this purpose a 
certain portion of the proceeds of the annual war taxes. But 
did they in fact take their quotas of the Danegeld from this 
regular source of income; or did they raise the Danegeld by 
levying on the peasant holdings an additional burden, distinct 
and separate from the annual war taxes? 

The correct answers to these questions may be easily con¬ 
jectured by anyone at all familiar with the character and meth¬ 
ods of seigneurial exploitation. A sentence of M. See * * 111 is so 
much to the point here that it deserves to be quoted: “Et tel 
est Tun des traits caracteristiques du regime domanial: il n’est 
aucune taxe, meme d’ordre public, qui ne retombe tout entiere 
sur les classes inferieures.” If the seigniors had applied the 
proceeds from the annual war taxes toward the Danegeld, the 
latter exaction would not have been felt at all by the peasants; 
they would have paid their lords no more in a year when Dane¬ 
geld was levied than they did any other year. In that case the 
bulk of the Danegeld would have been paid by the seigniors out 
of what they were now inclined to regard as their private 
resources. 112 Such, of course, was not the case. The evident 
willingness of the seigniors to aid the crown in raising the Dane¬ 
geld, the fact that on many occasions they preferred buying off 
the Vikings to fighting them, 113 are sure indications that the 
burden of the Danegeld fell on other shoulders than those of 
the great landholders. But we need not rely on mere indica¬ 
tions; for we have the direct evidence of Hincmar that the 
peasant population had in many cases been reduced to penury in 
consequence of the numerous exactions of Danegeld during the 
reign of Charles the Bald. Indeed it would appear that the 
peasantry, so far from escaping the burden of the tribute, prob- 

109 Roth, op. cit., 411 and n. 100; Brunner, op. cit., II, 212. 

110 See supra, n. 100. 

111 Op. cit., 92. 

112 Ibid., 92-93, 116. 

113 See supra, pp. 33, 41-42; cf. infra, chap. vi. 



CHAPTER V 


83 


ably had to bear its heaviest load. 114 The annual war taxes 
were levied, as a rule, only on mansi ingenuiles. But for the 
Danegeld of 866 all dependent mansi, the serviles as well as the 
ingenuiles, were taxed; and even the smallest, or least profitable 
holdings — accolae and hospitia — did not escape. 116 It is clear, 
therefore, that the Danegeld was levied on a large number of 
holdings which were as a rule exempt from the ordinary war 
taxes, viz., most of the mansi serviles, and all accolae and hos- 
pitda. On the other hand, it must be assumed that tenants of 
mansi ingenuiles and, in some cases, of mansi serviles were re¬ 
quired to contribute toward the Danegeld in addition to paying 
the annual war taxes. 117 If the contrary had been the case, they 
would have escaped those serious hardships in which we know 
they were involved as a consequence of the Danegeld. 118 

The seigniors, accordingly, had contributed little if anything 
out of their private resources to meet the first assessment for 
the Danegeld of 866. 119 This fact is of considerable importance 
in helping us to understand why it was easier for Charles the 
Bald to raise a Dangeld and buy off the Vikings than to raise 
an army and defeat them. 120 But it is not the whole truth. There 
were also other reasons why the seigniors did not in the main 
or as a rule object to raising the Danegeld. For them the Dane- 

114 This is indicated by Hincmar in a letter written to Louis the Stam¬ 
merer shortly after the exaction of the Danegeld of 877 (Migne, Patr. Lat., 
CXXV, 987): “qualiter . . . miser iste populus, qui jam per plures annos 
depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nortmannos re- 
pellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, . . . ut virtutem nobis Deus 
reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo jam ante plures annos locum in 
isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum 
pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites jam evacuatas habent.” 
Charles the Bald also refers to the burdensomeness of the Danegeld for the 
poorer classes in the Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta of 861 (M.G-.H., LL. 
Sectio II, t. ii, 301): “volumus, quia . . . consideratio misericors ... in hac 
commendatione nostra est necessaria propter paupertatem hominum, quia 
necesse fuit in istis temporibus coniectum de illis accipere et ad navium 
compositionem et in Nortmannorum causa pro regni . . . salvamento.” The 
remainder of this capitulary shows that in referring to the “poverty of 
men,” Charles was thinking not only of freemen but also of coloni and 
servi. Cf. supra, chap, iii, n. 75. 

115 In certain exceptional cases they were exacted on mansi serviles. Cf. 
supra, n. 98. 

116 Cf. supra, n. 67. 

117 Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 322. 

118 Cf. supra, n. 114. 

119 The seigniors ought of course to have furnished a 7 ieerbann for them¬ 
selves out of their demesnial resources (cf. supra, nn. 64, 68) ; but if M. 
See’s view (see the quotation on the preceding page) is correct, it would 
seem to follow that even this burden was shifted on the peasantry. 

120 Cf. supra, n. 113. 



84 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

geld meant not merely a saving of the expense that participation 
in a military expedition would have involved; it meant also an 
actual augmentation of their financial resources and the estab¬ 
lishment of a precedent of great value in connection with their 
exploitation of the peasants. 

We have already seen how the seigniors might enrich them¬ 
selves by requiring their subjects to pay the Danegeld in locally 
coined money. 121 It does not seem probable that the seigniors 
and their ministeriales would have gone to the trouble of collect¬ 
ing the Danegeld, unless there had been some prospect of re¬ 
muneration for the service thus rendered. 122 Though the royal 
assessment called for a specific tax from each of the various 
kinds of dependent holdings, it is very unlikely that the exact 
amount indicated, no more and no less, was collected in each 
case. 123 It is much more likely that the purpose of the assess- 


121 See supra, chap, iii, n. 62. 

122 We know that the ministeriales received a certain percentage of the 
annual war taxes (hostilitium, carnaticum) which they collected from the 
tenants of the mansi (Guerard, op. cit., 668 and n. 1; See op. cit., 123-24). 
We also know that when the count collected the heribannus in his county 
he was permitted to retain one-third of the proceeds therefrom (Waitz 
op. cit., IV, 578; Flach, op. cit., I, 321, n. 3). It therefore seems probable 
that the ministeriales likewise retained a portion of the Danegeld for their 
own profit. 

123 This view is based on a study of how the hostilitium and carnaticum 
were raised. According to Guerard (op. cit., 673-74). these annual war 
taxes were not paid directly by each tenant to the abbey of St. Germain. 
On the contrary, they were estimated for each fisc in what may be called 
lump sums—either in money or in kind—which were paid to the abbey by 
its ministeriales. Allowance was made for some variation in the amount 
and value of these lump sums, a variation which must have been due not 
only to fluctuations in the prices of oxen, etc., but also to changes occurring 
from time to time in the situation of the individual tax-payer; sometimes 
he was able to pay in kind, sometimes in money; one year he could pay 
more, another year less. It was for the ministeriales to adjust these mat¬ 
ters as best they could, but meanwhile see to it that the abbey received 
approximately what was due from each fisc. An arrangement such as this 
could hardly have failed to develop numerous irregularities in the collection 
of the annual war taxes (cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 625 and n. 3); and these 
irregularities were probably increased rather than decreased by reason of 
the fact that many mansi supported more than one family of peasants. 
(Guerard, op. cit., II, 897). I am inclined to think that there were more 
irregularities in the collection of the Danegeld than in that of the hostilitium 
and the carnaticum. The amount of these latter had been proportioned, more 
or less, to the value or yield of each individual mansus, and doubtless there 
were difficulties in the way of collecting more from any mansus than its 
tenants were accustomed to pay (ibid., 658-59). But in the exaction of the 
Danegeld there was no custom which might help secure equity. In theory, 
it is true, the Danegeld had been assessed at one and the same figure for all 
mansi ingenuiles. and at another, theoretically invariable figure for all 
mansi serviles, etc. But the following considerations lead me to believe 
that, in practice, varying amounts of Danegeld were exacted from tenants 



CHAPTER V 


85 


ment was merely to furnish a basis for estimating the proper 
contribution of each of the several seigniors, and that the latter 
were free to raise the amounts required of them more or less 
as they saw fit. 124 However that may have been, we shall not 
err in assuming that some arbitrariness and some abuses were 
bound to develop in connection with each levy of the Dane- 
geld, and that the purpose as well as the result of such abuses 
was the enrichment of the seigniors. 125 

In the development of seigneurial exploitation, therefore, the 
Danegeld must have been a factor of more than negligible im¬ 
portance. The royal authority had imposed on the seigniors an 
obligation to furnish a certain quota of the tribute money de¬ 
manded by the Vikings. That obligation could readily have 
been interpreted as conferring upon the seigniors a more or less 
general legal right to levy extraordinary contributions on their 
unfree dependents in times of emergency. And it is easy to see 
how the seigniors and their agents by the adroit application 
of such a theory may in many cases have succeeded in giving 
a color of legality to what in fact were arbitrary and unjust 
exactions; how precedents established in connection with the 
levy of the Danegeld may have aided and perhaps accelerated 
the development of the legal principle, so well known in feudal 
times, that the unfree peasants were taillables a merci , 126 

of the same kind of mansi: (1) mansi of the same class were not always of 
the same value even in the time of Charlemagne (ibid., 601), and by the 
time of Charles the Bald the differences in value had been much increased 
(ibicl., 602-3) ; (2) the redevances due from mansi of the same class differed 
considerably in quantity and nature (ibid., 659, 672 ff.); (3) mansi of one 
class were in some cases burdened with the kind of redevances ordinarily 
due from mansi of another class (ibid., 659; (4) for these reasons and for 

others of a more temporary nature, the ability of tenants of the same kind 
of mansi to pay Danegeld must have been very unequal, and, therefore, 
(5) the ministeriales obviously found it necessary, as well as profitable, to 
adopt the method of exacting in each case the largest amount obtainable. 
This view as regards the manner in which the Danegeld was exacted from 
the peasant population, appears to me to be in harmony with what is known 
about the collection of the annual war taxes and about the general situation 
and circumstances of the tenants on the dependent holdings. Cf. Roth, 
op. cit., 410. 

124 On this basis one might hazard the conjecture that the seigniors com¬ 
pelled every one of their dependents who had any kind of resources on 
which he might draw, to contribute toward the Danegeld; in other words, 
that the Danegeld was exacted not only from those dependents who occupied 
holdings in land— mansi, accolae, hospitia —but also for example from arti¬ 
sans, who may not in all cases have been tenants of even small plots of 
land, but whose labors in the crafts or otherwise must have yielded some 
measure of resources. 

125 Cf. supra, n. 114. 

126 Luchaire, Manuel des institutions francaises, periode des Capetiens 



86 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


It now remains to be determined whether the Danegeld con¬ 
tributions required of merchants and priests were, like those 
of freemen and seigniors, exacted on the theory that they were 
substitutes for military service. As regards the merchants, it 
is at least questionable whether they were in general obliged to 
render personal military service; it appears more probable that 
they were required to contribute toward military expeditions 
in some other way, perhaps by payments of money. 127 But what 
reason is there to suppose, as between these regular payments 
of the merchants and their contributions to the Danegeld, a 
difference of legal basis? On the contrary, there is every reason 
to believe that since the two exactions were in both cases made 
necessary by war, they were also in both cases legalized on the 
ground that they were substitutes for military service. 

The priests, it is true, had been exempt from personal military 
service, at least since the middle of the eighth century. 128 
Whether the predecessors of Charles the Bald had ever required 
them to contribute in any way toward the expenses of war, 
cannot be determined from the sources at our disposal. But 
after Charles the Bald 129 had introduced the principle that in 
the case of a necessitas, or lantweri — i. e. in a time of great 
national danger, as when the country was invaded by a foreign ' 
army 130 — all men without any exception were liable to military 

directs, 206-7, 309, 336; cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 342-43; Viollet, op. cit., II, 
449-50. 

127 Baldamus, op. cit., 40-60. The merchants of the Carolingian period 
were under the special protection of the king, and in return for this protec¬ 
tion they were required annually or biennially to pay over to the royal treas¬ 
ury a certain percentage of their profits; but the latter payments, it should 
be noted, were probably distinct from the war contributions (Waitz, op. cit., 
IV, 44-45, 586 and n. 4). P^ustel de Coulanges (op. cit., 510, 518) holds that 
the merchants were not exempt from military service. He bases his opinion 
on a capitulary requiring freemen who had property in movables, but not in 
land, to render their share of military service (cf. Waitz, op. cit., IV, 560 
ff.) But this general rule need not necessarily have applied to merchants. 
The latter were certainly excused by Louis the Pious from sccira service 
and from paying heerbann (ibid., 586, n. 4). 

128 Ibid., 592, n. 1. 

129 Beyond a doubt it was Charles the Bald who introduced the principle 
of universal obligatory military service in the event of foreign invasion. 

It is first mentioned in the Conventus apud Marsnam primus [847], III, 
Adnuntiatio Karoli, c. 5 (M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, 71): “talis regni in- 
vasio, quam lantweri dicunt, . . . acciderit, ut omnis populus illius regni 
ad earn repellendam communiter pergat.” Cf. Brunner, op. cit., II, 215; 
Waitz, op. cit., IV, 574-75. Roth (op. cit., 411) seems to think that* this 
principle had also applied in the time of Charlemagne; yet he can furnish 
no evidence of its application prior to the year 847 (ibid., n. 102). Cf supra 
n. 107. ’ 

130 See Prenzel. op. cit., 46-47 and notes; cf. .Baldamus, op. cit., 51 ff. 



CHAPTER V 


87 


service, then priests no longer could be or were regarded as com¬ 
pletely exempt from the burdens of war. 131 Accordingly, owing 
to the existence of a necessitas, or lantweri, in 866, 132 the lower 
clergy, since they had not been called upon to take the field, might 
conceivably, by way of substitution, be required to contribute 
toward the Danegeld. 133 Legally to justify the taxation of the 
priests in any other way, would be difficult if not impossible. 

The first assessment for the Danegeld of 866 ought, it would 
seem, to have yielded vastly more than 4,000 pounds. 134 Yet for 
some reason it proved inadequate and, consequently, a second 
assessment became necessary. 135 By this assessment an addi¬ 
tional tax of one denarius was levied on the two most numerous 
kinds of dependent holdings: the mansi ingenuiles and the mansi 
serviles. Even that did not suffice, and Charles finally had to ask 
for two successive contributions from the great magnates (regni 
primores). These contributions, consisting partly of money and 
partly of wine, 136 were in each case proportioned to the value of 
the honores held by the several magnates. 137 

131 Baldamus, op. cit., 52 and n. 75. It is interesting to note that Hincmar 
refers to the Danegeld paid by the priests in 866 as vectigal (cf. supra, n. 67). 
Another statement of Hincmar (Opera, II, 325,'quoted by Waitz, op. cit., IV, 
107, n. 3) may shed some light on what he meant by vectigal: “causa suae 
defensionis regi ac rei publicae vectigalia, quae nobiscum annua dona vo- 
cantur, praestat ecclesia.” Yet the Danegeld must not be confused with the 
annua dona (see supra, n. 103). 

132 Cf. supra . pp. 64 ff. 

133 Cf. Prenzel, op. cit., 46, n. 46. 

134 The mansi held by the abbey of St. Germain (Guerard, op. cit., II, 
903) ought alone to have yielded nearly 200 pounds; and it is difficult to 
believe that that abbey held five per cent of all the mansi in Francia, Neus- 
tria, and Burgundy. Moreover, in addition to the taxes laid on the depend¬ 
ent holdings, there were the payments of the freemen, the priests, and the 
merchants, which ought to have yielded a considerable sum. These consid¬ 
erations lead me to believe that the first assessment, if it had been generally 
paid, would have been ample to raise the entire Danegeld, even according 
to Danish weight (cf. supra, n. 61). Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., Forsch. z. d. 
Gesch., VI, p. 55. 

135 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81: “Inde de unoquoque manso, tarn ingenuili quam 
et servili, unus denarius sumitur.” These words of course imply that a 
second assessment was made. 

136 Ibid.: “et demum per duas vices, iuxta quod unusquisque regni pri- 
morum de honoribus habuit, coniectum tarn in argento quam et in vino ad 
pensum quod ipsis Nortmannis pactum fuerat persolvendum contulit.” The 
first five words of this quotation taken together with the quotation in the 
preceding note, indicate that all told four successive assessments had been 
required in order to raise the Danegeld of 866. 

137 The exact meaning of the expression, “iuxta quod unusquisque . . . de 
honoribus habuit, coniectum” (see the preceding note), is difficult to de¬ 
termine. Does it mean that the nobles were taxed in proportion to the 
estimated value of each of their honores as a whole; or does it mean that 
they were required to pay a specific sum for each dominant holding (man- 



88 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

The fact that the contributions required from the regni pri- 
mores were proportioned to the value of their honores, furnishes 
additional support for the above propounded theory concerning 
the legal basis of the Danegeld. Honores and beneficia, between 
which there was in the time of Charles the Bald little if any 
distinction, 138 were granted by the king principally in order to 
enable their holders to perform at the bidding of the monarch 
a certain amount of military service. 139 It is clear, therefore, 
that the king’s right to require the great magnates to contribute 
appropriately toward the Danegeld, was based on his right to 
demand military service from them in proportion to the number 
and value of their benefices or honores ; 140 and in the case of the 
regni primores as in that of the other classes, the king acted on 
the principle that he had a right to commute the actual military 
service into a money payment. 141 

The words of Hincmar, superficially at least, seem to indicate 
that the magnates paid their contributions to the Danegeld out 
of their private — as distinct from their dependents’ — re¬ 
sources. 142 The possibility that some may have done that can¬ 
not of course be wholly eliminated, since we have no direct 
evidence to the contrary. 143 On the other hand, it is, as we have 
seen, a well established fact that all payments of whatever kind 
which the seigniors of this period had to make, as a rule were 
supplied ultimately by the lower classes of the population, in 
particular the unfree peasants. To suppose that the Danegeld 
was in this respect an anomaly, is made impossible by the direct 
evidence we have of its deleterious effects on the economic con- 

sus inclominicatus) within their honores and perhaps, in addition, a part of 
the redevances due them from their dependents? We know that they were 
taxed on the latter basis in 877 (see infra, chap, vi, n. 42). Is it too bold 
to assume that the same arrangement was made in 866? 

138 Bourgeois, Le capitulaire cle Kiersy-sur-Oise, 129 ff.; Brunner, op. cit., 
II, 255; Waitz, op. oit., IV, 215, 216 and n. 1. Cf. Ann. Bert., 869, p. 98, 
where practically no distinction is made between honores and beneficia, and 
where both are said to consist of mansi. 

139 Brunner, op. cit., II, 210-11; cf. ibid., I, 209; Viollet, op. cit., I, 439. 

140 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 597, n. 2. Cf. Ann. Bert., 869, p. 98. 

141 Cf. supra, pp. 74 ff. 

142 Cf. supra, n. 136. 

143 Hincmar (see ibid.) does not say that the magnates themselves made 
the contribution. He does say that a coniectum in proportion to the number 
and value of the honores held by each magnate ad pensum . . . contulit. 
It does not seem advisable to base the argument that follows in the text on 
this peculiarity of statement, but it should be noted that the words of Hinc¬ 
mar do not disprove the argument. 




CHAPTER V 


89 


dition of the peasantry. 144 It is in much better accord with the 
established facts to believe that the contributions of the regni 
primores, and for that matter of all the seigniors, were furnished 
largely if not exclusively by their unfree dependents. Many of 
these doubtless had to pay considerably more than the amounts 
at which their holdings had been assessed by the king. The prob¬ 
ability is that the sums actually paid by the unfree tenants were 
determined, not by royal decree, but by the lord or his agents; 
and that these sums were always intended to cover at least two 
things: (1) the assessment levied by the king and (2) a liberal 
profit for the lord and his ministeriales . 145 But the regni primores 
probably deemed it necessary to increase these sums somewhat 
in the case of the peasants on those estates which were held as 
honores; in order that the payments of these peasants might 
cover not only the two things above mentioned, but also the two 
special contributions required of the primores — contributions 
which ought strictly to have been furnished by the magnates out 
of their private, demesnial resources. 146 Thus, it will be seen, 
the Danegeld always, even when it was levied on honores , proved 
for the great magnates a much lesser burden than actual military 
service; a fact which, as pointed out before, is of considerable 
help in trying to understand why it was easier for Charles the 
Bald to buy off the Vikings with money than to expel them by 
force of arms. 147 

Four different assessments 148 had been required in order to 
raise the sum demanded by the Northmen as the price of their 
withdrawal. Why so many levies were necessary, is a very 
important and interesting question, but one which cannot be 
answered with more than approximate certainty. It has been 
pointed out that the magnates and seigniors had, for various 
reasons, less objection to furnishing certain quotas of Danegeld 
than to equipping themselves and their men for the service of 
war. Always, however, there were some seigniors who, by 
reason of hostility to the crown, did neither of these things. 
Probably a certain number — e. g. Adalard and his following, 
perhaps even Robert the Strong for a time — pursued such a 

144 Cf. supra, pp. 82-83 and nn. Ill, 114. 

145 See supra, nn. 119, 122, 123, 124. 

146 The heribanni due from the seigniors may have been obtained by them 
in a similar way (cf. supra, n. 119). 

147 See supra, pp. 82 ff. 

148 See supra, n. 136. 



90 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

policy in 866. There is, as we have seen, reason to believe that 
the first assessment for the Danegeld of this year would have 
proved amply sufficient if all the tax-payers had properly re¬ 
sponded. 149 Evidently they did not, since three additional assess¬ 
ments had to be levied in order to secure the required amount 
of 4,000 pounds. It is clear, however, that the first assessment 
did yield by far the larger part of what was needed, for the 
second assessment was calculated to bring a much smaller amount 
of money than the first. 150 The last two contributions, which 
were based on the values of the honores held by the primores, 
must have aggregated but a small fraction of the whole Dane¬ 
geld. 151 

The agreement with the Vikings had been reached rather 
early in the year 866 ; 152 yet the Danegeld could not be paid until 
July, and not until after Robert the Strong had been given back 
his commanding position in Neustria. 153 Was there any connec¬ 
tion between the latter event and the raising of the Danegeld? 
To this question only a hypothetical answer can be given. The 
view expressed above regarding the reasons for Robert’s failure 
to make a stand against the Vikings at Melun, 154 implies that 
Robert was taking advantage of the presence of the Vikings for 
the furtherance of his own interests. If this view is correct, it 
follows that Robert would lend no aid in securing the removal 
of the Northmen, at least until Charles had done something 
toward rehabilitating the prestige of his ambitious vassal; or, 
more specifically, Robert would be reluctant to do his share in 
raising the Danegeld, unless and until Charles would reinstate 
him as his vicegerent in Neustria. 155 But we know that the 
Danegeld was not paid until after Robert had regained his posi- 

149 Cf. supra, n. 134. 

150 Cf. supra, n. 135. 

151 Lot (“Une annee . . . cle Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 405-6) sup¬ 
poses that Charles the Bald’s sale of the abbey of St. Bertin to Hilduin for 
thirty pounds of gold, on June 19, 866, was largely due to the necessity of 
securing more money for the Danegeld. I can find no basis for this conjec¬ 
ture except the fact that the sale took place about a month before the Dane¬ 
geld was paid to the Vikings, which fact really has no particular significance. 

152 Ibid., 398, n. 2. 

153 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81. Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 102-3; Lot, op. cit., 
400-1. 

154 See supra, pp. 68-70. 

155 Robert had a large following, particularly in Neustria, where he had 
taken an important part in the revolt of 858 (Lot, op. cit., 401). Opposi¬ 
tion on his part would therefore have been a serious obstacle in the collec¬ 
tion of the Danegeld. 



CHAPTER V 


91 


tion in Neustria. 156 Accordingly, it seems not too much to say 
that among the various considerations 157 which led Charles to 
readopt Robert the Strong as his most highly favored vassal 158 
must be included also the necessity of, or the difficulties encoun¬ 
tered in, raising the Danegeld. There can be little doubt that 
Robert and his followers, after their reinstatement, actually did 
raise the Danegeld for those honores in Neustria which had been 
granted to them, and thereby materially aided Charles in secur¬ 
ing the amount demanded by the Vikings. 159 

It was probably late in June, or early in July, 160 that the North¬ 
men quitted their island stronghold near the monastery of St. 
Denis. Thence they proceeded to a point farther down the 
Seine, where they tarried for a time to repair their ships and to 
await the payment of the Danegeld. Meanwhile, Charles, with 
a force of workmen and wagons, had repaired to Pitres to com¬ 
plete the fortifications in that place, in order that the Northmen 
might not again be able to ascend the Seine. 161 These measures 
on the part of the king indicate that in spite of recent events he 
had not lost faith in the fortified bridge as an effective means 
of opposing the Viking raids, 162 provided he could have the loyal 
cooperation of his ficleles in the operations of defense. 

Towards the end of July the Northmen received their 
money, 163 and then put to sea. Some of the Vikings proceeded 
directly to the pagus Isalgae (Ijsselgau?), in the realm of 
Lothaire II. Here they seem to have continued their operations 
without encountering any resistance on the part of Lothaire. 164 

156 Cf. supra, n. 153. 

157 Other reasons which may have induced Charles to favor Robert as he 
did, are given by Lot, op. cit., 402. 

158 Lot, op. cit., 401, calls Robert “le vrai roi du pays entre Seine et 
Loire.” 

159 Ann. Bert., 866, p. 81. Cf. von Kalckstein, op. cit., 102-3. 

160 Ann. Bert., 866. This source, in the edition of Waitz, p. 81, reads 
“mense Iunio.” Dehaisnes (p. 155) and others have “mense Iulio.” No 
explanation of this discrepancy has ever been given so far as I can ascertain. 

161 Ann. Bert., 866, pp. 81-82. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 402-3. 

162 Adoiiis Chronicon, 868, M.G.H., SS., II, P- 323. Cf. Lot, Le pont de 
Pitres,” loc. cit., 9. Charles apparently continued in the future to place 
much confidence in this means of resistance (ibid., 15 ff.). 

163 Ann. Xantenses, 866, M.G.H., SS., II, p. 232: “pagani crudeliter Gal- 
liam vastaverunt. Acceptoque inde a Karolo rege innumerabili censu, ad 
tempus reversi sunt.” Ann. Bert., 866, p. 82: “Nortmanni mense Iulio mare 

intrant.” 

164 Ibid.; Ann. Xantenses, 866, loc. cit., p. 232. Cf. Vogel, 217, n. Lot, 
“Une annee . . . de Charles le Chauve,” loc. cit., 403, n. 3. 



92 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

But the Seine region was now for ten years left undisturbed by 
Vikings. 165 

Thus, by reason of the negligence, disloyalty, and self-interest 
of his fideles , 166 Charles the Bald had been compelled for the 
fourth time 167 to secure the removal of a group of Vikings by the 
payment of Danegeld. And on this occasion, as in 860, he had 
found it impossible even to raise the Danegeld, until the ambi¬ 
tious demands of the more powerful among the fideles had been 
satisfied. The Danegeld, whatever may have been its legal basis, 
served only on the one hand further to curtail the royal power 
and, on the other, steadily to augment the power of the fideles 
politically as well as financially. 168 

165 Vogel, 217-18. 

166 For an illustration of the total lack of public interest 6n the part of 
the West Frankish nobility at this time, see Lot, op. cit., 430-31. 

167 Vogel, p. 216, calls the Danegeld of 866 the third payment of this kind 
to the Vikings. He overlooks the Danegeld of 853. 

168 Cf. Lot, op. cit., 401-2. 



t 



THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 93 


CHAPTER VI. 

The Two Danegelds of 877. 

After 866, a period of eleven years elapsed before Charles the 
Bald was again reduced to the necessity of paying Danegeld. 
The decade from 866 to 876 on the whole proved to be, for the 
greater part of the West Frankish realm, an era of peace, a time 
of recuperation from the ravages of the Northmen. 1 To the 
population of the Seine region in particular, which after suffer¬ 
ing the consequences of six successive Viking expeditions 2 was 
doubtless on the verge of complete exhaustion, this period of 
tranquillity and recovery must have been especially welcome. 
Yet there was in it no promise of security for the future. For 
the Northmen had after all not ceased from their destructive 
labors; they had only shifted for a time the principal scene of 
their plundering operations from the continent to England. And 
with the arrival in the Seine, in the year 876, of a seventh expe¬ 
dition of Vikings, the ten years of peace came to an abrupt close. 3 

The invaders had as usual timed their adventure well. When 
the Vikings entered the Seine, Charles was preoccupied with a 
project of such great moment to him, that there was small likeli¬ 
hood that he would swerve from it to deal with them. On the 
contrary, the Northmen had good reason to believe that they 
would be able to establish themselves and gain firm footing in 
the kingdom, before anything would be done to expel them or 
even to limit the area of their operations. 4 

This is not the place to give a detailed account of Charles the 
Bald’s unsuccessful attempt, on the death of Louis the German 
in 876, to gain possession of eastern Lorraine. 5 For the purposes 
of the present discussion it will suffice to note the relation be¬ 
tween the failure of that enterprise and the success of the Viking 
adventure. 

It was at Cologne, on the way to the fateful field of Andernach, 
that Charles received the news of the arrival of the Vikings. 

1 Vogel, 217, 224 ff. 

2 In 841, 845, 851, 852, 856-62, and 865-66. On the effects of these expedi- 
ditions, see Vogel, 188 ff., 205 ff., and passim. 

3 Miracula sancti Dionysii, III, cc. 1-2, Bouquet, VII, p. 365; also see 
infra, n. 6. For the activities of the Northmen between 866 and 876, see 
Vogel, 217-18, 224 ff. 

4 See ibid., 252, and cf. 83 ff. 

5 See Diimmler’s account (Gesch. d. ostfr. Reiches, III, 36-38). 



94 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

On September 16, so the king was informed, they had entered 
the Seine in a fleet numbering about one hundred large vessels. 6 
These tidings did not induce Charles to abandon his project of 
conquest. To him the acquisition of Lorraine probably seemed 
the more important thing for the moment; and he may have 
trusted that the fortifications at Pitres would prove a sufficient 
check to the Northmen until, after a victory over the East Franks, 
he would be able to give the Vikings his personal attention. 7 
Accordingly, Charles continued on his way to Andernach, where, 
on October 8, his forces were completely routed by an army of 
Saxons and Thuringians commanded by his nephew, Louis the 
Saxon. 8 

This defeat probably cooled the martial ardor of Charles con¬ 
siderably. At all events an offensive against the Northmen was 
now utterly out of the question. 9 To have attempted it would 
have been futile, not to say foolhardy, for the army of Charles 
had suffered unusually heavy losses at Andernach. 10 It is, there¬ 
fore, not surprising that Charles very soon dispatched a group 
of nobles, headed by Count Conrad II of Paris, to open negotia¬ 
tions with the Vikings. The envoys were instructed to make the 
best bargain possible under the circumstances, and to report to 
the king at a placitum which he had summoned to Samoussy for 
November 25. * 11 Whether the embassy of Count Conrad was able 
to reach an agreement with the invaders, and whether any 
report on this matter was submitted to the king at Samoussy, 
we do not know. 12 However that may be, it is certain that 


6 Ann. Bert., 876, p. 132; Annales Vedastini, 876, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 295. 

7 Cf. Vogel, 252. Lot (“Le pont de Pitres,” Le Moyen Age, 1905, IX, p. 
12) believes that either the fortifications at Pitres were not yet completed, or 
they were not guarded. 

8 Ann. Bert., 876, pp. 132-33. 

9 According to the Annals of St. Vaast, Charles, before he opened nego¬ 
tiations with the Vikings, had made an unsuccessful attempt to expel them 
by force of arms; but no such attempt is mentioned by Hincmar, and it 
seems very unlikely so soon after the catastrophe at Andernach (cf. infra, 
n. 13). 

10 Ann. Bert., 876, p. 133; cf. Vogel, 251. 

11 Ann. Bert., 876, p. 134: “Karolus imperator Chuonradus et alios pri- 
mores ad Nortmannos qui in Sequanam venerant misit, ut, quocumque modo 
possent, foedus cum eis pasiscerentur, et ad condictum placitum [in Sal- 
monciaco 15. die post missam s. Martini] ei renuntiarent.” Ann. Vedast., 
loc. cit.: “Unde de redemptione regni cogitare coepit [Karolus].” Cf. Vogel, 
252-53. 

12 Hincmar mentions the fact that the placitum at Samoussy was duly 
held, but says nothing of any report as regards the negotiations with the 
Northmen. There is good reason to suspect that these first negotiations had 
been without definite result, as will appear from what follows in the text. 



CHAPTER VI 


95 


Charles before leaving Samoussy stationed scarae along the 
Seine, hoping probably that he might be able in this way at least 
to prevent the Vikings from making a further advance. 13 

If negotiations with the Northmen had not been altogether 
broken off before Charles left Samoussy, they certainly must 
have been materially delayed by a very severe illness which fell 
upon the king soon after his departure, and from which he did 
not begin to convalesce until early in 877. 14 Then, if we may 
believe the Annals of St. Vaast, envoys were again dispatched 
to the Vikings with instructions to negotiate with them con¬ 
cerning their evacuation of the kingdom in return for the pay¬ 
ment of tribute. 15 This time a definite understanding was 
arrived at, 16 the Northmen agreeing to depart for a considera¬ 
tion of 5,000 pounds of silver according to weight. 17 

About the same time that the treaty with the Vikings in the 
Seine was concluded, or shortly afterward, a similar agreement 
was reached with another group of Northmen who for some time 
past had been established in the region of the lower Loire. 18 The 
negotiations with the latter appear to have been conducted, not 

13 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Scaras quoque, quae contra Nortmannos secus 
Sequanam in procinctu essent, disposuit [Karolus].” The Annals of St. 
Vaast (loc. cit,.), it is true, seem to indicate that Charles for a time had 
attempted to take the offensive against the Vikings, though without success: 
“Contra quos [Nortmannos] Karolus exercitum dirigit; sed nil utiliter 
egere.” According to the same source, this offensive preceded an eclipse of 
the sun on October 29—i. e. it took place nearly a month before the placitum 
was held at Samoussy on November 25. But it is not safe to place too much 
reliance on the sequence of events as given in the Annals of St. Vaast. 
Some further details as to the probable whereabouts of Charles himself in 
October and November, are given by Diimmler, III, 38, n. 2. The Vikings 
entered the monastery of St. Denis on November 30, but appear to have re¬ 
mained there only a short time (Lot, op. cit., pp. 13-14). 

14 Ann. Bert., 876-77, p. 134. 

15 Ann. Vedast., 877, p. 295: “Karolus legatos misit qui cum Nortmannis 
tractarent, ut munerati e regno ejus abirent.” Hincinar makes no men¬ 
tion of this embassy. 

16 Ann. Vedast., loc. cit.: “Et facta pactione, etc.” 

17 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “Summa vero tributi fuerunt quinque milia 
librae argenti ad pensam.” Cf. supra, n. 15, and infra, n. 97. On the sig¬ 
nificance of the provision that the money was to be weighed, see supra, 
chap, iii, nn. 61, 62; chap, v, n. 61. 

18 On the long continued occupation of the lower Loire region by the 
Northmen, see Vogel, passim, and especially, for their operations between 
874 and 878, pp. 248-51. The statement in the text as regards the probable 
time when the treaty with the Loire Vikings was made, is based on the fact 
that Hincmar mentions this treaty (see the following note) immediately 
after he has described the manner in which the Danegeld for the Vikings in 
the Seine was raised. 



96 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

by the king himself, but by the magnates of Neustria, 19 among 
whom at this time Abbot Hugh functioned as the king’s vice¬ 
regent. 20 We have no information concerning the amount of 
the tribute which was demanded by the Vikings of the Loire. 21 

Meanwhile there had arrived in France two papal envoys 
bringing letters from John VIII to Charles the Bald. The latter, 
it is well known, had in 875, on the death of his nephew, the 
Emperor Louis II, undertaken an expedition to Italy, where, 
thanks to the friendly attitude of Pope John, he had been able 
to secure the imperial title and some nominal recognition of his 
suzerainty. Before the emperor left Italy he had given the pope, 
whose position was precarious, assurance of his speedy return. 21a 

It was the immediate fulfillment of this engagement which 
John VIII urged in the letters dispatched to the emperor early 
in 877. The pope besought Charles in impetuous terms to come 
without further delay to his aid against the Saracens and other 
enemies; and he emphasized the necessity of asserting and 
establishing the imperial authority in the peninsula. 22 This was 
not the first time that John VIII had reminded Charles of his 
promise to come to the defense of the Roman church, 23 and now 
the emperor probably felt that in spite of the various problems 
confronting him at home, he could no longer defer the fulfillment 
of his promise to the pontiff. 24 

Charles, having determined to undertake a second journey to 
Italy, at once set about making his preparations. Before he 
could start out it was necessary, among other things, to provide 
adequately for the general administration of the West Frankish 
kingdom during his absence, and for the raising of the tribute 


19 Ann. Bert., loc cit.: “Illi vero, tam episcopi quam et alii qui trans 
Sequanam sunt de Neustria, tributum illis Nortmannis qui in Ligeri erant 
secundum quod sibi ab eis fuit impositum, undecumque valuerunt, reddere 
procuraverunt.” 

20 Vogel, 220-22; cf. Bourgeois, Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 99 ff. 

21 Two considerations lead me to conjecture that it was a smaller amount 
than that paid to the Vikings of the Seine: (1) it was to be raised in a 
smaller district—only in Neustria, while the other was to be raised in Bur¬ 
gundy as well as in the larger part of Francia; (2) the Vikings in the Loire 
were probably fewer in number than those in the Seine (cf. Vogel, 248, 
bottom). 

21a See Diimmler, II, 388-400. 

22 Ann. Bert., 877, pp. 134-35. The letters of John VIII are printed in 
Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova, et amplissima collectio, XVII, 27 ff. Cf. 
Diimmler, III, 40. 

23 Cf. ibid., 39 ff.; Bourgeois, op. cit., 74 ff. 

24 Cf. Diimmler, III, 40-41. 



CHAPTER VI 


97 

due the Northmen of the Seine. It was to arrange these and 
other matters that the emperor summoned his magnates to the 
famous assembly at Kiersy on June 14. 25 

It has been supposed that a first assessment for the Danegeld 
promised the Vikings of the Seine was prepared at a meeting held 
at Compiegne on May 7, six weeks prior to the Assembly of 
Kiersy.- 6 But careful study reveals the fact that there is nothing 
to support this view except an erroneous superscription added 
by some monk, or scribe, of a later period, to one of the two tax 
documents evidently drawn up at Kiersy. 27 There can scarcely 
be any doubt that the rates of assessment, as we have them, were 
fixed at the Assembly of Kiersy, and that they were part of what 
is usually called the Capitulary of Kiersy : 28 It is true that the 
manuscript of this capitulary, in the form that we know it, 29 
contains only a very brief reference to the Danegeld, a mere 
topical statement, indicating that it was one of the subjects 
discussed at the meeting. 30 But we are fortunate in obtaining 
more detailed information from the Annals of St. Berlin, 31 the 
Annals of St. Vaast, 32 and the two tax documents just men¬ 
tioned. 33 

The money paid as Danegeld to the Vikings of the Seine in 
877, was raised in a more limited area than most of the preceding 
Danegelds: 34 only in the kingdom of Francia and in Burgundy. 35 

25 Ann. Bert., 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135; cf. ed. Dehaisnes, p. 255, notes (a) 
and (b) ; M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t, ii, pp. 355 ff. As regards the tribute to the 
Loire Vikings, see infra, n. 38. 

26 See infra, appendix i, nn. 1, 4, 5. 

27 See infra, appendix i. 

28 According to Bourgeois (op. cit., 68, and passim), this was not a capi¬ 
tulary in the proper sense, but merely a record of deliberations such as 
usually preceded the issuance of a capitulary. Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, “Les 
articles de Kiersy,” Nouvelles recherches sur quelques problemes d’histoire, 
417 ff. 

29 The text of the Capitulary of Kiersy was preserved to the nineteenth 
century in only a single manuscript, which, unfortunately, is now lost. 
Practically all that is known about this manuscript may be found in Bour¬ 
geois, op. cit., 11 ff. 

30 Capitulare Carisiacense, c. 30, M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361: “Qual- 
iter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet 
de coniecto.” 

31 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135. 

32 877, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 295-96. 

33 The documents are printed in M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354, 
under the title Edictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico, and are 
there designated respectively as A. and B. On the relation of these docu¬ 
ments to each other and to the Capitulary of Kiersy, see infra, appendix ii. 

34 See supra, chap, i, n. 47; chap, iii, n. 37; chap, v, n. 65. Cf. chap, iv 
and n. 12. 

35 It was doubtless partly for this reason, and because the amount of the 

Danegeld. 7. 





98 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


And it was specifically provided that that part of Francia which 
Charles the Bald had acquired by the treaty of Mersen in 870, 
was not to be taxed. 30 Neustria, which heretofore had usually 
been taxed along with Francia and Burgundy, 37 was not included 
in this levy, 38 manifestly because another and separate Danegeld 
was to be raised there for the Vikings of the Loire. 39 Aquitaine, 
which was regarded as a separate kingdom, had never before 
been required to contribute toward the Danegeld, and was not 
in 877. 40 

Danegeld was higher in 877 than in 866, that the mansi inclominicati had 
to be included, and the rate of the tax on the other mansi increased, in 
the assessment of 877 (cf. supra, chap, v, nn. 61, 67-69.) But there were 
other reasons, too (see infra, p. 101 and n. 59). 

36 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “quomodo tributum de parte regni Franciae 
quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgundia exigeretur, [Karo- 
lus] disposuit.” Ann. Veclast., 877, pp. 295-96: “omne regnum ad hoc tribu¬ 
tum dat ut ab hac liberarentur clade. ... At hi qui in Francia remanserant, 
dato tributo, Danos e regno abire coegerunt.” Also in the superscriptions 
of the tax documents mentioned above, there are references to the territory 
in which the Danegeld was levied; but these convey no additional informa¬ 
tion, and one is inaccurate (cf. infra, appendices i and ii). On the tax in 
Burgundy, cf. infra, n. 40. Lot, op. cit., 15, suggests that it would have been 
poor policy to tax that part of Francia which had been acquired after the 
death of Lothaire II. 

37 Except for the Danegeld of 862, which probably was not levied outside 
of Neustria (cf. supra, n. 34). 

38 Vogel, p. 255, seems to think it possible that Neustria was taxed for 
both Danegelds: that paid to the Vikings of the Seine as well as that paid 
to the Vikings of the Loire. But Hincmar’s words leave no room for doubt 
on this point. He speaks first of the “tributum de parte regni Franciae 
quam ante mortem Lotharii TKarolusl habuit, sed et de Burgundia” (Ann. 
Bert., loc. cit.), and then, after he has explained how this was raised, pro¬ 
ceeds to mention another tribute for the Loire Vikings. That, he says, “tarn 
episcopi quam et alii qui trans Sequanam sunt de Neustria . . . reddere pro- 
curaverunt” (ibid.). On the other hand, it is doubtless true that those 
seigniors who, like Abbot Hugh, held benefices in Neustria as well as in 
Francia or Burgundy, had to contribute toward both Danegelds in 877 (cf. 
von Kalckstein, Abt Hugo aus dem Hause der Welfcn, Markgraf von Neu- 
strien, in Forsch. z. d. Gesch., XIV, 74. 

39 Cf. supra, n. 19. 

40 Bourgeois (op. cit., 98-99) seems to think that in 877 the magnates 

of Aquitaine had been asked to contribute, but had refused; and he believes 
that the seigniors of Burgundy had likewise refused to pay the Danegeld. 
But his hypothesis can not be sustained. It is based on the following falla¬ 
cies: (1) The relations between the fideles assembled at Kiersy and Charles 
the Bald were strained, and a revolt was brewing. This theory has been 
disposed of by Halphen (“A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise,” 
Rev. Hist., 1911, CVI, 286 ff.). (2) The non-appearance of a magnate at 

Kiersy implies that he was not in favor of buying off the Northmen, and 
that, therefore, he had refused to contribute to the Danegeld. This is, of 
course, nothing more than a gratuitous assumption; and it is invalidated 
by the fact that the seigniors had heretofore as a rule been more inclined 
to collect the Danegeld than to enter into combat with the Vikings (cf. 
supra, chap, v, n. 113, and what follows in the text of that chapter). (3) 
The position of that clause in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy which 
relates to the honores of Boso and others (in Burgundy), implies that these 



CHAPTER VI 


99 


To raise the Danegeld in Francia and Burgundy, a graduated 
property and income tax was levied on (1) the dominant and 
dependent holdings of land which constituted the honores, or 
benefices, 41 of bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals; 42 (2) 
the property, or resources, of all priests; 43 and (3) the property 
of merchants and townspeople. 44 Presumably the tax did not 
yield the whole amount required, 45 for it became necessary, as 
it had been on at least one preceding occasion, 46 to draw also on 

men had refused to pay the Danegeld. This argument is, in my opinion, 
disposed of infra, in appendix ii (cf. appendix i, n. 5). (4) The theory that a 
first, or preliminary assessment for the Danegeld due the Vikings of the 
Seine, had been drawn up at Compiegne on May 7. Without this theory, 
which represents an attempt to reconcile two conflicting statements in the 
sources—and it is a theory which seems to have been in the main accepted 
by most scholars—Bourgeois could hardly have constructed the thesis which 
he defends in his book. The present writer, however, believes that this 
theory must be abandoned, if the argument set forth infra, in appendix i, 
is accepted as valid. 

41 On the practical identity of honores and benefices at this time, see 
supra, chap, v, n. 138; see also infra, n. 48. 

42 Edictum . . . de tribute Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “Episcopi, abbates, 
comites ac vassi dominici ex suis honoribus de unoquoque manso indomi- 
nicato donent denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuili quatuor denarios de 
censu dominicato et quatuor de facultate mansuarii, de servili vero manso 
duos denarios de censu indominicato et duos de facultate mansuarii.” Ann. 
Bert., 877, p. 135: “de mansis indominicatis solidus unus, de unoquoque 
manso ingenuili 4 denarii de censu dominico et 4 de facultate mansuarii, de 
manso vero servili duo denarii de censu dominico et duo de facultate mansu¬ 
arii.” It will be noted that the only difference between these two statements 
is that the second is more inclusive than the first. According to Hincmar 
all the mansi in the realm were to be taxed, but according to document B. 
the tax applied only to those mansi which constituted the honores of the 
magnates and the royal vassals (cf. infra, n. 61). Of course, we must re¬ 
gard the document as more accurate than the statement of Hincmar (see 
infra, appendix i, n. 14). As regards document A., see infra, appendix, ii. 

43 Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “De omnibus vero 
ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus . . . vel abbas . . . accipiant . . . de pres- 
byteris secundum possibilitatem ... a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo 
minimum quatuor denarios.” Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “unusquisque episcopus 
de presbiteris suae parrochiae secundum quod cuique possibile erat, a quo 
plurimum, etc.” On document A., according to which the priests of 
churches held by the emperor appear to be exempt, see infra, appendix ii. 

44 Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit,.: “De negotiatoribus 
autem vel qui in civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum 
quod habuerint de facultatibus, coniectus exigatur.” Gapitulare Carisia- 
cense. c. 31, ibid., p. 361: “Et de cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut 
ludaei dent decimam et negotiatores christiani undecimam.” This tax is 
not mentioned either in the Annals of St. Bertin or in document A. 

45 At least that inference may be drawn from the recital of Hincmar, 
who does not mention the contribution from the churches until after he has 
explained all the details of the tax proper; also it does not seem probable 
that the church treasuries would have been drawn upon if the tax had 
yielded a sufficient amount. Cf. infra, n. 47. 

46 In 860-61; cf. supra, chap, iii, n. 36. 



100 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


the church treasuries, each of which contributed in proportion 
to the resources at its disposal. 47 

The tax on the honores was assessed in accordance with the 
following schedule: for each mansus indominicatus 48 there 
were to be paid twelve denarii (or one solidus ) ; 49 for each man¬ 
sus ingenuilis 50 eight denarii? 1 of which four were to be taken 
from the cens due the seignior, 52 while the other four were to be 
contributed (in addition to the regular redevances due the 
seignior) by the holder (or holders) 53 of the mansus; 54 for each 
servile mansus 55 four denarii were exacted, 56 of which two were 
to be taken from the seignior’s cens, and two contributed (like¬ 
wise in addition to the regular redevances) by the tenants. 57 

47 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “Sed et de thesauris ecclesiarum, prout quantitas 
loci extitit, ad idem tributum exsolvendum acceptum fuit.” Ann. Vedast., 
877, p. 295: “Et facta pactione spoliantur ecclesiae, et omne regnum ad hoc 
tributum dat.” The fact that the “spoliation” of the churches is mentioned 
before the collection of the tax in the Annals of St. Vaast, does not seem to 
invalidate the argument given above in n. 45, since Hincmar evidently gives 
more detailed, and more accurate, information on the raising of the Dane- 
geld. The author of the Annals of St. Vaast probably mentioned first that 
feature of the Danegeld which to him seemed most important, or rather, 
most reprehensible. That he did not approve of using the treasures of the 
church for this purpose is indicated by his characterization of the act as a 
“spoliation” (cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 82-83). 

48 The mansus indominicatus was the demensne, or home farm—dominant 
holding—to which the mansi ingenuiles and mansi serviles were attached, 
and on which the labor services owed by the tenants were performed (cf. 
See, Les classes rurales et le reg. dom. en France, 28 ff.). Since the term 
honores at this time usually was applied to very important benefices 
(Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., IV, 16 and n. 1), perhaps we may infer that 
the honores ordinarily consisted of several mansi indominicati with their 
dependent tenures (cf. Guerard, ed., Polypt. d’Irminon, I (Proleg.), 565-67, 
579-82, 891). 

49 See supra, n. 42. 

50 Cf. supra. chap, v, n. 69. 

51 See supra, n. 42. 

52 The cens was a real, as distinct from a personal, redevance. It varied 
in amount, probably according to custom, and was payable sometimes in 
money, sometimes in kind (See, op. cit., 78-83). By this time the cens had 
probably come to include the old war taxes (cf. ihid., 116); at any rate, 
while the terms hostilitium and carnaticum disappear in the course of the 
ninth century (cf. Du Cange, Glossarium, s. v.), the taxes which they rep¬ 
resented certainly continued to be collected (Waitz, op. cit., IV, 624; Guer¬ 
ard, op. cit., 661 ff.). Cf. supra, pp. 78 ff. 

53 Many mansi supported more than one family of peasants (Guerard, 
op. cit., 897). 

54 In other words, the tenant of a mansus ingenuilis was, in theory, to 
pay toward the Danegeld only four denarii out of what remained of his 
income after he had paid all other dues which he owed. But cf. infra, pp. 
102-3. 

55 Cf supra, chap, v, n. 69. 

56 See supra, n. 42. 

57 What is said supra, nn. 52-54, applies here also, mutatis mutandis. 



CHAPTER VI 


101 


In the preceding chapter it was shown that the Danegeld must 
be regarded, in its legal aspects, as a money payment which 
the king claimed the right to exact as a substitute for the mili¬ 
tary service owed by all freemen. We have also seen how, in 
866, all freemen, including those of very moderate fortune, were 
required to contribute toward the Danegeld by paying a heer- 
bann. 58 But in 877 no tax, not even a disguised one, was laid 
on freemen as such. And an examination of the schedule of as¬ 
sessments for the Danegeld of this year will show that it fails 
to provide for any taxes whatsoever on allodial property. All 
of which may, superficially at least, seem to invalidate the theory 
that the Danegeld was, in legal principle, a substitute for mili¬ 
tary service. It must be remembered, however, that in the ninth 
century the freeman of moderate fortune, and with him his 
allodial property, was rapidly disappearing. Long before the 
close of the reign of Charles the Bald, the Carolingian armies 
of freemen had in large part been superseded by armies made up 
almost exclusively of groups of vassals. The latter, unless they 
were royal vassals, were not under the direct command of the 
king, or the king’s officials as such; they were subject only to 
the control of their lords, the great seigniors, lay and ecclesi¬ 
astical. 59 Moreover, the principle that the seigniors owed mili¬ 
tary service, not so much because they were freemen as because 
they were benefice holders, and that they owned it strictly in pro¬ 
portion to the size or value of their benefices, was now rapidly 
gaining headway. 60 These facts will probably serve to explain 
why the Danegeld of 877 was levied, not on the allodial property 
of any freeman, nor on benefices held of other lords than the king, 
but only on the honores G1 held directly of the king by bishops, ab¬ 
bots, counts, and royal vassals; and they clearly indicate that 

58 Supra, chap, v, pp. 73 ff. 

59 Diimmler, I, 222, 322-24; Baldamus, Das Heerwesen u. d. spat. Karo- 
lingern (in Gierke’s Untersuch. z. d. Staats- u. Rechtsgesch., IV), pp. 32 ff., 
39; Prou, “De la nature du service militaire, etc.,” Rev. Hist., 1890, XLIV, 
314-15; Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform, de la royaute, 509-23, 640-65; 
Flach, Les orig. de Vane. France, I, 317-22; Lot, ‘‘La grande invasion nor- 
mande,” Bil)l. de Vecole des chartes, 1908, LXIX, 7, n. 4; Brunner, D. Rechts¬ 
gesch., II, 202 ff. The facts referred to above in the text may explain why 
no attempt was made at this time to collect the heerbann as a tax for the 
Danegeld. Owing to the impoverishment of those freemen who were not 
seigniors, and to the dwindling of their numbers, it was probably felt that 
at best a collection of the heerbann would have yielded very little. It is, 
unfortunately, impossible to estimate how much the heerbann, as a tax for 
the purposes of the Danegeld, had yielded in 866 (cf. sujwa, pp. 73-77). 

60 Baldamus, op. cit., 28 ff., 34-35; Waitz, op. cit., IV, 597 and n. 2; cf. 
Ann. Bert., 869, p. 98. 



102 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

the holder of a honor was by the king held liable to either military 
service or its money equivalent — Danegeld. 

There are certain indications of an attempt to lighten the 
burden of the Danegeld for the poorer classes on this occasion. 
Accolte and hospitia, which had been taxed in 866, 62 were exempt 
in 877, theoretically at least. 63 And the taxes on the mansi in- 
genuiles and serviles were in the latter year divided in such wise 
that only one half was to be paid by the holder (or holders) 
of the mansus, the seignior being required to furnish the other 
half from the customary cens paid him by his tenants. In 866, 
the tenants of dependent mansi , had been required to furnish 
the entire tax laid on their holding, and this tax was to be paid 
in addition to the cens due the seignior, which was at that time 
left untouched by the Danegeld. 64 It must be assumed, there¬ 
fore, that the king now wished the seigniors to contribute a 
very considerable part of the Danegeld out of what may be 
regarded as their resources — in contradistinction to those of 
their tenants — and that those provisions of the assessment of 
877 by which taxes were laid on the mansi indominicati and on 
the lord’s cens, 65 were intended to secure this result. 

But did they? Though this question can not be answered 
categorically, for want of sufficient and direct evidence, the 
evidence that we do have 66 seems to imply that in practice 
the assessment of 877 was regarded very much in the same 
way as that of 866 had been. 67 We may believe that while 
the seigniors probably raised amounts of money corresponding 
more or less to those for which they were responsible according 
to the assessment, yet they arranged to have the whole burden 
of the entire tax — even that part of it which they had been 
ordered by the king to contribute out of their resources — fall 

61 Cf. supra, nn. 41, 42. That there was still an important distinction 
between benefices and allodial property, and that the magnates of the West 
Frankish realm usually possessed both kinds, is proved by that provision in 
chapter 10 of the Capitulary of Kiersy which permits a ficlelis in a given 
case to transfer his honores to a relative, though he retains his allodium 
(loc. cit., p. 358). Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 130 ff.; Fustel de Coulanges, 
Nouvelles recherches, 427, 466 ff. 

62 See supra, chap, v, nn. 67, 70, 71. 

63 I. e. they are not mentioned in the assessment. 

64 Cf. supra, pp. 79-85. 

65 Cf. supra, nn. 42, 52, 54, 57. 

66 See supra, chap, v, n. 114; cf. infra, n. 114. 

67 Cf. supra, pp. 81 ff. 





CHAPTER VI 


103 


on the peasantry. 68 It is, for this reason, very improbable that 
each tenant paid for his holding the exact amount specified in 
the assessment, i. e. four denarii for a mansus ingenuilis and 
two denarii for a mansus sei'vilis. It is much more likely that 
the assessment was regarded by the seigniors merely as a sched¬ 
ule according to which the quotas for which they were held 
responsible would be computed. 69 To raise his full quota, a 
seignior probably found it necessary to exact from each one of 
his tenants — even from those occupying accolse and hospitda — 
as large a sum as the tenant could be forced to pay. 70 This levy 
of Danegeld, therefore, so far from proving a special hardship 
for the seigniors, simply provided them with another oppor¬ 
tunity to exploit their peasantry and to accelerate the develop¬ 
ment of the principle that the unfree peasant was taillable a 
merci. 71 Small wonder that the magnates did not object to the 
Danegeld; they were probably beginning to regard it as a sub¬ 
stantial, if somewhat irregular, source of income. 

The tax levied on the priests in 877, 72 varied in proportion 
to the property or resources of each, but apparently no priest 
was wholly exempt. 73 The maximum paid by any priest was 
five solidi (or sixty denarii); some paid four solidi, others three, 
two, or only one; and the minimum was four denarii. 7 4 For the 

68 According to See, this was a general rule applying not only to the 
Danegeld, but to all taxes of whatever kind. See supra, p. 82. 

69 This opinion is strengthened by the wording of document B. (see 
supra, n. 42), which requires the benefice-holders to give (donent) “de uno- 
quoque manso, etc.” It is true that document A. has accipiat, but this docu¬ 
ment was superseded by B. (cf. mjra, appendix ii). 

70 It is not impossible that the seigniors also forced the unfree peasants 
on their allodial lands to contribute toward the Danegeld, in spite of the 
fact that seigniors themselves were not required to furnish anything toward 
the Danegeld by virtue of their ownership of such lands; cf. Ann. Vedast., 
877, p. 295: “omne regnum ad hoc tributum dat.” 

71 Cf. supra, pp. 84 f. 

72 It has been shown above that the contributions of the priests probably 
were regarded as war taxes, and a substitute for actual military service; 
see supra, pp. 86 f. Cf. also what Hincmar said regarding the military obliga¬ 
tions of the bishops (quoted by Waitz, op. cit., IV, 597, n. 2). 

73 See the following note, and cf. supra, n. 43. 

74 Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico, B., loc. cit.: “De omnibus vero 
ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus de suo episcopatu vel abbas de sua solum- 
modo abbatia, in cuiuscumque episcopi sint parrochia, accipiant cum misso 
episcopi, in cuius parrochia sunt, de presbyteris secundum possibilitatem 
quinque solidos vel quatuor vel tres vel duos vel unum solidum; a quo pluri- 
mum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero 
imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassallorum imperialium, tarn 
de illis, qui cum imperatore pergent, quam et illis, qui remanserint, epis¬ 
copus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum praedfctum modum coniec- 
tum accipiat.” Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “unusquisque episcopus de presbi- 




104 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


collection of the priests’ taxes special provisions were made, 75 
evidently at the instigation and in the interest of their eccle¬ 
siastical superiors. 76 The prelates would probably not have 
tolerated the collection by lay seigniors of taxes due from clergy¬ 
men; such a procedure would have been sure to lead to abuses 
and the establishment of bad customs. 77 And then the pre¬ 
lates doubtless preferred to secure for themselves the profits 
accruing from the collection of those taxes. 78 As a general rule, 
therefore, only bishops were authorized to collect the taxes of 
the priests. But an exception was made in the case of those 
priests who held parishes that were dependent on monasteries ; 79 
their contribution was to be collected by the abbot and the 
bishop’s missus jointly. 80 Thus, even in this case, provision was 
made for episcopal supervision. In all other cases each bishop 
had the exclusive right of collection within the limits of his 
diocese. This right applied not only to churches directly under 
the bishop’s control, but also to those which had lay patrons, 
such as the emperor, the empress, counts, or royal vassals. 81 
With reference to churches held by counts or royal vassals it 
was specifically provided that the bishop was to collect not only 

teris suae parrochiae secundum quod cuique possibile erat, a quo plurimum 
quinque solidos, a quo minimum 4 denarios episcopi de singulis presbiteris 
acciperent et missis dominicis redderent.” 

75 See the preceding note. It will be observed that Hincmar, in his sum¬ 
mary (cf. infra, appendix i, n. 14) of the assessment, does not give all the 
provisions with regard to the collection of the taxes from the priests. They 
are given in document A., as well as in B., and these documents differ very 
little from each other on this point. The differences that do occur will be 
pointed out in the following notes. 

76 This statement and the following one are based on the nature of the 
provisions made; but cf. infra, n. 78. 

77 That such abuses and bad customs had been common during the recent 
period, is indicated by the following passage from Hincmar’s letter to 
Louis the Stammerer in 877 (Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, 987): “ut Ecclesiae 
in isto regno per occasionabiles circadas et per indebitas consuetudinarias 
exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli et Ludovici non fuerunt, ante annos 
viginti impositas non affligantur.” Cf. also chapter 8 of the decisions of 
the Synod of Fismes in 881 (quoted by Diimmler, III, 150, n. 2, and 151, n. 
1): “quatenus ecclesiae in isto regno . . . per indebitas consuetudinarias 
exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli et Hludovici non fuerunt, sed 
moderno tempore impositae fuerunt, non affligantur.” 

78 It is at least an interesting fact that the only copy of the Capitulary 
of Kiersy of which we have any knowledge, was found on a manuscript 
containing dispositions very favorable to the church (cf. Bourgeois, op. cit 
26). 

79 This is mentioned in both tax documents, but not by Hincmar. 

80 Cf. supra, n. 74. The cooperation of the bishop’s missus is mentioned 
only in tax document B. 

81 The churches of the emperor himself are specifically mentioned in 
document B. (cf. supra, n. 74), but not in A. (cf. infra, appendix ii). 



CHAPTER VI 


105 


from those priests whose patrons were to accompany the em¬ 
peror to Italy, but also from those whose patrons were to remain 
in France. 82 The purpose of this provision is fairly clear. 
Charles did not wish to have it appear that those seigniors who 
were permitted to remain in France, were to have any oppor¬ 
tunities for financial gain of which those whom he designated 
to accompany him to Italy would not be able to avail themselves. 83 
It is obvious, of course, that the collection of the Danegeld was 
regarded, not as a burdensome duty, but as a very valuable 
and highly profitable right. 84 The arrangement to have the 
prelates collect the taxes from the priests is therefore in per¬ 
fect accord with the general policy of Charles the Bald to seek 
support for his various enterprises from the higher clergy rather 
than from the lay nobility. 85 In making his preparations for 
the Italian expedition Charles could probably not have chosen 
any other policy, for a very large majority of the lay magnates 
were bitterly opposed to the expedition; and in spite of the favor 
shown by the king to the bishops, many of these eventually joined 
hands with the revolting nobles. 86 

The contributions exacted from merchants toward the tribute 
of 877 were, as usual, proportioned to the fortune of each. 87 
Evidently all merchants without exception were taxed. 88 Several 

82 This provision occurs in both documents. The version in B., given 
supra, n. 74, may be compared with that in A., given here: “De ecclesiis 
vero, quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore 
nostro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia 
consistunt, secundum praetaxatum modum accipere procurabit.” 

83 A provision such as the one just noted may have been necessary also in 
order to enable the bishops to collect from the priests in question, in the 
event that the patron should fail to give his consent, or in case he should 
be absent in Italy when the bishop’s officials came to collect. In view of 
the probability that the tax-payers would avail themselves of any and every 
pretext to escape the tax, a special emphasis on the bishop’s right to collect, 
particularly from those priests whom they did not themselves appoint, and 
whose incomes they did not control, may have been absolutely indispensable. 

84 If the contrary be assumed, the various provisions relating to the col¬ 
lection of the priests’ taxes seem to lose their point. 

85 Cf. Dummler, I, 295, 382 and n. 4, 434 ff.; Ill, 55 ff. An army raised 
by Charles the Bald in 866 is said to have consisted principally of episcopal 
contingents (Ann. Bert., 866, p. 84). 

86 Ann. Vedast., 877, p. 296: “Contra voluntatem . . . suorum . . . [Karo- 
lus] iterum Italiam ingressus est.” Hincmar tells of the conspiracy formed 
by Abbot Hugh and Counts Boso and Bernard against Charles, after he had 
reached Italy: “Qui [i. e. Hugh, Boso, and Bernard] una cum aliis regni 
primoribus, exceptis paucis, et episcopis adversus eum [Karolum] conspiran- 
tes coniuraverunt” (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 136). On this whole subject, cf. 
Bourgeois, op. cit., 69-126. 

87 See supra, n. 44, and infra, appendix ii. 

88 At least no exemptions are mentioned. The tax on the merchants, as 



106 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

different classes are mentioned: itinerant merchants (cappi?), 8 * 
resident merchants or townsmen, Jews and Christians. 90 So 
far as the contribution to the Danegeld was concerned, no di¬ 
stinction was made, except possibly as between Jews and Chris¬ 
tians. According to one source, 91 the former were taxed at 
one tenth, the latter at one eleventh (of their property?). 92 
We have no direct information as to who were authorized to 
collect these taxes. But it is well known that during the Caro- 
lingian period merchants were under the special protection of 
the king, and that in return for this protection they were re¬ 
quired to make an annual or biennial contribution to the royal 
treasury; 93 therefore it does not seem too bold to presume that 
in the case of the Danegeld, too, the merchants paid their taxes 
to the usual royal officials. 

After the various local authorities had collected the taxes due 
within their respective territories or jurisdictions, they were, 
according to Hincmar, to turn over the amounts thus raised to 
the missi dominici . 94 The missi, whose office was at this time 
in the process of becoming territorialized, 95 are probably not 

on the other classes, probably was interpreted as a substitute for military 
service (cf. supra , p. 86). 

89 Lot (“Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 14, n. 2) and Thompson (“Com¬ 
merce of France,” Journal of Polit. Economy, 1915, XXIII, 874 and n. 6) 
believe that the negotiatoriltus of document B. must be itinerant merchants, 
since they are contradistinguished from those qui in civitatibus commanent. 
But who were the cappi referred to in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of 
Kiersy? The latest theory offered in solution of this very vexing problem 
is that of Thompson (op. cit., 882-87), who suggests that the cappi may have 
been Syrian merchants trading in France, with their headquarters at the 
emporium of Chappes, just above Troyes, on the upper Seine. 

90 Cf. supra . nn. 87, 89. 

91 The Capitulary of Kiersy (supra, n. 44). As to the value and reliabil¬ 
ity of this part of the capitulary, see infra, appendix ii. 

92 In 866 all merchants, apparently without any distinction, had been re¬ 
quired to pay one tenth of “all they seemed to have”; in 860 the rate of their 
tax was not specified, but it was based on a valuation of their houses and 
movables, and even the poorest had to contribute. Cf. supra, chap, v, n. 67; 
chap, iii, n. 36. If a distinction was made in 877 between Jews and Chris¬ 
tians, and in favor of the latter, it is the only instance of its kind on record 
for this period. 

93 Cf. supra, chap, v, n. 127. 

94 See supra, n. 74, end. I interpret Hincmar’s words to mean that the 
seigniors in general, not only the bishops, were to remit the Danegeld to 
the missi. This feature of the collection is mentioned only by Hincmar. 

95 On the whole subject see Thompson, Decline of the Missi Dominici, 19 
ff. The following passage from chapter IS of the Capitulary of Kiersy is 
illuminating: “Et missi nostri, qui per per omne regnum nostrum constituti 
sunt, missaticum nostrum prout eis opportunum fuerit, agere non negligant.” 
This seems to imply that the office of the missi had become territorial, or 
at least that it was no longer merely temporary. It is not a question of 
appointing or reappointing missi, but of admonishing those who held that 
office to be faithful and diligent in the discharge of their duties. 



CHAPTER VI 


107 


to be distinguished from the principes regni, or primores, who, 
according to the Annals of St. Vaast, were engaged in the collec¬ 
tion of the Danegeld. 96 

Charles the Bald had entrusted the general supervision of 
the raising of the tribute to his son, Louis the Stammerer, and 
those primores who were to remain with Louis in France. The 
collection of the taxes had been begun probably late in June 
or early in July, but was not completed until some time after 
the emperor had departed for Italy, hardly before the middle 
of August and possibly later. 97 Since it became necessary event¬ 
ually to draw on the church treasuries, 98 it must be assumed 
either that the assessment prepared at Kiersy had proved in¬ 
adequate or that unexpected difficulties were encountered in 
the collection of the tax, the latter being the more probable. 09 

96 See the following note. 

97 Ann. Vedast.. 877, pp. 295-96: “Et dum in his [i. e. the collection of the 

Danegeld] principes regni occupantur, Karolus imperator ad hoc negotium 
perficiendum Hludowicum filium suum delegit in regno cum suis primoribus 
relinquendum, et iterum iter parat quo Italiam pergeret. . . . Papiaeque 
civitate Johannes papa ei occurrit ... . At hi qui in Francia remanserant, 

dato tributo, Danos e regno abire coegerunt.” Folcwin, Gesta abbatum 
sancti Bertini Sithiensium, c. 87, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 622: “Karolus . . . 
Romam properare volens post medium Iulium de Francia iter arripuit.” The 
diplomas of Charles confirm the statement of Folcwin (Bohmer-Miihlbacher, 
Die Regesten d. Kaiserreichs u. d. Karolingern, nos. 1815-24), as do the 
Miracula s. Dionysii (cf. Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 16, n. 2). In 
view of the fact that the collection of the Danegeld was not at most more 
than barely begun when Charles set out for Italy, it is impossible to assume 
a connection between the large treasure which the emperor took with him 
on his journey (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135), and the raising of the Danegeld. 
The treasure in question may have consisted, at least in part, of the annua 
dona which certain seigniors presented to the king immediately after the 
Assembly of Kiersy had been dissolved (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 363, 
lines 7 ff.). Cf. supra, chap. v. n. 103. Gfrorer’s theory (Gesch. d. ost- u. 
westfrdnk. Carolinger, II, 141, 163), that this Danegeld really was, in large 
part, a Romersteuer, was disposed of by von Noorden (Hinkmar, Erzbischof 
von Rheims, 334, n. 6), who substituted for it another, equally untenable 
theory (cf. infra, appendix ii and n. 6). 

98 See supra, n. 47. 

99 It is not unlikely that in many cases the poorer people had become 
so impoverished as not to be able to pay the taxes levied upon their hold¬ 
ings (cf. infra, n. 114). The letter written by Hincmar to Louis the Stam¬ 
merer about this time, and referred to by Flodoard (Historia Remensis ec- 
clesiae, III, c. 19, M.G.H., 88., XIII, 510) as being “de coniecto Normannis 
dando,” may have dealt with these and other difficulties in the collection of 
the tax. It is a noteworthy fact that the draft on the church treasuries is 
not included in either of the tax documents drawn up at Kiersy. Perhaps 
Hincmar in his letter to Louis had suggested some other way of raising the 
remainder of the tribute. That he disapproved, fully as much as the author 
of the Annals of St. Vaast (cf. supra, n. 47), of delivering the treasures of 
the churches into the hands of the pagans, is evident from what he says in 
another letter to Louis (cf. infra, n. 114). 



108 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

With the aid of the contributions from the churches, however, 
the primores were finally able to bring together the needed sum 
of 5,000 pounds, which they then paid over to the Northmen. 100 

It has already been indicated that another tribute was mean¬ 
while being raised in Neustria, to secure the removal of the 
Northmen in the Loire. 101 Our information on this Danegeld 
is very scant. We know, however, that the Neustrian bishops 
and magnates had undertaken to procure it, probably with the 
consent if not at the instigation of Charles the Bald, and per- * 
haps under the direction of Abbot Hugh who functioned in 
the capacity of viceroy in this region. 102 The words of Hincmar, 
who is our only source here, seem to imply that there was no 
attempt at any orderly and regulated assessment, but that the 
magnates, probably by the application of coercive measures in 
cases where such seemed necessary, collected money wherever 
there was any to be had. 103 How long they were occupied in 
this, no doubt very profitable, task cannot be ascertained. The 
amount demanded by the freebooters of the Loire remains like¬ 
wise unknown, though it was probably a smaller sum than that 
paid to the Vikings of the Seine. 104 

The magnates in Francia and Burgundy, after they had paid 
the Danegeld, forced the Northmen of the Seine to evacuate 
the realm. 105 The Neustrian magnates, on the other hand, ap¬ 
pear to have been unable to secure the removal of the Vikings 
from the Loire. 106 Why, we do not know. It may be that it 
had proved impossible to raise the sum of money demanded; 
or the Vikings, after they had received the money, may have 

repudiated their agreement, and remained in spite of their 

— 

100 Cf. supra, n. 97. 

101 See supra, nn. 18, 19, 21. 

102 Cf. supra, n. 20. 

103 That is my interpretation of the following: “tributum . . . secundum 
quod sibi [i. e. the magnates of Neustria] ab eis [Nortmannis] fuit imposi- 
tum, undecumque valuerunt, reddere procuraverunt” (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 
135). 

104 The reasons for this conjecture are given supra , n. 21. It has also 
been shown that the magnates of Neustria as such, were not, so far as we 
know, required to raise any part of the Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the 
Seine (see supra, n. 38). 

105 See supra, n. 97. 

106 In the following year (878) Louis the Stammerer was constrained by 
Abbot Hugh to undertake what proved to be a fruitless expedition against 
them (Ann. Bert., 878, p. 140; cf. Vogel, 257 ff.). 



CHAPTER VI 


109 


promise to evacuate. 107 However that may be, it is certain that 
the Loire region was not entirely cleared of Vikings until 882. 108 

The Danegelds of 877 were the last levied during the reign 
of Charles the Bald, for that monarch died on the return from 
his second expedition to Italy. 103 There can be no doubt that 
the tributes of this year had, like those of preceding years, 
proved a heavy burden on the tax-payers; a burden which, more¬ 
over, had been very inequitably distributed. Unquestionably 
it was the unfree peasants and the priests — that part of the 
population which, though most numerous, was the least able 
to pay — who had furnished the great bulk of the tax money. 
And if the merchants, who shared the burden with the peasants 
and the priests, were in some instances well situated economic¬ 
ally, many were doubtless comparatively poor men; 110 besides, 
their property had been taxed at a much higher rate than that 
of the others. The seigniors, on the other hand, who could and 
who ought to have born the heaviest share of taxation, not 
only escaped their part of the burden altogether, by shifting 
it on the peasantry, but very probably were enriched as a result 
of the abuses to which they resorted in collecting the taxes of 
their dependents. 

As the cumulative result of six successive levies * * 111 of general 
Danegeld 112 — all during the reign of Charles the Bald — there 
was now in the West Frankish realm an unusual degree of 
pecuniary distress. If we may believe Hincmar, the laboring 
classes had been impoverished, and the church treasuries 
emptied. Beyond that, abuses of various kinds, depredation, 
and rapine were current everywhere; but right and justice were 
dead. All of which, according to our informant, was a con¬ 
sequence of the corrupt policy of buying off the Northmen when 
they should have been resisted with the sword. In a letter to 
Louis the Stammerer, written at the time of his accession to 
the throne, Hincmar earnestly admonished the new monarch 

107 The latter conjecture seems the more probable. Even the Seine Vik¬ 
ings, after they had received the tribute, did not evacuate until they were 
forced so to do. Cf. supra, n. 97. 

108 Vogel, 259, 347 ff. 

109 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 137. 

110 For a reference to very poor merchants, see supra, chap, iii, n. 36. 

111 In 845, 853, 860-61, 862, 866, and 877. See supra. 

112 In addition to these levies of general Danegeld, there had also been 
a number of exactions of local Danegeld, or ransom, in various places (see 
infra, chaps, xv, xvi). 




110 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


to take counsel with God and with his ficleles as to how some 
measure of relief might be brought to the wretched and pitiable 
populace, exhausted by continual depredations and by exactions 
of Danegeld. And he added: “May justice and equity, which 
now are as it were dead, be revived among us; may God once 
more endue us with valor and martial strength, so that we may 
be able to resist our pagan enemies: for until now there has 
for many years been no thought of defense in this kingdom, 113 
but only of ransom and tribute; and not only poor men, but 
even churches once rich, have become impoverished.” 114 

113 This is not strictly true, as shown passim in the preceding pages, 
and by Lot, op. cit., 1-27. Cf. Vogel, 257. 

114 Epistola ad Ludovicum Balbum (Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, 987-88): 
“Quarto, ut inveniatis cum Deo et vestris fidelibus, qualiter istae rapinae 
et depraedationes in isto regno cessent, et miser iste populus, qui jam per 
plures annos depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nort- 
mannos repellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, et justitia et judi¬ 
cium, quae quasi emortua apud nos sunt, reviviscant, ut virtutem nobis 
Deus reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo jam ante plures annos locum 
in isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum 
pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites jam evacuatas habent.” 


* 


/ 



THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 111 


CHAPTER VII. 

Summary of the Causes Which Forced Charles the Bald 

to Resort to the Danegeld. 

No one at all familiar with the character of Charles the Bald 
as it is revealed in his various activities, could say that he was 
a model ruler. 1 But it must be insisted that Charles was neither 
exclusively nor mainly responsible for the policy of securing 
the removal of the Vikings by the payment of Danegeld. 2 Each 
time he agreed to pay tribute, except possibly in 877, Charles 
was virtually forced to do so by the attitude of his magnates. 3 
Usually it was the magnates who were responsible for the crea¬ 
tion of a situation out of which the king saw no better means 
of escape than that afforded by the Danegeld. And if it is true 
that the situation in 877 was not one for which the nobles can 
be held responsible, it is also true that Charles could not have 
foreseen the coming of the Vikings when he proceeded to the 
invasion of Lorraine, and that after the defeat at Andernach 
there remained no method of procuring the removal of the in¬ 
vaders other than the payment of tribute. 4 Moreover, we must 
not forget that in 862 Robert the Strong had been quite willing 
to pay a stipendiary Danegeld to the Vikings of the Seine in 
return for their services against the Bretons ; 5 and that, in 877, 
Abbot Hugh and the magnates of Neustria rather than enter 
into conflict with the Northmen of the Loire, chose to pay them 
tribute. 6 There is not the slightest evidence to prove that the 
lay seigniors ever were opposed to the payment of Danegeld 
on principle, or that for this reason they ever refused to collect 
the taxes levied to raise the tribute; 7 on the other hand, there 
is considerable evidence which indicates that they secured a 
substantial profit each time they collected such taxes from their 

1 Cf. Diimmler, III, 54 ff. 

2 Diimmler (ibid., p. 58) seems to hold Charles exclusively responsible 
for the policy of paying tribute, and practically all the older students of this 
period do likewise. Vogel (p. 257) and Lot (“Le pont de Pitres,” Le Moyer* 
Age, 1905, IX, p. 9, and elsewhere) are inclined to regard the policy of pay¬ 
ing Danegeld as the only resource left after military efforts had proved 
futile. 

3 See supra, pp. 33 ff., and n. 36, pp. 40 ff., 45 ff., 66-71. 

4 This is also the view of Vogel (p. 257). 

5 Cf. supra, chap. iv. 

6 Cf. supra, chap. vi. 

7 The contrary opinion of Bourgeois on this point is erroneous. See 
supra, chap, vi., n. 40. 



112 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 


dependents. 8 We have reason to believe that if the military 
forces of the realm had been under the complete control, and 
at the free and immediate disposal of Charles, he would seldom 
if ever have resorted to the expedient of buying off the North¬ 
men. With Charles the Danegeld was a matter, not of choice, 
but of necessity; with the nobles it appears to have been a matter 
of profit, a deliberate policy, based on selfish material interest. 

Yet, while Charles the Bald cannot be held excluively respon¬ 
sible for the policy of paying Danegeld, it is none the less true 
that he was the first monarch who was forced to adopt that 
policy. 9 A principal reason for this is found by some scholars 
in the character of Charles, which has been represented as very 
weak and, on the whole, despicable. That the personality of 
Charles the Bald fades into insignificance when compared with 
that of his great ancestors, particularly Charlemagne, will not 
be denied. But Charles was undoubtedly a much stronger 
monarch than his father, Louis the Pious; and what evidence 
is there to show that he was so very much weaker than Lothaire 
I or even Louis the German? 10 It is not true that Charles, un¬ 
like his brothers, was by nature disinclined to engage in military 
exploits, and for that reason would rather pay Danegeld than 
resist the Northmen by force of arms. 11 The fact is that he 

8 See supra, pp. 53-54 and notes, pp. 81-85, 102-3. 

9 We have no evidence that any monarch prior to Charles the Bald ever 
consented to the payment of Danegeld. It is true, however, that the Vikings 
had compelled the Frisians to pay local Danegeld in Charlemagne’s time and 
on several occasions during the reign of Louis the Pious. For a discussion 
of these payments and their relation to the Danegeld in France, see infra, 
appendix iii. 

10 Cf. supra, n. 2. No one, perhaps, would deny that Charles the Bald 
was a stronger ruler than Louis the Pious. But until recently the opinion 
has prevailed that the character and personality of Charles the Bald was 
far weaker than that of Louis the German. See especially Diimmler’s (II, 
412 ff.) eulogy on Louis the German, and cf. this with his unfavorable at¬ 
titude toward Charles the Bald (III, 54 ff.). A careful comparison of what 
is known concerning the lives of the two brothers leads one to doubt the 
correctness of this opinion, which undoubtedly has been colored by national 
sympathies as well as by preconceived ideas and inherited notions (Bour¬ 
geois, Le capit. de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 161-67, 194-98, 200-2; Lot, “Une annee 
. . . de Charles le Chauve,” Le Moyen Age, 1902, VI, 398, n. 3). Recently, 
however, there have been attempts to arrive at a more correct and just 
estimate of the character of Charles the Bald. Such attempts, of course, 
have been made chiefly by French scholars: Fustel de Coulanges, Bour¬ 
geois, Lot, and others. But at least one German scholar, namely Vogel, has 
recently given indications of a sounder judgment on this subject (pp. 256-r 
57), though it is apparent that he can divorce himself from the older opinion 
only with great difficulty (pp. 106, 110 and n. 3). Cf. also Thompson, Decline 
of the Missi Dominici, p. 18. 

11 Cf. Vogel (256-57), who discards the view of Diimmler (III, 55). 



CHAPTER VII 


113 


did resist the Vikings in a military way whenever that was 
possible; and in the latter part of his reign, when he had come 
to a fuller appreciation of the significance of the Norse inva¬ 
sions, he was very active in providing for the military defense 
of the exposed portions of his realm. 12 

The foregoing detailed study of each of the various occasions 
on which Danegeld was paid between 845 and 877, will, I believe, 
substantiate the view that Charles the Bald was compelled to 
adopt this policy by reason of a very peculiar combination of 
circumstances; a combination which had not existed before his 
time, and which during his time appears to have been more fully 
developed in the western kingdom than in any other part of the 
Frankish realm. These circumstances may be grouped under 
eight general heads, as follows: 

(1) The great change which took place after the death of 
Louis the Pious in the frequency, the character, and the purpose, 
of the Viking expeditions. It was no longer a question merely 
of an occasional raid by a small band of freebooters looking 
only for plunder. In the time of Charles the Bald the activities 
of the Vikings almost reached their climax. There was hardly 
a year of his reign when some part of the kingdom was not 
occupied or raided by the Northmen. They came now in large, 
well organized, and highly disciplined armies under the com¬ 
mand of chieftains whose strategy and general military skill 
was on the whole superior to that of the Franks; and they 
purposed not only to enrich themselves with the fruits of pillage, 
but also to secure territory, make settlements, and establish 
colonies. 13 

(2) The kingdom of Charles the Bald was more exposed to 
the Viking expeditions than any of the other Frankish states, 
owing to the fact that it had the longest coast-line. 14 Therefore, 
the only adequate defense against the Vikings would have been 
an efficient fleet. But that means of defense the Franks did not 
possess. 15 Furthermore, the coast-guard formerly maintained 

12 Lot, “Le pont de Pitres,” loc. cit., 1-17. 

13 Vogel, 39-44, 125-27; cf. 49. 

14 Cf. ibid., 86-87. 

15 Charles the Bald’s efforts to create a fleet were not successful (cf. 
supra, p, 49 and nn. 11, 12). It is curious that no attempt was ever made 
to organize a fleet of river craft by utilizing the barges belonging to the 
abbeys. On this see Thompson, “Commerce of Prance,” Journal of Polit. 
Economy, 1915, XXIII, p. 870, n. 3. 

Ddneyeld. 8. 



114 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

by Charlemagne had by the time of Charles the Bald fallen into 
decay. 16 

(3) The wealth and material resources of the western king¬ 
dom probably were more considerable than those of the other 
Frankish kingdoms and, therefore, its power of attraction for 
the Vikings was greater. 17 

(4) After the death of Charlemagne, the steady decline of 
the power and prestige of the crown had been accompanied by 
an increasing tendency toward independence on the part of the 
local magnates and great seigniors; in other words, the rapidly 
developing influence of feudalism had tended to weaken the posi¬ 
tion, and destroy many prerogatives, of the king. Perhaps the 
most important feature of this development was the practice 
of commendation, which eventually tranformed the Frankish 
army of freemen into one consisting of vassals and their retain¬ 
ers. This metamorphosis in the character of the army materially 
reduced the military power of the king; henceforth he was 
virtually impotent if deserted or disobeyed by the magnates. 18 

(5) After the division of the Frankish realm between the 
sons of Louis the Pious, and the exhaustion resulting from the 
civil wars waged by Louis the German and Charles the Bald 
against Lothaire I, the Frankish power of resistance was much 
lowered. The matter of defense in each one of the kigdoms, 
but particularly in that of the west, which was more exposed 
than the others, now became a very difficult problem to solve; 19 
and one which was further complicated by reason of its con¬ 
nection with point 4 above, and points 6, 7, and 8 below. 

(6) The perverse character of the West Frankish nobility; 
their increasing greed and selfishness and their declining, if not 
utter lack of patriotism. Hostile to the interests both of the 
higher clergy and of the crown, the lay magnates lusted to gain 
possession of and to exploit the lands, the revenues, and all the 
accumulated wealth of the church; while they regarded the ten-* 
ure of honores, or public functions, merely as opportunities for 
pecuniary gain. Some went to the extreme of forming secret 

16 Cf. supra, chap, i, n. 5. 

17 Diimmler, I, 221. 

18 See especially Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform, de la royautc , 616- 
66; cf. the references given supra, chap, vi, n. 59. 

19 Vogel, pp. 82-83; cf. p. 65 and n. 4. 



CHAPTER VII 


115 


alliances with the pagans, and few hesitated to make indirect 
use of the Viking operations in the furtherance of their own 
ends. The ravages of the invaders concerned them little, so 
long as their own property and interests were not at stake. Us¬ 
ually secure from attack in their rural strongholds, they had 
no desire to take the field against the Vikings for the purpose 
of defending churches, monasteries, and towns. Moreover, war¬ 
fare with the Northmen, besides being always a very uncertain 
adventure, was from the viewpoint of the magnates an enter¬ 
prise of rather doubtful value; if successful it might strengthen 
the hands of the king, and it always involved much expense with 
little hope of pecuniary gain. Payment of Danegeld was, with 
the nobles, the preferred method of securing the removal of the 
Vikings. By this expedient the magnates, in the first place, 
escaped all danger and all expense; for if to raise the tribute 
taxes were levied also on demesnial holdings, these taxes could 
easily be shifted on the peasantry. And, in the second place, the 
magnates in collecting the taxes due from their dependents were 
able to reap a considerable harvest for themselves. 20 

(7) The revolts of the West Frankish nobles, and the support 
given the rebels by Louis the German. These revolts were due, 
in large part, to attempts made by Charles the Bald to check the 
growing independence and disobedience of the nobles, and toward 
rehabilitating the position and the prerogatives of the crown. 21 

(8) The ambitious projects of Charles the Bald to annex Lor¬ 
raine and to secure the undisputed recognition of his imperial 
authority in Italy. 22 The fateful preoccupation of Charles with 

20 Richer’s description (Historiae, I, c. 4, ed. Waitz, pp. 3-4) of conditions 
at the close of the ninth century is also applicable to the time of Charles 
the Bald: “cum regnorum principes nimia rerum cupidine sese preire con- 
tenderent, quisque ut poterat rem dilatabat. Nemo regis provectum, nemo 
regni tutelam querebat. Aliena adquirere summum cuique erat. Nec rem 
suam provehere videbatur, qui alieni aliquid non addebat. Unde et omnium 
concordia in summam discordiam relapsa est. Hinc direptiones, hinc in- 
cendia, hinc rerum pervasiones exarsere. Quae cum immanissime agita- 
rentur, piratae ... ad rerum immanitatem incitantur.” Ermentarius 
(Miracula sancti Filiberti, M. G. H., SS., XV, 302) adds the following to 
his recital of events for the year 850: “omnes fugam arripiunt, rarus est qui 
dicat: ‘state, state, resistite, pugnate pro patria, liberis et gente!’ Sicque 
torpentes atque invicem dissidentes, quod defendere debuerant armis, tri- 
butis redimunt, ac christianorum pessumdatur regnum.” For a fuller dis¬ 
cussion of these matters and additional details, see Diimmler, I, 222, 228-29, 
420-21; cf. Flach, Les orig. de Vane . France, I, 147-48 and passim; Favre, 
Eudes, 221 ff.; supra, pp. 26-27 and n. 6, 33-34, 41-43, 45-49, 66-71; infra, 
chap. ix. 

21 Cf supra, pp. 37-39 and notes. 

22 For detailed discussion of these enterprises, see Diimmler, III, 32 ff. 



116 THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD 

these projects in the last years of his reign was doubtless one of 
the principal reasons why Danegeld had to be paid in 877. 23 
Moreover, these unwise and unsuccessful enterprises helped to 
exhaust the resources needed for the defense of the home lands. 

These various circumstances, which apply in particular to the 
western kingdom, combined to form during the reign of Charles 
the Bald that peculiar situation which must be regarded as the 
real reason why he was constrained to pay Danegeld. To assume 
that Louis the German, or any other contemporary ruler, could 
have done better than Charles the Bald in a similar situation, is 
either to ignore the essential facts in the case, or to under¬ 
estimate the power of the controlling forces of the age. 24 

On the accession of Louis the Stammerer, Hincmar voiced the 
hope that the ensuing reign would be one of better accord be¬ 
tween king and magnates than that of Charles the Bald had 
been; that, consequently, there would be a revival of public 
spirit, of patriotism, and of military valor; that the policy of 
buying off the foreign enemy would be discontinued; and that 
the abuses engendered by the exaction of the Danegeld would 
be gradually stamped out. 25 But all such hopes were to prove 
vain. On several occasions the successors of Charles the Bald 
found themselves in situations out of which they could devise 
no means of escape other than the one to which he had resorted, 
because in the nature of the case there was no other. 

It will perhaps be agreed that in the situation analyzed above 
the most important single factor, next to the Vikings themselves, 
was the attitude of the West Frankish nobility. Almost always it 
was the magnates who were chiefly responsible for the conditions 
which forced the king to fall back on the Danegeld as a last 
resort. For this reason, the policy of paying Danegeld must be 
regarded as much less the policy of the king than of the mag¬ 
nates. And the truth of this assertion is further illustrated by 
the fact that Danegeld continued to be paid in the West Frankish 
kingdom long after the death of Charles the Bald. His succes¬ 
sors, who are distinguishable from the other magnates only by 

23 Cf. supra, pp. 93-96; Vogel, 83 ff. 

24 We know that Lothaire II on at least one occasion found it necessary 
to resort to the Danegeld (see infra, appendix iv). As for Louis the Ger¬ 
man, he “never raised a finger to repel the numerous inroads of the North¬ 
men in Saxony” (Vogel, 257). 

25 See supra, chap, vi, n. 114. 



CHAPTER VII 


117 


their royal title, were not in position to oppose the policy of the 
all-powerful aristocracy. 26 There was to be no change in this 
policy until the magnates began to realize that the continued 
pursuit of it would undermine their own interests. 27 


26 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., 640-66, 689-702; Baldamus, Heer- 
wesen (in Gierke’s Untersucli. z. d. Staats- u. Rechtsgesch., IV), pp. 32-34; 
Flach op. cit., I, 147-48. 

27 Cf. infra, chap. xiv. 



PART II. 


The Danegeld After 877 . 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Danegeld Paid for Carloman in 884. 

The payment of Danegeld in the West Frankish realm did not 
cease with the death of Charles the Bald in 877. 1 Only seven 
years after that date, in 884, the Vikings were again in position 
to demand tribute; and they received then a larger sum than 
they had on any preceding occasion, indeed the largest ever paid 
them by the Franks. 2 

If Louis the Stammerer, the immediate successor of Charles 
the Bald, did not find it necessary to resort to the Danegeld, this 
may be explained not only by the brevity of his reign (877—79), 
but also by the fact that during these years the Danish Vikings 
made England the principal theater of their operations. 3 It is 
to be noted, moreover, that many Vikings about this time gave 
up their former habits, and reconciled themselves to a more 
settled and domesticated mode of existence in what came to be 

m 

called the Danelaw. 

1 Cf. supra, p. 116. 

2 What follows in the next succeeding paragraphs, down to the establish¬ 
ment of the Vikings at Conde (see infra, p. 122 and n. 22), is not intended to 
be more than a brief summary of the Viking movements and the general 
situation in the West Frankish kingdom, from the death of Charles the Bald 
to the time of Carloman. It is based largely on the detailed discussion of 
this period given by Vogel (pp. 260-311); in some cases, however, references 
are given also to the work of Dummler (III, 113-71, 198-258). 

3 Vogel, 260-63. It is true that a band of Vikings was operating in the 
lower Loire during the reign of Louis the Stammerer (cf. supra, pp. 108-9 and 
nn. 106-8), and that the latter made an attempt to aid Abbot Hugh in ex¬ 
pelling them. But the king fell ill on this expedition, and, so far as known, 
nothing ever came of it. In any case, the Loire was not cleared of Vikings 
until the time of Louis III (882). See Vogel, 257-59, 311. 



THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


119 


There was, however, among the Danes in England, a more 
adventurous element, the members of which could not or would 
not resign themselves to peaceful pursuits. Quite naturally these 
came to regard conditions in England as less and less satisfac¬ 
tory for their purposes, in proportion as Alfred the Great was 
able to increase the efficiency and the resisting power of the West 
Saxon fyrd. The numbers of this adventuorous element were 
much augmented by the arrival in the Thames, about the year 
878, of a fresh group of Vikings from Denmark. These adven¬ 
turers and freebooters, old and new, soon coalesced to form the 
nucleus of a very large and powerful military organization, later 
known as the “great army” of the Danes. 

Abandoning England as a land of small opportunities for 
plunder and tribute, these Vikings in the summer of 879 trans¬ 
ported themselves across the channel to the Frankish realm, 
where conditions were from their point of view much more in¬ 
viting. Their landing, in July, on the coast of Flanders at a 
point not far from Calais, marked the beginning of a long period 
of calamities for the Franks; a period during which the Vikings 
plundered, burned, and massacred almost at will throughout the 
entire region between the Rhine and the Seine. This disastrous 
epoch did not come to a close until in 892, when the “great army” 
at last returned to the Thames, its original point of departure. 4 
To follow all the movements of this army after its arrival in 
Frankish territory, does not fall within the scope of the present 
treatise. But an attempt must be made to explain how that 
situation arose which in 884 led to the payment of another 
Danegeld. 

On the death of Louis the Stammerer, in 879, certain mag¬ 
nates of the West Frankish kingdom, under the leadership of 
Abbot Gauzelin and Count Conrad of Paris, endeavored to ex¬ 
clude Louis and Carloman, the two youthful sons of the Stam¬ 
merer, from the succession to the throne. This party of oppo¬ 
sition allied itself with Louis the Younger, king of the East 
Franks, who, on the invitation of the rebels, at once under¬ 
took to invade and conquer the kingdom to the west. The plan 
was foiled only by the prompt action of Abbot Hugh, guardian 
and protector of the young princes; by the concession of western 
Lorraine, Hugh induced Louis the Younger to give up his am- 


4 Vogel, 371-72. 



120 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


bitious project and to return home. In September of the same 
year (879) he was able to secure the coronation of his two royal 
wards. 5 

New troubles, however, did not long wait to announce them¬ 
selves. In October occurred the revolt of Boso, who was recog¬ 
nized and crowned as king in Burgundy; 6 and in January of 
the following year (880), Louis the Younger, at the instigation 
of Abbot Gauzelin and Count Conrad, 7 renewed his invasion 
of the western kingdom. 

Probably it was the threatening activities of the Northmen 
at this time which induced the Franks to compose their griev¬ 
ances, and to give attention to the real dangers facing them. 8 
With the retirement of Louis the Younger, and the reentrance 
of the West Frankish rebels into royal favor, it became possible 
at last to proceed to a division of the western realm between 
the two (elder) sons of Louis the Stammerer: Francia and 
Neustria were to constitute the kingdom of Louis III; while 
Aquitaine, Burgundy, and Gothia fell to the lot of Carloman. 9 

There can be no doubt that the events above described were 
well kown to the Northmen, and that the latter intended to 
avail themselves of the favorable opportunity created by the 
domestic quarrels and rivalries of the Franks. After its ar¬ 
rival in Flanders in July, 879, the “great army” had proceeded 
at once to plunder and devastate the valleys of the Yser, Lys, 
and Scheldt. In November the Vikings established themselves 
in winter quarters at Ghent; and from that point as a center, 
they rapidly extended their plundering operations in all direc¬ 
tions. Owing to the preoccupation of the Franks, which we 
have noted above, the freebooters met with practically no re¬ 
sistance. 10 The blow dealt by Louis the Younger (of the East 
Franks) in February, 880, to one division of the “great army,” 
at Thimeon in Lorraine, 11 was hardly more than an incident; 
and during the spring and summer of 880 both Louis III and 

5 Dummler, III, 113-18; cf. Vogel, 263. 

6 Dummler, III, 121-27. 

7 Gauzelin and Conrad were the leaders of a party of nobles opposed to 
that of Abbot Hugh. It appears that they were jealous of Hugh, whose 
influence with Louis III was from their point of view altogether too great. 
Ann. Vedast., 880, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 302 and note (a). 

8 Dummler, III, 127-33; cf. Vogel, 266-67. 

9 Dummler, III, 137-38. 

10 Vogel, 264, 266. 

11 Ibid., 267-69. 



CHAPTER VIII 


121 


Carloman were occupied in a futile endeavor to subjugate Boso 
in Burgundy. 12 It is true that in the meantime Abbot Gauzelin 
had been charged with the defense of Francia; but his ambitious 
project to wipe out the “great army” at Ghent, ended in miser¬ 
able failure, and served only to increase the audacity of the 
invaders. 13 

In November the Viking camp was moved from Ghent to 
Kortrijk, on the Lys, from which place the entire region as far 
south as the Somme, was subjected to pitiless devastation. So 
heartrending was the lamentation that arose as a result of the 
terrible calamities which his land suffered at the hands of the 
Vikings, that Louis III, abandoning the attempt to reduce Boso 
to obedience, determined to give his exclusive attention to the 
Northmen. In June, 881, he moved against them with con¬ 
siderable forces, and on August 3 won a brilliant victory, over 
a large division of the “great army” at Saucourt (in the Vimeu, 
just south of the mouth of the Somme). Some eight or nine 
thousand Danes are said to have fallen in this engagement. 14 
Thenceforth the Vikings probably harbored a wholesome fear of 
the military prowess of Louis III. Discovering presently that 
conditions in the East Frankish realm were now better adapted 
for their purposes, the invaders gave up their camp at Kortrijk, 
and proceeded both by land and by water to Elsloo, on the 
Meuse. 15 Here they began, in November 881, the construction 
of a very strong camp, from which the valleys of the Meuse, 
the Rhine, and the Moselle, were to be plundered. 16 

In the West Frankish realm there followed, after the events 
just described, a period of comparative quiet. It was, however, 
not of long duration — hardly a year. 17 On August 5, 882, 
Louis III, the hero of Saucourt, died; 18 and in the following 
month his brother Carloman, a mere youth, was acknowledged 
king of the entire West Frankish realm. 19 About the same 

12 Diimmler, III, 137-38. 

13 Vogel, 269 ff. 

14 Cf. Diimmler, III, 153 ff. 

15 Vogel, 269-75. 

16 Ibicl., 280 ff. 

17 Ibid., 311 ff. 

18 Diimmler, III, 207. In July, 882, hardly a month before his death, 
Louis III appears to have concluded an arrangement with the Northmen of 
the Loire by which the latter were persuaded to put to sea in the fall of that 
year. Just what the terms of the agreement were we do not know. See 
Vogel, 349, 350 and n. 1. 

19 Diimmler, III, 207, 228. 



122 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


time the “great army/’ under the leadership of Godfrey, Sieg¬ 
fried, Vurm, and Hals, had abandoned its camp at Elsloo and, 
in accordance with a treaty concluded with Charles the Fat, 20 
had evacuated the territories of the East Franks. 21 Godfrey 
probably retired to his newly acquired fiefs in Frisia; while 
Siegfried and his followers sailed out of the Meuse only to 
ascend the Scheldt as far as Conde, where, in October, 882, they 
established themselves in a fortified winter camp. 22 

The usual operations were promptly commenced, and the 
entire territory west and south to the Somme was speedily 
plundered. 23 Carloman made some attempt to check the inva¬ 
ders but was able to accomplish little, since his right-hand man, 
Abbot Hugh, was absent in Germany, 24 and since several of the 
magnates refused to aid him. 25 The Northmen, evidently aware 
of this situation, proceeded to make the most of their opportun¬ 
ity. Plundering and burning, they advanced to the vicinity of 
Rheims. It was doubtless feared that they would attack the 
episcopal city itself; for Hincmar hastily collected the relics 
and treasures of his church and with these fled beyond the 
Marne. 26 Undaunted by the scant success of his earlier effort, 
Carloman for the second time ventured with his meager forces 
to oppose the invaders. Having engaged and defeated one group 
of Vikings, he compelled another hastily to fall back and to 
rejoin the main army; and the latter, though not attacked, yet 
deemed it prudent to return to the camp at Conde. 27 

But this was only a partial and temporary success. In De¬ 
cember (882) the pagans recommenced their operations, ad¬ 
vancing as far as the Oise without meeting any resistance. 28 


20 See infra, appendix iv. 

21 Part of the “great army” may have remained for some time in the 
district of the lower Rhine or of the Meuse. See Vogel, 294 and n. 4. 

22 Ibid., 312 and n. 1. Cf. Dtimmler (III, 209, n. 1), who quotes some 
additional sources. 

23 Ann. Vedast., 882, pp. 314-15. 

24 Abbot Hugh had departed in November on an embassy to Charles the 
Pat. Hugh at this time was the most influential magnate in the western 
kingdom, the real ruler in fact, and the defense of the realm had been 
specially entrusted to him. Cf. Diimmler, III, 207, n. 5. 

25 Ann. Bert., 882, ed. Waitz, p. 154. 

26 Ibid. Hincmar asserts that the Vikings intended to conquer the king¬ 
dom (of Francia?). The aged archbishop died in exile from his see on 
December 21, 882 (cf. Diimmler, III, 209-10). The Annals of St. Bertin, it 
may be noted, were not continued after his death. 

27 Ann. Bert., 882, p. 154; Ann. Vedast., 882, pp. 314-15. Cf. Vogel, 313-14. 

28 Ann. Vedast., 882, p. 315. 






CHAPTER VIII 


123 


Abbot Hugh, who had by this time returned home, now collected 
his men and united them with the army of the king. Together 
they inflicted some minor losses on the Vikings and forced them 
back to their ships. 29 But all to no avail. Early in 883 the 
Vikings again set forth on their work of destruction, and again 
Carloman’s efforts to check them met with no success. 30 In the 
spring, however, the “great army” quitted its camp at Conde 
and proceeded to Flanders, to spend the summer plundering that 
territory. 31 

Carloman, who may have been aware of the plans of the 
Northmen, 32 in the fall (883) again placed himself at the head 
of his army and took up a position at Miannay (in the Vimeu), 
on the left bank of the lower Somme; doubtless hoping that he 
might be able successfully to resist the Vikings should they at¬ 
tempt to ascend the Somme. 33 That the young monarch was 
doing everything in his power to protect the kingdom, can hardly 
be denied. But his efforts proved all in vain. Towards the close 
of October, the whole “great army” arrived at a place on the 
right bank of the Somme directly opposite that occupied by the 
forces of Carloman; and about the same time the Danish fleet 
entered the mouth of the river. 34 Whether an engagement took 
place is not known, but Carloman and his army were forced to 
flee beyond the Oise. 35 

The Vikings then advanced up the valley of the Somme to 
Amiens, where they prepared to spend the winter 36 — a terrible 
winter for the population between the Somme and the Seine. 
The entire region was laid waste; monasteries and churches, 
houses and villages, were burned to the ground. The North- 

29 Ann. Yeclast., 882, p. 315. 

30 Ibid., 883, p. 316. Cf. Vogel, 315, n. 1. 

31 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 316. 

32 This may be inferred from the fact that he took up his position at a 
point which commanded the entrance to the Somme. Cf. infra, n. 34. 

33 Ann. Vedast., 883, pp. 316-17. 

34 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “Nortmanni vero, octobrio mense finiente, 
Latuerum cum equitibus et peditibus atque omni supellectili veniunt. Naves 
quoque per mare Sumnam fluvium ingressae, etc.” Regino, Chronicon, 884, 
ed. Kurze, p. 121: “Nortmanni, qui ab Haslon recesserant, Somnam fluvium 
intrant ibique consederunt.” Ethelwerdi chronicon, III, 884, M.G.H., SS., 
XIII, p. 123; Florentius Wigorn., Chronicon ex chronicis, 884, Mon. historica 
Britannica, pp. 560-61; Annales anglo-saxonici, 884, M.G.H., SS., XIII, pp. 
104-5. Cf. Vogel, 315. 

35 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “regem cunctumque exercitum ejus fugere 
compulerunt [Nortmanni], atque Hisam fluvium transire fecerunt.” 

36 Ibid. 




124 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


men, according to the Annals of St. Vaast, “ceased not to take 
Christian people captive and to kill them. . . . Through all the 
streets lay bodies of the clergy, of laymen, nobles and others, 
of women, children, and suckling babes. There was no road 
nor place where the dead did not lie; and all were filled with 
sorrow and despair when they saw the Christian people brought 
almost to the verge of destruction.” 37 Encountering no resist¬ 
ance whatever, 38 the Vikings threw off all restraint and con¬ 
verted the country subject to their raids into an immense sham¬ 
bles. It became patent that something had to be done at once 
to stem the tide of destruction, or all would be lost. 

In tardy recognition of this fact, the West Frankish mag¬ 
nates assembled at Compiegne early in 884, to discuss what 
measures ought to be taken by them — not by the king — to 
secure the removal of the Danes. 39 So far as we know, the 

37 Ann. Vedast., 883-84, pp. 317-18. The translation of this passage in¬ 
serted into the text above, is, except for a few emendations, that given by J. 
H. Robinson in his Readings in European History (Chicago, Ginn and Com¬ 
pany, 1906), I, p. 164. 

38 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “nemine eis [Nortmannis] resistente. Tunc 
Franci, videntes Nortmannorum res prospere in omnibus accrescere, etc.” 

39 Ibid, (this follows immediatedly after the words quoted in the preced¬ 
ing note) : “quemdam Danum christianum, Sigefridum nomine, mittunt ad 
eos, qui caute cum eis de redemptione regni ageret.” Ibid., 884, p. 318: 
“Interim, quia rex juvenis erat, omnes principes Compendio palatio con- 
veniunt, tractaturi quid illis esset agendum; initoque consilio, Sigefridum 
. . . mittunt ut cum principibus suae gentis tractaret, ut tributum accip- 
erent, et a regno abirent.” As appears from the above quotations, the 
Annals of St. Vaast contain two separate recitals regarding the embassy of 
Siegfried. According to the first of these, the negotiations with the Danes 
were begun before the end of the year 883; while according to the second, 
they did not commence until early in 884. Though there is no disagreement 
between the two recitals, except in the matter of the dates, it is true that 
the first lacks certain details given in the second and does not follow the nego¬ 
tiations to their conclusion. It is possible that Siegfried was sent before the 
close of the year 883, but that no agreement with the Vikings could be 
reached until February, 884 (cf. von Kalckstein, Abt Hugo, in Forsch. z. d. 
Gesch., XIV, 120-21). The basis for this view is the fact that the entry for 
883 mentions only the sending of Siegfried, the purpose of his mission, and 
his arrival in Amiens; while the entry for 884 goes on to describe the protrac¬ 
tion of the negotiations and the final arrangement. I am inclined, however, 
to take a different view. Two important considerations lead me to believe 
that the entry for 883 is erroneous, and that the magnates did not decide to 
parley with the Danes until early in 884 (Vogel, p. 316, apparently takes a 
similar view, but without giving any reasons for it). In the first place, 
it is very strange that a medieval annalist, and particularly one with as 
great a love for brevity as the annalist of St. Vaast, should have repeated 
at the beginning of his entries for 884 information which he had already 
given at the end of his recital for 883; secondly, it is very improbable that 
the Danes would have engaged in the terrible devastation described at the 
beginning of 884, if, in fact, negotiations for the payment of tribute were 
already under way. On this basis, therefore, I venture the following con- 



CHAPTER VIII 


125 


magnates came together on their own initiative — there is no 
evidence that they had been summoned by the king — and they 
tried to justify the taking of matters into their own hands by 
urging the youthfulness of Carloman. Of the deliberations of 
the magnates no record has come down to us save that, having 
taken counsel, they decided to open negotiations with the Viking 
leaders, to sound them cautiously as to their demands, and if 
possible to persuade them to evacuate the kingdom in return for 
the payment of tribute. There is no indication of any kind 
that it entered the minds of the magnates to get rid of the Danes 
in some way other than by payment of tribute. 40 

Before we seek to penetrate into the motives of the magnates 
when they adopted this course, it will be desirable first to try 
to ascertain whether their explanation of Carloman’s failure to 
check the advance of the Northmen — namely that it was due 
to his youth and inexperience — 41 is the true one. It must be 
admitted that despite all the efforts of the young monarch to 
check the ravages of the Vikings, these had increased rather 
that diminished. 42 Just why this was so, why Carloman had 
not been able to offer effective resistance, is, of course, a ques¬ 
tion of capital importance in an attempt to determine the raison 
d'etre of the Danegeld of 884. Was it principally because of 
immaturity and lack of military ability? Or was it rather be¬ 
cause he had not been properly supported? Or were there per¬ 
haps other reasons? While it is difficult to elicit from our 
sources thoroughly satisfactory answers to these questions, the 

jecture. The person who wrote the entries for 884 was, it would seem, not 
aware of any previous entry relative to the embassy of Siegfried. It is 
possible, therefore, that the annals beginning with 884 were not written by 
the person who had made the entries for the preceding period. We know 
that the author of the Annals of St. Vaast was an inmate of the monastery 
of that name (see Dehaisnes’ note on p. 307 of his edition of these annals); 
we know also that Rodulf, the abbot of St. Vaast, died in 883 (ibid., 883, p. 
317). Rodulf may have been the author of the annals until his death in 
883; some later scribe in possession of this earlier part of the work, but 
not of the remainder, may have added at the end of the manuscript in his 
possession the sentences referring to Siegfried, without indicating, possibly 
without knowing, that the negotiations with the Danes were begun in 884 
and not in 883.—See also infra, n. 69. 

40 Compare with this the deliberations of the East Franks in 882. They 
appear to have had no other thought than that of expelling the invaders by 
force of arms. See infra, appendix iv. 

41 Cf. supra, n. 39. 

42 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “Franci, videntes Nortmannorum res pros- 
pere in omnibus accrescere, etc.” Regino, Chron., 884, loc. cit., p. 121: 
“Quorum [Normannorum] creberrimas incursiones cum Carlomannus sus- 
tinere non posset, etc.” Cf. supra, pp. 121 ff. 




126 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


considerations set forth in the following paragraph may serve 
to throw some light on the general situation. Obviously it would 
be a serious error to attribute the ill success of the Franks ex¬ 
clusively to the youth and inexperience of their king unless, 
indeed, no other reasons for it were apparent. Our first task, 
accordingly, must be to note the other factors entering into the 
situation, and to determine, so far as we may, the relative im¬ 
portance of each of these. 

It is generally admitted that the “great army” was one of the 
largest Viking forces with which the Franks ever had to con¬ 
tend. 43 On the other hand, it is very improbable that Carloman 
had ever had at his command anything approaching an adequate 
number of troops. 44 The freemen who owed military service were 
growing ever less in number, 45 and there is reason to believe 
that their diminution in the recent period had been very rapid. 40 
For some time past the real military strength of the kingdom 
had been, not the army of freemen under the leadership of the 
counts, but the contingents of vassals led by the great mag¬ 
nates. 47 Though some of the latter may have come to the aid 
of Carloman, 48 it is very doubtful that even a majority of the 
magnates had properly supported the young monarch in his 
military endeavors. 49 We must note also that with regard to 
organizations, tactics, and leadership, the Franks were as yet 


43 Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 209-17; Vogel, 262-63, 315, 325. 

44 Cf. supra, pp. 121 ff.; infra , n. 49. 

45 Cf. supra, chap, vi, n. 59; p. 114 and n. 18. 

46 Hincmar, Ad episcopos regni admonitio altera, c. xv (Migne, Patr. Lat., 
CXXV, 1016): “in tantum . . . affligerentur pauperes, ut inde prius in ex^ 
ercitu plures ire poterant, vix aliqui modo ire praevaleant.” These words 
were written by Hincmar at the close of the year 882, shortly before he died. 

47 Cf. supra, chap, vi, n. 59. 

48 At the time the Northmen came to Rheims in 882, Hincmar’s men were 
with the army of Carloman (Ann. Bert., 882, p. 154). Abbot Hugh, after 
he had returned from Germany, collected his forces and joined the king (cf. 
supra, p. 123); Hugh (accompanied by his men?) was with Carloman also at 
Miannay (cf. ibid.) according to a document issued at that place (Bouquet, 
IX, 431; cf. Dummler, III, 207, n. 5 and v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 120). 

49 According to the Annals of St. Vaast (882, p. 290), Hugh’s absence in 
Germany in 882 was very unfortunate “quia Karlomannus non habuit unde 
Nortmannis posset resistere, quibusdam regni primoribus ab ipsius auxilio 
se retrahentibus.” Later in the same year Carloman is said to have op¬ 
posed the Northmen “cum quibus potuit” (ibid., p. 291); which seems to 
imply that there were comparatively few men at the king’s disposal. In 
connection with the ravages of the Vikings in 882, and again in 883, we 
meet the words, “nemine sibi [eis] resistente” (ibid., pp. 315, 317). 



CHAPTER VIII 


12? 


inferior to the Northmen. 50 There can hardly be any doubt that 
engagements between equal numbers of Vikings and Franks, even 
when the latter were under the direction of their ablest men, 
had so far usually ended in favor of the Vikings. 51 There is, 
furthermore, conclusive evidence that the Frankish army of this 
period was sadly lacking in morale. 52 These facts speak for 
themselves; doubtless they were the real reason for Carloman’s 
failure to defeat the Northmen. His lack of experience and 
insight may perhaps have had something to do with the matter; 
but it is at best very doubtful whether a more mature ruler 
placed in the same circumstances as Carloman, could have suc¬ 
ceeded in forcibly expelling the Northmen. 53 

Remains now to explain the reasons for the policy of the West 
Frankish magnates. Why did they not give better support to 
the military efforts of Carloman? What made them prefer to 
resort to the Danegeld? Attention should be called to the fact 
that this was not the only course open to them. 54 They might, 
conceivably, have chosen to support the military policy of the 
king and, in accordance therewith, have attempted by a united 
effort forcibly to expel the Danes from the realm. But they 

50 Vogel, 39-41, 43-44; cf. Vander Linden, “Les Normands a Louvain,’' 
Rev. Hist., 1917, CXXIV, 69, 70 and n. 1. If it is true that the superiority 
of the Vikings in leadership and tactics began to wane towards the close of 
the ninth century (Vogel, 44), this change is certainly not noticeable before 
the siege of Paris in 885-86 (cf. ibid., 337-38, 368-69). 

51 To support and illustrate this statement, it seems necessary only to 
cite a few examples, such as the following: the engagement at Brissarthe in 
866, where Robert the Strong was killed (Vogel, 218-19); the miserable 
defeat, and rout of the troops under Abbot Gauzelin in 880 (ibid., 269-70); 
the sanguinary defeat of Duke Brun’s Saxon army in the same year (ibid., 
276). Louis Ill’s victory over the Vikings at Saucourt (see supra, p. 121) is 
doubtless to be explained in part by the probable numerical superiority of 
the Franks (cf. Vogel, 274); like other lesser successes of the Franks, its 
importance has no doubt been much exaggerated not only by tradition (ibid., 
273, n. 1), but also by the contemporary annalists (see Vander Linden, op. 
cit., pp. 66-67). 

52 Robbery had become so common among the West Franks that it must 
have been a serious risk for anyone to leave his holdings for any length of 
time. The man who went to perform the army service required of him 
might return home only to find himself plundered of all or most of what he 
possessed. Quite naturally many preferred not to go. Of those who actually 
went to the army many are said to have gone merely for the sake of thereby 
securing more favorable opportunities for plunder and pillage. All of which 
must have had a disastrous effect on the morale of the army (Capit. Ver- 
nense, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 371, lines 37-38; p. 372, lines 2 ff. 
Cf. infra, n. 61 and supra, n. 35). 

53 Vogel (p. 316) apparently takes a different view; but cf. v. Kalckstein, 
op. cit., p. 118. 

54 Vogel, loc. cit., thinks it was, or at least believes the magnates thought 
so. 



128 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


did not. Why? Obviously on one or both of the following 
grounds: (1) Knowing the strength and military superiority of 
the Northmen, the magnates believed it impossible to defeat 
them under existing circumstances; or (2) the magnates had 
a special interest in securing their removal by the payment of 
Danegeld. 

As regards the first of these points, the following considera¬ 
tions may suffice. If we admit that the Vikings were superior 
to the Franks in military qualities, and that their “great army” 
had outnumbered the army of Carloman, 55 it is still difficult 
to believe that the Frankish resources in men and materiel, 
potentially at least, were not far greater than those of the 
Vikings. 56 And while the army of Carloman had been lacking 
in morale, 57 it can not be conceded that the Franks in all cases 
were inferior to the Northmen in personal valor. 58 If the Vik¬ 
ings had the advantage of superior leadership, it is nevertheless 
true that there were men of considerable ability among the 
Franks, such as Abbot Hugh, Abbot Gauzelin, Count Odo, and 
others. 59 With these assets in their favor, there seems to be 

V 

some reason for believing that if the Franks had set aside their 
selfish personal interests, and had patriotically united their ef¬ 
forts in defense of their land and their possessions, they would 
in the end have prevailed over the Vikings. 60 And since this 

55 Cf. supra, nn. 49, 50. 

56 The point here is that Carloman’s army had represented but a small 
fraction of all the military resources of the western kingdom—even exclu¬ 
sive of Aquitaine and Burgundy. If all the “effectives” of Francia and 
Neustria, or even a majority of them, could have been brought into the 
field, it seems to the present writer that they must have far outnumbered 
the entire “great army.” At the siege of Paris (885-86) the “great army” 
is said to have numbered some forty thousand men, and Vogel (p. 325) be¬ 
lieves this to have been “die grosste normannische Armee, die je auf frank- 
ischem Boden vereinigt worden war.” Yet, this army was but a fraction of 
the surplus male population of Denmark. It does not seem possible that the 
total male population of Denmark—or even of Scandinavia—could have been 
greater than that of Francia and Neustria (Levasseur, La population fran- 
gaise, I, 132-41, estimates the population of France in the ninth century at 
five and one-half millions; in Hildebrand’s (ed.) Sveriges historia, III, 282 ; 
the population of Sweden with Finland and its other possessions, in the 
sixteenth century, is estimated at one-half million). Can there be any 
doubt, then, that the potential military strength of the western Franks, had 
it been available, would have been overwhelmingly greater than that of the 
Viking forces? 

57 Cf. supra, n. 52. 

58 Vogel, 39, 44. 

59 v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 126; Vogel, 323. Cf. Eckel, Charles le Simple, 
p. 3. 

60 After the payment of the Danegeld, which doubtless proved far heavier 



CHAPTER VIII 


129 


was recognized at the time, in fact almost taken for granted, 63 
we are perforce driven to the conclusion that the real or principal 
reason for the policy of the magnates was, not any diffidence 
in their own ability to resist and even to defeat the Northmen, 
but rather a preference to secure their removal by the payment 
of Danegeld, a preference which grew out of the purely selfish 
interests to which these magnates were committed. 

What has been said above is not intended to imply that the 
Frankish magnates had entered into conspiracy with the Vikings 
in the matter of the Danegeld. The fact that they eventually 
took measures to secure the removal of the invaders, is evidence 
that even from their point of view the presence of the Danes, 
with its attendant destruction of life and property, was an evil, 
which sooner or later had to be cured in some way. 62 For this 
very reason, however, their failure to support the military efforts 
of Carloman, and their dilatory tactics in general, seem all the 
more striking. Not until the northern part of Francia had been 
converted into a shambles, did the magnates evince anything 
like a serious concern in the welfare of their country. 63 Were 

than had been expected (cf. infra, pp. 131-32), the Franks did unite their 
forces, and prepared to support Carloman in case the Vikings should violate 
the terms of their agreement. See infra, n. 96. 

61 The following quotations from Carloman’s Capitulare Vernense, issued 
in March, 884 (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 371 ff.), may suffice to illus¬ 
trate the point referred to in the text: “[p. 371] non est autem mirum, si 
pagani et exterae nationes nobis dominantur nobisque temporalia tollunt, dum 
unusquisque proximo suo per vim tollit, unde vivere debet, etc. [p. 372] Nos 
vero praedamur fratres nostros, et idcirco pagani merito nos nostramque sub- 
stantiam depraedantur. Quomodo igitur securi poterimus pergere contra 
inimicos . . . nostros, cum ‘rapina pauperis inclusa est in domo nostra’? 
Et non solum domi reclusa est, verum etiam plerumque evenit, ut pleno 
ventre rapina in hostem quidam proficiscantur.* Et quomodo poterimus ini¬ 
micos nostros devincere, cum sanguis fratrum nostrorum ab ore nostro dis- 
tillat, et manus nostrae plenae sunt sanguine et brachia pondere miseriarum 
et rapinarum gravantur totaque virtus animi corporisque debilitatur?” On 
two occasions the annalist of St. Vaast, after having described the ravages 
of the Vikings, adds with a reproach: “nemine eis [Normannis] resistente” 
(supra, n. 49). Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 122. 

62 Cf. supra, n. 39. 

63 Cf. supra, pp. 123-25. The statement in the text applies to the mag¬ 
nates as a class, or a body. It is true that a few individuals among them, 
like Hincmar and Abbot Hugh, may have given Carloman some support (cf. 
supra, n. 48). Still, even Hugh did not, so far as we know, lift a finger 
against the Vikings after they had established themselves at Amiens in 883 
and were devastating the valleys of the Seine and the Oise. That was per¬ 
mitted to go on nemine eis resistente (supra, n. 49). v. Kalckstein’s words 
(op. cit., p. 120): “Da man ihren Fortschritten kein Ziel zu setzen ver- ■ 
mochte,” are misleading, for not the slightest attempt was made to check 
the Vikings after they had reached Amiens. It must not be assumed that 
Hugh had any insuperable objections to the policy of paying Danegeld. We 

i 

Danegeld. 9. 



130 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


they endeavoring now, as on several occasions during the reign 
of Charles the Bald, to create a situation out of which the pay¬ 
ment of Danegeld would offer the only avenue of escape? It is 
certain that when the magnates finally convened for the purpose 
of dealing with the Viking problem, they had no solution to offer 
other than the payment of tribute. 64 

With the general character and interest of the magnates in 
the western kingdom we are sufficiently familiar. 65 It has been 
pointed out above that, as between fighting the Northmen and 
paying them tribute, the magnates usually preferred to pay 
tribute. 66 And for good reasons. In the collection of the tribute 
they were able to shift the burden of the tax so that it fell almost 
exclusively on the subject population. Not only did the magnates 
themselves escape the tax altogether, but in most cases they 
were probably enriched by it. And, besides, it furnished them 
with a valuable precedent to which appeal might be made in 
connection with future exploitations of the peasantry. 67 There 
is, therefore, little room for doubt as to the motives by which 
the magnates were actuated in the formation of their policy on 
this occasion. From their point of view warfare with an enemy 
who was their superior in strategy and tactics, if not in numbers, 
was unnecessary when it could be avoided by payment of tribute. 
Warfare, moreover, involved expense, hardships, even bodily 
danger. That method of removing the Vikings would hardly be 

know that he had agreed to it in 877 (cf. supra, pp. 95-96 and nn. 19, 20, p. 
108), and since he was present at the assembly of magnates in Compiegne in 
884—which included omnes principes (see supra, n. 39, and cf. v. Kalckstein, 
op. cit., p. 121)—we may infer that Hugh, as the foremost of the magnates, 
was closely identified with the policy there and then adopted. 

64 Cf. cupra, pp. 124-25 and n. 40. 

65 Cf. supra, pp. 114-15 and n. 20. 

66 Ibid. 

67 This matter is well illustrated by Hincmar in the last of his extant 

writings, Ad episcopos regni admonitio altera (cf. supra, n. 46): “[c. xiv] 

De oppressione pauperum providendum est, quia in eorum afflictione Deus 
offenditur. . . . Providendum est ne affligantur in aedificiis superfluis, in 
exactione hostili, si Deus pacem pro sua misericordia tribuerit, etc. [c. xv] 
quando enim sperant aliquid lucrari, ad legem se convertunt [sc. comites 
et vicarii, vel etiam decani]: quando vero per legem non aestimant acqui- 
rere, ad capitula confugiunt: sicque interdum fit, ut nec capitula pleniter 
conserventur, sed pro nihilo habeantur, nec lex.” While it is true that 
Hincmar is here referring particularly to those abuses that were con¬ 
nected with summonses to courts of law and with the fines levied in conse¬ 
quence of failure to appear, there can be little doubt that other abuses were 
legalized by a similar method of procedure. Cf. Flach, Les origines de Vane. 
France, I, 342-44, and passim. 



CHAPTER VIII 


131 


chosen by men devoid of public spirit, utterly selfish and greedy; 
they would prefer a method which, while it was much more con¬ 
venient, might also yield them a financial return. 6S 

Having agreed in principle as to the policy they were to pursue, 
the nobles at once proceeded to open negotiations with the 
Vikings. 69 For this purpose they employed as their envoy a 
certain Siegfried, a Christian Dane, who was at that time a 
fidelis of the West Frankish king. 70 It was probably felt that a 
native Dane might be able to drive a better bargain with the 
Vikings than a Frank. Siegfried was instructed to enter into 
parley with the Viking leaders, and to propose to them in a 
discreet and cautious manner that they accept tribute and depart 

68 These traits of the magnates evidently were well known to the Vikings. 
In the following year (885,1, when Charles the Pat sent an army of Lor- 
rainers and West Franks against the Northmen at Louvain, the latter are 
said to have affected surprise at seeing the nobles of the western kingdom 
engaged in such an enterprise, and to have taunted them saying: “Why did 
you come to us? That was not necessary. We know who you are; you 
desire that we return to you; which we shall do” (see infra, n. 110). Van- 
der Linden (op. cit., p. 70) doubts that these words ever were spoken by 
the Northmen, and supposes that the annalist of St. Vaast inserted them in 
his narrative merely for the purpose of making it interesting and dramatic; 
in other words, Vander Linden would reduce this passage to a mere artifice 
of style without any element of truth in it whatever (ibid., p. 67). His 
opinion probably has been formed too hastily, and evidently is not the result 
of any comparison of the style of the annalist of St. Vaast with those of 
other writers of this period. Conclusions that are based exclusively on what 
are supposed to be the general characteristics of the literary style of an 
epoch, are at best very precarious. No one, perhaps, would deny that the 
literary device of letting the dramatis personae talk, was frequently em¬ 
ployed by the writers of the ninth century, and especially by the hagio- 
graphers. But it will not do to carry the generalization too far and assume 
that every author of that period habitually made use of this device. In 
particular, it must not be assumed that the annalist of St. Vaast used it 
very much, for, if my observations are correct, this is the only occasion on 
which he ever put words into the mouths of the persons who figure in his 
narrative. Even in describing the siege of Paris, which offered plentiful 
opportunities for the employment of this device (cf. the poem of Abbo, 
which abounds with such artifices), the annalist of St. Vaast refrained from 
using it. In fact, the most distinguishing characteristics of his style are its 
brevity (cf. supra, n. 39) and its freedom from rhetorical embellishments 
and literary artifices. For these reasons I prefer to believe with Diimmler 
(III, 237, 349; cf. Vogel, 320) that the words accredited by the annalist of 
St. Vaast to the Northmen do contain the substance of a sarcastic remark 
actually made by the Vikings to the western magnates. A contrary opinion 
must certainly be supported by more convincing arguments than those ad¬ 
vanced by Vander Linden, if it is to gain general acceptance. 

69 Cf. supra, n. 39. Regino (884, p. 121) states that it was Carloman who 
promised to pay the Danegeld. But his information is at best very inac¬ 
curate, and certainly is not to be given precedence over that furnished by 
the Annals of St. Vaast. Cf. supra, nn. 76, 105, 106. 

70 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 318: “Sigefridum Danum, christianum regique 
fidelem, qui nepos fuerat Hrorici Dani, etc.” Cf. supra, n. 39. On the 
identity of Siegfried, see Vogel, 316, n. 2. 



182 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


from the kingdom. 71 This commission Siegfried faithfully dis¬ 
charged. Setting out from Compiegne, he went by way of Beau¬ 
vais to the Viking headquarters at Amiens, and there presented 
the proposals of the Frankish magnates to the leaders of the 
“great army.” 72 The Vikings, conscious of their advantage, 
evidently demanded an enormous tribute as the price of their 
withdrawal, 73 much to the surprise and disappointment of the 
Frankish magnates; the latter had, in all probability, expected 
to pay an amount of money corresponding more or less to the 
sums paid at previous times. 74 Quite naturally, therefore, re¬ 
peated efforts were made to induce the Danes to lower their 
demands; and Siegfried was compelled to journey back and forth 
between Compiegne and Amiens a number of times before an 
agreement could be reached. 75 Finally after very protracted 
negotiations, the Vikings named as the price of their withdrawal 
a tribute of 12,000 pounds of pure and tested silver according 
to Norse weight, to be levied on Carloman and the Franks. 76 

71 Ann. Vedast., 883, p. 317: “qui [i. e. Sigefridus] caute cum eis [Nort- 
mannis] de redemptione regni ageret.” Ibid., 884, p. 318 (cf. supra, n. 39): 
“Sigefridum . . . mittunt, ut cum principibus suae gentis tractaret, ut tribu- 
tum acciperent, et e regno abirent.” 

72 Ibid., 883, p. 317: “Ille [Sigefridus] vero Bellovagum venit, et ita 
Ambianis perrexit ad exercendum injunctum sibi negotium.” Ibid., 884, pp. 
318-19 (cf. supra, n. 39): “At ille quod sibi injunctum fuit, opere implere 
studuit, Ambianis venit, primoribus gentis quae sibi fuerant dicta enuntiat, 
etc.” 

73 Regino, 884, p. 121: “Mox avidae gentis animi ad optinendam pecuniam 
exardescunt, etc.” Ann. Fuldenses, III, 884, ed. Kurze, pp. 101-2: “Nord- 
manni, qui regnum illius [Karlomanni] praedis et incendiis longo tempore 
fatigaverunt, audaciores effecti, etc.” 

74 At least I can suggest no other reason for the protraction of the ne¬ 
gotiations. 

75 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “et post longam et diuturnam concionem in 
eundo et redeundo, renuntiando nunc his nunc illis, etc.” 

76 Ibid.: “ad ultimum 12 milia pondera argenti cum suo pondere imposu- 
erunt [Norfmanni] regi et Francis in tributum.” Regino, 884, p. 121: “et 
XII milia pondera argenti puri atque probati exigunt totidemque annis 
pacem promittunt.” The last statement of Regino must be regarded as both 
inaccurate and false. He probably meant twelve years, not twelve thousand; 
i. e. totidem must be taken to refer, not to the word milia —that would be 
absurd—but to the numerals XII only. Even so, the truth of his statement 
may be doubted. No other source indicates that the treaty was made for a 
definite term of years. This may be one of those numerous errors in Re- 
gino’s Chronicle that are to be attributed to the author’s uncritical adher¬ 
ence to tradition and hearsay (see Diimmler’s introduction to Regino in 
Geschichtschreiber d. d. Vorzeit, IX Century, XIV, p. x; cf. Lot, “Une annee 
. . . de Charles le Chauve,” Le Moyen Ape, 1902, VI, 427, n. 4; Vander Lin¬ 
den, op. cit., 65-66). Ann. Fuld., Ill, 884, p. 102: “duodecim milia librarum 
auri et argenti ab ilia regione tributi nomine exegerunt.” I am inclined to 
doubt that any part of the Danegeld was paid in gold, partly because there 
is no mention of it either in the Annals of St. Vaast or in Regino’s Chronicle 



CHAPTER VIII 


133 


This was, so far as we know, the heaviest Danegeld ever de¬ 
manded by the Vikings in Frankish territory ; 77 and it was levied 
at a time when the ruin, desolation, and loss of life, caused by 
the Northmen, seemed perhaps more appalling than ever before. 78 
The agreement with the Danes evidently was reached on or 
shortly before February 2, for from that date a truce was de¬ 
clared to and including the month of October. 79 The truce being 
guaranteed by an exchange of hostages, even that part of the 
West Frankish population which dwelt north of the Oise — and 
which therefore had been most directly exposed to the ravages of 
the Vikings 80 —began henceforth to enjoy some measure of secur¬ 
ity. But in the East Frankish kingdom, beyond the Scheldt, 
the devastation continued as before. 81 

The evidence relating to the method by which the Danegeld of 


—the first of which must be regarded as more reliable on this point than the 
Annals of Fulda —and partly because the accuracy of the Bavarian (Fulda) 
annalist may be gravely questioned; according to him, this Danegeld was 
neither agreed to nor paid until after the death of Carloman, which is 
obviously not correct (cf. Vogel, 317, n. 1; Diimmler, III, 229, n. 3). Abou- 
el-Cassim, an Arabic writer of the tenth century, whose information appears 
to be badly confused, has this to say of Carloman: “Ce fut ce roi acheta des 
Madgiousses une paix de sept ans au prix de 600 rattals d’or et de 600 
rattals d’argent” (cited by Depping, Histoire des expeditions maritimes des 
Normands, 201, n.2). We know that Berengar raised a large tribute for 
the Hungarian king, Taxis, who invaded Italy in 947 (see Liutprand, Anta- 
podosis, V, 33, ed. Diimmler, p. 118). Is it possible that Abou-el-Cassim 
confused Carloman with Berengar, and the Vikings with the Magyars? 

77 The next highest Danegeld is that of 845, which amounted to 7,000 
pounds (cf. supra, chap, i, n. 45). It is true that the amounts of the Dane- 
gelds paid between 889 and 926, inclusive, are unknown; but it does not 
appear likely that they were as high as the tribute for 884, since on the 
later occasions the Vikings did not have such decided advantages over the 
Franks as they did in 884. To my mind, the reign of Carloman marks the 
culmination of the Viking invasions in the West Frankish kingdom (cf. 
Vogel, p. 259, last paragraph). 

78 The plaint of the annalist of St. Vaast, given supra, p. 124, seems to 
justify this statement. Cf. Vogel, 316 and n. 1. 

79 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “datis obsidibus ad invicem, coeperunt hi 
qui trans Hisam erant, aliquatenus securi esse. A die itaque purifications 
s. Mariae usque mense octobrio inter eos haec securitas data est.” 

80 Cf. the preceding note. I can not agree with Vogel (p. 317) that trans 
Hisam should be translated “southeast of the Oise.” In that case, the popu¬ 
lation on either side of the Somme, which had suffered most, would have 
obtained no relief. The truce must have applied to all that portion of the 
western kingdom in which the “great army” had been operating, i. e. to the 
entire district between the Scheldt, the Oise, and the Seine. There is no 
evidence that the Vikings had extended their ravages southeast of the 
Oise at this time. If they had, the magnates would hardly have assembled 
at Compiegne, on the Oise, to deliberate. Cf. supra, p. 124 and n. 39, and see 
the following note. 

81 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “Sed Nortmanni trans Scaldum . . . more 
sibi solito . . . devastant, etc.” 



134 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


884 was raised, is very scant. 82 All we really know is that a 
general tax was levied for the purpose, 83 and, probably because 
the tax did not yield the required amount, 84 that it became neces¬ 
sary also to draw on the church treasuries. Perhaps we shall 
not go far wrong if we assume that this Danegeld was secured 
by methods very much akin to those employed for a similar pur¬ 
pose in 877. 85 Whether or not a graduated assessment was pre¬ 
pared, proportioned in each case to the value of holdings in land 
or to other sources of income, it may be taken for granted that 
the burden of the tax fell, as usual, on that part of the population 
which was least able to pay ; 86 in other words, that the holders of 
mansi, together with priests and merchants, were forced to pay 
not only what might be regarded as their legitimate share, but 
also that additional amount which, in justice, ought to have been 
contributed by their seigniors. 87 

The, sources at our disposal do not permit us to arrive at any 
satisfactory conclusion as regards the territorial-limits within 
which this Danegeld was raised. There can be no doubt that the 
tax was levied in Francia, which had been chiefly exposed to the 
operations of the “great army.” 88 Whether Neustria, Aquitaine, 
and what remained of Burgundy, also were required to con¬ 
tribute, must be left to conjecture. It seems hardly possible 
that the largest tribute ever demanded by the Vikings on the 
continent, 89 could have been raised in Francia alone. On most 
previous occasions (when the sums required were much smaller) 
it had been usual to tax Neustria and Burgundy as well as 
Francia ; 9Q and after the recent devastations Francia was, in 884, 
more exhausted than ever. Since Carloman was now ruler of 


82 Ann. Veclast., 884, p. 319: “Post sanctum itaque pascha inchoatur tribu* 
turn persolvi, spoliantur ecclesiae et ecclesiastica mancipia, tandem soluto 
tributo, mense octobrio finiente, adunantur Franci, etc.” 

83 I take it that the words, “inchoatur tributum persolvi” (see the pre¬ 
ceding note), imply a collection of taxes levied to raise the Danegeld; the 
expression, “spoliantur . . . ecclesiastica mancipia,” undoubtedly indicates 
that the serfs on the lands of the church were required to contribute toward 
the Danegeld. 

84 In 877 the church treasuries were drawn upon only after the proceeds 
of the tax had proved inadequate (cf. supra, chap, vi, nn. 45, 47). The 
words, “spoliantur ecclesiae . . . tandem soluto tributo” (cf. supra, n. 82), 
lead me to believe that this holds true also for 884. 

85 Cf. supra, pp. 99 ff. 

86 Cf. supra, pp. 102-3 and n. 68, p. 109. 

87 Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., p. 123. 

88 Cf. supra, n. 80. 

89 Cf. supra, n. 77. 

90 See supra, pp. 97-98 and nn. 34, 37-40. 



CHAPTER VIII 


135 


the entire West Frankish realm (not including Lorraine and the 
kingdom of Boso), 91 and since all the magnates are said to have 
been assembled when they decided to buy off the Vikings, 92 it is 
possible to argue that the whole kingdom of Carloman, at least 
all of it outside of Aquitaine, 93 was required to contribute in 
884. 94 But no statement can be made on this subject with any 
degree of assurance. — At least seven months were required to 
raise the enormous tribute; the first payments to the Danes were 
made shortly after Easter (April 16), but the final installment 
could not be paid until the end of October. 95 

After the tribute had been liquidated, the Frankish magnates, 
suspicious of the good faith and the intentions of the Vikings, 
mobilized their forces, and prepared to offer armed resistance to 
the invaders in the event that they should fail to live up to their 
engagements. 96 But the Vikings set fire to their camp and de¬ 
parted from Amiens toward the sea-coast. Carloman and the 
Franks, having crossed the Oise, followed the retreating Danes 
at some distance, evidently to make sure of their departure. 97 

91 Cf. supra, p. 121 and n. 19. 

92 Cf. supra, n. 39. The fact that the magnates who assembled at Com¬ 
piegne are sometimes referred to as Fraud (Ann. Veclast., 883, p. 317; 884, 
p. 319), is of no significance as regards their number or nationality. The 
Fraud are also said to have invited Charles the Fat to become the ruler of 
the West Frankish kingdom (Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 320); yet we know that 
Charles the Fat was recognized as king not only in the North, but also in 
Aquitaine (Diimmler, III, 235, n. 1). See also infra, n. 95. 

93 Aquitaine had thus far never been required to contribute toward the 
Danegeld (cf. supra, p. 98 and n. 40). It seems very doubtful that a tribute 
for Vikings operating from the Somme would have been raised in southern 
France. 

94 v. Kalckstein (op. dt., p. 123) believes that Abbot Hugh supervised the 
collection of the Danegeld in Neustria. 

95 See supra, n. 82. I interpret the words, “inchoatur tributum persolvi” 
(cf. supra, n. 83), as signifying that the tribute was paid to the Vikings 
in successive installments, according as it could be collected from the tax* 
payers. Since the first installments were paid after Easter, it may be 
assumed that the collection of the Danegeld from the subject population had 
begun at, or even before, Easter (i. e. April 16, according to v. Kalckstein, 
op. dt., p. 123). It will be remembered that the Franks had agreed to raise 
the Danegeld on, or probably before, February 2 (cf. supra, n. 79). v. Kalck¬ 
stein (op. dt., p. 123) believes that the Danegeld was assessed at the As¬ 
sembly of Ver in March. But it seems more probable that this had been 
done at Compiegne in February. All the magnates had been present at 
Compiegne (cf. supra, n. 39), but only part of them came to Ver (M.G.H. 
LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 371, line 22), and the Danegeld is not even mentioned 
in the Capitulare Vernense. 

96 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 319: “mense octobrio finiente, adunantur Franci, 
ut si Nortmanni inmutari fidem vellent, eis resisterent.” 

97 ll)id.: “Nortmanni vero sua castra incendunt, atque ab Ambianis rece- 
dunt; rex vero et Franci, transito Hysa, lente itinere eos- insequuntur.” 
Regino, 884, p. 121: “Accepta tam ingenti pecunia, funes a litore solvunt, 
naves conscendunt et marina litora repetunt.” 



136 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


Arrived at Boulogne, the Vikings took counsel among themselves 
as to future operations. They finally separated into two groups, 
some going to England, while others proceeded to the old king¬ 
dom of Lothaire. The latter group eventually established itself 
for the winter in a camp constructed at Louvain, on the River 
Dyle. 98 

Hardly had the Frankish army disbanded, after the departure 
of the Vikings, when Carloman was accidentally wounded by one 
of his companions on a hunting expedition." The young monarch 
survived but a few days, passing away on December 12, 884, in 
the eighteenth year of his life. 100 This left a five year old boy, 
Charles — later called the Simple — the nearest heir to the 
western kingdom. 101 It was recognized that the situation did 
not permit the experiment of elevating a mere child to the throne; 
and we may assume that the experiences of the magnates during 
the reign of Carloman did not incline them to set up a regency 
under a man like Abbot Hugh. 102 Also there is reason to believe 
that the nobles were now fully alive to the danger that threat¬ 
ened their own interests if they permitted the Vikings to con¬ 
tinue their operations unchecked and with impunity. 103 The 
tribute of 884 had doubtless been far heavier than the magnates 
had expected ; 104 and they probably wished to avoid the necessity 
of having to pay another Danegeld, at least for some time. But 

98 Ann. Vedast., 884, pp. 319-20: “Praedicti vero Dani iter agentes Bo- 
noniam veniunt; ibique agentes consilium, quid sibi faciendum est, pars 
illorum mare transiit, atque pars Luvanium in regno quondam Hlotharii; 
ibique sibi castra statuunt ad hyemandum.” See also Regino, 884, p. 122 
(quoted infra, n. 106); Ethelwerdi Chron., Ill, 884, loc. cit., p. 123; Floren- 
tius Wigorn., 885, loc. cit., p. 561; Ann. Anglo-Saxonici, 885, loc. cit., pp. 
104-5. On the sojourn of the Northmen at Louvain, see Vander Linden, op. 
cit., 64-81. 

99 Ann. Vedast., 884, p. 320. 

100 Diimmler, III, 232 and n. 1. 

101 Ibid., 233. 

102 Though Hugh had enjoyed the favor of Louis III and Carloman, whom 
he had loyally supported (cf. supra, p. 120 and n. 7, pp. 122-23), and though 
he doubtless had a considerable following (cf. supra, p. 122 and n. 24), it is 
also true that there was a party strongly opposed to the advancement of his 
interests (cf. supra, nn. 7, 49). Cf. Eckel, op. cit., p. 3. 

103 Cf. supra, pp. 124-25. In 885 the western magnates, at the request of 
Charles the Fat, actually took part in an expedition against the Viking 
camp at Louvain, outside their own boundaries. It is true that the expedi¬ 
tion ended in failure, but it was the first occasion on which the West Franks 
ever went to engage the Northmen beyond the limits of the western king¬ 
dom (Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 321; cf. infra, p. 138). The determined resistance 
of the Franks at the siege of Paris (see infra, chap, ix), is another indication 
of a change in their attitude as regards the Viking invasions. 

104 Cf. supra, p. 132 and nn. 73, 74. 



CHAPTER VIII 


137 


it was rumored, and possibly believed by some, that the leaders 
of the “great army,” having learned of the death of Carloman, 
regarded the recent treaty as no longer binding and were there¬ 
fore demanding that the successor of Carloman, whoever he 
might be, pay another tribute of 12,000 pounds as the price of 
peace. 105 Whether the Vikings had really made any such demand 
is doubtful, 106 but the rumor to that effect may indicate what was 
feared. In any case, it is clear that the magnates felt they could 
afford to take no risks. Passing over the claims of the boy 

105 What I have interpreted as a rumor current among the Franks, is by 
Regino presented as a fact (884, p. 122): “Nordmanni cognita morte regis 
protinus in regnum revertuntur. Itaque Hugo abba et ceteri proceres lega- 
tos ad eos dirigunt, promissionem et fidem datam violatam esse proclamant. 
Ad haec illi respondent, se cum Carlomanno rege, non cum alio aliquo foedus 
pepigisse [but cf. supra, n. 76]; quisquis ille esset, qui ei in regnum suc- 
cederet, eiusdem numeri et quantitatis pecuniam daret, si quiete ac pacifice 
imperium tenere vellet. Territi huiuscemodi mandatis optimates regni ad 
Carolum imperatorem missos dirigunt eumque ultro in regnum invitant, etc.” 
In this case, as in the one cited before (supra, n. 76), Regino’s statements 
are not corroborated by any other writer, and we may well doubt whether 
what he says is literally true. His information on what took place at this 
time is at best very inaccurate. To he convinced of this, one needs only 
compare his entries for the year 884 with those for 886, and note how he 
confused the chronology of the events he was describing. A second Dane- 
geld of 12,000 pounds was certainly never paid by the Franks. Cf. the fol¬ 
lowing note. 

106 Both Diimmler (III, 233) and Vogel (318-19) accept the testimony 
of Regino on this point (cf. the preceding note) without question. But 
neither of them has given sufficient attention to what Regino says in the 
context. Both assume that the Vikings did not learn of Carloman’s death, 
and therefore did not demand a second Danegeld, until after they had 
reached Louvain. But that is not what Regino says (884, pp. 121-22): “Ac- 
cepta tarn ingenti pecunia funes a litore solvunt [Nortmanni], naves con- 
scendunt et marina litora repetunt. . . . Nortmanni cognita morte regis 
protinus in regnum revertuntur, etc.” (see preceding note). These words 
imply that the Northmen learned of the death of Carloman before they had 
left the sea-coast, and that it was thence, and not from Louvain, that they 
returned to the western kingdom (cf. supra, n. 98). Not until the end of his 
recital for 884 does Regino state that the Northmen left the Somme and 
proceeded to Louvain (p. 122): “His etiam diebus Nortmanni a Somna 
exeunt et rursus in regno Lotharii revertentes in loco, qui dicitur Lovon, 
castrametati sunt in confinio eiusdem regni et continuis incursionum in- 
festationibus utraque regna fatigant.” A passage almost identical with the 
one just quoted occurs again for 886 (p. 125). All this is very confused. 
And since there is not a word in any other source regarding a demand for 
a second Danegeld, I am not only inclined to doubt that such a demand was 
ever made; I question also whether the Northmen returned inland imme¬ 
diately upon receiving news of Carloman’s death. There is every reason to 
believe that they did not reenter the western kingdom until after their 
sojourn at Louvain (cf. the following page and n. 110). Diimmler (III, 234, 
n. 1) apparently believes what Regino says about the demand for a second 
Danegeld, but thinks he goes too far when he asserts this to have been the 
reason why the western magnates gave their allegiance to Charles the Fat 
(cf. the preceding note). The statements in the Annals of Fulda (III, 884, 
pp. 101-2) on these matters, are confused and altogether unreliable (cf. 
supra, n. 76, end; Yog el, 317, n. 1). 



138 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


Charles, they gave their allegiance to Emperor Charles the 
Fat, 107 who, in spite of his weakness in matters military and 
otherwise, was at that time the most prominent figure among 
all the Franks, partly because of his imperial position, but more 
on account of the powerful supporters he had as ruler of the 
eastern kingdom. 108 

Charles the Fat seems to have recognized the necessity of ex¬ 
pelling the Northmen from his realm; for one of his first acts, 
after he had received the homage and fealty of his new vassals 
early in 885, was to order a combined army of West Franks and 
Lorrainers to proceed against the stronghold of the Vikings at 
Louvain. 109 It is certain that from this time, if not before, the 
leaders of the “great army” ceased to consider themselves bound 
by the terms of their treaty with Carloman and the western mag¬ 
nates in 884. 110 Within a few months the Vikings left their camp 
at Louvain, and proceeded by land and sea to the Seine. * * 111 
Rouen was taken on July 25, 885, and by November of the same 
year the memorable siege of Paris had begun. 112 

In return for the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds of silver, 
the western kingdom had enjoyed peace for a period of less than 
eighteen mouths. 113 Though we possess no direct evidence on the 
point, there can scarcely be any doubt that the Danegeld had been 
raised only with very great difficulty, 114 coming as it did after a 
period during which the country had suffered terribly from de¬ 
vastation and plundering. 115 Whatever may have been the mo- 


107 Ann. Vedast., 884, 885, p. 320. Cf. the two preceding notes. 

108 Diimmler, III, 233-35. 

109 Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 321. According to Regino (see supra, n. 106), 
both kingdoms, the western as well as the eastern, had been raided by the 
Vikings from their camp at Louvain. Cf. Vander Linden, op. cit., p. 69. 

110 This is indicated by the jeers with which the Vikings greeted the 
Franks from the western realm (Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 321): “Francosque qui 
venerant ex regno Karlomanni irrisere Dani: Ut quid ad nos venistis? non 
fuit necesse; nos scimus qui estis; et vultis ut ad vos redeamus; quod 
faciemus.” That this was not an idle threat is sufficiently demonstrated 
infra in the text. Cf. supra, n. 68. 

111 Ann. Vedast., 885, p. 321; Regino, 887, p. 125. Cf. Vogel, 320, n. 3, 
where some additional references are given. 

112 Ann. Vedast., 885, pp. 321-23. Cf. Vogel, 320 ft. 

113 From February 2, 884, when the truce was declared (see supra, n. 79), 
to about July 25, 885, when the Viking army entered Rouen. 

114 The words of the annalist of St. Vaast (cf. supra, n. 82): “spoliantur 
ecclesiae et ecclesiastica mancipia, tandem soluto tributo,” and the long 
period required to raise the tribute, are indications to this effect. Cf. 
Diimmler, III, 230. 

115 Cf. supra, pp. 123-24. 



CHAPTER VIII 


139 


tives of the magnates when they entered into negotiations with 
the Vikings, 116 it is fairly clear that for the present they had had 
enough of the policy of paying tribute, and that their eyes had 
been opened to the imminent danger with which their own inter¬ 
ests were threatened by the operations of the “great army.” 117 
Yet it would undoubtedly be a mistake to suppose that the 
strengthening of the resistance to the Vikings which followed 
the payment of this Danegeld, 118 resulted from a sudden outburst 
of patriotism or a spontaneous birth of public spirit on the part 
of the magnates. 119 They probably remained quite as self-seek¬ 
ing and greedy as before; and their interests were the same as 
they had always been. But they found themselves in a somewhat 
changed situation. The Vikings of this period were not loose 
bands of freebooters bent solely on the acquisition of plunder; 
they were a strongly organized “great army,” which had come 
for the purpose of conquest, and with the intention of establish¬ 
ing colonies and making permanent settlements in the conquered 
territory. 120 At this time there was no ambitious monarch 121 
whose schemes of strengthening the royal power had to be frus¬ 
trated by keeping him occupied with the Northmen, as was the 
case in the time of Charles the Bald. 122 The real danger in the 
present situation lay in the fact that the monarch was not suf¬ 
ficiently strong to be able to give protection against the foreign 
enemy. Such a situation was a direct menace to the private 
interests of the magnates. 123 And the recognition, by the nobles, 
of that menace furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of 
their unusual efforts to prevent the return of the “great army” 
to their country after 884, their stout resistance to the Vikings 
at the siege of Paris (885—86), and their refusal to buy the 
removal of the invaders by the payment of another Danegeld— 124 
for the next chapter will make clear that the Danegeld which 
eventually was paid to the Vikings at Paris, was agreed to and 

116 Cf. supra, pp. 124 ff. 

117 Cf. supra, p. 132 and n. 74, p. 136. 

118 See supra, n. 103 and cf. Vogel, 44, 321 ff. 

119 Cf. supra, pp. 128-31, 114-17. 

120 See supra, n. 26. Cf. Vogel, 260-61; Vander Linden, op. cit., 64-65. 

121 It will be agreed that Emperor Charles the Fat was not regarded as 
such. 

112 See supra, pp. 114-17. 

123 This is wefl brought out by Fustel de Coulanges (Les transform, de 
la royaute, 695-96) when he explains why the western magnates chose 
Charles the Fat instead of Charles the Simple as their king in 884. Cf. 
supra, pp. 136-38. 

124 These matters are taken up for discussion in the following chapter. 



140 THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 

furnished, not by the defenders of the city, but by Emperor 
Charles the Fat. 

The situation above described did not, however, last very 
long. 125 We shall find Odo and Rudolph paying Danegeld under 
circumstances not essentially different from those which had 
forced Charles the Bald to resort to this expedient. 126 


125 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., 696-97. 

126 See infra, chaps, x-xiv; cf. supra, chap. vii. 




THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


141 


CHAPTER IX. 

Payments Made to the Danes (886—87) in Connection 

With the Siege of Paris. 

At the close of the preceding chapter attention was called 
to that peculiar situation which during and after the year 884 
led to a temporary strengthening of the resistance offered by 
the magnates of the western kingdom to the Viking invaders. 
But it was also pointed out that this determined effort of the 
Frankish nobles to expel the Danes, did not prevent the in¬ 
vaders from securing a payment of Danegeld from Charles the 
Fat before they quitted Paris. 1 In truth, two money payments 
were made to the Danes in connection with the famous siege 
of 885—86, though only one of these can be regarded, in any 
proper sense, as a Danegeld; and we shall find that even this 
differed in several ways from preceding Danegelds. 

No attempt will be made here to tell again the whole story 
of the siege of Paris. 2 But if the reasons for the two payments 
just mentioned are to be made at all clear, it will be necessary 
briefly to review the general course of the siege operations, and 
to examine certain details in connection with the negotiations 
that took place between the Franks and the Vikings. 

The “great army” had arrived before Paris on November 24, 
885. 3 The following day, Siegfried, one of the Viking leaders, 
appeared before Bishop Gauzelin, requesting that the Danes 
be permitted to ascend the Seine, and promising on this con¬ 
dition to spare the city of Paris from destruction or damage. 4 
When this request was peremptorily refused, the Vikings on 
November 26 and 27 attempted, though in vain, to take the city 
by storm. 5 They thereupon proceeded to a regular investment 

1 See supra, pp. 139-40. 

2 The most detailed and accurate secondary account of the siege of Paris 
is that of Favre (Eudes, 17-68); other more or less detailed descriptions are 
given by Vogel (320 ff.) and Dummler (HI, 260 ff ; ). Freeman (“The Early 
Sieges of Paris,” in Historical Essays, First Series, 212-56) has the only 
account in English that even approaches completeness. For other references 
see Vogel, 324, n. 6. My sketch of the earlier part of the siege is based in 
part, but by no means exclusively, on the work of Favre. 

3 Favre, 35; cf. Vogel, 324, n. 5. 

4 Favre, 35-36. 

5 Ibid., 36-39. 



142 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


of the place, meanwhile engaging intermittently in plundering 
raids throughout the surrounding district. 6 

Up to February, 886, comparatively small progress was made 
in the siege operations, although the Vikings had very large 
forces at their disposal. 7 Under the staunch and able direction 
of Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo, 8 the Franks had thus far 
baffled every attempt of the Vikings to gain entrance to the city 
or to break down the system of defenses. 9 But on February 
6 the Danes, aided by a flood of the Seine, finally captured and 
destroyed one of the protecting towers. 10 This misfortune in¬ 
duced Bishop Gauzelin to appeal for aid to Count Henry in 
Saxony, one of the ablest leaders of the East Franks in their 
warfare with the Northmen. * 11 For certain reasons that are not 
entirely clear, Henry was able to accomplish little or nothing; 
after having spent a month or more in a futile attempt to secure 
an engagement with the Vikings in the open field, he returned 
home towards the beginning of April. 12 

The departure of Count Henry left the brave defenders of 
Paris with no present hope of aid or succor. After another 
attack on the citadel, which was sanguinarily repulsed, 13 the 
Danes moved their camp from the north to the south bank of 
the Seine, 14 where they would have the river between themselves 


6 Favre, 39 ff. 

7 Ibid., 35 and n. 2, 39-43; cf. Vogel, 324-25. 

8 Favre, 26 ff. 

9 Ibid., 43-46. 

10 Ann. Vedast., 886, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 323-24. Cf. Favre, 46 ff. 

11 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 324; Abbo, De bellis Parisiacae urbis, II, lines 
3-4, M.G.H., Poetae Latini, IV, Part I. See also Favre, 48-51. 

12 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 324; Abbo, II, lines 3-22; Regino, Chron., 887, ed. 
Kurze, p. 125; Ann. Fuld., Ill, 886, ed. Kurze, 104. 

13 Abbo, II, lines 15-22. This attack appears to have been overlooked 
by most writers on the subject, including Favre. 

14 Abbo, II, lines 34-40. I agree with Favre (52, n. 2) in rejecting the 
view of Steenstrup (Normannerne, II, 225) and Diimmler (III, 266), that 
only part of the Viking army — i. e. Siegfried and his men — crossed the 
Seine to erect a new camp. Undoubtedly it was the entire “great army” 
which changed its. place of encampment. But it seems to me that all writ¬ 
ers on this subject, including Favre (52, n. 2) and Vogel (331) err when 
they assert that the Viking camp was moved on the advice of Siegfried. 
This assertion is based on a misinterpretation of the following words of Sieg¬ 
fried to his companions (Abbo, II, lines 32-33): “ ‘Hanc linquite sedem, Hie 
non stare diu nostrum manet, hinc sed abire!’” Here Siegfried is not urg¬ 
ing the Vikings merely to transfer their camp from one place to another, but 
to go away, to depart, abire; in other words, to give up the siege of Paris and 
go elsewhere. To my mind it seems that Abbo here uses the verb abire in ex¬ 
actly the same sense as he does in lines 64-65, where there can be no question 
as to its meaning (see infra, n. 32). Furthermore, the reason assigned by 



CHAPTER IX 


143 


and any hostile relief force coming, as it most likely would, 
from the north. 15 There was, however, nothing on which the 
besieged might base any hopes of a change in the general situa¬ 
tion, for the Vikings fortified themselves very strongly and 
prepared to continue the siege. 10 Indeed, the prospect must 
have seemed gloomy enough, and it is hardly to be wondered 
at, if, under such circumstances, the defenders of Paris began 
to consider the possibility of putting an end to the siege, or at 
least of securing the withdrawal of part of the “great army,” 
by means of bribery. 17 

Aware that such a scheme would be successful only if some 
Viking chief with considerable prestige and influence could be 
interested in it, the Franks determined to approach “King” Sieg¬ 
fried with a proposal of this nature. 18 A meeting arranged 
between Siegfried and Odo, 19 seems to have resulted in an agree¬ 
ment that Siegfried was to attempt to induce his fellow leaders 
and their men to give up the siege and to retire from Paris. 20 
Hardly had this compact been made, however, when a group 
of Vikings appeared, ready to overpower Odo and carry him 

Abbo in lines 31-32 for what he represents Siegfried as saying in lines 32- 
33, would be meaningless if Siegfried were suggesting only that the camp 
be moved; “conspiciens Sigemfredus nostros in agone esse feros”—Siegfried 
perceived that the Parisian Franks were impetuous in battle, and therefore 
he advocated that the Vikings move their camp from one side of the city to 
the other (!); in truth, a poor remedy against the impetuosity of the 
Franks! The usual misinterpretation of this passage is probably due to an 
erroneous translation of the word ergo in line 34; it should not be translated 
“therefore” or “consequently,” but “now when”; for it is used to resume the 
discussion dropped in line 22, or, more exactly, to bring the reader’s atten¬ 
tion back to what happened at the time Count Henry returned to Germany 
(see line 15). 

15 Vogel, 331. Favre’s view (p. 52), that the camp was transferred by 
reason of a disease which broke out among the Vikings, seems less probable. 

16 Abbo, II, lines 37-40. 

17 Ann. Veclast., 886, p. 324: “Episcopus vero, corde confractus ex gravi 
damno, . . . mandans ut . . . [Heinricus] ei et populo christiano subveniret. 
. . . sed Heinricus nil ibi profecit; atque in suam rediit regionem. Gozlinus 
vero, dum omnibus modis populo christiano juvare studeret, cum Sigefrido, 
rege Danorum, amicitiam fecit, ut per hoc civitas ab obsidione liberaretur.” 
Cf. infra, nn. 24-26. 

18 Cf. Vogel, 40, n. 3, 325 and n. 3; Favre, 35, n. 9. 

19 Abbo, II, line 23: “Rege Sigemfedo simul ast Odone loquente.” Cf. 
supra, n. 17. According to the Annals of St. Vaast it was Gauzelin, but ac¬ 
cording to Abbo it was Odo, who conducted the negotiations with Siegfried. 
This need raise no difficulty if it be remembered that the two men were 
cooperating, and that Odo may well have undertaken this mission at the 
suggestion, or at least with the approval, of Gauzelin, who probably was ill 
at this time (Ann. Veclast., 886, p. 325). Gauzelin held the supreme com¬ 
mand at Paris until his death gave it to Odo (Favre, 54, n. 3). 

20 Cf. infra, n. 22. 



144 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


off as a prisoner. But Odo stood his ground, and the Viking 
band was driven off by a number of Franks who had rushed 
forward to the aid of their leader. 21 Siegfried now took occa¬ 
sion to point out to his fellow Vikings the fierce valor of Odo’s 
men in battle, hoping by such argument to persuade them that 
it would be useless to continue the investment of Paris, and 
better policy to go elsewhere. 22 

But it proved very difficult for Siegfried to convince the other 
Danes on these points, 23 and eventually he found it advisable 
to reopen his negotiations with the Franks on a narrower basis. 
It was now agreed that whether or not the other Danes could be 
persuaded to do so, Siegfried and his men were to depart from 
Paris in return for the payment of the comparatively small sum 
of sixty pounds of silver. 24 It is quite possible that Siegfried 
had been promised a larger bribe — for this payment can not 
be regarded as anything else 25 — if he should finally succeed in 
persuading his fellow countrymen to follow him. 26 Indeed, he 
made a second attempt, but without result. 27 The Danes, su¬ 
specting, or possibly knowing, that Siegfried was advancing his 
own ends rather than theirs, refused to follow him. 28 Where¬ 
upon Siegfried challenged them to attack Paris without his aid. 29 

Though this challenge was accepted, the attack resulted only in 

__ \ 

21 Abbo, II, lines 24-30. 

22 Ibid., lines 31-33: “Conspiciens Sigemfredus nostros in agone / Esse 
feros, inquit sociis: ‘Hanc linquite sedem,/ Hie non stare diu nostrum 
manet, hinc sed abire!’” Cf. supra, n. 14. 

23 They seem to have ignored his suggestions; at least Abbo (II, lines 
31-40) has nothing to say of any reply from them. 

24 Abbo, II, lines 41-42: “Denique rex dictus [i. e. Sigefredus] denas 
capiens argenti / Sex libras nitidi nobis causa redeundi, etc.” The Annals 
of St. Vaast (cf. supra, n. 17) mention the compact with Siegfried, but say 
nothing' of the money payment. The other sources do not mention the agree¬ 
ment with Siegfried at all. 

25 A payment of sixty pounds of silver hardly constitutes a Danegeld 
of the type that has so far been studied in this dissertation. Danegeld was 
paid by the Franks when they were unable, or unwilling, to offer any 
further resistance to the Vikings; and it was paid in amounts compared 
with which the sum accepted by Siegfried was a mere pittance. All we 
know about the policy of the Vikings in the past would lead us to believe 
that they would have been quite willing to raise the siege of Paris, if the 
Franks had been ready to pay Danegeld. Cf. infra, n. 31 and see also pp. 
146-147. 

26 This conjecture is based on the fact that Siegfried, even after he had 
received the bribe, made efforts to persuade the Vikings to give up the siege 
and follow him seaward. See the following note, and cf. Favre, 53, first two 
lines. 

27 Abbo, II, lines 43-47. 

28 Ibid., line 47: “his [Normannis] autem nolentibus.” 

29 Ibid., lines 48-52. 



CHAPTER IX 


145 


losses for the Northmen — two of their “kings” among the 
rest. 30 Yet, in spite of the repulse, the bulk of the Danish army 
chose to continue the siege operations, doubtless in the hope that 
eventually they would be able either to reduce Paris or, at the 
least, to secure a large sum of money, a veritable Danegeld, as 
the price of their retreat. 31 But Siegfried, satisfied that without 
his aid little could be accomplished by the besieging army, now 
collected his own men and withdrew from the Seine. 32 

The departure of Siegfried brought small relief to the defen¬ 
ders of Paris. After the death of Gauzelin, in April 886, 33 the 
Northmen pressed the siege with redoubled vigor, and there 
were violent conflicts every day for a long time. 34 Odo, who 
was now in supreme command, at length decided to apply for 
aid to Emperor Charles the Fat. 35 But that monarch, for some 
reason that has never been made quite clear, was in no haste 
to relieve the hard pressed town, and did not arrive at Paris 
until late in September, or early in October. 36 

Meanwhile Count Henry, whom the emperor probably had 
sent on a reconnoitering exploit in advance of his main army, 
had fallen into a trap prepared by the Northmen, and had been 
killed. 37 Henry's death was a severe blow to the emperor, 38 and 

30 Abbo, II, lines 53-60. 

31 Ibid., lines 66-67: “Mox hilaris Sequanam liquit [Sigefredus] pro 
munere sumpto / Sic alii facerent, eadem si tunc meruissent.” This pass¬ 
age indicates that the other Northmen would have followed Siegfried’s ex¬ 
ample, if they had been properly rewarded. Vogel’s view (p. 331), that the 
Parisians were willing to pay tribute, appears to be unfounded. 

32 Abbo, II, lines 61-66: “Sigemfredus ovans, ridens morientibus inquit: / 

‘Nunc . . . urbem capitote, / ...!’/ Inde suis: ‘Abeamus,’ ait, ‘tempus 

venit ecce, / Quo gratum fuerit nobis istinc abiise!’ / Mox hilaris, etc.” (see 
preceding note). Siegfried returned to the Seine in November (see infra, 
pp. 96-97 and n. 66; cf. Favre, p. 53, n. 4, p. 63). 

33 Diimmler, III, 267, n. 2. 

34 Abbo, II, lines 154-62; Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 325. 

35 Abbo, II, lines 163-65. The Annals of St. Vaast (886, p. 325) represent 
Odo as applying for aid to the principibus regni, whom he requested to not¬ 
ify the emperor of the the sad plight of Paris. Cf. Flodoard, Historia Rem- 
ensis ecclesiae , IV, c. 5, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 563. 

36 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326; Ann. Fuld., Ill, 886, p. 105. See also Bohmer- 
Miihlbacher, Regesten, nos. 1723a, 1725a; cf. Vogel, 334, n. 5; Favre, 59, n. 4. 

37 The death of Count Henry occurred on August 28, 886 (Annales necro- 

logici Fuldenses , SS., XIII, p. 185; cf. Diimmler, III, 269 and n. 2). 

The Annals of St. Vaast (886, p. 326), but not Abbo, state that Henry had 
been sent in advance by the emperor. The details in connection with the 
second expedition, and the death, of Henry are given by Regino (887, pp. 
125-26), but many of his statements are no doubt inaccurate (cf. Favre, 
57, n. 1; Vogel, 334, n. 3). See also Ann. Fuld., Ill, 886, p. 105. Cf. v. 
Kalckstein, Geschicte des franzosischen Kdnigtums, I, 40, n. 4. 

38 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326: “sed quia dux periit, ipse [imperator] nil 
utile gessit.” 

Danegeld. 10. 




146 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


a great loss to the Franks. It ought to have emphasized the 
necessity of bringing immediate succor to the defenders of Paris. 
Yet Charles apparently made no effort to accelerate his move¬ 
ments. 39 

When the emperor finally did appear before the city, at the 
head of a very large and splendid, though motley, host, 40 he 
accomplished nothing which, in the opinion of his contempora¬ 
ries and of later historians, was at all commensurate with what 
the situation demanded or his resources permitted. 41 We get 
the impression from the sources that precisely at the time when 
he had it in his power to deliver a crushing blow against the 
invaders, he failed to strike, 42 and instead opened up negotia¬ 
tions, 43 which in November, 886, led to the conclusion of a very 
pusillanimous treaty. 44 The Northmen were given permission 
to proceed to Sens and the Burgundian territories, with the 
understanding that they might spend the winter there, plunder¬ 
ing at will; 45 also they were promised a tribute of 700 pounds 

39 Abbo (II, lines 219-330) recounts the various events which took place 
at Paris between the death of Count Henry and the arrival of Charles the 
Fat. Cf. Vogel, 333; Favre, 59; Diimmler, III, 270. 

40 Abbo, II, 330-34: “En princeps de quo canitur, circumdatis armis / 
Omnigenis, caelum veluti splendoribus astreis, / Induperator adest Karolus 
comitatus opimo / Diversi populo labii, tentoria figens / Sub Martis pedibus 
montis speculamque secundum.” Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326: “[imperator] 
Carisiacum veniens cum ingenti exercitu, etc.” Ibid.: “Parisius venit cum 
manu valida.” 

41 Ibid. (cf. note (a) on p. 327): “ipse [imperator] nil utile gessit.” Re- 
gino, 887, p. 127: “[Imperator] nil dignum imperatoriae maiestati in eodem 
loco gessit.” Ann. Fuld., Co?it. Rcitisb., 886, p. 114: “parum prospere actis 
rebus.” Cf. Favre, 59; v. Kalckstein, op. cit., I, 42; Vogel, 335; Diimmler, 
III, 271. See also infra, n. 44. 

42 According to the Annals of St. Vaast (886, p. 327), Charles, after his 
arrival in the vicinity of Paris, not only had forced the Northmen to aban¬ 
don one of their camps and to retire across the Seine, but also had sent re- 
enforcements into the town; besides, he had led his own army across the 
river to a position from which, it may be presumed, a successful attack 
might have been launched against the principal camp, and main force, of the 
Vikings. Abbo (II, lines 315-29) tells of how a certain detachment from the 
imperial army, aided by the Parisians, had defeated and put to flight a 
group of Northmen before Charles arrived with the bulk of his forces. 

43 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “indeque coeperunt, quia hyems imminebat, 
missi ad invicem discurrere, ut imperator pacem cum Danis faceret.” 

44 Ibid.: “factum est vere consilium nimis miserum.” Abbo, II, line 389: 
“foedere . . . fragili.” For the date of the treaty, see Favre, 61, n. 1; 
Bohmer-Muhlbacher, op. cit., no. 1733a. 

45 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “via sine impedimento attributa, ut Bur- 
gundiam hyeme depraedarent.” Abbo, II, line 338: “Annuiturque feris lici- 
tum Senones adeundi.” Regino, 887, p. 127: “concessis terris et regionibus, 
quae ultra Sequanam erant, Normannis ad depredandum.” Ann. Fuld., Ill, 
886, p. 105: “quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam dedit” (cf. the 
following note). 



CHAPTER IX 


147 


of silver, payable in March of the following year; after the re¬ 
ceipt of, and in return for, this payment, they were to return 
to their own country. 46 

Thus, in spite of the long and brave resistance of the defenders 
of Paris, in spite of the departure of Siegfried, in spite also of 
the great Frankish army which had come to relieve the city, 
the Vikings had triumphed. What the Parisians had sought 
by herculean efforts and by great sacrifices to prevent, what they 
had steadfastly denied the Vikings — tribute and free passage 
up the Seine — was conceded to them, almost without a murmur, 
by the emperor at whose request Bishop Gauzelin and Count 
Odo had undertaken to hold Paris at all costs. 47 The language 
used by a German scholar to describe a similar event in 882, 
could be used with even greater propriety in this case; for indeed 
we have here “das jammervollste Schauspiel, das sich iiberhaupt 
in der Geschichte der normannischen Einfalle den Blicken 
bietet.” 48 

Why did Charles conclude a so humiliating treaty? To this 
question our sources give three different answers. In the first 
place, the winter season was approaching; 49 which was indeed 
true, but does not seem a sufficient reason for the treaty. Sec¬ 
ondly, Charles wished to chastise the population ultra Sequanam 

46 Abbo, II, lines 339-40: “Septies argenti libris causa redeundi / Martis 
mense datis centum sua ad impia regna.” Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 327: “nam 
utrumque, et civitatis redemptio illis promissa est et data, et via sine im- 
pedimento, etc.” (cf. the preceding note). Ann. Fuld., Ill, 886, p. 105, 
wrongly state that the permission to plunder Burgundy< was given to one 
group of Vikings, and the Danegeld to another: “quibusdam per Burgundiam 
vagandi licentiam dedit, quisbusdam plurimam promisit pecuniam, si a regno 
eius statuto inter eos tempore discederent.” Regino (cf. the preceding note'* 
mentions the permission to plunder Burgundy, but not the tribute. A com¬ 
parison of these statements, and an analysis of the various factors that 
serve to explain the nature of the treaty (infra, pp. 147-50), lead me to con¬ 
clude that the annalist of St. Vaast is not entirely accurate when he refers 
to the money payment as civitatis redemptio. There is reason to believe 
(cf. Abbo and the Annals of Fulda) that the payment was, not a mere ran¬ 
som for the city of Paris—a local Danegeld (see infra, chap, xv)—but a 
general Danegeld, i. e. a payment made to secure the eventual evacuation 
of Prankish territory by the “great army.” Cf. infra, n. 83. 

47 Abbo, I, lines 36-59. Cf. supra, p. 141; Pavre, 36; Vogel, 325. Even 
if it be admitted that Gauzelin and Odo were defending their own interests 
at the same time that they proved their fidelity to the emperor, that does 
not lessen the pusillanimity of the latter. 

48 Vogel (291, cf. 325) applied these words to the treaty which Charles 
the Pat concluded with the “great army” in 882. But at that time the Vik¬ 
ings were not dispatched into the heart of the Prankish realm to plunder, 
and they had not been held at bay for a whole year (see infra, appendix iv). 

49 Abbo, II, 341: “Tunc glaciabantur torpentis saecla Novembris.” Ann. 
Vedast. (see supra, n. 43). 



148 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


for refusing him obedience; which is doubtful, at the least . 50 
Thirdly, Charles was terrified at the news of Siegfried’s return; 
which was not true, for Charles did not learn of the approach 
of Siegfried until some time after he had concluded the treaty . 51 

In the opinion of the present writer, a more satisfactory 
explanation of the course followed by the emperor, may be found 
in his diseased physical condition , 52 and in his dejected state 
of mind, the latter due to the loss of his right hand man, Count 
Henry . 53 Charles was by nature timorous , 54 and now he simply 
could not muster sufficient courage to attack the Danes, who, 
it must be remembered, had a very large army at their disposal . 55 
This view is strengthened by the fact that the emperor, in order 

50 Regino, 887, p. 127: “eo quocl incolae illarum [sc. terrarum et regionum 
quae ultra Sequanam erant] sibi obtemperare nollent.” This reason is given 
by Regino only. But here, as elsewhere, Regino’s testimony can hardly be 
accepted at its face value (cf. Vander Linden, “Les Normands a Louvain,” 
Rev. Hist., 1917, CXXIV, 65-66; Lot, “La Loire, l’Aquitaine et la Seine, etc.,” 
Bibl. cle Vecole des chartes, 1915, LXXVI, 507, note; id.,- “Une annee . . . de 
Charles le Chauve,” Le Moyen Age , 1902, VI, 427, n. 4), and we have noth¬ 
ing to corroborate it. Diimmler’s early conjecture that Charles the Fat 
wished to employ the Northmen against Boso in Lower Burgundy, is im¬ 
probable, and has long ago been abandoned even by Diimmler himself (see 
Favre, 62, n. 1 and Diimmler, II, 317, n. 4). Cf. Wenck, Erhebung Arnulfs, 
p. 12, n. 5. 

51 This reason is given only in Ann. Fuld., Ill, 886, p. 105: “[imperator] 
inde contra Nordmannos profectus est. Ubi dum aliquanto tempore morare- 
tur, Heimrih comes a suis desertus et ab hostibus circumdatus occiditur. 
Interea Sigifrid cum magna multitudine Nordmannorum caeteris, qui ibi 
residebant, auxilium laturus venit ac christianis magnum intulit metum. 
Unde imperator perterritus quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam 
dedit, etc.” (see supra, n. 46). Most writers, including Favre (61, n. 1) and 
Diimmler (III, 271, n. 2), accept this as one of the probable reasons for the 
treaty. But the Annals of St. Vaast (886, pp. 327-28) state explicitly that 
Charles was not apprised of the return of Siegfried into the Seine until 
after the conclusion of the treaty, and these annals certainly are more reli¬ 
able on this point than those of Fulda. The latter are inaccurate also with 
reference to the terms of the treaty (cf. supra, n. 46). 

52 On the return journey to Germany Charles fell very ill (Ann. Fuld., 
Ill, 886, p. 105; ibid., Font. Ratisb., 887, p. 115; Abbo, II, line 342), and he 
seems always to have suffered more or less from nervous disorders. See 
Diimmler, III, 286; cf. Vogel, 333. 

53 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 326: “Ille [imperator] vero audito [sc. mortuo 
Heinrici] multum doluit . . . sed quia dux [Heinricus] periit, ipse [impe- 
ratorj nil utile gessit.” 

54 Diimmler, III, 290-92. 

55 Prior to the departure of Siegfried the “great army” at Paris was, so 
far as known, the largest host ever collected by the Vikings in the ninth 
century (see Steenstrup, op. cit., I, 214-17; Favre, 35; cf. supra, chap, viii, 
n. 56). Even after Siegfried’s departure the numbers of the besiegers must 
have been very large (cf. Favre, 52, n. 2), and many Franks are said to have 
made common cause with them (Flodoard, Hist. Rem. eccl., IV, c. 5, loc. cit-., 
p. 563). In the following winter Siegfried’s army is said to have numbered 
5,000 men (Vogel, 336, n. 3). 



CHAPTER IX 


149 


to avoid an armed conflict, agreed to furnish the tribute in 
return for which Paris was to be spared, out of his own resour¬ 
ces . 56 The Parisians, aware of the strength of their citadel, 
and unwilling to have their past efforts go for naught, evidently 
had refused to raise any money on their own account to buy off 
the invaders. They were willing to continue the fight if neces¬ 
sary, but the emperor was not . 57 

These relations between the emperor and the Parisians may 
aid us in understanding why Burgundy was conceded to the 
Danes as a field for plunder. Undoubtedly the Northmen had 
demanded the privilege of spending the winter in some interior 
region of France . 58 They could not very well have been sent 
into the valley of the Marne, for the Parisians — Count Odo and 
Bishop Askrich, in particular — probably raised objections, 
based on the fact that they, or their relatives, had large holdings 
and important interests in that district . 59 But there was no 
objection to letting loose the fury of the invaders in Burgundy 
— particularly against the town and pagus of Sens — for the 
relations between the Parisians and the Burgundians were at 
that time very strained . 60 Add to this the fact that Burgundy 
was a rich country, so far practically untouched by the Vik¬ 
ings , 61 and one may easily comprehend why an agreement was 
reached on this point. 

We may conclude, then, that while the principal reason for this 
treaty was the personal disinclination of Charles the Fat to 
enter into a sanguinary conflict with the Northmen, and his 
consequent willingness to accept what must be regarded as highly 
unsatisfactory terms, yet the concession to plunder Burgundy, 
rather than some other interior district, probably was in part 
due to Parisian influence. That the policy of Charles was sup¬ 
ported by some of the East Franks, who dreaded the incon¬ 
veniences of a return journey during the winter season, is quite 

56 See infra, n. 73. 

57 Cf. supra, nn. 25, 31. 

58 Prom the time the Vikings entered the Seine, in the fall of 885, it had 
been their plan to penetrate into the hinterland (see Abbo, I, lines 40 ff., 
and cf. Favre, 35-36). If they had not demanded this privilege from Charles, 
we may be certain that it would not have been accorded them; for, of course, 
Charles had come to Paris with the intention of expelling the Vikings from 
his territories. 

59 A later treaty with the Parisians expressly prohibited the Northmen 
from entering the Marne (Abbo, II, lines 411-16). Cf. Favre, 66; infra, p. 
152 and n. 80. 

60 Favre, 62, n. 2; cf. 66. 

61 Abbo, II, lines 343-46. 



150 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


probable; but, by reason of the determined resistance, and the 
endurance, of the defenders of Paris, and in view of the general 
condemnation of the treaty by contemporary chroniclers, 62 it 
must be assumed that the majority of the Franks, and partic¬ 
ularly those of the west, 63 did not approve of the imperial policy. 

Before quitting Paris, Charles appointed Askrich successor 
to Bishop Gauzelin, and invested Count Odo with the fiefs for¬ 
merly held by Odo’s father, Robert the Strong. 64 Thereupon 
the emperor set out on the return journey to Germany; 65 the 
speed of his travel no doubt being accelerated somewhat by the 
news of the return of Siegfried into the valley of the Oise. 66 

Meanwhile, the Northmen who had been besieging Paris 
hastened to avail themselves of the terms of the recent treaty; 
they moved up the Seine, entered the Yonne, and, on November 
30, 886, laid siege to the episcopal city of Sens. 67 According 
to one account, 68 Evrard, the archbishop of that place, immed¬ 
iately entered into negotiations with the invaders, and succeeded 

62 Cf. supra, nn. 41, 44. 

63 A large number of the western magnates appear to have been present 
at Paris when the treaty was concluded. Cf. Favre, 60. 

64 Abbo, II, lines 335-37; Ann. Veclast., 886, p. 327; Regino, 887, pp. 126- 
27. Cf. Favre, 60, 69 ff. 

65 Ann. Veclast., 886, p. 327; Abbo, II, line 342. 

66 Ann. Veclast., 886, p. 327: “necdumque se de eo [Suessione] moverat 
loco, et ecce Sigefridus rex . . . Hysam fluvium ingressus, etc.” Ann. Fuld., 
Ill, 886, p. 105 (cf. supra, n. 51). 

67 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 328; Abbo, II, lines 343-46; cf. Regino, 888, pp. 
130-31. Regino states that the Parisians refused to permit the Vikings to 
ascend the Seine, and that the latter therefore dragged their ships for 2,000 
paces overland, after which they launched them again and proceeded up the 
river. But this statement is not corroborated by any other source, and I 
am inclined, with Diimmler (III, 272, n. 2) and Vogel (337 and n. 1), to 
reject it, not because the Vikings could not have performed such a feat— 
it was a common thing with the Varangians in Russia—but because the 
recital of Regino can seldom be relied upon when his statements are not 
confirmed by other writers (cf. supra, n. 50). For the date of the siege of 
Sens, see Annales sancti Columbae Senonensis, 886, M.G.H., 88., I, p. 104, 
and cf. Bohmer-Muhlbacher, op. cit., no. 1733c, where November 10 evidently 
is a misprint for November 30. 

68 Ann. Vedast., 886, p. 328: “Evrardus, archiepiscopus ipsius civitatis, 
statim cum eis de redemptione civitatis agi coepit, et obtinuit quod voluit.” 
Regino (888, p. 131), Chronicon sancti Fetri Vivi Senonensis (Bouquet, 
IX, 33), and Vita sancti Romani abbatis Autissioclorensis (ibid.. 135), do 
not mention any negotiations; according to them, Sens was besieged contin¬ 
uously for six months, from November 30 to sometime in May, but with¬ 
stood all attempts of the Northmen to take it. Favre (64, n. 3) thinks that 
the essential agreement of these three sources is a sufficient reason for re¬ 
jecting the statement in the Annals of St. Vaast. I can not share his faith 
in those sources. As noted before (supra, nn. 50, 67), Regino’s statements 
can seldom be accepted without corroboration. The fact thaf the other two 
are local sources does not necessarily make them reliable, as Favre seems to 



CHAPTER IX 


151 


in buying them off. 69 Other sources indicate that the siege of 
Sens was continued for several months. 70 However that may 
be, it is certain that the Vikings spent the winter in Burgundy, 
which they are said to have devastated so thoroughly that it was 
left practically a wilderness. 71 

In May, 887, the Vikings returned to Paris for the purpose 
of receiving the Danegeld promised them by Charles the Fat. 72 
To secure the tribute for the invaders, Askrich, the bishop of 
Paris, journeyed to Kirchen in Alemannia, where the emperor 
was sojourning in June, 887. Having obtained the promised 
amount apparently without difficulty, Askrich on his return paid 
it over to the Northmen. 73 

We possess no information whatever as to how this Danegeld 
of 886—87 was raised, and conjectures on the subject would be 
idle. Compared with preceding Danegelds, the amount of this 
one was very small — only 700 pounds; in that respect it offers 
a marked contrast to the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds 
paid in 884. 74 Yet it must not be supposed that the Vikings had 
made a bad bargain, for doubtless the proceeds of their perfectly 
legitimate plundering operations in Burgundy, 75 had been very 

think; it should be remembered that they are not contemporary; the Vita 
s. Romani was written in the eleventh, and the Chron. s. Petri Vivi Seno- 
nensis in the twelfth, century. Whether the information contained in them 
was derived from some older and more reliable source, which is now lost, 
remains to be proved. Meanwhile it seems advisable to follow the Annals 
of St. Vaast, which usually may be relied upon, and with which the state¬ 
ment in the Ann. s. Columbae Senonensis (886, loc. cit.. p. 104) may be 
reconciled. Cf. Chronica Albrici, 888, M.G'.H., SS., XXIII, p. 745, and see 
Steenstrup, op. cit., II, 231. 

69 If the city of Sens really was ransomed, this is but one example of the 
numerous payments of local Danegeld that were made during this period. 
This whole matter is taken up for discussion infra, chap. xv. 

70 See supra, n. 68. 

71 Regino, 888, p. 131; Annales sancti Benigni Divionensis, 887, 

SS., V, p. 40; Chron. s. Petri Vivi Senon., loc. cit., p. 33; Vita s. Romani 
Abb. Autiss., ibid., p. 135. Cf. Pavre, 65. 

72 According to the terms of the treaty with Charles the Pat, the Dane¬ 
geld was to have been paid in March (cf. supra, n. 46). But from the An¬ 
nals of St. Vaast (887, pp. 328-29) it would appear that the money was not 
paid until late in the spring. Cf. Abbo, II, line 347. The Ann. s. Columb. 
Senon. indicate that the Northmen retired from Burgundy in May (cf. supra, 
n. 68). See Bohmer-Muhlbacher, op. cit., no. 1749a. 

73 Ann. Vedast., 887, p. 329: “Dani vero Parisius regressi propter tribu- 
tum ab imperatore promissum; pro qua re Askrichus ad imperatorem abiit, 
et pro quo ierat, rediens, secum detulit. Datoque tributo, etc.” Odo appears 
also to have been present at Kirchen, and may have accompanied Askrich 
thither. Cf. Pavre, 65; Diimmler, III, 278-79; Bohmer-Muhlbacher, op. cit., 
no. 1749a. 

74 See supra, chap, viii, nn. 76, 77. 

75 Cf. supra, n. 45. 



152 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


considerable. The Danegeld of 886—87 also differs from its 
predecessors in that it came from the eastern, not from the west¬ 
ern, kingdom. By whatever method the tribute was raised, it 
is certain that the western Franks did not contribute toward 
it. 76 Therefore, despite the fact that it was paid to secure the 
removal of the Vikings from the West Frankish realm, this pay¬ 
ment had no influence on the institutional development of the 
Danegeld in France. 

After they had received the tribute, the Vikings, in accord¬ 
ance with the terms of their treaty with Charles the Fat, ought 
to have returned to their own country. 77 But the absence of 
the emperor, and perhaps of Odo, 78 may have encouraged them 
to disregard the treaty. They made a desperate attempt to 
ascend the Seine a second time. 79 This design of the Northmen, 
though at first resisted and checked, was afterwards consented 
to, by the Parisians, on condition that the Danes enter no other 
river than the Seine. 80 But after the freebooters had once 
passed the Parisian bridges, they violated this second treaty, 
as they had the first one, entered the Marne, and established 
themselves in a fortified camp at Chessy, some twelve kilometers 
distant from Meaux. 81 From this stronghold they continued 
to plunder and devastate in the usual way throughout Cham¬ 
pagne and northern Burgundy. 82 

The tribute paid by Charles the Fat had utterly failed to se¬ 
cure the result aimed at, namely, the return of the Danes to 
their own country. 83 In fact, the emperor’s whole policy with 
reference to the Vikings had proved worse than useless. 

76 See supra, n. 73, and cf. nn. 25, 31. 

77 Cf. supra , n. 46. 

78 Odo is not mentioned among those who opposed the Vikings when they 
tried to reascend the Seine. Cf. Favre, 66, n. 2. 

79 Abbo, II, lines 388-95. Regino, 889, p. 123, inaccurately says that the 
Parisians refused to permit the Northmen to descend the Seine. 

80 Abbo, II, lines 396-423. The Annals of St. Vaast, 889, p. 327, say: 
“quia nullus erat qui eis resisteret, iterum per Sequanam Maternam fluvium 
ingressi.” It is not true that there was no resistance offered when the Vik¬ 
ings, in violation of the treaty, attempted to reascend the Seine, for the evi¬ 
dence of Abbo on this point cannot be disregarded. But if the statement in 
the Annals of St. Vaast applies only to the ascent of the Marne —which did 
not take place until after the Northmen had come to terms with the Pari¬ 
sians—it is, in the main, true. 

81 Ann. Vedast., 887, p. 329; cf. Asser, Gesta Aelfredi regis, M.G.H., SS., 
XIII, 122; Ann. Anglo-Saxonici, ibid., 106. See also Favre, 67, n. 1. 

82 Ann. Vedast., 887, p. 330. Cf. Vogel, 342. 

83 Of course, the fact that Paris escaped destruction at the hands of the 
Vikings must be attributed, not to the payment of the Danegeld, but to the 
valor and endurance of its defenders. See supra, p. 149 and notes, and cf. 
nn. 25, 31, 46, 80. 



THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


153 


CHAPTER X. 


Odo’s First Danegeld (889). 

The Danish army which in the year 887 had ascended the 
Marne and established itself in a fortified camp at Chessy, 1 spent 
the following winter (887—88) in plundering and devastating 
the valley of the Meuse and parts of Burgundy. 2 Early in the 
summer of 888 the Vikings invested the city of Meaux, which 
eventually was forced to capitulate, and then, on June 14, was 
burned and almost totally destroyed. 3 The Vikings remained in 
the vicinity of Meaux throughout the summer and early fall of 
888. 4 

Meanwhile Odo, who on February 29, 888, had been crowned 
king at Compiegne, 5 fearing that the Northmen might attempt 
again to besiege Paris, took measures to forestall such eventu¬ 
ality by collecting an army in a fortified camp protecting the 
city. 6 The Danes, indeed, returned to the Seine toward the be¬ 
ginning of November, but did not proceed to Paris, presumably 
because of Odo’s measures of defense. 7 Instead they ascended 
the Seine to the Loing, on the banks of which they established 
themselves for the winter. 8 Their plundering operations were 
extended into Neustria, Burgundy, and Aquitaine, 9 and did not 

1 See the preceding page and n. 81. 

2 Ann. Vedast., 887, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 330. 

3 Ibid.. 888, pp. 333-34; Abbo, II, lines 453-66, M.G.H., Poetae Latini, IV, 
Part I; Annales Nivernenses, 888, M.G.H., SS., XIII, 89. See Vogel, 343, 
344 and n. 1; cf. Favre, Eudes , 116, n. 5. 

4 Ann. Vedast., 888, p. 334. Presumably it was part of this Viking army 
which was engaged, and decisively defeated, by Odo at Montfaucon on June 
24, 888 (ibid., p. 332; Abbo, II, lines 491 ff.; cf. Vogel, 344, n. 1). For the 
significance of this event, see Favre, 108 and n. 3; Vogel, 344-45; Diimmler, 
III, 320-23. 

5 Favre, 89 and nn. 4, 5. 

6 Ann. Vedast., 888, p. 334: “Circa autumni vero tempora Odo rex, adu- 
nato exercitu, Parisius venit; ibique castra metatus est prope civitatem, ne 
iterum ipsa obsideretur.” 

7 I agree with Vogel (345, n. 3) in rejecting Diimmler’s statement (III, 
345) that the Vikings returned to Paris at this time. The only basis for it 
is the chronologically inaccurate account of Regino (890, ed. Kurze, p. 134), 
which, by the way, also has led Steenstrup (Eormannerne, II, 237) to certain 
erroneous conclusions. 

8 Ann. Vedast., 888, p. 334: “Nortmanni vero per Maternam in Sequanam 
regressi, indeque navigantes et iter per terram facientes, Luviam fluvium 
ingressi, circa ejus littora sedem sibi firmant.” Cf. Favre, 117-18 and, notes. 

9 Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: “Dani vero more suo Burgundiam, Neustriam 
atque partem Aquitaniae, nullo resistente, igno ,et ferro devastant.” Cf. 
Vogel, 346, n. 1. 



154 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


cease until the following summer (88-9), when, probably in early 
July, their army and fleet appeared again, and for the last time, 
before Paris. 10 

Odo was there to meet them with a large army of Franks, 
Aquitanians, and Burgundians, summoned together from the 
various territories in which his authority had been recognized. * 11 
Some bitter fighting 12 appears to have taken place for a short 
time, but we get the impression that, on the whole, the Franks 
were getting the upper hand. 13 This initial success, however, 
was not followed up; very soon the fighting ceased, 14 and negotia¬ 
tions were commenced. 15 These were concluded by the payment 

10 Ann. Veclast., 889, p. 335: “Circa autumni vero tempora Parisius re- 
gressi [Dani], etc.” Abbo, II, line 467: “Denique Luteciae revolant [Dani] 
ad culmina tutae.” See also the diplomas of Odo in Bouquet, IX, 447, 448, 
and in Favre, op. cit., appendix, pp. 236-38. Cf. Regino, 890, pp. 134-35. 
The Vikings may have had intentions of returning to Paris earlier in the 
year. At any rate, Odo, who in January had journeyed to Aquitaine, for the 
purpose of receiving the submission of the magnates of that country, deemed 
it necessary temporarily to interrupt these proceedings, and hasten back to 
defend Francia against the Northmen (cf. Favre, 123). Perhaps it was a 
false alarm, for Odo soon returned to Aquitaine. However that may be, the 
Northmen certainly did arrive at Paris in July, when Odo again left Aqui¬ 
taine to oppose them. The presence of the Vikings, as well as of Odo, at 
Paris in July, is proved by the diplomas cited above. The expression, circa 
autumni tempora, in the Annals of St. Vaast, is very indefinite, and does 
not invalidate the testimony of the diplomas. In the poem of Abbo the arri¬ 
val of the Northmen at Paris is mentioned immediately after the descrip¬ 
tion of the siege and surrender of Meaux. But Abbo was not attempting to 
present these events in chonological order. Cf. Favre, 127, n. 4. 

11 Abbo, II, lines 468-72: “Convocat hue omnes proprios per regna moran- 
tes; / En, sine iam numero prestans Odo nectit: / Francigeni approperant 
alta cum fronte superbi, / Calliditate venis acieque, Aquitania, linguae, ./ 
Consilioque fugae Burgun-adiere-diones.” Ann. Veclast., 889, p. 335: “Con¬ 
tra quos [Danos] Odo rex venit.” 

12 That in some cases at least the fighting was of the bitterest sort, while 
it lasted, may be deduced from Abbo’s account of the valorous deeds of Ade- 
mar, Sclademar, and Anscheric (II, lines 474-90). It is also attested to by 
Regino, 890, pp. 134-35. 

13 The ascendancy of the Franks in the conflict is indicated in the fol¬ 
lowing lines of Abbo’s second book: 473, 483-84, 489-90. Cf. v. Kalckstein, 
Gesch. d. franz. Konigtums, I, 63. 

14 Abbo, II, line 473: “Sessio fit non longa satis frustrata triumpho.” 

15 Ann. Vedast., 889, p. 335: “nuntiis intercurrentibus.” This source has 
no mention of any fighting. According to Regino (890, p. 135), there were 
no negotiations. Instead the Vikings, when they perceived that they could 
not reach their goal in any other way, again (?)—see supra, chap, ix, n. 67— 
resorted to the stratagem of dragging their ships overland for some distance. 
But the information of Regino is not reliable, and cannot invalidate the 
testimony of the Annals of St. Vaast (cf. Vogel, 347, n. 1). Favre thinks 
(p. 128) that the treaty with Odo did not permit the Northmen to pass 
under the Parisian bridges, and that they were therefore forced to drag 
their ships overland; but this interpretation does not harmonize with what 
Regino says (pp. 134-35): “civibus . . . audaciter reluctantibus, Nortmanni 
desperatis rebus naves per terram . . . trahunt.” 



CHAPTER X 


155 


to the Danes of a sum of money, in return for which they retired 
from Paris and quitted the Seine. 16 The Viking army did not 
proceed very far beyond the limits of the West Frankish realm; 
it invaded the Cotentin — which was then held by the Bretons 17 
— and, having established itself in the vicinity of St. Lo, laid 
siege to that place. 18 

The motives that led Odo to enter into negotiations with the 
Vikings, and eventually to pay them tribute, can only be con¬ 
jectured. In spite of the bold front presented by the Franks, 
those of Neustria as well as those of Francia, 19 and of the brave 
deeds performed by a few heroic individuals, 20 there is reason to 
believe that some contingents in Odo’s army engaged the enemy 
in only a half-hearted way, or not at all. The Aquitanians, it is 
intimated, preferred negotiation to fighting, 21 while the Burgun¬ 
dians are accused of having suggested flight; 22 which indicates 
not only that Odo could not place entire confidence in his troops, 
but also that there was considerable opposition to his policy of 
energetic resistance. 23 To have continued the struggle under 
such circumstances would have been unwise, if not foolhardy; 24 
and there remained but one alternative — the payment of Dane- 
geld. 

16 Ann. Veclast., 889, p. 335: “[Dani] munerati ab eo [Odone] regressi a 
Parisius, relicto Sequana.” Freeman (Historical Essays, First Series, p. 
243), we may note, calls this payment a Danegeld. 

17 The county of Coutances had been held by the Bretons since 867. See 
Vogel, 227; cf. 358. 

18 Ann. Veclast., 889, pp. 335-36; Regino, 890, p. 135; Anglo-Saxon Chron¬ 
icle, 890, ed. Plummer, pp. 82, 83. 

19 Abbo, II, line 470: “Francigeni approperant alta cum fronte superbi.” 
The Franks, i. e. the population, or rather the vassals, of Francia and 
Neustria are here contrasted with those of Aquitaine and Burgundy, re¬ 
ferred to in lines 471-72 (see supra, n. 11). 

20 Abbo, II, lines 474-90; cf. supra, n. 12. 

21 I take that to be the implication (cf. supra, n. 19) of these words of 
Abbo (II, line 471): “Calliditate venis acieque, Aquitania, linguae.” They 
are differently interpreted in Guizot, Collection cles memoires, VI, p. 59. 

22 Abbo, II, line 472: “Consilioque fugae Burgun-adiere-diones.” Accord¬ 
ing to Favre, p. 85, there was a party opposed to Odo in Burgundy. 

23 That such was the policy of Odo is shown by the measures he had al¬ 
ready taken to oppose 4he Vikings (see supra, pp. 153-54 and nn. 6, 11). 

24 Cf. Vogel, p. 347, and Favre, p. 128, who seem to think that the inten¬ 
tion of the Northmen to make a descent on Brittany, also may have influ¬ 
enced Odo to treat with them. This is possible, but the sources do not indi¬ 
cate that Odo was aware of the plans of the Vikings, v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 
p. 63, suggests that Odo may have been forced to cease fighting because his 
vassals’ period of military service had expired; which is a pure, and im¬ 
probable, conjecture. What evidence is there that, in the ninth century, 
military service could be required of vassals only for a certain length of 
time? If that had been the case, the siege of Paris (885-86) would have 
been of shorter duration. 



156 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


Evidently Odo found himself in a situation that did not essen¬ 
tially differ from those which had forced Charles the Bald to 
resort to the Danegeld. 25 It has been indicated above 26 that for 
certain reasons the policy of the western magnates with regard 
to the Vikings underwent a change toward the close of the reign 
of Carloman; that for some time after the year 884 27 the opposi¬ 
tion offered to the invaders was stronger and more determined 
than it had been in the preceding period. This change of policy, 
however, was only temporary, 28 and by 889 it had lost most of its 
raison d'etre. With the accession of Odo the magnates again 
found their interests jeopardized by the ambition of a vigorous 
monarch, anxious to rehabilitate the power of the crown, and 
determined to secure the submission of all the great vassals in 
his kingdom. 29 It may be true that the nobles of this period were 
somewhat better aware of the significance of the Viking inva¬ 
sions than those of a preceding generation, 30 and, consequently, 
that they were more willing, and better prepared, to engage the 
Northmen than their predecessors had been. 31 Yet, like the 
latter, they were inclined to regard the advancement of the royal 
power and the exaltation of the monarch as a greater menace to 
their interests than foreign invasion, 32 and they did not hesitate, 
on occasion, to make use of the presence of the Vikings in the 
furtherance of their own ends and to defeat the projects of the 
crown. 33 


25 Cf. supra, chap. vii. 

26 Supra, pp. 139-40. 

27 The altered policy prevailed some four or five years, and was respon¬ 
sible for the election to the West Frankish throne not only of Charles the 
Fat in 884 (cf. supra, p. 139 and n. 123), but also of Odo in 888 (see Favre, 
78-80); on both occasions Charles the Simple was passed over because it w T as 
felt that the exigencies produced by the Viking invasions did not permit the 
elevation of a mere child to the throne. 

28 Cf. supra, p. 140 and n. 125. 

29 The severe treatment of the rebel Waucher of Laon is an illuminating 
illustration of Odo’s attempts to assert his royal authority (Favre, 143-45). 
For examples of his efforts to gain recognition as overlord in the various 
parts of his realm, see ibid., 94, 99, 106, 116, 126, 129, 194-95. 

30 See supra, pp. 135-40 and n. 103; cf. pp. 114-17. 

31 The determined resistance offered to the Vikings at Paris, during the 
siege of 885-86 and on a later occasion (cf. supra, p. 147 and n. 47, p. 152 and 
n. 80), is an indication to that effect. 

32 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, Les transform, de la royaut6, 696-97; Favre, 
194-95. 

33 Even Charles the Simple at one time probably was considering an alli¬ 
ance with the Vikings against Odo. It is true that Archbishop Fulk of 
Rheims severely censured such a policy, and that Charles never allied him¬ 
self with the enemies of the Christians. But it is also true that certain 
supporters of Charles had suggested to him this method of gaining the 



CHAPTER X 


157 


The amount of the Danegeld of 889 is unknown, and we have 
no information as to whence or how it was obtained. 34 It may 
be assumed, however, that the methods of assessment and collec¬ 
tion which had been developed during the reign of Charles the 
Bald, 35 were resorted to now also. Thus, the right of the seign¬ 
iors to tax their subject peasantry a merci, was further strength¬ 
ened wherever the Danegeld was exacted. 36 

This Danegeld effected what Charles the Fat had aimed at, but 
failed to secure, when he paid tribute to the Danes in 887 ; 37 for 
the invaders now sailed out of the Seine and evacuated the West 
Frankish realm. 38 But this result cannot be attributed to the 
Danegeld alone. The compliance of the Vikings was no doubt 
due, partly at least, to the presence of a large Frankish army at 
Paris; 39 and probably for a similar reason the agreement with 
Odo could not be immediately disregarded, as the one with 
Charles the Fat had been. Yet, within a comparatively short 
time this treaty too was violated. In the autumn of the next 
year (890), after having suffered defeat at the hands of the 
Bretons, the Vikings returned to the Seine; and before long their 
ships were ascending the Oise. 40 

throne; which illustrates the truth of the statement made in the text. See 
Flodoard, Historia Remensis ecclesiae, IV, c. 5, M.G.H., SS., XIII, pp. 565- 
66; cf. Pavre, 187-89, 221-23. 

34 All we know about this particular payment of Danegeld is derived 
from the passage in the Annals of St. Vaast quoted supra, n. 16. The state¬ 
ments of Vogel, p. 346, Dtimmler, III, 346, and Pavre, p. 128, to the effect that 
the Danegeld of 889 probably was small, are purely conjectural. 

35 See supra, chaps, v, vi; infra, chap. xvii. 

36 Cf. supra, pp. 85, 102-3, and notes. 

37 See supra, p. 152 and n. 83. 

38 See supra, p. 155 and n. 16. 

39 Ibid, and n. 11. Pavre, pp. 128-29, indicates that Odo probably re¬ 
mained at Paris with his fideles for some time after the departure of the 
Vikings. 

40 Ann. Vedast., 890, p. 336: “Brittani vero viriliter suum defensavere 
regnum, atque afflictos Danos Sequanam redire compulerunt. Imminente 
vero festivitate omnium Sanctorum, Dani, per Sequanam Hisam ingressi, 
etc.” Cf. Vogel, 359 ff.; Favre, 132 ff. 



158 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


CHAPTER XI. 


Odo’s Second Danegeld (897). 

Shortly before the end of his reign, Odo, the brave defender of 
Paris and valiant leader of the West Franks, for the second time 
found it necessary to agree to the payment of Danegeld. 1 The 
circumstances surrounding this event will be briefly set forth. 2 

In the year 896 a few hundred Vikings, under the leadership 
of a certain Huncdeus, 3 left their companions in England, and 
in five ships sailed across the channel toward the French coast. 4 
They entered the Seine, and immediately began to plunder and 
devastate the surrounding districts in the usual manner. 5 Since 
they were penniless when they departed from England, 6 we may 
assume that their plundering operations were inspired by a 
desire to repair their fortunes just as speedily as opportunities 
permitted. 7 Just then the opportunities probably were excellent, 
for Odo was occupied with other affairs, and did not offer any 
resistance to the freebooters. 8 The preoccupation of Odo at this 

1 As king of the West Franks Odo had paid Danegeld for the first time in 
889 (see the preceding chapter); as count of Paris, and in conjunction with 
Bishop Gauzelin, he had also, in 886, paid a bribe of sixty pounds to Sieg¬ 
fried, thereby securing the removal of that chieftain and his men from 
Paris. See supra, chap, ix, nn. 24-26. 

2 There is only one principal source for this Danegeld—the Annals of 
St. Vaast; but some additional information as to contemporary conditions 
and events may be gleaned from Abbo and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. Cf. 
Vogel, 373-79; Favre, Eucles, 187-93; Eckel, Charles le Simple, 26 ff., 64 ff.; 
Diimmler, III, 435-36; Steenstrup, Normannerne, II, 282-85; v. Kalckstein, 
Gesch. cl. franz. Konigtums, I, 105-6. 

3 For a discussion of the name and identity of Huncdeus, see Vogel, 373, 
n. 2, and Steenstrup, op. cit., I, 157-59. For the numbers of the Vikings, see 
Favre, 187 and n. 4. Steenstrup (op. cit., II, 282, n. 3) believes that Rollo 
too came to France at this time; but cf. Vogel, 376, n. 3. 

4 Ann. Vedast., 896, p. 353: “Et per idem tempus iterum Nortmanni cum 
duce Hundeo nomine et quinque barchis iterum Sequanam ingressi.” Anglo- 
Saxon Chronicle, 897, ed. Plummer, p. 89. The chronology of the latter 
source, beginning with the entries for 879 and for some time thereafter, is 
one year in advance. See Plummer’s Notes to his edition of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle, p. 95; cf. Vogel, 373, n. 1; Steenstrup, op. cit., II, 74, n. 1. 

5 See infra, n. 8. 

6 Anglo-Sax. Chron., loc. cit. 

7 Cf. Favre, 187. 

8 Ann. Vcclast., 896, p. 353: “et dum rex ad alia intendit, magnum sibi et 
regno malum accrescere facit.” Abbo, II, lines 583-91: “Et iterum misero 
gemitu loquor affore sevos / Allofilos. Terram vastant populosque truci- 
dant, / Circumeunt urbes pedibus, regnantis et aedes, / Ruricolas prendunt, 
nexant et trans mare mittunt. / Rex audit, nec curat, Odo; per verba re¬ 
sponds, / O quam responsi facinus! non ore dedisti / Tale tuo, demon 
certe proprium tibi favit; / Non tua mens procurat oves Christo tibi missas? 



CHAPTER XI 159 

time proved very detrimental both to his own interests and to 
those of the kingdom, as the sequel will show. 9 

Encouraged by success and by the lack of resistance, the in¬ 
vaders soon grew bolder in their projects; moreover, their num¬ 
bers were increased presently by the arrival of more Vikings, 
who, it may be presumed, likewise came from England. 10 Shortly 
before Christmas the Northmen left the Seine and proceeded up 
the Oise as far as Choisy-au-Bac, near the confluence of the 
Oise and the Aisne, where they established themselves in a 
fortified camp. * 11 From this stronghold the entire surrounding 
district as far east as the Meuse, was pillaged throughout the 
winter and spring of 897. 12 

Odo, unable to postpone resistance any longer, now moved 
against the Vikings with a (comparatively) large army. 13 He 
encountered them as they were returning from a plundering 
raid, but was able to accomplish little; if an engagement took 
place it was indecisive. 14 To be sure, the numerical superiority 
of the Franks 15 was not altogether without effect; for the Vikings, 
in order that they might not expose themselves to the danger of 

/ Longius ille tuum forsan nec curet honorem.” Cf. Vogel, p. 375, who 
thinks Odo was prevented by illness from defending his realm. This view 
is not based on any statement in the sources for the year 896, and seems to 
be invalidated by these words in the Annals of St. Vaast: “dum rex ad alia 
intendit,” which by no means imply illness on the part of Odo. Cf. v. Kalck- 
stein, op. cit., 105-6. 

9 As noted in the text, the invaders at this time probably numbered only 
a few hundred men and therefore could easily have been expelled. Later 
their numbers were greatly increased, until finally they were able to defy 
any Prankish levy that Odo might send against them. Abbo, II, lines 592- 
95: “Haec ubi fata receperunt probitate neglecti, / Exultant hilares, barcas 
agitantque per omnes / Gallia quis amnes fruitur, terram pelaguque / In 
dicione tenent totum, tutore ferente!” See also the Annals of St. Vaast 
(quoted in the preceding note and infra, n. 22). 

10 Ann. Veclast., 896, p. 353: “Nortmanni vero jam multiplicati, etc.” Vo¬ 
gel, 376, n. 3, conjectures that Rollo, who later became the first duke of 
Normandy, may have been among those Vikings who came from England 
to Prance at this time. Cf. supra, n. 3. 

11 Ann. Vedast., 896, p. 353: ‘‘[Nortmanni] paucis ante nativitatem diebus 
Hisam ingressi, Cauciaco sedem sibi, nullo resistente, firmant.” 

12 Ibid., 897, p. 354: ‘‘Post haec usque Mosam in praeda exierunt [Nort¬ 
manni] nullo sibi resistente.” 

13 Pavre, p. 189, denies that Odo accompanied the Prankish army, but on 
insufficient grounds; see Vogel, 376, n. 4. On the size of Odo’s army, see 
infra, n. 15. 

14 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 354: “A praeda vero illis Nortmannis reverten- 
tibus occurrit regis exercitus; sed nil profecerunt.” 

15 The Pranks perhaps were more numerous (see the following note) 
than the Northmen just then; later it was the other way (see infra, n. 22). 
Odo’s army could not have been large except in a relative sense. Cf. infra, 
n. 17. 



160 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


being besieged, prudently ascended their ships and retired to the 
Seine. There was, however, no further attempt to dislodge them, 
and the Vikings continued during the summer to harry the 
country and collect booty. 16 

Meanwhile, Charles the Simple, who was disputing Odo’s 
claims to the West Frankish throne, 17 had entered into amicable 
relations with the invaders, 18 and was thinking of allying him¬ 
self with them in order to defeat his rival. 19 It is true that this 
project was never carried into effect, and that, on the contrary, 
a reconciliation took place between Charles and Odo. 20 Yet the 
possibility of such an alliance must have caused Odo some anx¬ 
iety, and may help to explain his future policy with regard to the 
Vikings. 21 

Toward the close of the summer of 897, the numbers of the 
invaders had become so large as to inspire them with the confi¬ 
dence that they might ravage the remaining parts of Odo’s king¬ 
dom with impunity; a confidence of which their fearful devas¬ 
tations gave ample proof. 22 Recognizing that it would be haz¬ 
ardous to attempt anything against the Vikings as things then 
stood, Odo resolved to make use, once more, of the only remain¬ 
ing method whereby he might hope to rid his kingdom of these 
pestiferous parasites. He opened negotiations looking to the 
removal of the Northmen in return for the payment of Danegeld. 

16 Ann. Veaast., 897, p. 354: “Verum Nortmanni ad naves reversi, timentes 
multitudinem exercitus ne obsiderentur, in Sequanam redierunt; ibique tota 
demorantes aestate praedas agebant, nullo sibi resistente.” 

17 On the strife between the partisans of Odo and Charles the Simple, see 
Eckel, op. cit., 13-27; Favre, 158-90; Diimmler, III, 382-436. These civil 
wars, while they lasted, probably prevented Odo from opposing the Vikings 
with anything more than merely local levies (Vogel, 375). 

18 At Easter, 897, Charles the Simple acted the sponsor at the baptism of 
Huncdeus, the Viking chieftain (Ann. Veclast., 897, p. 354). Did Charles 
demand that Huncdeus be baptized as the prerequisite for an alliance be¬ 
tween them (cf. Eckel, p. 25)? Steenstrup’s assumption (op. cit., II, 284, 
n. 1), that Charles at first had opposed the Vikings and vainly appealed to 
Odo for aid, is not warranted by the passage in Abbo’s poem to which he 
refers. 

19 Flodoard, Hist. Rem. ecclesiae, IV, c. 5, M.G.H., 8S., XIII, p. 565. Cf. 
Vogel, 377 and n. 1; Eckel, 61-64; supra, chap, x, n. 33. 

20 Ann. Veclast., 897, pp. 354-55. Cf. Favre, 190-91. 

21 Cf. Vogel, 378; Eckel, 27. 

22 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 355: “Nortmanni vero, jam in multitudine fidentes, 
omnes reliquias regni ferro et igne devastant.” Several lines before this 
quotation the annalist stated that the Northmen spent the entire summer 
along the Seine (see supra, n. 16). 



CHAPTER XI 


161 


After the treaty had been concluded, the Viking army proceeded 
southward, beyond the Loire, to pass the winter in Aquitaine. 23 

The reasons which induced Odo to agree to the payment of 
Danegeld at this time are fairly clear, and, in substance, similar 
to those which had led to the payment of the tribute on previous 
occasions. Reference has already been made to the numerical 
superiority attained by the Viking army, 24 and to the possibility 
of an alliance between the Vikings and some of the supporters 
of Charles the Simple. 25 These two considerations alone may 
have sufficed to induce Odo to act as he did; which is only another 
way of saying that the king was forced to resort to the Danegeld 
by reason of the attitude of his magnates. But if the difficulties 
of Qdo’s position are to be fully appreciated, we must remember 
also that during his reign there had been a heavy and continued 
drain on the military resources of the West Franks, and that 
Odo himself was no longer in possession of that energy, endur¬ 
ance, and resourcefulness, which in early and middle life had 
characterized the defender of Paris. 26 Having concluded the 
treaty with the Northmen, Odo retired to the castle of La Fere, 
on the Oise, where he was struck down with a serious illness, 27 
which on January 1, 898, ended his life. 28 

Concerning the amount of money promised the Vikings in 897 
we have no specific information. Owing to the self-confidence 
and arrogance which their large numbers fostered, 29 it is improb¬ 
able that the invaders would have consented to retire except for 
a very considerable compensation. The sources are silent also 
on the questions of how and where the Danegeld was to be raised. 
Indeed, there is some reason to doubt whether the tribute prom¬ 
ised in 897 was ever paid. 30 

23 Ann. Veclast. (this quotation follows immediately after the one given 
in the preceding note): “Unde rex misit ad eos, regnum redimere volens; 
et, facto placito, super Ligerim hiemandi gratia pergunt.” Since the prepo¬ 
sition super in the last sentence is used with a verb of motion, it ought to be 
translated beyond; Pavre (p. 192, bottom) translates it on, which to me 
seems inaccurate. 

24 Cf. supra , nn. 9, 17, 22. 

25 Cf. supra, nn. 18, 19. 

26 Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 106; Eckel, 28. 

27 Ann. Vedast., 897, p. 355. 

28 Ibid., 898, pp. 355-56. 

29 See supra, n. 22. 

30 The annalist of St. Vaast (see supra, n. 23), who is our only source of 
information for this Danegeld, says merely that Odo wished to ransom the 

Danegeld. 11. 



162 


CHAPTER XI 


However that may be, the Vikings subjected not only Aqui¬ 
taine but also Neustria to ruthless devastation before, in the 
spring, they returned to their ships in the lower Seine. 31 Even 
then the Northmen did not evacuate the realm; instead they 
undertook a plundering raid into Francia, on the return from 
which they were intercepted, though without important results, 
by a small Frankish army led by Charles the Simple, now mon¬ 
arch of the western kingdom. 32 

kingdom, and that he concluded a treaty with the Vikings on this basis. 
It is not stated anywhere that the Danegeld was paid. We know that Odo 
was taken ill shortly after he had come to terms with the Northmen, i. e. 
late in October (cf. Favre, 193), and that he died on January 1, 898 (see 
supra , n. 28) ; it is not impossible that these circumstances occasioned much 
delay in levying the taxes for the Danegeld. After the accession of Charles 
the Simple the attempt to raise the tribute may have been definitely aban¬ 
doned; at least the activities of the Vikings about that time (see the fol¬ 
lowing note) seem to indicate that they no longer entertained any hope of 
receiving the money promised by Odo. 

31 Ann. Veclast., 898, p. 356: “Nortmanni vero verno tempore rediere ad 
naves, vastata Aquitaniae parte atque Neustria, insuper plurimis eversis 
castris, interfectisque habitatoribus.” Favre (192-93) seems to imply that 
Odo by the treaty of 897 had consented to the plundering operations of the 
Northmen in Aquitaine and Neustria, and he finds little difference between 
Odo’s policy on this occasion and that of Charles the Fat in 886, who then 
permitted the Vikings to plunder Burgundy (cf. supra, p. 146 and n. 45). I 
am inclined to doubt that Odo consented to any plundering by the Vikings 
at least in Neustria, which was his own country. After the conclusion of 
the treaty the Vikings proceeded beyond the Loire (cf. supra, n. 23)—i. e. 
into Aquitaine, not Neustria—to spend the winter. Evidently it had been 
agreed that they were to sojourn there only during the stormy season and 
while they were awaiting the payment of the Danegeld; for it is inconceiv¬ 
able that Odo would have agreed to pay tribute for anything less than their 
(eventual) evacuation of the realm. Nothing is said of any plundering by 
the Vikings during the last months of 897. They seem to have refrained 
from that so long as they still hoped to receive the promised Danegeld. But 
when it became apparent that this was not forthcoming, the Vikings at once 
resumed hostile tactics; and these were not confined to Aquitaine, but in¬ 
cluded Neustria as well, and later were extended also to Francia (see the 
following note). 

32 Ann. Vedast., 898, pp. 356-57. 



THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


163 


CHAPTER XII. 

Rudolph’s First Danegeld (923—24). 

After the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte in 911, by which Charles 
the Simple ceded part of the region afterwards called Normandy 
to Rollo and his followers, 1 one might conjecture that so far as 
France was concerned there would be no further occasion for 
paying tribute to the Northmen. Yet the West Franks were 
required to pay Danegeld at least twice after the event referred 
to, first in the year 924 and again in 926. 2 It must be admitted 
that the reasons which made the first of these payments neces¬ 
sary, are somewhat obscure; and in order to render them at all 
comprehensible, it seems desirable to review briefly the course 
of events in France during the preceding twelvemonth. 3 

The year 923 is not without significance in the political, and 
more especially in the dynastic, history of France. It was then 
that the fortunes of Charles the Simple were broken, beyond 
hope of recovery, on the field of Soissons. For though Robert 
of Paris, the Capetian rival of Charles, was killed in this engage¬ 
ment, his forces were completely victorious over those of the 
Carolingian. All the efforts of Charles to rehabilitate himself 

1 On the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte, see Eckel, Charles le Simple, 75 ff. 

2 The Danegeld of 926 is taken up in the next chapter. Lauer’s statement, 
in his edition of the Annals of Flodoard, p. 35, n. 1, that Henry I of Ger¬ 
many in 924 agreed to buy peace from the Normans, is a gross error, due 
either to a misprint or to carelessness on the part of an otherwise very ac¬ 
curate scholar. Henry paid tribute, not to the Normans, but to the Magyars 
(Waitz, Jahrbucher des deutschen Reichs unter Kdnig Heinrich I, Third 
edition [1885], p. 78). 

3 The principal if not the only source of information for this Danegeld 
and that of 926 are the contemporary Annals of Flodoard. Richer in his 
Historiae has something to say on the Danegeld of 924, but fails to mention 
any payment in 926. His account was not written until the close of the 
tenth century. For the preceding period Richer depended largely on the 
Annals of Flodoard, and the value of his supplementary statements is very 
doubtful (see the edition of Waitz, Intro., pp. vi ff.). For detailed discus¬ 
sions of the course of events in the West Frankish kingdom during this 
period, see Lauer, Robert et Raoul, 20-45; Lippert, Geschichte des west- 
frdnkischen Reiches unter Kdnig Rudolf, 31-58; v. Kalckstein, Gesch. d. 
franz. Konigtums, I, 161-72; cf. Eckel, Charles le Simple, 116-33. In Eng¬ 
lish there is a very brief account by Freeman (Norman Conquest, I, Third 
edition, pp. 175-77) and a more detailed one by Palgrave (History of Nor¬ 
mandy and England, II, 50-60). Neither of these is now of much value. 
The work of Palgrave in particular has become very antiquated. It contains 
numerous errors and inaccuracies, some of which pertain to the Danegeld; 
but it seems unnecessary at this date to refute or even to signalize them. 




164 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


proved vain. Abandoning this unfortunate scion of Charle¬ 
magne, the western magnates gave their allegiance to Rudolph 
of Burgundy, who was crowned king of France at Soissons on 
July 13, 923. 4 Not long thereafter the wily and ambitious Her¬ 
bert, count of Vermandois, by a successful ruse obtained posses¬ 
sion of the unsuspecting Carolingian and threw him into prison. 5 

An army of Northmen now advanced into Francia, ostensibly 
for the purpose of supporting the cause of Charles, who had 
appealed to them for aid several times before he was imprisoned. 
This army was composed chiefly of the followers of Ragenold, 
who for some time had had their rendezvous near the Loire; 
besides these, however, it also included a large contingent from 
Rouen, i. e. from Rollo’s army. Ragenold appears to have been 
the leader of the combined Scandinavian forces. 6 While Count 
Herbert of Vermandois was sojourning with King Rudolph in 
Burgundy, 7 the Northmen subjected the territory west and north 
of the Oise to devastation and plunder. 8 It is true that the vassals 
of Herbert, aided by other nobles, offered effective resistance to 
the enemy, killed several hundred of them, and compelled the 

4 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 14 and n. 3. Cf. Lauer, c.p. cit., 6-19. 

5 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 15; Richer, I, 47, pp. 30-31. Cf. Lauer, 20-24. 
In spite of several temporary releases from prison, the captivity of Charles 
the Simple was ended only by his death on October 7, 929 (cf. Eckel, 127-35; 
Lippert, 32-35). 

6 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 15: “Interea Ragenoldus, princeps Nordmanno- 
rum qui in fluvio Ligeri versabantur, Karoli frequentibus missis jampridem 
excitus, Franciam trans Isaram, conjunctis sibi plurimis ex Rodomo, de- 
praedatur.” Cf. Richer, I, 46, p. 30: “Nortmannis quoque usque ad effectum 
suasit [Karolus], adeo ut regi fidem spondere eique ut iuberet militare vel- 
lent. Qui cum regi militaturi occurrere pararent, a Gallis intercurrentibus 
inhibiti sunt. Unde et eorum suppetiis rex privatus est.” Ibid., c. 48, p. 31: 
“Haec [i. e. the capture and incarceration of Charles the Simple] dum 
agerentur, pyratae Gallias irruperunt, etc.” Lauer, p. 24, indicates that 
Ragenold also had grievances of his own. Lippert, p. 34, asserts that for the 
Northmen the captivity of Charles was ‘‘nur ein Vorwand ftir . . . Raube- 
reien”; cf. ibid., pp. 35-36. 

7 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 15: “et sic ipse Heribertus Rodulfum regem in 
Burgundiam prosecutus est.” Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 163. 

8 Cf. ibid. Lauer, p. 24, and Lippert. p. 36, seem to be of the opinion that 
Ragenold’s men had crossed the Oise and were operating in the region east 
of that river. But Flodoard (see supra, n. 6) says, “Ragenoldus . . . Fran¬ 
ciam trans Isaram . . . depraedatur”; this must mean that the Vikings were 
devastating that part of Francia which from Flodoard’s point of view was 
trans Isaram. Therefore, since Flodoard was writing at Rheims (see Lauer’s 
edition of Flodoard’s Annals , Intro., pp. vi, xvi), it fellows that he referred 
to the territory west and north of the Oise. Doubtless most if not all of the 
invaded territory lay within the jurisdiction of Count Herbert of Verman¬ 
dois; for it was his vassals who first offered resistance to the Northmen 
(Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 15), and it was he who had imprisoned Charles the 
Simple, in whose behalf Ragenold is said to have taken up arms. 



CHAPTER XII 


165 


rest to seek refuge within the Norman strongholds. 9 Yet the 
ravaging continued, and eventually Hugh the Great, Duke of 
Francia, felt that it was necessary to summon the king to the 
rescue. 

Rudolph, in response to this summons, immediately left Bur¬ 
gundy and proceeded to Compiegne on the Oise. 10 Learning now 
that the Normans had devastated the territory of Beauvais, the 
king hastened thither, accompanied by Archbishop Seulf of 
Rheims, Count Herbert of Vermandois, and others. * 11 By way 
of retaliation, he penetrated with the Frankish forces into Nor¬ 
mandy and began to harry that land after the fashion of the 
Vikings. 

From these measures of reprisal Rudolph was called away to 
receive the homage and fealty of the magnates of Lorraine. 
Counts Hugo and Herbert were left to oppose the Normans and 
to prevent them from crossing the Oise. 13 In the latter endeavor 
the Frankish magnates were not successful, but they retaliated 
by ravaging in Normandy. These guerilla tactics could not be 
continued indefinitely, and at last both sides were ready for 
negotiation. 14 The Normans promised Count Herbert, Arch- 

9 Flodoard, Ann., 923, pp. 15-16. Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 163. 

10 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 16: “Quibus urgentibus causis, rex Rodulfus 
ab Hugone, filio Rotberti, accitus de Burgundia venit ad Compendia super 
Isaram.” 

11 Ibid.: “et audito quod Nordmanni pagum Belvacensem depraedabantur, 
illo transiit cum Seulfo archiepiscopo et Heriberto comite, aliisque quibus- 
dam et electis viris fortibus.” That Flodoard is here referring to the Nor¬ 
mans, not to the Loire Vikings under Ragenold, is evident from what fol¬ 
lows (see the next note). 

12 Ibid., pp. 16-17: “Itta fluvio transito, ingressus est terram, quae dudum 
Nordmannis ad Mem Xpisti venientibus, ut hanc fidem colerent et pacem 
haberent, fuerat data; partem quoque ipsius terrae rex cum Francis, quia 
ipsi Nordmanni pacem quam pepigerant, propter promissiones Karoli, qui 
eis latitudinem terrae pollicitus fuerat, infregere, caedibus et igne devastat.” 

13 Ibid., p. 17: “His vero eum rebus intentum legati adeunt Lotharien- 
sium, se suaque ipsi subdere spondentium; quorum legatione revocatus ab 
hac devastatione, cum primatum qui secum aderant, consilio Lothariensibus 
obviam pergit, Hugone et Heriberto comitibus ad praesidium patriae trans 
Isaram relictis.” Lippert, p. 36, comments thus on Rudolph’s policy at this 
juncture: “auch er [Rudolf] konnte sich dem Zuge seiner Zeit und seiner 
Stellung nicht entziehen; die Ausdehnung seines Herrschaftsgebiets iiber 
das weite Reich Lothars musste wie alien Westfranken auch ihm als hoh- 
erer, ruhmvollerer Gewinn gelten als die definitive Ziichtigung der norman- 
nischen Rauber, welche ja seine Vasallen durchfuhren konnten.” 

14 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 17: “Interea Nordmannis quosdam pagos nos¬ 
tros trans Isaram et nostratibus eorum terram depraedantibus, crebris al- 
ternatim directis legationibus, etc.” 



166 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


bishop Seulf, and the other French nobles, that they would make 
peace on condition that they be granted as large an extent of 
territory on the left bank of the Seine as they demanded; also 
the Normans sent hostages to King Rudolph — who was then at 
Laon, having returned from Lorraine — and accepted his pro¬ 
posal of a truce until the middle of May in the following year 
(924). 15 

Meanwhile Henry I of Germany, on the invitation of certain 
magnates hostile to Rudolph, had invaded Lorraine, and was 
attempting to coerce the nobility of that region to transfer their 
allegiance to him. These efforts, however, proved somewhat 
premature. Apprised that Rudolph was preparing to oppose 
him with a very large army, summoned together not only from 
Francia but also from Burgundy, Henry deemed it advisable 
temporarily to postpone the execution of his project, and speedily 
retired to Germany. 16 

Rudolph was now ready to give his attention to the seigniors 
of the south, Duke William II of Aquitaine in particular, who 
had so far refused him allegiance. 17 But we are informed that 
at the beginning of the year 924, and before the king set out on 
his expedition to Aquitaine, there was levied in Francia an ex¬ 
action for the purpose of raising a sum of money to be paid to 
the Northmen as the price of peace. 18 In view of the fact that 

15 Flodoard, Ann., 923, pp. 17-18: “pacem Heriberto comiti et Seulfo archi- 
episcopo pollicentur ceterisque Francis qui cum ipsis contra Nordmannos 
sedebant, si tamen eis terra daretur quam spaciosam petebant ultra Sequa- 
nam. Rodulfo interea rege, ut dictum est [p. 17], Laudunum reverso, obsides 
illi mittunt et inducias ab eo usque ad medium Maium accipiunt.” A few lines 
before this quotation (p. 17) Flodoard stated that Rudolph was detained in 
Lorraine toto pene . . . autumno. It is therefore probable that the truce with 
the Normans was concluded in September or October, 923. Cf. v. Kalckstein, 
op. cit., 164, n. 2. 

16 Flodoard, Ann., 923, p. 18. Cf. Parisot, Le Royaume de Lorraine sous 
les Carolingiens, p. 667; Lauer, 25-26; Lippert, 36-37. 

17 See the following note, and cf. Lauer, 27; Lippert, 38-39. 

18 Flodoard, Ann., 924, p. 19: “Anno DCCCCXXIIII incipiente, fit exactio 
per Franciam pecuniae collaticiae, quae Nordmannis [probably the Normans; 
see infra, in the text] pacto pacis daretur, et Rodulfus rex profectionem 
parabat in Aquitaniam, quia Willelmus, ejusdem regionis princeps, subdi 
sibi differebat.” Richer, I, 48, p. 31: “Haec dum agerentur [cf. supra, n. 6], 
pyratae Gallias irruperunt, pecudum armentorumque abductione multarum- 
que opum exhaustu cum plurimorum capitivitate terram depopulantes. Quo¬ 
rum impetum rex dolens, suorum usus consilio, exactionem pecuniae collati- 
tiae fieri exactoribus indixit, quae hostibus in pacis pacto conferretur. Et 
collata, ad votum commune paciscuntur atque in sua concedunt. Rex vero, 
licet merens, ad adia se contulit. Exercitum itaque in Aquitaniam adversus 





CHAPTER XII 


167 


the recent warfare had not issued wholly in favor of the Scan¬ 
dinavians 19 — it was they, not the Franks, who had furnished 
hostages 20 — it seems rather disconcerting now to find the North¬ 
men in a position to demand, and the Franks willing to agree to, 
the payment of tribute. Which group of Northmen had made 
this demand, and what considerations had induced the Franks 
to yield? 

1 

Answers to these questions must be largely in the form of con¬ 
jecture, for the annalists, though they furnish us with the facts, 
offer hardly a word of explanation. 21 In all probability the Dane- 
geld was paid to the Northmen of the Seine, i. e. the Normans, 
with whom Rudolph had arranged a truce the preceding year. 22 
The continued hostile attitude of the Loire Northmen, led by 
Ragenold, seems to preclude the possibility of the tribute having 
been paid, either in whole or in part, to them. 23 It is not impos¬ 
sible that the Normans had stipulated for the payment of Dane- 

eius principem Wilelmum parat, eo quod subdi sibi contempneret.” This 
portion of Richer’s account (cf. the edition of Waitz, p. 31, n. 3) depends on 
the Annals of Flodoard. It must be assumed that the details added by 
Richer, such as Rudolph’s grief at having to resort to the Danegeld and his 
consultation with the magnates, are wholly gratuitous. Richer does not 
mention the truce which had been arranged with the Normans prior to the 
payment of the Danegeld, nor does he distinguish the Loire Vikings under 
Ragenold from the Normans under Rollo. 

19 See supra, n. 14. Lippert, p. 38, says: “Keiner von beiden Teilen 
konnte sich einen entscheidenden Sieg zuschreiben.” Lauer, p. 2?, agrees 
that there had been no decisive encounter. 

20 See supra, n. 15. Cf. Lippert, p. 38; Lauer, p .27. 

21 Flodoard says (supra, n. 18) simply that the Danegeld was paid to the 
Northmen; he has no explanation whatever of the reasons why the Franks 
agreed to pay tribute, unless, indeed, we assume that a causal relation is 
implied between the two events described in the sentence quoted supra, 
n. 18. Richer (see ibid.) would have us believe that the Northmen, as a 
result of their tactics of devastation, had the Franks completely at their 
mercy—in other words, that the latter had no choice in the matter of paying 
Danegeld; which is not true (see supra, n. 18; cf. nn. 3, 18). 

22 Cf. supra, n. 15. This is also the opinion of Lauer, p. 27, and of Lip¬ 
pert, p. 38. 

23 In 924 the truce with the Normans was ended by a definitive peace (see 
infra, n. 35; cf. nn. 25, 27). But this, according to Flodoard, did not affect 
the Loire Vikings (Ann., 924, pp. 24-25): “Ragenoldus cum suis Nordman- 
nis, quia nondum possessionem intra Gallias acceperat, terram Hugonis inter 
Ligerim et Sequanam depopulantur.” Later, after William II of Aquitaine 
and Hugh the Great had come to terms with Ragenold—probably by per¬ 
mitting him free passage through their territories (Lippert, p. 44)—the 
latter transferred his plundering operations to Burgundy (Flodoard, Ann., 
924, 925, pp. 25 ff.). Cf. Lauer, 33-34. 



168 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


geld before they agreed to the truce in 923 ; 24 or it may be that 
Rudolph, by subsequent negotiations, had secured an extension 
of the truce in return for the promise of tribute. 25 In any case, 
it seems pretty clear that the king by this measure was merely 
taking precautions against the possible reopening of hostilities 
by the Normans during the period when he expected to be occu¬ 
pied with the business of securing submission in Aquitaine. 26 
There is no reason to suppose that the Danegeld secured anything 
more than an extension of the truce. 27 A definitive peace with 
the Normans was not concluded until the late summer or early 

24 In his recent work (Robert et Raoul, p. 27) Lauer takes the view that 
when the Normans gave hostages in 923 (cf. supra, n. 15), they did so in 
return for the promise of tribute. When he published his edition of the 
Annals of Flodoard, Lauer was of the opinion (p, 24, n. 5) that the Dane¬ 
geld was arranged for in a separate treaty concluded early in 924. 

25 The treaty which formally terminated the period of truce (see infra, 
n. 35) was probably concluded long after the middle of May (cf. supra, 
n. 15), as will appear from the following. Rudolph’s illness (Flodoard, 
Ann., 924, p. 23; cf. Lippert, 41-43) must be placed in the period after April 
9 (Lauer, ed., Ann. de Flodoard, p. 23, n. 4), when he was at Chalon-sur- 
Saone in Burgundy. Before he fell ill, but after April 9, Rudolph partici¬ 
pated in the Assembly of Attigny. It was directly after that event, and 
while he was preparing an expedition to Lorraine, that the illness came upon 
him. After a time he began to convalesce, but soon suffered a relapse, and, 
despairing of recovery, was brought to the monastery of St. Remy at Rheims, 
where he remained for four weeks. A careful consideration of these facts 
leads me to believe that Rudolph could not have left Rheims before June 1. 
Thereupon he proceeded to Soissons and thence to Burgundy. At this point 
in his narrative Flodoard (pp. 23-24) states that “Heinricus [the Fowler] 
aeque . . . valitudine corporis tota detinetur aestate”; which brings us to 
the summer months—July or perhaps August. Next Flodoard refers to an 
outbreak of hostilities between certain nobles and then, finally, to the con¬ 
clusion of peace with the Normans (see infra, n. 35). Seven or eight lines 
further on (p. 25, line 2) he mentions the Synod of Trosly, held in October. 
There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the treaty with the Normans 
was not concluded much prior to September 1, and possibly later (cf. v. 
Kalckstein, op. cit., 167 and n. 1) ; which means that the truce had been 
prolonged from three to four months beyond the time originally agreed upon, 
v. Kalckstein (ibid., 165) believes that Rudolph concluded a definite treaty 
of peace with the Normans when he agreed to the Danegeld; but see infra, 
n. 27 and cf. supra, n. 24. 

26 Cf. supra, nn. 18, 21. This is also the opinion of Lauer, p. 27, and of 
Lippert, p. 38. 

27 The contrary view of v. Kalckstein (cf. supra, n. 25) is hardly tenable. 
If a definitive peace had been concluded when the Danegeld was paid, early 
in 924, it would be impossible to explain why another peace treaty, and one 
so disadvantageous to the Franks, was necessary later in the same year, 
since Flodoard has not a word concerning any reopening of hostilities in the 
intervening period. The fact that the Franks, by the treaty concluded in 
the fall of 924 (see infra, n. 35), yielded to the demands made by the Nor¬ 
mans at the cessation of hostilities in 923 (see supra, n. 15), also indicates 
that there had been no final settlement with the Normans in the meantime. 



CHAPTER XII 


169 


fall of 924,-^ by which time the submission of Aquitaine was an 
accomplished fact. 29 

For the Danegeld of 924 our sources offer no information 
whatever as regards amount, rates of assessment, or method of 
collection. 30 Probably it was a considerable sum, since, as 
already stated, it had to be raised by means of an exaction, or 
general tax, levied throughout Francia — which, roughly de¬ 
scribed, then comprised the territory between the Epte, the 
Seine, the upper Meuse, and the Scheldt. 31 Presumably the 
money was raised by methods very similar to, if not identical 
with, those that had been developed for this purpose in the 
preceding century. 32 

Not until several months after the submission of Aquitaine, 
were the Franks ready to make peace with the Normans. Ru¬ 
dolph was then in Burgundy, convalescing from a serious ill¬ 
ness. 33 It was therefore left to Counts Hugo and Herbert and 
Archbishop Seulf to arrange the terms of the treaty. We are 
assured, however, that the magnates acted with the king’s con¬ 
sent when, yielding to the demands put forward by the Normans 

28 Cf. supra, n. 25; infra, n. 35. 

29 Rudolph had returned from Aquitaine before April 6 (Lippert, 41, 108) ; 
cf. Flodoard, Ann., 924, p. 20 and n. 1, p. 21). 

30 All the information we haye on this Danegeld is given supra, n. 18. 
Richer states that the king entrusted the collection of the tax to exactores. 
It would be futile to speculate on the identity of these officials, since, in all 
probability, Richer himself only assumed that they must have existed and 
functioned. In asserting that this Danegeld was raised by a personal tax, 
Lauer, p. 27, is evidently following Lippert, p. 38, who refers to it as “wohl 
eine Art aussergewohnlicher Kopfsteuer, die es sonst nicht gab.” For this 
view I can find no basis. Pecunia collaticia (see supra, n. 18) cannot be 
interpreted to mean a capitation tax. The adjective collaticius does not 
appear in DuCange’s Glossarium; in Harper's Latin Dictionary it is said to 
be of post-Augustan usage and to mean “brought together,” “raised by con¬ 
tribution,” or “mingled.” The second of these meanings is quite appropriate 
for the connection in which Flodoard uses the word; furthermore, it may 
indicate that this Danegeld, like those of the ninth century, was not col¬ 
lected in strict accordance with a royal assessment, but that each tax-payer 
was forced to contribute whatever his resources permitted (see supra, chap, 
v, n. 123). 

31 Longnon, Atlas historique de la France, Text, pp. 85-86; cf. Lauer, ed., 
Ann., de Flodoard, p. 24, n. 10. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 165, assumes that 
when Rudolph in the spring of 924 granted Hugh the Great the county of 
Maine—which soon afterward was ceded to the Normans (see infra, n. 35) — 
he did so partly in order to indemnify him for his contributions toward the 
Danegeld. 

32 These are summarized infra, chap. xvii. 

33 Cf. supra, nn. 25, 28. 



170 


CHAPTER XII 


in 923, 34 they ceded to them the districts of Maine and Bessin. 35 
This peace, of course, did not prevent the Vikings under Rage- 
nold, who as yet had received no grant of territory in France, 
from plundering and devasting on their own account. 36 What 
was worse, it failed to keep the Normans pacified for more than 
a brief interval. In 925 Rollo’s men invaded Beauvais, Amiens, 
Arras, and Noyon, thereby violating the compact of the previous 
year. 37 

34 Cf. supra, n. 15. 

35 Flodoard, Ann., 924, p. 24: “Nordmanni cum Francis pacem ineunt sac- 
ramentis per Hugonem et Heribertum comites, Seulfum quoque archiepis- 
copum, absente rege Rudulfo: ejus tamen consensu terra illis aucta, Cino- 
mannis et Baiocae pacto pacis eis concessae.” Lauer, p. 32, asserts that 
before he left Rheims (cf. supra, n. 25), Rudolph had charged the magnates 
to conclude peace with the Normans. Lippert, p. 43, indicates that these 
matters were arranged at Soissons a little later. 

36 See supra, n. 23. Ragenold probably was incensed at having been ex¬ 
cluded from the negotiations with the Franks, and he must have regarded 
the increase in the holdings of the Normans with envy. Cf. Lauer, p. 33. 

37 Flodoard, Ann., 925, pp. 29-30: “Nordmanni de Rodomo foedus quod 
olim pepigerant irrumpentes, pagum Belvacensem atque Ambianensem depo- 
pulantur, etc.” 



THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


171 


CHAPTER XIII. 

Rudolph’s Second Danegeld (926). 

« 

At the close of the preceding chapter it was indicated that the 
peace which the West Franks concluded with the Normans under 
Rollo in 924 was violated by the latter in the following year. 1 
After they had devastated the district about Beauvais, and had 
burned Amiens aud Arras, the Normans proceeded to Noyon, 
which they intended to subject to a like fate. In this, however, 
they were only partially successful; though the suburbs, or fau¬ 
bourgs, were enkindled, a sally by the castellani, aided by the 
suburbani, forced the Normans to retire some distance, and at 
least part of the faubourgs was cleared of the enemy. In the 
meantime Frankish contingents had invaded Norman territory, 
ravaging and burning as they advanced; while Count Herbert 
of Vermandois undertook to strengthen the resistance along the 
Oise. 2 In this way a general diversion was produced, which com¬ 
pelled the Normans speedily to return to the defense of their 
own lands. 3 

King Rudolph, who had returned from Burgundy to Francia 
about this time, presently ordered a general mobilization of the 
Franks against the Normans. 4 One division of the Frankish 
army, under the leadership of Counts Herbert of Vermandois 
and Arnulf of Flanders, moved against the Norman stronghold 
of Eu, near the mouth of the Somme ; 5 this citadel was taken and 
demolished, many Normans were killed, and the victorious 
Franks brought back with them a large amount of booty. 6 


1 See supra, p. 170, n. 37. The sources and the secondary works which 
contain references to this Danegeld are given in note 3 of the preceding 
chapter. Lippert, p. 49, has some discussion of the probable reasons for the 
violation of the treaty by the Normans, v. Kalckstein’s statement (op. cit., 
169), that the Normans under Rollo broke their compact with the Franks 
at the instigation of Ragenold, is pure conjecture; yet Lauer, p. 37, seems 
inclined to accept it. v. Kalckstein (ibid.) also believes that the terms of 
the peace of 924 had not been fully executed. 

2 Flodoard, Ann., 925, p. 30. 

3 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 

4 Ibid., p. 31. Cf. Lauer, 38; Lippert, 50. 

5 Flodoard, Ann., 925, p. 31. Richer (I, 49-50, p. 32) states, inaccurately 
no doubt, that King Rudolph participated in the storming of the fortress of 
Eu; also Richer fails to distinguish the Vikings under Ragenold from the 
Normans. Cf. Lippert, 51 and n. 1. 

6 Flodoard, Ann., 925, pp. 31-32; Richer, I, 50, p. 32. Cf. Lippert, 51 
and n. 2. 



172 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


Early in 926 the Franks resumed their offensive, 7 this time 
under the direction of King Rudolph himself, aided by Count 
Herbert. 8 An engagement took place (at Fauquembergue?) in 
the county of Artois. 9 The Normans eventually were forced to 
retire, but not until they had killed Helgaud, the Count of Pon- 
thieu, and inflicted serious wounds on King Rudolph, who, in 
consequence thereof, withdrew to Laon. 10 In spite of the con¬ 
siderable losses which they had suffered, the Normans were able 
to proceed eastward as.far as the county of Porcien, which they 
subjected to devastation and pillage. * 11 

As if that were not enough, the inhabitants of this region soon 
learned that a band of Hungarians had crossed the Rhine and 
were desolating the territory just to the east of them with fire 
and sword. 12 About the same time — probably in April — Duke 
William of Aquitaine broke his allegiance and raised the banner 
of revolt. 13 Conditions had suddenly shaped themselves in such 
a way that Rudolph found it necessary to come to terms with one 
group of adversaries in order that thereby he might be enabled 

7 Flodoard, Ann., 925, p. 32, indicates that Hugh the Great, Duke of 
France, meanwhile had concluded a separate peace with the Normans, from 
which, however, the magnates of the maritime districts, such as the Counts 
of Flanders and Ponthieu, were excluded (cf. Lippert, 51, 52 and n. 1; Lauer, 
39-40). Also, Flodoard mentions, near the close of his recital for the year 
925 (p. 33), that the entire nobility of Lorraine swore allegiance to Henry I 
of Germany, thus violating their fealty to Rudolph (cf. supra, chap, xii, n. 
13). Cf. Lauer, 40; Lippert, 52-53; v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 170. 

8 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 33. 

9 Ibid. Lippert, p. 56, n. 1, and Lauer, p. 43, n. 2, believe that the battle 
referred to by Flodoard here is to be identified with that of Fauquembergue, 
mentioned by Folcwin in Gesta abbatum sancti Bei'tini Sithiensium, c. 101, 
M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 626. 

10 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 33; Richer, I, 51, pp. 32-33. Cf. Lippert, 55-56. 

11 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 34: “Nordmanni, usque in pagum Porcensem, 
silvestria loca depraedantur.” 

12 Ibicl.: “Hungari quoque, Rheno transmeato, usque in pagum Vonzinsem, 
praedis incendiisque desaeviunt.” Immediately after this Flodoard mentions 
an eclipse of the moon on April 1, and then describes the translation of the 
various relics, Hungarorum onetu (cf. infra, n. 20). For other references on 
the Hungarian invasion, see Lauer, 44, n. 1. 

13 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p. 35 (cf. n. 3) : “Hinc [i. e. after the Danegeld 
had been paid and peace concluded with the Normans—see infra, nn. 17, 21] 
exercitus ex Francia Burgundiaque cum Rodulfo rege et Heriberto comite 
proficiscitur super Ligerim et, acceptis obsidibus, ab urbe Nivernensi, quam 
frater Willelmi contra regem tutabatur, in Aquitaniam ad persequendum 
Willelmum qui a rege forte desciverat, transeunt, etc.” This passage indi¬ 
cates that the revolt of William of Aquitaine probably preceded (desciverat— 
the pluperfect tense) the compact with the Normans. Cf. v. Kalckstein, op. 
cit., 171. 





CHAPTER XIII 


173 


to oppose the others with better hope of success. 14 An under¬ 
standing was arrived at with the Normans, who, as usual, were 
willing to make peace in return for the payment of Danegeld. 15 

The amount of the tribute demanded by the Normans in 926 
is unknown; but probably it was a large sum. 16 Though we know 
that an exaction was levied in both Francia and Burgundy for 
the purpose of raising this Danegeld, 17 we possess no information 
with reference to the distribution of the tax or the rates of assess¬ 
ment ; presumably the seigniors procured the money in the usual 
way, by collecting from their dependents what each one could be 
induced or forced to pay. 18 

Rudolph's policy on this occasion must probably be regarded 
as very fortunate. 19 Since the Hungarian invasion above referred 
to, proved to be but a passing danger, the king was, after the 
pacification of the Normans, 21 free to give his attention once 
more to the rebellious William of Aquitaine. There was, it is 


14 Cf. Lauer, 43; Lippert, 57. Since Hugh the Great, Duke of France, had 
concluded a separate treaty with the Normans in 925, whereby his own ter¬ 
ritories were made secure from devastation (cf. supra, n. 7), Rudolph prob¬ 
ably could not count on any aid from him against the Normans. Cf. v. Kalck- 
stein, op. cit., 169-71. 

15 See infra, n. 17. 

16 I infer that from the fact that it was raised in both Francia and Bur¬ 
gundy (see the following note). 

17 Flodoard, Ann., 926, pp. 34-35: “Exactio pecuniae collaticiae Nord- 
mannis pacto pacis dandae publice fit per Franciam atque Burgundiam.” 
Flodoard describes this Danegeld in almost the same words as that of 924 
(see supra, chap, xii, n. 18). Richer, on the other hand, does not even 
mention the Danegeld of 926. 

18 Cf. supra, chap, xii, n. 30. 

19 It was fortunate for Rudolph and those northern seigniors whose in¬ 
terests at this moment happened to coincide with those of the king. It is 
well known that these nobles—Herbert of Vermandois in particular—were 
now supporting Rudolph not only against the Normans, but also against the 
magnates of Aquitaine; the latter, as well as the Normans, ostensibly were 
committed to the cause of Charles the Simple, though in reality that was 
only a pretext for the advancement of their own interests. On this see 
Eckel, 107 ff„ 123-33; Lauer, 33-34, 52, 56-57, and passim; Lippert, 25-31, 
38-39, 47, 59 and n. 1, and passim. 

20 Still it produced much alarm, as is evident from the hurried removal 
of the bodies of the saints (cf. supra, n. 12). See Lippert, 56-57; Lauer, 
44-45. 

21 Flodoard, Ann., 926, p .35: “Data igitur pecunia, pax utrimque est cum 
juramento firmata.” The Danegeld was paid probably late in April or early 
in May (see supra, n. 12; cf. v. Kalckstein, op. cit., 171, last line). 



174 


CHAPTER XIII 


true, a second invasion of the Magyars; 22 but like the first one, 
it only postponed for a time the final settlement of the question 
of Aquitaine. If, on the other hand, the king had had also the 
Normans to deal with, it seems very doubtful whether he could 
ever have accomplished his purpose in the south. The fact that 
Rudolph was not at any time during the remainder of his reign 
preoccupied with the Normans, must doubtless be considered a 
principal reason for his eventual success in securing the sub¬ 
mission of the southern seigniors. 23 

i 

The peace which the Normans had concluded with the Franks 
in 926 was, unlike those of preceding years, to be of long dura¬ 
tion ; 24 and the Danegeld of 926 is significant as probably being 
the last Danegeld ever exacted from the Franks, at all events 
the last of which there is any record. 25 

22 Flodoard, Ann. (this quotation follows immediately after the one given 
supra, n. 13) : “insequunturque [sc. Rodulfus rex et Heribertus comes] 
fugientem [Willelmum] donee rumor infestationis Hungarorum quod iterum 
jam Rhenum transissent, exercitum in Franciam repedare coegit.” Cf. 
supra, n. 12. See also Lippert, 57 and n. 2; Lauer, 45; v. Kalckstein, op. 
cit., 172. 

23 Aquitaine was not completely subdued until some time after the death 
of Charles the Simple (October 7, 929). Cf. supra, n. 19, and see Lauer, 
55-60, 67-68; cf. 78. 

24 Cf. what Lauer says in his edition of Flodoard’s Annals, p. 35, n. 2. 
The Vikings under Ragenold continued to make trouble in Aquitaine until, 
it is said, they were almost annihilated by Rudolph in 930 (Flodoard, Ann., 
930, p. 45). Probably many survived, or more arrived soon afterward, for in 
931 they were able, under a new leader, Incon, to gain possession of (a large 
part of ?) Brittany (ibicl., 931, pp. 51-52). 

25 It does not seem impossible that stipendiary Danegelds of a more or 
less local character continued to be levied after this date. At any rate 
Normans were employed, probably as mercenaries, on several occasions by 
various French seigniors, and at one time, in 945, by Louis d’Outre-Mer 
(Flodoard, Ann., 939, p. 72; 945, p. 96; 948, p. 117; 949, pp. 124, 125). 




THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


175 


CHAPTER XIV. 

Summary of the Reasons for the Payment of Danegeld 
After the Time of Charles the Bald. 

The payment of tribute to the Northmen in the West Frankish 
kingdom did not cease with the death of Charles the Bald. 1 It has 
been shown above that the Danegeld was resorted to at least six 
times after 877: in 884, 887, 889, 897, 924, and 926. But while 
the circumstances which led to the payment of Danegeld in the 
later period were more or less similar to those which had forced 
Charles the Bald to make use of this expedient, 2 it would be in¬ 
accurate to say that the situation throughout remained wholly 
unaltered. After the reign of Carloman certain changes took 
place not only in the relative strength and advantages of the 
Franks and the Northmen, but also in the policy of the magnates 
— their attitude to the king on the one hand and to the Vikings 
on the other. The latter point will be illustrated by what follows 
in the succeeding paragraphs of this chapter. As regards the 
former it may suffice to say here that the Vikings retained the 
military superiority until towards the close of the ninth century, 
when it began gradually to pass to the Franks. 3 Why, under 
those conditions, it should have been necessary for the Franks 
to continue to pay Danegeld even in the tenth century, can be 
made clear only by specific references to the facts in each case. 

The first Danegeld after the death of Charles the Bald, that of 
884, was agreed to at a time when the havoc created by the 
Vikings perhaps had reached its climax. 4 It is impossible to 
deny that the magnates were responsible for permitting this 
situation to arise. They had neglected or refused to support the 
military efforts of Carloman, and when it finally became impos¬ 
sible for them longer to defer action, they had nothing to propose 
save the payment of tribute. The motives which induced the 
nobles to pursue a course of this kind need not be set forth again. 
It is clear that in the main they were still adhering to the policy 
which had been characteristic of them in the time of Charles the 
Bald; selfish material interest dictated that it was more con- 

1 Cf. supra, pp. 116-17. . 

2 Cf. supra, chap. vii. 

3 Cf. Vogel, p. 44. 

4 Cf. supra, chap, viii and n. 78. 



176 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


venient and more profitable to pay the Vikings than to resist 
them with the sword. 5 

It is true, however, that a change in the policy of the western 
magnates becomes apparent about this time or shortly afterward. 
The immoderate sum demanded by the Northmen in 884, together 
with their unprecedented ravages in the preceding period, seem 
to have awakened the magnates to a realization of the true sig¬ 
nificance of the Viking incursions and to the fact that a continued 
policy of inaction would gravely imperil their own interests. 6 
A temporary stiffening of the West Frankish resistance to the 
Northmen in the period between the election of Charles the Fat 
in 884 and that of Odo in 888, is very noticeable especially in 
Francia and Neustria, the regions which were most exposed to, 
and which had suffered most from, the Viking raids. 7 When 
Charles the Fat promised to pay Danegeld to the besiegers of 
Paris in 886, he did so probably against the wishes of the West 
Frankish nobility, and more particularly against the wishes of 
Odo and the Parisians, 8 whose heroic resistance during the 
recent siege seemed by the emperor’s compliance to be rendered 
futile. 9 

Firmness, however, did not for more than a brief interval 
characterize the attitude of the western magnates toward the 
Vikings. After Odo’s accession to the throne the nobles reverted 
to their old policy of temporizing with the invaders. Odo, though, 
nay rather because, he was a strong monarch, found it necessary 
to buy off the Northmen on two different occasions. , The condi¬ 
tions under which he was forced to resort to this expedient do 
not essentially differ from the circumstances which had made 
the Danegeld necessary in the time of Charles the Bald. The 
great vassals, those of Aquitaine and Burgundy in particular 
refused or were reluctant to cooperate with the king in his at¬ 
tempts to expel the enemy by military measures. They were 
apprehensive lest the complete removal of the Vikings might 

5 See supra, pp. 125-31; cf. chap. vii. 

6 Cf. supra, pp. 135-40. 

7 Cf. supra, p. 156 and n. 27. 

8 Cf. supra, pp. 146-50. 

9 But while it is true that the action of Charles the Fat thwarted the im¬ 
mediate purpose of the Parisians, it would be inaccurate to say that the 
defense of Paris had been utterly fruitless. The impregnable citadel on the 
Seine henceforth proved a serious obstacle to the movements of the Vik¬ 
ings. Cf. Vogel, 337-38. 



CHAPTER XIV 


177 

make possible a rehabilitation of the power of the crown, which 
from their point of view would have been a greater calamity 
than the evils attendant on the presence of the Northmen. Some 
of the magnates simply were jealous of the rising fortunes of 
the man they had elevated to the throne; others opposed Odo by 
reason of their real or pretended attachment to the cause of the 
Carolingian dynasty in the person of Charles the Simple. Prob¬ 
ably all the seigniors were more or less influenced by their own 
economic interest in the levying of the Danegeld, which, it may 
be presumed, still yielded them a financial return, and also tended 
further to strengthen the legal principle so advantageous to the 
seigniors, viz., that the unfree peasant was taillable a merci. 10 

The Danegelds of the tenth century are not strictly identical 
with those of the ninth. They were not paid to a group of 
itinerant Vikings, who temporarily held the Franks more or less 
at their mercy. These last Danegelds were paid to the Normans, 
who by this time were permanently established on Frankish soil 
and had been formally admitted into the political organization 
of the West Frankish realm. * 11 The purpose of these payments 
was, not to secure the removal of the Normans from the king¬ 
dom, 12 but only to procure a cessation of hostilities on their part. 

10 See supra, pp. 155-56, 160-61. Cf. Eckel, Charles le Simple, pp. 8-9. 

11 By the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte, on which see Eckel, 87 ft. In spite 
of the political relations established by the treaty of 911, the Franks and 
the Normans for some time afterward continued to engage in intermittent 
hostilities with each other. The causes of these hostilities were (1) the 
ostensible support given by the Normans to the cause of Charles the Simple, 
and (2) their efforts to enlarge their holdings in France. It was only nat¬ 
ural that the Normans, so far as they took any part in the political affairs 
of the West Frankish realm, should have supported the Carolingian; for it 
was to him they owed their legal adoption within the Frankish state, and 
only from him might they expect further favors. Both Robert and Rudolph 
were supported by those Frankish seigniors who were particularly hostile 
to the Normans. The ambition of the latter to widen their boundaries by 
new grants, or by conquests, served to antagonize those neighboring Frank¬ 
ish nobles who realized that if the Normans were to be satisfied, it would be 
at their expense. The magnates who were most active in opposing the 
further expansion of the Norman duchy at the close of the first quarter of 
the tenth century were Count Hugh the Great of Paris, Count Herbert of 
Vermandois, and the lords of the maritime districts, such as the Counts of 
Flanders and Pontliieu. It was they rather than the king who offered the 
most continued and effective resistance to the Normans, though in so doing 
they were probably not inspired by anything more noble than the desire 
to defend their own interests (cf. Bauer, ed , Annals of Flodoard, pp. 17, n. 1, 
24, n. 5). The probable reasons for King Rudolph’s occasional participation 
in the wars with the Normans are indicated in the following note. 

12 The West Frankish kingdom had by this time been transformed into a 
congeries of feudal states, which were only loosely held together by the 

Danegeld. 12. 



178 


THE DANEGELD AFTER 877 


Why did the Franks need to resort to the Danegeld in the 
tenth century? Chiefly because King Rudolph and the magnates 
who supported him 13 could not, or would not, devote themselves 
exclusively or even primarily to the subjugation of their enemies 
in the west. Various other projects also engaged their attention 
projects which to them, no doubt, seemed more important than 
a final settlement with the Normans. 14 Among these may be 
mentioned the attempts to force the seigniors of the south, espe¬ 
cially Duke William II of Aquitaine, to recognize Rudolph; the 
unsuccessful struggle to keep Lorraine from falling into the 
hands of Henry I of Germany; the incessant warfare with Rage- 
nold and the Vikings of the Loire; and, finally, the resistance to 
the Magyars, who invaded the West Frankish kingdom twice 
during the year 926. This constant preoccupation was doubtless 
the principal reason why the Franks were unable to terminate 
their intermittent hostilities with the Normans by a military 
decision. In order to be able to take the field against the insub¬ 
ordinate southern magnates, and also, on one occasion, in order 

recognition of a common overlord or a common danger (cf. Eckel, pp. 4-t. 
32 ff.). According to the preceding note, it was not the entire West Frank¬ 
ish realm which under the leadership of its monarch offered resistance to 
tne Normans. The opposition came only from those northern seigniors 
whose interests were directly menaced, and, to some extent, from the king. 
It is very improbable, however, that Rudolph took part in this struggle with 
the intention of ultimately expelling the Normans from France; he was 
hardly attempting anything more than to check their territorial expansion 
and in that he was not so vitally interested as were the magnates. Ru¬ 
dolph’s participation in the hostilities with the Normans is rather to be 
explained on the following grounds. In the first place, he was regarded as 
a usurper by the Normans, w^ho, refusing him their allegiance, preferred, for 
Uie reasons stated in the preceding note, to support the cause of Charles the 
Simple. Also, policy dictated to Rudolph, in the early years of his reign a: 
least, that it would be advisable to come to the aid of, and to make common 
cause with, those magnates to whom he owed his throne, i. e. Herbert oi 
Vermandois and Hugh the Great in particular; otherwise they might fail 
him in the projects in which he was especially interested, such as the ac¬ 
quisition of Lorraine, the subjugation of Aquitaine, etc.; and Herbert of 
Vermandois always had it in his power to liberate, and to set up against 
Rudolph, his rival Charles the Simple. Furthermore, Rudolph’s own duchy 
of Burgundy was to some extent exposed to the ravages of the Loire Vik¬ 
ings under Ragenold, who w r ere the allies of the Normans. Finally, the 
fact that success in the Norman wars would lend prestige to his person and 
to the crown, also was doubtless a consideration of some importance with 
Rudolph. Thus the interests of the king so far coincided with these of the 
northern seigniors as to result in a cooperative effort on their part to resist 
the encroachments of the Normans. 


13 I. e. most of the northern seigniors (cf. the two preceding notes, and 
see supra, chap, xiii, n. 19). 

14 Cf. Lippert (quoted supra, chap, xii, n. 13). 





CHAPTER XIV 


179 


to repel the Magyars, Rudolph and his supporters found it neces¬ 
sary or advisable to buy the inaction of the Normans; the Dane- 
geld of 924 seems to have procured only a truce, or the extension 
of it, but that of 926, fortunately, brought permanent peace. 
Is it too bold to presume that in adopting this policy, the king 
and the northern magnates were influenced also by a custom of 
long standing, and by their own economic interest in the levy of 
the Danegeld? 15 


15 Cf. the two preceding chapters. 



/ 


PART III. 

Local Danegeld : Ransom. 


CHAPTER XV. 

Ransom of Places. 

So far exclusive attention has been given to what may be 
called the general Danegeld — those payments of tribute, which 
were made to the Vikings or the Normans on behalf of the West 
Frankish kingdom as a whole, and which in large part were 
raised by means of general taxation in considerable portions of 
the western realm. As pointed out before, 1 however, there were 
also other payments made to the Vikings in the West Frankish 
kingdom, payments decidedly local in character, but which none 
the less may properly enough be referred to as Danegeld; for 
there is no reason why that term should be restricted to mean 
only those payments which were made on behalf of the kingdom 
as a whole. These local payments were in the form of ransom 
(1) of places and (2) of persons. To distinguish them from the 
general Danegeld, they are referred to in this dissertation as 
local Danegeld. 

It is very unlikely that the sources at our disposal offer any¬ 
thing like a complete record of all the occasions on which local 
Danegeld was paid. Doubtless many payments were made to 
the Vikings for the purpose of saving a town or a monastery from 
destruction, or of redeeming prisoners from captivity, of which 
no mention is made either by the annalists or by the hagiograph- 
ical writers. What information has been handed down on this 
subject must therefore be regarded as merely illustrative of 
what probably were happenings of frequent occurrence in the 


1 Cf. supra, introduction. 




CHAPTER XV 


181 


ninth century. In the present chapter a survey will be attempted 
of those comparatively well known occasions 2 on which the West 
Franks 3 by the payment of ransom secured indemnity at the 
hands of the Vikings for monasteries, churches, towns, etc.; the 
consideration of the ransom of persons being reserved for the 
following chapter. 

The first instance on record of the payment of local Danegeld 
in the West Frankish realm appears to be in 841. In that year, 
when Charles the Bald and Louis the German were engaged in 
their struggle with Lothaire I, a fleet of Vikings under the chief¬ 
tain Oscar had entered the Seine and set fire to Rouen. Thence 
they proceeded up the river to the monastery of Jumieges, which 
likewise was burned. 4 It was to save their monastery from a 
similar fate that the monks of St. Vandrille (Fontanelle) on 
May 25 paid a ransom of six pounds (of silver?) to the Vikings; 5 
and probably several other monasteries followed their example 
at this time. 6 The following year (842) the population of Quen- 
towic, after having been despoiled of most of its movables by the 
Vikings, finally induced them to spare the buildings of the town 
in return for the payment of ransom, the amount of which is 


2 I do not claim, however, that the instances of the payment of ransom 
which I have brought together in this and the following chapter include all 
cases on record. In spite of my constant watchfulness for payments of this 
kind, it is quite possible that I may have missed some examples. This dis¬ 
sertation is primarily a study of the general Danegeld; and what is said 
concerning ransom, or local Danegeld, is intended to be illustrative rather 
than exhaustive. 

3 Local Danegeld was paid also in Frisia, Brittany, and the East Frank¬ 
ish kingdom. See infra, appendices iii, iv, and v. 

4 Ann. Bert., 841, pp. 24-25; Chron. Fontanellense, 841, M.G.H., SS., II, 
p. 301; Ann. Rotomagenses, 841, ibid., XXVI, p. 494. See also the marginal 
note added to the Poem Celebrating the Battle of Fontenay, M.G.H., Poetae 
Latini, II, p. 137, n. 1. 

5 Chron. Fontanellense, 841, loc. cit., p. 301: “8 Kal. Iunii redemptum est 
Fontinellense coenobium libris 6.” Cf. the following note. According to an 
anonymous writer of the eleventh century, the monks of St. Vandrille as a 
result of this payment were reduced to penury, and at last were forced to 
seek refuge in flight (Appendix secunda ad Chron. Fontanellense, Bouquet, 
VII, p. 231): “Monachi qui sub ingenti metu ... in praefato Fontinellae 
monasterio ea adhuc tempestate in ambiguo potius pendere quam vitam 
videbantur agere. Nam secundo dato paganis pretio se locumque redemer- 
ant: et vero deficiente jam pecunia, et invalescente persecutions immani- 
tate, fugae praesidium deliberarunt ad postremum arripere.” 

6 Ann. Bert., 841, p. 25: “omnia monasteria seu [quaejcumque loca flu- 
mini Sequanae adhaerentia aut depopulati sunt aut multis acceptis pecuniis 
territa reliquerunt.” 



182 


LOCAL DANEGELD 


unknown. 7 In the winter of 852—53 it is likely that a number 
of churches and monasteries in the vicinity of the lower Seine 
bought immunity from plunder or destruction by paying ran¬ 
som to the Northmen under Sydroc. 8 Orleans was saved from 
destruction in 856, probably because its bishop agreed to pay 
the ransom of gold demanded by the Northmen. 9 When the 
Vikings who had established themselves on the island of Oscellus 
in the Seine invaded Paris in 857, 10 they burned all but three of 
the Parisian churches, and these were spared only because a 
heavy ransom “of many solidi” was paid for them. * 11 Later in 
the same year all the monasteries in that vicinity found it neces* 
sary to pay ransom in order not to be destroyed. 12 

In 863 the town of Poitiers secured immunity from destruction 
by the payment of ransom, though that did not prevent the 
Vikings from burning the church of St. Hilary. 13 Ransom on a 
larger scale was demanded from the inhabitants of southwestern 
Neustria (Maine, Anjou, and Touraine) in 869 by the Vikings 

7 Ann. Bert.. 842, p. 28: “Ea tempestate Nordmannorum classis in env 
borio quod Quantovicus dicitur repentino sub lucem adventu depraedationi- 
bus, captivitate et nece sexus utriusque hominum adeo debachati sunt, ut 
nihil in eo praeter aedificia pretio redempta relinquerent.” Cf. Nithard, 
Historiae, IV, c. 3, M.G.H., SS., II, p. 669; Anglo-Saxon Chron., 839, ed. 
Plummer, pp. 64-65; Chronicon sancti Neoti, 842 (ed. T. Gale, Historian 
Britannicae. etc., scriptores, I, p. 155). For the location of Quentowic, see 
the references given by Vogel, p. 88, n. 1. 

8 See supra, p. 41, n. 16. In the spring of 853 Charles the Bald secured 
the removal of these Vikings, evidently by the payment of a (more or less) 
general Danegeld (see supra, pp. 39-44). 

9 Adrevaldus Floriacensis, Miracula sancti Benedicti (M.G.H., SS., XV, p. 
494): “[Nortmanni] Aurelianis perveniunt captamque urbem auro distra- 
hunt, Agio tunc temporis praesulatum praefatae urbis gerente; sicque ad 
tempus recedentes, etc.” Cf. Ann. Bert., 856, p. 46. Cf. Vogel, 153, n. 1. 

10 See supra, chap, iii, n. 6. 

11 Ann. Bert., 857, p. 48: “Dani . . . basilicam b. Petri et s. Genovefae 
incendunt et ceteras omnes praeter domum s. Stephani et ecclesiam s. Win- 
centii atque Germani praeterque ecclesiam s. Dionisii, pro quibus tantum- 
modo ne incenderentur multa solidorum summa soluta est.” Cf. supra, p. 
45 and n. 7. 

12 Aimoin, Miracula s. Germani, II, c. 10, AA.SS., May, VI, pp. 792-93: 
“Redimebantur omnia in circuitu vicina monasteria, ne illorum saevitia 
impositis ignibus cremarentur.” See Lot, “La grande invasion normande,” 
Bibl. de Vecole des chartes, 1908, LXIX, 13, 18. Cf. supra, p. 45. 

13 Ann. Bert., 863, p. 66: “Nortmanni Pictavis venerant, et sub redemp- 
tione civitate servata, ecclesiam s. Hilarii magni confessoris incenderint.” 
Cf. Chronicon sancti Maxentii, Bouquet, VII, 228, which does not mention 
the ransom, and states that Poitiers was devastated. See also Lot, “La 
Loire, l’Aquitaine et la Seine,” Bibl. de Vecole des chartes, 1915, LXXV1, 
483-84. 



CHAPTER XV 


183 


of the lower Loire. The latter had learned of Charles the Bald’s 
intention to have fortifications built around the towns of Le Mans 
and Tours, in order that these might serve as strongholds against 
the Northmen. Realizing that the carrying out of these plans 
would mean curtainment of their opportunities for plunder, the 
Vikings demanded as the price of peace in this region a ransom 
consisting of a large sum of money, together with considerable 
quantities of grain, wine, and live stock. But there is nothing to 
indicate that this demand was ever complied with. 14 

Hincmar in his old age was confronted with the problem of 
having to raise a ransom for his episcopal city of Rheims. In a 
letter to Bishop Hetilo of Noyon in 880 15 the archbishop declared 
that the amount of money demanded by the Vikings was so large 
that it would be impossible to raise it, especially since every¬ 
thing of value had already been plundered. Whether this ransom 
ever was paid cannot be determined. 16 The bribe by which 
Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo secured the withdrawal of Sieg¬ 
fried from the siege of Paris in 886, though it has been discussed 
before, 17 also, perhaps, should be referred to in connection with 
the payments of local Danegeld. Finally there is, as we have 
seen, reason to believe that Bishop Evrard of Sens paid ransom 
to the Vikings who, later in the same year (886), had laid siege 
to his episcopal seat. 18 

These instances of the payment or demand of ransom must, as 
pointed out before, probably be regarded only as examples of 
what were matters of frequent occurrence in the period of the 
Viking invasions. 19 They are another indication that money 
was needed frequently, and in large quantities, to buy peace from 
the Scandinavian invaders. Whence the money was obtained 
that was paid by the local authorities to save a monastery, 

14 Ann. Bert., 869, p. 107: “Karolus vero civitates trans Sequanam ab 
incolis firmari rogavit, Cynomannis scilicet ac Turonis, ut praesidio contra - 
Nortmannos populis esse possent. Nortmanni autem lioc audientes, multam 
summam argenti, frumenti quoque et vini ac animalium ab incolis terrae 
ipsius quaesierunt, ut cum eis pacem facerent.” Cf. Vogel, 234-35. 

15 Plodoard, Hist. Rem. ecclesiae, III, c. 23, SB.. XIII, p. 534: 

“ceteris omnibus depredatis tanta quaerebatur [barbari] pro civitate re- 
demptio, quantam explere non valeret [Hincmarus].” Cf. Vogel, 267, n. 4. 

16 Vogel, p. 267, seems to be of the opinion that the ransom really was 
paid. This may be true, but I can find nothing that proves it. 

17 See supra, p. 144 and n. 25. 

18 See supra , pp. 150-51 and nn. 68, 69. 

19 See supra, pp. 180-81 and nn. 2, 3. 



184 


CHAPTER XV 


a church, or a town from destruction, can be only conjectured. 
Doubtless considerable sums were taken from the ecclesiastical 
treasuries, and much of the plate belonging to churches and 
monasteries was used, for this purpose. 20 But it is also probable 
that the local authorities, bishops, abbots, counts, or lay seigniors, 
sometimes availed themselves of another method to raise ransom 
money. The crown levied taxes to raise the general Danegeld. 21 
Why could not local Danegeld be secured in the same way? It 
must be admitted that such procedure would be in harmony with 
, the general tendency of the age — to shift all burdens so that 
ultimately they fell on the peasantry. 22 After all, did the tax¬ 
payer always know — did he ever know — by whom the contri¬ 
butions he was called upon to make toward the Danegeld, had 
been authorized; whether by the king, or only by some local 
potentate, perhaps his own seignior? What he was beginning 
to realize more and more definitely, must have been that his 
seignior had or claimed the right to tax him ad voluntatem when¬ 
ever he was in need of money. If there is any element of truth 
in this conjecture, it follows that the local Danegeld, like the 
general Danegeld, was a not unimportant factor in the develop¬ 
ment of the legal principle that the unfree peasant was taillable 
a merci. 2Z 


20 This also, of course, holds true for the general Danegeld. Hence we 
can easily understand why many churches and monasteries were emptied 
of their financial resources (cf. supra, n. 5) and stripped of their ornaments 
by the close of the reign of Charles the Bald. Cf. supra, p. 110 and n. 114. 

21 The methods by which the general Danegeld was raised are summarized 
infra, chap. xvii. 

22 Cf. supra, p. 82. 

23 Cf. infra, chap, xviii. 





LOCAL DANEGELD 


185 


CHAPTER XVI. 

Ransom of Persons. 

It may seem, on first consideration, that payments made for 
the purpose of redeeming persons taken captive and held for 
ransom by the Vikings, can not properly be included in a treatise 
on the Danegeld. And if the money paid for this purpose had 
been obtained by methods entirely different from those which 
were used to raise the general Danegeld, this view would perhaps 
be justified. But we know that on at least one occasion such ran¬ 
som money was secured by a procedure very similar to that em¬ 
ployed for raising the general Danegeld; and one is therefore in¬ 
clined to suspect that the same method may have been resorted to 
on other occasions, even though there is no direct evidence to that 
effect. For this reason it seems appropriate briefly to set forth 
in this chapter some instances of the ransom of persons taken 
captive by the Vikings in the West Frankish realm. 1 Doubtless 
these instances are but examples of what became a very common 
occurrence during the course of the ninth century. 2 

On May 28, 841, the monks of St. Denis proceeded to the 
Vikings who under the leadership of Oscar were ravaging the 
Seine in that year, 3 to redeem 68 Christian captives; for these 
they were required to pay a ransom of 26 pounds (of silver?). 4 

Many of the Franks taken prisoner by the Vikings who devas¬ 
tated Nantes in 843, were afterwards redeemed by those who 
had survived the catastrophe and escaped capture. 5 

1 On the ransom of captives in Frisia, Brittany, and the East Frankish 
kingdom, see infra, appendices iii, iv, and v. 

2 See also the reservation expressed supra, chap, xv. n. 2. 

3 Cf. supra, pp. 180-81 and nn. 4-6. 

4 Chron. Fontanellense, 841, M.G.H., 88., II, p. 301: “5 Kal. Junii venerunt 
monachi de s. Dionysio, redemeruntque captivos sexaginta octo libris viginti 
sex.” Ann. Bert., 841, p. 25: “Interea pyratae Danorum . . . Rotumam ir- 
ruentes, rapinis, ferro ignique bachantes, urbem, monachos reliquumque vul- 
gum et caedibus captivitate pessumdederunt et omnia monasteria seu [quae]- 
curnque loca flumini Sequanae adhaerentia aut depopulati sunt aut multis 
acceptis pecuniis territa reliquerunt.” 

5 Chronicon Namnetense, c. 6, ed. Merlet, p. 17: “Post liaec, erasis omni¬ 
bus opibus cum gregibus captivorum utriusque ordinis, sexus, aetatis a,d 
naves remeant. Ad quorum postmodum redemptionem plurimum a cladis 
superstitibus collatum est.” Ci. Ann. Bert., 843, p. 29; Miracula saneti Mar¬ 
tini abbatis Vertavensis, c. 8, M.G.H., 88., rer. Merov., Ill, 573. See also 
Vogel, 94-95. 



186 


LOCAL DANEGELD 


Immense sums of ransom money were paid to the Vikings 
encamped on the island of Oscellus in the Seine during the period 
from 856 to 861.° These Vikings, it would seem, were tireless 
in their efforts to devise schemes and artifices by which they 
might capture Frankish nobles, to be held for high ransom. 7 The 
best evidence of the excellent results of this business is the huge 
amount of money they were able to amass. 8 Their greatest suc¬ 
cess was scored in the capture (858) of the two half-brothers 
Louis and Gauzelin, abbots of St. Denis and Glanfeuil, respect¬ 
ively. 9 Louis in particular — who was the grandson of Charle¬ 
magne, and as archchancellor occupied the position of first rank 
at the court of Charles the Bald 10 — proved a highly remunera¬ 
tive catch. * 11 While it is impossible to arrive at a final conclusion 
as regards the exact amount paid for his release, we may be sure 
that it was not less than 688 pounds of gold and 3,250 pounds 
of silver. 12 Probably only a fraction of the enormous ransom 13 

6 See supra, pp. 45 ff. 

7 Aimoin, Miracula s. Germani, c. 10, AA.8S., May. VI, p. 793: “Stude- 
bantque [Nortmanni] praeterea vicibus aequis, quatenus aliquas nobilium 
gratia pecuniae capere possent; unde (veluti ex mitissimi viri Domini Hlu- 
dowici Abbatis redemptione) non modicum et incomparabile acquirebant 
lucri negotium. Et quotiescumque tale quid agere disposuissent, dissimula- 
bant se multis diebus ante nullatenus quoquam ire, ne cui illorum furtivus 
innotesceret adventus.” 

8 This is referred to by Aimoin (see the preceding note) ; and we know 
that when the Vikings on Oscellus finally surrendered to the followers of 
Weland in 861, they were able to pay to the latter the snug sum of 6,000 
pounds, which probably represented only part of the money in their pos¬ 
session at that time. See supra, p. 55 and n. 63. 

9 Ann. Bert., 858, p. 49: “Pars altera eorundem pyratarum Ludowicum 
abbatem monasterii S. Dyonisii cum fratre ipsius Gauzleno capiunt eisque 
redemptionis suae gravissimam multam imponunt.” The father of Louis and 
Gauzefin was Rorgon, Count of Maine. Louis was the fruit of an illegitimate 
union of Rorgon with Rotrude, the daughter of Charlemagne. Gauzelin 
probably was the youngest son of Rorgon with his wife Blichilde. See v. 
Kalckstein, Robert d. Tapfere, pp. 136-41, 165. 

10 Cf. Lot, “La grande invasion normande,” Bibl. dc Vecole des chartes. 
1908, LXIX. p. 19 and n. 3. 

11 Vita 8. Faronis, c. 124, Bouquet, VII, p. 357: “Clarior autem atque 
potentior Princeps insignis de nomine Ludovicus, Pastor Ecclesiae S. Dion- 
ysii, quae caput extollit super ceteras Ecclesias terrarum potentia dignita¬ 
tis, et principatum omni honore sapientiae ac religionis, impotens fuit ab 
eorum captivatione se observare. Cujus redemptione ponderibus inaestima- 
bilibus auri et argenti ablata est omnis gloria et ornatus atque decor ab 
universis Ecclesiis regni, atque ipsa aurea Roma se spoliatam suo decore 
aliquo modo sentit.” 

12 The figures given in the text are taken from the following note added 
to a manuscript of the ninth century (Catalogue general des manuscripts 
des bibliothcques publiques de France, XXXIX, pp. 123-24) : “Datum est in 
redemptione Hludovici, abbatis, a parte Sancti Dionysii, de auro librfas] 
CCCCCCLXXXVIII, de argento librfas] III mil[ia) CCL, excepto vasall[os] 
et illorum feminfas] et parentes illor[um].” According to the usual in- 





CHAPTER XVI 


187 


terpretation (cf. Vogel, p. 161), these words mean that the monastery of 
St. Denis alone furnished 688 pounds of gold and 3250 pounds of silver, and 
that this sum did not include the additional amounts paid by the vassals of 
the monastery and their wives and relatives. Lot, op. cit., p. 20. n. 2, is 
probably justified in rejecting this interpretation on the ground that the 
monastery of St. Denis could not have possessed such vast resources- It 
must be admitted that the meaning of the words in this note is not clear; 
and unless supplementary evidence is produced, it will probably always re¬ 
main more or less a matter of conjecture. Lot assumes that the words a 
parte should be ad partem, and then proceeds to reconcile the contents of 
the note with the following passage in the Annals of St. Bertin (for what 
precedes the following, see supra, n. 9): “Ob quam [multam] multi thesauro- 
rum ecclesiarum Dei ex regno Karli, ipso jubente, exhausti sunt. Sed his 
minime sufficientibus, ab eodem rege et omnibus episcopis, abbatibus, comi- 
tibus ceterisque viris potentibus multa ad suppletionem praedictae summae 
certatim conlata sunt.” He identifies the 688 pounds of gold and the 3250 
pounds of silver with the contributions ordered by Charles the Bald from 
the churches in his kingdom, and supposes that the amounts which the 
note says were furnished by the vassals of the monastery of St. Denis and 
their wives and relatives, are those which according to the Annals of St. 
Bertin were furnished by the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and 
other magnates, to complete the required amount. The latter part of Lot’s 
hypothesis is open to criticism. It is impossible to admit that the group 
which included the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and other mag¬ 
nates is identical with the group which consisted of the vassals of the mon¬ 
astery of St. Denis together with their wives and relatives. I shall there¬ 
fore make bold to present another hypothesis. This will be based prin¬ 
cipally on a different interpretation of the last eight words in the note: 
“excepto . . . illor[uml.” The old interpretation of these words is based 
on the tacit assumption that the only person ransomed by or for the monas¬ 
tery of St. Denis (Gauzelin was ransomed by the Church of Rheims—see 
■Infra, n. 18) was Louis, its abbot. But there is good reason to believe that 
the Vikings had captured a number of Franks, and that all of these were 
held for ransom, the amount varying in each case according to the import¬ 
ance of the person concerned. Aimoin (see supra, n. 7) indicates that the 
Vikings were intent on capturing a number of nobles, and that he refers to 
the ransom of Abbot Louis as an example of how they amassed lucre: 
“quatenus aliquas nobilium gratia pecuniae capere possent; unde (veluti ex 
. . . Hludowici Abbatis redemptione) non modicum et incomparabile ac- 
quirebant lucri negotium.” We know that the Vikings fell upon the Parisian 
churches at Easter, when they knew that there would be a large concourse 
of people in the various places of worship (Lot, op. cit., p. 19). Doubtless 
many vassals of the monastery of St. Denis, together with their wives and 
dependents (I take it that parentes here signifies “subjects” or “depend¬ 
ents” rather than “relatives”), also were present at Paris on this occasion. 
It is very likely that the Vikings forced some of these to accompany Abbot 
Louis into captivity; and thus the monastery of St. Denis found it neces¬ 
sary to ransom not only its abbot, but also some of its vassals and their 
dependents. If this hypothesis is correct, the note quoted above would 
mean that 688 pounds of gold and 3250 pounds of silver were paid for the 
ransom of Abbot Louis, but that this sum did not include the money paid 
to redeem the vassals of the monastery with their wives and dependents. 
The Annals of St. Bertin state how the ransom of Louis was raised, and I 
refer to this infra in the text and in n. 17. The ransom of the vassals and 
their dependents presumably was raised by the monastery itself in the 
usual way (see infra, n. 17). 

13 On the assumption that the ratio of silver to gold at this time was 
about 12: 1 (see Mayer, “Zum friihmittelalterlichen Miinzwesen,” Viertel- 
fahrschrift fiir Social- tend Wirtschafisgeschichte, 1916, XIII, p. 352, n. 1), 
the total ransom would amount to not less than 11,506 pounds of silver (cf. 


188 


CHAPTER XVI 


could be provided by the monastery of St. Denis. 14 Charles the 
Bald found it necessary to empty the treasuries of many churches 
in his kingdom, 15 and it is alleged that the church of Rome also 
parted with some of its treasure, for this purpose. 16 When even 
such sacrifices did not bring the required amount, large contribu¬ 
tions were eagerly furnished by the king and all the bishops, 
abbots, counts, and other magnates, to make up what was lack¬ 
ing. 17 The amount paid for the ransom of Abbot Gauzelin is 
nowhere indicated, but we know that it was furnished by the 
church of Rheims, of which Gauzelin had formerly been a 
priest. ls 

The method by which the ransom of Abbot Louis of St. Denis 
was raised probably illustrates the usual procedure in raising 
money for purposes of this kind. It proves that the treasures 
of the ecclesiastical establishments were drawn upon not only 
for the general Danegeld, but also for the payment of ransom. 
When these did not suffice, or were not available, as perhaps in 
the case of laymen, contributions were voluntarily furnished by, 
and at a later period probably were required from, those seign¬ 
iors upon whom the captive had a claim of any kind. 19 To assume 
that such contributions were supplied by the seigniors out of 
their own private resources, would be to ignore the prevailing 
customs of the ninth century. Beyond a doubt the peasantry 
was frequently taxed not only for the general, but also for the 
local Danegeld, and for the ransom of persons no less than for 
the ransom of places. 20 

Vogel, p. 216). The heaviest general Danegeld ever paid by the West Pranks, 
that of 884 (see supra, chap, viii), amounted to 12,000 pounds of silver. 

14 Cf. supra, n. 12. 

15 Ann. Bert., 858, p. 49 (quoted supra, n. 12). 

16 See supra, n. 11. 

17 Lot (op. cit., p. 20) fails to note that according to the Annals of St. 
Bertin the king too made a contribution, and he assumes that “the king 
levied a special impost on the bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals.” 
The Annals of St. Bertin (quoted supra, n. 12) indicate that the contribu¬ 
tions of the magnates were voluntary: “multa ad suppletionem praedictae 
summae certatim conlata sunt.” However that may be, it is very improb¬ 
able that the magnates furnished their contributions out of their own re¬ 
sources. We may believe that they were raised in the usual way, i. e. by 
taxing the peasantry (cf. supra, pp. 183-84). 

18 Flodoard, Hist. Rem. ecclesiae, III, c. 24, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 536: “Ut 
reminiscatur quia Remensis ecclesia eum [Gauzlenum] regeneravit in 
Christo tonsumque in clericum sub religione nutriverit et docuerit, de cap- 
tione paganorum redemerit, etc.” 

19 See infra, chap, xviii. 

20 Cf. supra, n. 17; see also p. 184. 



PART IV. 


General Summary and Conclusions. 


CHAPTER XVII. 

The Institutional Character of the Danegeld in France. 

The various circumstances which serve to explain why the 
West Franks resorted to the Danegeld have been summarized 
above 1 and do not need to be set forth again. In this chapter 
those facts will be brought together which throw some light on 
the institutional character of the Danegeld, and in the following 
one will be presented an estimate of its effect on the political 
and economic development of France. 

According to the records that we have, twelve or thirteen pay¬ 
ments of general Danegeld 2 were made to the Vikings in the West 
Frankish realm. 3 Our information concerning the methods by 
which the money 4 5 for this purpose was raised is not complete. 
We have unimpeachable evidence that taxation was resorted to 
in five instances (860—61, 866, 877, 3 924, 926) ; in four other 


1 Supra, chaps, vii, xiv. 

2 On the local Danegeld, see infra, p. 204. 

3 It will be remembered that there were two payments in 877, and that it 
is doubtful whether the Danegeld promised by Odo in 897 ever was paid. 
Soetbeer’s catalogue of the various payments of Danegeld (Forsch. z. cl. 
Gesch., VI, 54-56) is very inaccurate. Among other errors we may note 
that he regards the Danegeld of 860 as the first general tribute; also he 
assumes that an annual tribute of 5,000 pounds was paid after 877, for which 
there is no basis whatever. 

4 As a rule the Danegeld appears to have been paid in money or plate 
(see the following chapter, p. 214) ; but on two occasions food supplies were 
furnished in addition to the money payment: grain and cattle in 861, wine 
in 866. The magnates are said to have contributed the wine (supra, p. 71 
and n. 62, p. 87 and n. 136). Whence the supplies of grain and cattle came in 
861 cannot be definitely determined, though it may be presumed that ulti¬ 
mately the peasants could no more escape this burden than that of the 
Danegeld. Cf. supra, pp. 53 ff. 

5 The Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Seine in 877 certainly was 
raised by taxation, and that paid to the Vikings of the Loire in the same 
year probably was. 





190 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


instances (845, 853, 877, G 884) the evidence is indeed somewhat 
scant, but what there is of it points in the direction of taxation; 
and in the remaining four instances (862, 886, 889, 897) there 
is no evidence at all as to how the money was obtained. It should 
be added that in one of the last mentioned cases (886) the money 
came from outside the western kingdom; and, therefore, the 
method by which that payment was raised is of no importance 
for the institutional development of the Danegeld in France. 
We know also that on at least three occasions (860—61, 877, 
884) the Danegeld was made up in part by drafts on the treas¬ 
ures of the ecclesiastical establishments. From these premises 
it seems legitimate to conclude that the general Danegeld usually 
was secured by resorting to taxation, though in some cases it 
was found necessary also to draw upon the treasures of the 
church; and we may assume that one or both of these methods 
were used on those occasions for which there is no specific 
evidence. 

The information that we have on the form and distribution 
of the taxes levied to raise the Danegeld is very limited in scope. 
Only for the last three payments during the reign of Charles 
the Bald — those of 860—61, 866, and 877 — do we get anything 
like particulars. Yet so far as they go, these particulars are 
very valuable, illustrating in all probability the usual procedure 
in the levying of the tax. 

They indicate, in the first place, that the ordinary and most 
common unit of taxation was the holding of land known as the 
mansus. In 860 Charles the Bald is said to have levied a tax 
on all the mansi of his kingdom. In 866 he levied a similar tax. 
but discriminated between mansi ingenuiles and mansi serviles 
in such wise that he assessed the former at six, and the latter 
at three, denarii each; and by a second assessment — which 
proved necessary in order to raise the tribute of that year — 
he laid an additional tax of one denarius on both these kinds ot 
mansi; so that, all told, the mansi ingenuiles were taxed at seven, 
and the mansi serviles at four, denarii in 866. For the Dane¬ 
geld of 877, land taxes were laid on only those mansi which con¬ 
stituted the honores of bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals; 
but all the mansi comprising a honor were taxed on that occa- 

6 1 refer here to the Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Loire (cf. the 
preceding note). 




CHAPTER XVII 


191 


sion; not only mansi ingenuiles and serviles, but also the dom¬ 
inant holdings known as mansi inclominicati. These were asses¬ 
sed at the rate of twelve denarii (or one solidus) ; while taxes 
of eight and four denarii were required for mansi ingenuiles 
and serviles, respectively. It was provided in the case of the 
the latter (mansi ingenuiles and serviles) that the holders were 
to pay only one half of the taxes required for their mansus; the 
other half to be taken from the cens, or redevance, paid to the 
seignior. If the latter arrangement was,made with the inten¬ 
tion of placing the burden of taxation on those who could best 
afford to bear it, the probability is that it failed of its purpose, 
as will appear more clearly later in the discussion. 

The taxation of demesnial holdings, it should be noted, appears 
to have been exceptional. The only time that the mansus in- 
dominicatus was specifically mentioned as a unit of taxation for 
the Danegeld, was in 877; and then it referred, not to all mansi 
indominicati, but only to those that were included in honores 
held of the king by bishops, abbots, counts and royal vassals. 
It is true, however, that in 866 there had been required from 
each of the magnates two successive contributions of money 
and wine, proportioned to the value of their honores; and this 
may imply that the tax of that year was, in theory, laid on 
mansi indominicati as well as on dependent mansir Whether 
the tax of 860, which is said to have been laid on all mansi, ap¬ 
plied also to the demesnes, may be doubted. In any case there 
is, save for this vague statement relative to the tax of 860, no 
evidence that taxes for the Danegeld were ever laid on demesnial 
holdings other than those included in honores held of the king; 
and of the taxation of the latter we have at most two instances. 

Land tenures of less extent or value than the mansi were taxed 
on at least one occasion; in 866 one denarius was exacted for 
each accola, and, likewise, one denarius for every two hospitiu . 

All the taxes so far referred to were taxes on land or the 
income from land. But the Danegeld was raised also by taxes 
on all kinds of property and on incomes other than the income 
trom land. Thus, merchants were required to contribute on 
at least three known occasions: in 860—61, 866, and 877. In 
860 a careful and exact evaluation of their property was 


7 Cf. supra, p. 87 and n. 137. 




192 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


ordered; and taxes were levied not only on their houses, but 
also on their movables (merchandise and household goods) ; even 
the poorest of them could not escape the tax. In 866 they were 
required to contribute one tenth of all they possessed. A dis¬ 
crimination may have been made between Christian and Jewish 
merchants in 877; the former are said to have contributed only 
one eleventh of their resources, while the Jews were required to 
pay one tenth, as before. 8 

Priests, too, were taxed for the Danegeld at least twice: in 
866 and in 877. The tax was graduated in proportion to their 
resources and income. 9 No specific rates are given for 866, 
but in 877 the assessments ranged from a minimum of four 
clenarii to a maximum of five solidi. 

Another form of taxation for the Danegeld was the collection 
of the heerbann from the freemen. Of this there is only one 
instance (866), but it is of great significance. Originally the 
heerbann had been a fine of sixty solidi, imposed on those free¬ 
men who failed to respond to the summons to military service. 
Since the time of Charlemagne, however, both the military serv¬ 
ice and the heerbann had, as a rule, been graduated in propor¬ 
tion to the resources of the freemen; and there is reason to 
believe that it was so graduated in 866. The important thing 
about the heerbann of 866 is the fact that it was collected as a 
tax, not as a fine; in that fact may be found a clew to the legal 
basis of the Danegeld. But the development of this point must 
be postponed to a later stage in the discussion. We turn now 
to a resume of what is known concerning the collection of the 
Danegeld. 

The direct evidence as to how the Danegeld was collected from 
the tax-payers is very unsatifactory, and must be supplemented 
by what is known about the methods of collecting other con¬ 
tributions — taxes and redevances — at the same period. There 

8 The question as to whether this discrimination between Jewish and 
Christian merchants really applies to the Danegeld of 877 remains some¬ 
what doubtful. See infra, appendix ii. 

9 Originally at least, one part of the income from the tithe went to the 
support of the priest. It is true that from the ninth century onward the 
seigniors in many cases usurped the tithes, ceded them, sold them, infeu- 
dated them, etc. (Imbart de la Tour, “Les paroisses rurales, etc.,” Rev. Hist., 
1897, LXIII, pp. 30-32). It must be assumed that those priests who still 
retained a share of the tithe were taxed for the Danegeld on the basis of 
their total resources, including the income from the tithe. 





CHAPTER XVII 


193 


can be no doubt that on all seigneurlal estates the taxes for the 
Danegeld were collected from the peasant population — the 
holders of dependent mansi, accolx, and hospitia -— not by the 
officers of the crown, but by the agents of the seignior, his 
ministeriales . 10 In the collection of the tax the latter evidently 
did not consider themselves bound by the rates of assessment 
prescribed by the monarch, but exacted from the peasants the 
largest amounts possible in each case, thus securing not only 
what was demanded by the king, but also a substantial profit 
for the seignior and themselves. It is very probable that the 
official assessment of the tax was regarded only as a basis for 
calculating the amount which the individual seignior ought to 
turn over to the king. Indeed, we may believe that the seig¬ 
niors succeeded in shifting the entire burden of taxation, even 
that part of it which they ought to have born themselves, upon 
their dependent peasantry. * 11 

It may be inferred that the taxes paid by the priests in 866 12 
were collected by the officials of their patrons; the latter being, 
in some cases the bishop of the diocese, in others the abbot of 
a monastery, and in still others a lay seignior. But in 877 it 
was specifically provided that the bishops were to collect the 
taxes of all priests, except those whose churches were dependent 
on monasteries; in the latter case the collection was to be made 
by the abbot and the bishop’s missus jointly. The taxes of the 
priests, like those paid by the other classes, probably were not 
applied exclusively to the purposes of the Danegeld; doubtless 
a considerable portion was appropriated by those who enjoyed 
the right of collection. 13 

There is no evidence whatever as to who were authorized to 
collect the taxes of the merchants. Probably they were paid 
to those officials of the fisc who received the annual or biennial 
contributions required by the king in return for the special pro¬ 
tection he extended to merchants. 14 

10 Supra, pp. 77-79 and nn. 92, 99, p. 84 and nn. 122, 123, p. 99, n. 42, p. 103, 
n. 69. 

11 Supra, pp. 84-85 and nn. 122, 123, pp. 88-89, 102-3 and nn. 68-71; cf. p. 
108, n. 103. 

12 The inference is based on the special provisions made in 877; these 
indicate that certain changes were made in the method of collection for that 
year which seem to imply a previous method of the kind suggested above. 
Cf. supra, pp. 103-5. 

13 Jbid.; cf. nn. 77, 78, 84. 

14 Supra, p. 86, n. 127, pp. 105-6. 

Danegeld. 13. 



194 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


The heerbann, as a fine, was usually paid to the missi , 15 and 
there is no reason to suppose that a different arrangement was 
made when it was levied as a tax toward the Danegeld. 

Thus, except in the cases of merchants and freemen, the taxes 
for the Danegeld were collected, in the first instance, by the 
officials (ministeriales) of the local authorities, seigniors and 
prelates. The latter, in turn, were responsible to the king for 
the taxes levied by him on the property and income of themselves 
and their dependents, the peasants and the priests. On at least 
one occasion (877) these local authorities — bishops, abbots, 
counts, and royal vassals — were instructed to pay over their 
respective quotas to the royal missi. 16 This instruction perhaps 
illustrates the usual arrangement during the time of Charles the 
Bald, 17 and that arrangement may possibly have prevailed as late 
as the reign of Odo. 18 According to the doubtful testimony of 
Richer, the Danegelds of the tenth century were collected by 
(royal?) excictores. 19 

It would be interesting to know something about the method 
of procedure employed by the officials of the king when they 
were engaged in the work of distributing, apportioning, and 
fixing the rates of the taxes for the Danegeld. Did they plan 
to secure on each occasion only what had been demanded by the 
Vikings; or did they arrange for the collection of a larger 
amount, part of which was to be used for other purposes than 
the Danegeld? Was it their intention to distribute the tax 
fairly and equitably between the various classes of tax-payers, 
and, if so, did they succeed in this endeavor? In apportioning 

15 Charlemagne sometimes had the heerbann collected by special hari- 

bannatores ; but as a rule this was undoubtedly one of the functions of the 
missi (Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., IV, 577 and n. 3, 578 and nn. 1-3). 
Charles the Bald in 864 prescribed that the heerbann was to be collected 
as before, i. e. by the missi (Edictum Pistense, c. 27, LL. Sectio II, 

t. 2, p. 322; cf. supra, chap, v, n. 75). I have been unable to find any refer¬ 
ences to haribannatores for the time of Charles the Bald and thereafter. 

16 Supra, chap, vi, n. 74. 

17 Supra, pp. 106-7 and nn. 94-97; cf. p. 36 and n. 48, p. 54, n. 62. 

18 Cf. Thompson, Decline of the Missi, pp. 19-20; Viollet, Les inst. polit. 
de la France, I, 305-7. That the institution of the missi had not entirely 
disappeared by the time of Odo is proved by the following passage from a 
charter issued by that monarch in 899 (Pavre, Eudes, p. 237): “Precipien- 
tes ergo iubemus ut nullus comes seu vicecomes aut aliquis ex saecularibus 
iudicibus vel ex missis nostris discurrentibus in praefato coenobio . . . po¬ 
testative mansiones accipiat aut paratas ... vel inferendas ab eo exigere 
praesumat.” 

19 Supra, p. 166, n. 18, p. 169, n. 30. 




CHAPTER XVII 


195 

and fixing the rates of the taxes, did they have at their disposal, 
and for their guidance, any kind of information — general or 
specific — on which to base calculations and estimates as to the 
probable net yield of the tax? Unfortunately, the information 
that we possess on these matters is very sparse. 

There is no evidence which proves that the monarch ever 
applied the proceeds of the Danegeld to any other than their 
proper purpose. 20 It is true that Charles the Bald on one occa¬ 
sion was suspected of having done something of that kind. 21 
But his own vigorous protest against this imputation, together 
with the undeniable fact that there had been numerous abuses 
in the collection of this particular Danegeld (that of 860—61), 
seems to make it impossible for us to regard the suspicion against 
the king as well grounded. On the other hand, it cannot be 
doubted that those who collected the Danegeld in the first in¬ 
stance very often exacted from the tax-payers more than was 
necessary to fill the quota required of them by the king. 22 

The question as to whether the royal officials intended to 
distribute the impost equitably between the various classes of 

20 The following passage from the Const. Carisiac. de moneta of 861 

LL. Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 301-2) has sometimes been taken to indicate 
that the Danegeld of 860-61 was raised not only to pay off the Vikings, but 
also to provide and equip a fleet: “necesse fuit in istis temporibus coniec- 
tum de illis accipere et ad navium compositionem et in Nortmannorum causa 
pro regni, sicut res coniacet, salvamento, ut omnes cognoscant, qui non quaes- 
tum inhonestum, sed publicam regni utilitatem quaerimus.” This interpre¬ 
tation, however, will not bear criticism. The fleet referred to was em¬ 
ployed by Charles the Bald when he attempted to expel the Vikings from 
Oscellus in 858 (cf. supra, pp. 45-47, 63., n. 11). He did not agree to pay 
Danegeld to the other group of Vikings, under Weland, until early in 860 
(supra, pp. 48-49). Therefore, the passage just quoted must be taken to imply 
two levies of taxes, one probably in 857 or 858 for the construction of the 
fleet, and another in 860-61 for the purposes of the Danegeld. See also 
supra, p. 107, n. 97. 

21 The last part of the quotation given in the preceding note practically 
proves that Charles the Bald had been accused of seeking a quaestum in¬ 
honestum when he levied the Danegeld in 860-61. It is an interesting fact 
that when Berengar, King of Italy, levied taxes for a tribute to the Magyars 
in 947, he retained for his own profit a considerable part of the money thus 
raised (Liutprand, Antapodosis, V, 33, ed. Diimmler, 1877, p. 118): “Per 
id tempus Taxis, Hungariorum rex, magno cum exercitu in Italiam venit. 
Cui Berengarius non ex propria pecunia, sed ex ecclesiarum ac pauperum 
collectione X modios nummorum dedit. Fecit autem hoc, non ut populi 
curam haberet, sed ut hac occasione magnam pecuniam congregaret. Quod 
et fecit. In omni enim utrius sexus homo, tamque ablactatus quam lactens, 
pro se nummum dedit; quibus aes commiscens, ex paucis X modios fecit; 
caeteram vero partem, et quicquid ex ecclesiis tulit, sibi retinuit.” The 
Magyars evidently were less exacting as regards the quality of the coins 
they accepted than were the Vikings (cf. infra, pp. 214-15). 

22 Supra, p. 193, n. 11, p. 194, n. 16. 




196 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


the population is somewhat difficult to answer. It cannot be 
denied that in the official assessments there are certain indica¬ 
tions of an endeavor to fix the rates more or less in proportion 
to the ability to pay. The taxes of merchants and priests were 
assessed on the basis of a valuation of their resources; the heer- 
bann of 866 probably was graduated in proportion to the amount 
of property possessed by the freemen; the taxes on the depend¬ 
ent holdings of land varied according as they were mansi in- 
genuiles, mansi serviles, accolse, or hospitia; the taxes on a 
mansus indominicatus were higher than those on a dependent 
mansus; and honores, or benefices, were taxed in proportion to 
their value or income. But whether these provisions were in¬ 
tended to be anything more than a basis for calculating the total 
amounts due from those who collected the taxes in the first in¬ 
stance, remains doubtful. We have only one bit of evidence 
which points in that direction. It is the provision in the doc¬ 
uments for the year 877 which specifies that only one half of 
the tax laid on a dependent mansus was to be paid by the holder 
of the mansus, while the other half was to be taken from the 
cens, or redevance, due the seignior. It does not seem possible 
that the king at any time could have enforced a rigid adherence 
to the provisions of the official assessments, since in most cases 
his officers did not deal directly with the actual taxpayers. 
Sometimes — as, for example, to raise the Danegeld demanded 
by the Vikings of the Loire in 877 — no regular assessment was 
attempted; the magnates were authorized to raise the needed 
sum in whatever way they could. Assessment or no assessment, 
the probability is that the seigniors and prelates always succeeded 
in shifting the tax on their dependents; that the king was well 
aware of this abuse, but unable to prevent it. We may believe 
that the lower classes, peasants and priests in particular, usually 
were required to pay much more than the amount that was 
legitimately due from them. 23 And it may be assumed that 
the peasants, whose holdings were taxed oftener than any other 
kind of property, furnished by far the larger part of the money 
collected as Danegeld. 

The rates of taxation prescribed in the assessments may have 
been fixed on the basis of a rough estimate as to the amount that 
would be required from each unit of taxation in order to raise 


23 Supra, p. 193, nn. 11-13. 




CHAPTER XVII 


197 


the sum demanded by the Vikings. At least it is possible to 
point to the existence of certain prerequisites for making such 
an estimate. We have evidence which indicates that the king 
sometimes took an inventory of the benefices held from him; 24 
the counts and the missi were required to report from time to 
time on the number of freemen in each county that were liable 
to military service; 25 the polyptiques of the abbeys prove that 
records were kept by the ecclesiastical establishments, of the 
number and kinds of mansi within their domains, and also of 
the number and status of their tenants; it may be inferred that 
similar records were kept by the lay seigniors; 26 undoubtedly 
the bishops had records of the resources of all the priests within 
their dioceses; and the royal fisc very probably possessed some 
information as regards the resources of the merchants. 27 Per¬ 
haps these considerations make it impossible to regard the pre¬ 
scribed rates of taxation as mere guesses on the subject of what 
each unit of taxation ought to contribute in order to raise a 
specific sum of money. On the other hand, however, it seems 
very unlikely that the royal officials ever could have secured, 
as the basis for their calculations, a body of fiscal information 
that was at all complete or accurate. Whether all of the records 
referred to above were constantly at their disposal, may with 
good reason be doubted. But even if they had been, the officials 
probably would have been unable to estimate in advance just 
how many seigniors would fail to remit all or part of the quotas 
for which they were held liable, and what portion of the tax 
for various other reasons could never be collected. The best 
proof of this is the fact that on some occasions more than one 
assessment was necessary, 2S while on others the required amount 
could be raised only by drawing on the treasures of the church. 29 

24 Ann. Bert., 869, p. 98: “[Karolus] per prune regnum suiim litteras misit, 
lit episcopi, abbates et abbatissae breves de honoribus suis, quanta mansa 
quisque haberet, futuras Kalendas Mai deferre curarent, vassalli autem 
dominici comitum beneficia et comites vassallorum beneficia inbreviarent et 
praedicto placito aediurn breves inde deterrent, etc.” 

25 See for example Edictum Pistense (864), c. 27, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, 
t. 2, p. 321. 

26. Cf. Dopsch, Wirtschaftsentwicklung cl. Karolingerzeit, I, 299-300. 

27 This may be deduced from the obligation of the merchants to pay over 
to the fisc a certain percentage of their profits. See supra, p. 86, n. 127. 

28 In 860-61 there appear to have been at least two assessments (supra, 
pp. 50-53); in 866 there were four (supra, p. 87, n. 136, p. 89). 

29 Supra, p. 190. 




198 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


The raising of the Danegeld appears to have been a com¬ 
paratively slow process, especially when more than one assess¬ 
ment proved necessary in order to secure a given amount or 
when the amount was unusually high. Ordinarily it must have 
been a matter of several months; rarely, if ever, could a Dane¬ 
geld be collected in less than two or three months; 30 and seven 
months were necessary to raise the enormous tribute of 12,000 
pounds in 884. 31 

So far as known, the general Danegeld was never levied 
throughout the entire West Frankish realm. We have no cert¬ 
ain indication that it ever was raised in Aquitaine, not even 
when the tribute was paid to Vikings operating from the Loire. 32 
Except in 886, when the entire Danegeld was furnished by 
Charles the Fat from Germany, 33 Francia appears to have been 
taxed for all the Danegelds paid to Vikings operating in northern 
France, including the Normans. This probably holds true of 
Neustria and Burgundy also, save for the following exceptions: 
neither of these countries was taxed for the Danegeld of 924 ; 34 
Neustria did not contribute toward the payment to the Seine 
Vikings in 877, but furnished the entire amount paid to the 
Loire Vikings in that year. 35 Also, the stipendiary Danegeld 
of 862 was raised in Neustria alone. 36 

What has been said above sufficiently demonstrates that the 
Danegeld was in fact an extraordinary direct tax levied by royal 
authority, within large and well defined portions of the West 
Frankish kingdom, on various kinds of property and resources. 
It was not the only direct tax known to the Carolingian period. 
Such burdens as the annua dona, and, in certain cases, 37 the 
census, tributum, inferenda, etc., must also be classified as direct 

30 Nearly three months were required for 7,000 pounds in 845 (supra, p. 
36 and n. 53); five or six months for 4,000 pounds in 866 (supra, pp. 90-91); 
probably three months for 5,000 pounds in 877 (supra, pp. 107-8). The some¬ 
what anomalous tribute of 853 appears to have been raised in less than two 
months (see supra, chap, ii, n. 24). 

31 Supra, p. 135 and n. 95. 

32 Supra, pp. 60, 97-98 and nn. 37-40. 

33 Supra, pp. 149-52 and n. 73. 

34 Supra, p. 169. 

35 Supra, pp. 97-98 and nn. 36-40. 

36 Supra, p. 60. 

37 In those cases where they had not been transformed into private 
redevances. 



CHAPTER XVII 


199 


taxes. 38 But these were paid, each year or oftener, 39 not on the 
basis of an assessment prepared for each occasion, but according 
to custom. 40 Also, though regular, they were not general, taxes. 
In theory, the annua dona were required only of the great seign¬ 
iors; 41 while census, tributum, etc., were exacted (as royal taxes) 
only in those cases where they had not yet become private 
redevances. 42 In the case of these customary taxes, moreover, 
no distinction appears to have been made, at least from the point 
of view of the uses to which they were put, between the income 
of the state and that of the king. 43 They were for both, no doubt, 
but mostly for the king. 44 

38 This was denied by Waitz (op. cit., IV,. Ill ff.); but most French his¬ 
torians have taken the other view (see e. g. Flach, Les orig. de Vcinc. France, 
III, 344 and n. 1; Viollet, op. cit., I, 321 ff.). Dopsch is strongly of the 
opinion that a very considerable part of the Carolingian revenues was de¬ 
rived from taxation (op. cit., II, 333 ff., 342). 

39 Waitz, op. cit., IV, 107, n. 2. 

40 This is not denying that changes in custom took place occasionally, 
nor that customs varied. The point is simply that particular rates were not 
prescribed each time the taxes were to be paid (see Waitz, op. cit., IV, 108- 
11, 113-20). While Dopsch (op. cit., II, 334-40) insists that these burdens 
were, not private redevances, but true taxes, he does not deny their cus¬ 
tomary character. Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 338-41; III, 344 and n. 2; Glasson, 
Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France, II, 480-83. 

41 Waitz, op. cit., IV,, 110; cf. 106 and nn. 2, 3; Glasson, op. cit., II, 483. 

42 Ibid., 480-82; Viollet, op. cit., I, 322-24; Dopsch, op. cit., II, 334 ff. 

43 According to Dopsch (ibid., 333 and n. 6), the proceeds of the annua 
dona were intended to cover the expenditures of the state rather than those 
of the monarch; special gifts for the latter purpose being termed dona 
private. The principal basis for this argument is the following statement 
of Hincmar (Opera, II, 325): “causa suae defensionis regi ac rei publicae 
vectigalia, quae nobiscum annua dona vocatur, praestat ecclesia.” But 
surely this passage does not prove Dopsch’s point; rather it begs the ques¬ 
tion; for Hincmar here fails to distinguish between the expenditures of the 
king and those of the state—the annua dona are for both. The fact that the 
dona private were paid in addition to the dona annua does not prove that 
there was a distinction in the uses to which they were applied. In some 
cases perhaps the dona privata were voluntary; that would distinguish them 
from the annua dona, which for a long time had been “gifts” only in name. 
On this whole subject, see Waitz, op. cit., IV, 5-6, 105-7. Lot (“Le Pont de 
Pitres,” Le Moyen Age, 1905, IX, pp. 3, 4, 10 and n. 2, p. 11 and n. 1) thinks 
the annua dona were used at least in part for the building of defenses, such 
as the Pont de Pitres. 

44 It is difficult to find any evidence of disbursements in the Carolingian 
period that were made for purely public purposes and which redounded pri¬ 
marily to the benefit of the people as a whole or to that of the state. Glasson 
(op. cit., II, 482) declares that at this period there were practically no state 
expenditures, since the services required by the state either were performed 
gratuitously or were rewarded by the proceeds from land grants and from 
fines levied in the law courts. Waitz (op. cit., IV, 9 ff.) is of practically the 
same opinion, though his statements are more guarded and accurate. Cf. 
Flach, op. cit., Ill, 485 ff. 



200 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


It has been asserted 45 that in addition to these regular taxes — 
annua dona, census, tributum, inferenda — the sources of the 
Carolingian period also give evidence of three extraordinary 
taxes other than the Danegeld. They are said to have been the 
following: (1) a contribution for the poor prescribed by Charle¬ 
magne in 780 ; 46 (2) a collection of alms in 810 for the restora¬ 
tion of churches in Jerusalem; 47 and (3) an exaction levied by 
Louis the German to secure money for the redemption of Chris¬ 
tian captives in the Holy Land. 48 On closer examination, how¬ 
ever, it will be found that none of these exactions really was a 
tax in any strict sense. Furthermore, they can not be regarded 
as contributions either to the king or to the state. 

The Danegeld differs not only from such more or less obligatory 
contributions toward benevolent purposes, but also from the 
aforementioned customary taxes, in several respects. In the first 
place, it approached nearer than did any of these to being a 
general tax. In 866 probably no one who held property or pos¬ 
sessed resources of any important kind could legitimately have 
escaped the Danegeld. 49 If the assessments were less compre¬ 
hensive on other occasions, and if in 877 (and thereafter?) the 
Danegeld was, as a land tax, levied only on benefices held of the 
king, 50 the fact remains that no other tax of the Carolingian 

45 By Dopsch, op. cit., II, 254, 339. 

46 This contribution was required from bishops, abbots, abesses, counts, 
and royal vassals, in proportion to their resources (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, 
t. 1, p. 52). Dopsch (op. cit., II, 254) calls it a poor tax (Armensteuer), 
and asserts that such taxes were levied “zu wiederholten Malen.” It is true 
that Charlemagne often gave instructions on the subject of how the poor 
were to be taken care of; but I can find no evidence that he ordered specific 
contributions for the indigent on more than a single occasion—in 780. Fur¬ 
thermore, this contribution can not be regarded as in theory a tax; it was 
an obligation to give alms which Charlemagne imposed at the suggestion 
of his prelates; if he was legislating at all, it was for the church, but cer¬ 
tainly not for the state. Cf. Sommerlad, Die wirtschaftliche Tdtigkeit cler 
Kirche, II, 110 ff. 

47 The only information we have on this matter is the following (M.G.H. , 
LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 154, c. 18): “De elemosina mittenda ad Hierusalem 
propter aecclesias Dei restaurandas.” Dopsch’s argument (op. cit., II, 254, 
n. 2) that the word elemosina here should be interpreted in the sense of a 
tax is very weak, and in any case is invalidated by what I have said in the 
preceding note. 

48 The exaction is thus described by the Monk of St. Gall (M.G.H., SS., 
II, p. 753, c. 9): “totam Germaniam, quae temporibus . . . Hludowici de 
singulis hobis regalium possessionum singulos denarios reddere compulsa 
est.” This exaction, it will be noted, was collected only on the royal domain. 
So far from being in any sense a general tax, as Dopsch thinks (op. cit., II, 
254 and n. 2), it was simply an extraordinary redevance. 

49 Supra, p. 72, n. 64. 

50 Supra, pp. 99-102 and nn. 42, 61. 





CHAPTER XVII 


201 


period (excluding the ecclesiastical taxes) was laid on more 
kinds of property, and paid by a larger number of persons than 
the Danegeld. In the second place, the Danegeld, unlike the cus- 
stomary taxes, was as a rule levied in accordance with special 
royal assessments which prescribed particular rates for each 
occasion. Graduated in proportion to the amount or value of 
property and resources, these rates, theoretically at least, applied 
uniformly throughout the entire territory about to be taxed. 
Finally, in contradistinction to all the taxes and contributions 
above mentioned, the Danegeld was a specific tax for the direct 
benefit of the state as such — for the defense of the kingdom. 
Legally it could not be, and probably it never was, raised by the 
king for any other than its proper purpose. 51 

The only tax of this period that seems at all analogous to the 
Danegeld is the exaction levied by Charles the Bald in 857, or 
858, for the purpose of securing funds to equip a fleet against 
the Vikings. So far as we know, such a tax was not levied on 
more than the single occasion noted. 52 

In the late ninth and early tenth centuries, after the regular 
direct taxes to the crown — annua clona, census, tributum, in¬ 
fer enda — either had wholly ceased to be paid or had been trans¬ 
formed into private redevances, 53 these extraordinary taxes — 
the Danegeld and the fleet tax — may be regarded as virtually 
the only remaining evidences of a public or state economy in the 
West Frankish kingdom. 54 

But if it seems clear to us of the present day that the Danegeld 
in certain respects was a new departure in Carolingian public 
finance, it remains very doubtful whether the tax-payers of the 
ninth and tenth centuries recognized it as such. We have seen 
that the machinery employed to collect the Danegeld was, in 
large part and essentially, not the machinery of the state, but 
that of the seigneurial regime. Very seldom — so far as we 
know, only in the case of freemen and possibly in that of mer¬ 
chants — did the officials of the king enter into direct relations 
with the actual tax-payers. While tillers of the soil and priests 
had to bear the burdens of taxation, it was not they, but their 

51 Supra, p. 195 and n. 21. 

52 Ibicl., n. 20. 

53 Glasson, op. cit., II, 481, 483; Viollet, op. cit., I, 324; Dopsch, op. cit., 
II, 343-44. 

54 Cf. Viollet, op. cit., I, 324. 




202 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


seigniors and patrons, who were held responsible for the taxes 
by the monarch. 55 A sufficient amount of Danegeld could never 
have been raised without the cooperation of the local authori¬ 
ties. 56 It was to their ministeriales that most of the money was 
paid in the first instance. The officials of the crown had no con¬ 
trol over the great bulk of the tax money until, after having been 
collected from the tax-payers, it was paid over by the seigniors 
and the prelates to the royal missi. We have also seen that in 
most cases the Danegeld was collected, probably not in strict 
accordance with the royal assessments; but in such manner, and 
in such amounts, as would enable the seigniors and the prelates, 
after they had remitted their quotas to the missi, to retain a sub¬ 
stantial profit for themselves, while they escaped having to fur¬ 
nish anything out of their own resources. For peasants and 
priests, therefore, the chief if not the only distinction between 
payments toward the Danegeld on the one hand, and redevances 
on the other, must have been that in the case of the former there 
was no custom to regulate the amount that might be demanded. 57 

Again, it may be doubted whether the king levied the Danegeld, 
in theory, as a tax. It does not seem likely that seigniors, pre¬ 
lates, and freemen would have submitted to being formally taxed. 
Very probably the old Germanic principle that the free man 
could not be subjected to taxation either on his person or his 
property was still too strong to be brushed aside, even in the 
case of a great national emergency. 58 By what right, then, did 
Charles the Bald and his successors levy the Danegeld? On what 
principle was the exaction legally justified? In my opinion, the 
key to this problem is to be found in the collection of the heer- 
bann for the purposes of the Danegeld. By collecting the heer- 
bann as Danegeld, Charles the Bald altered its character. In 
that form it was not a penalty for negligence or refusal to render 


55 Supra, pp. 192-94. 

56 Supra, pp. 50-54, 90-91. 

57 Supra, p. 84, n. 123. 

58 On this point I venture to differ with Dopsch (op. cit., II, 338 ff.), who 
assumes that the existence of the Danegeld and the other extraordinary 
burdens referred to above (p. 200) is enough to prove that the principle of 
immunity from taxation had by the time of Charlemagne ceased to be re¬ 
spected. I have shown (supra, p. 200, nn. 47-49) that none of these extra¬ 
ordinary exactions with exception of the Danegeld can be regarded as a true 
tax. In the following I shall endeavor to prove that even the Danegeld 
was not in the strict theory of the ninth century a tax, but merely a money 
payment substituted for military service. 



CHAPTER XVII 


203 


military service, blit a money payment substituted for military 
service. The legal basis of the heerbann was the same in both 
cases: the king’s right to require military service of all freemen 
at their own expense. But when he exacted heerbann as Dane- 
geld, the monarch must have acted on the theory that he had a 
right either to the personal military service or to its money equiv¬ 
alent, and that it lay within his discretion to determine which 
of the two was to be demanded on any occasion. 59 On this basis 
the king was legally justified in exacting Danegeld not only from 
freemen, but also from seigniors and prelates; for the latter were 
liable to render military service, no longer only in proportion to 
the number of freemen within their jurisdiction, 00 but — at the 
time of Charles the Bald and thereafter — in proportion to the 
size or value of their benefices. 61 Moreover, after Charles the Bald 
had introduced the principle of the levee en masse — the prin¬ 
ciple that in the event of a necessitas (foreign invasion) it was 
the duty of all men, regardless of class, to take up arms in defense 
of their country — it was possible to collect Danegeld from all 
classes of the population, even priests, on the ground that it was 
a substitute for military service at a very critical time. 62 And, 
indeed, that must have been the legal basis of the Danegeld: 
it was interpreted as a substitute for the military service owed 
by all men to the monarch as the defender of the land and its 
people against foreign invasion. To legitimize the taxation for 
the Danegeld on any other basis has proved difficult if not im¬ 
possible. 63 

There is no evidence that the French monarchs continued to 
collect Danegeld after the cessation of the Viking invasions and 
the pacification of the Normans. So far as can be ascertained, 

59 To this theory there could be little objection, since the average free¬ 
man would far rather pay the lieer'bann than render military service. See 
supra, pp. 74-77. 

60 Supra, pp. 77 ff. 

61 Supra, pp. 87-88, 101. 

62 Supra , pp. 86-87. Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 317-18, 321 and n. 2; III, 343, 473 
and n. 2. 

63 Vuitry (Le regime -financier de la France, I, 92-93) regarded the Dane¬ 
geld as an evidence of the survival of the tradition of Roman taxation into 
the ninth and tenth centuries. Dopsch (op. cit., II, 339-40) assumes that 
the taxing power was derived from “der plenitudo potestatis des frankis- 
chen Konigs,” and in particular from the royal , right to issue bans. The 
latter part of this view, it will be noted, may be reconciled with my theory 
that the Danegeld was a substitute for military service. Waitz (op. cit., IV, 
120) referred to the Danegeld as a Heersteuer, but did not attempt to fix 
its legal basis. 




204 


CHAPTER XVII 


the last levy of Danegeld as such, in France, took place in 926. 
In its local abuses the Danegeld may, indeed, have survived, 64 
and this point will be discussed in the following chapter; but as 
a form of general taxation, authorized by the monarch in the 
interests of the kingdom as a whole, and applied uniformly 
throughout considerable portions of the West Frankish realm, 
the Danegeld disappears after 926. Between the latter date and 
1146, when Louis VII levied the first royal aid to provide funds 
for his participation in the Second Crusade, there is no evidence 
of the collection of anything resembling a general tax, as distinct 
from a redevance or a feudal aid, by a king of France. 65 In this 
respect the history of the French Danegeld offers a striking con¬ 
trast to that of the English Danegeld, which, after its revival by 
William the Conqueror, constituted a very important part of 
the regular royal revenues, and was collected under the name of 
Danegeld as late as 1162 by Henry II. 66 

The fragmentary evidence that we have on the subject of the 
local Danegeld — paid as ransom money for towns, churches, 
monasteries, or captives — leads me to believe that it was raised 
by the same, or similar, methods as the general Danegeld. While 
the treasures of ecclesiastical establishments were doubtless 
often drawn upon, it may be presumed that when these were not 
available or did not suffice, taxes in the form of extraordinary 
redevances, were levied on the local population. 67 We know that 
in the case of the ransom of Abbot Louis in 858 it not only 
proved necessary to empty many church treasuries; the king 
and the magnates also had to furnish large contributions which 
they raised probably by taxing their peasantry. 68 

64 Vogel, p. 386, conjectures that Rollo, after his establishment in Nor¬ 
mandy, levied tribute on the peasants who had remained in the land. 

65 Luchaire, Manuel, pp. 578-79; id., Histoire des institutions monarchi- 
ques de la France, second ed. (1891), I, 125-28; Vuitry, op. cit., 390-91. 
Clamageran (Hist, de Vimpot, I, 193-94; cf. 278-79) fails to note the Dane¬ 
geld of 926 and (wrongly) gives 1147 as the date of the aid levied by Louis 
VII. Flach (op. cit., Ill, 349-50) asserts that the royal right to levy a 
general impost was not irremediably lost after the Danegeld ceased to be 
collected, that the royal aid of 1146 proves the survival of the principle. 

66 Round, Feudal England, p. 500; cf. supra, introduction. 

67 Supra, pp. 183-84, 188. 

68 Supra, pp. 186-88. 



GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


205 


CHAPTER XVIII. 

The Results of the Danegeld : Its Effect on the Political 
and Economic Development of France. 

Some of the results of the policy of paying Danegeld have been 
referred to from time to time in the foregoing discussion. These 
may now be summarized and brought into relation with certain 
other matters not yet mentioned. 

It is probably true that the Franks never expected to put an 
end to the Viking invasions by the payment of Danegeld: that 
they made use of this expedient only for the purpose of gaining 
a temporary respite from plunder and devastation, and in the 
hope that they would be able sufficiently to strengthen their 
power of resistance in the meantime. 1 Yet this hope was never 
realized. Each payment of tribute served only, on the one hand 
to whet the appetite of the invaders for more money, and on the 
other to lessen the inclination, and therefore the ability, of the 
Franks to resist their enemies by military measures. 2 The very 
knowledge that in the last resort the Vikings always could be 
bought off, undoubtedly made both nobles and freemen as a rule 
disinclined to risk the somewhat doubtful issues of armed con¬ 
flicts with an enemy who in military efficiency was their supe¬ 
rior. 3 And though Charles the Bald and other monarchs in 
general were forced by a peculiar combination of circumstances, 
and presumably against their own wishes, to resort to the Dane¬ 
geld, there is not wanting evidence that even they, at times when 
they desired to pursue some object of their choice, culpably 
neglected the defense of the realm and relied upon the venality 
of the Vikings. 4 The Danegeld, therefore, not only failed to 
secure the immediate end at which it was aimed; it also had the 
disastrous effect of further weakening the resisting power of 
the Frankish army, and it led to a serious decline in patriotism 
and public spirit among all classes, but chiefly perhaps among 
the magnates. The economic advantages which each levy of 
Danegeld yielded them must have proved a strong temptation to 
the seigniors. They much preferred bying off the Vikings to 

1 CL the statement of Charles the Bald quoted infra, appendix i, n. 35. 

2 Supra, p. 38 and n. 58, p. 110 and n. 114. 

3 Supra, pp. 113 fL, 175-79. 

4 Supra, pp. 115-16, 146-47, 178-79. 



206 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


fighting them, and thereby increased the tendency of subordi¬ 
nating* the vital interests of the realm to the pursuit of private 
aims and wholly selfish ends. 5 

The policy of paying Danegeld also had the effect of detracting 
from the prerogatives and the prestige* of the monarch at the 
same time that it increased the wealth, the independence, and the 
power of the nobility. It has been shown 6 that the policy or pay • 
ing Danegeld usually was the policy of the magnates, seldom that 
of the king; that the magnates in most cases forced the king to 
this expedient by refusing or neglecting to render the military 
service demanded of them; that, furthermore, they were enriched 
by each levy of the Danegeld on their subjects. With the trans¬ 
formation of the Frankish army of freemen into an aggregation 
of feudal vassals, the monarch was rendered powerless to defend 
his realm against invasion whenever the magnates and seigniors 
refused him their obedience and military support. 7 By com¬ 
pelling the monarch to resort to the Danegeld, the magnates 
extracted from him what must have been regarded by his sub¬ 
jects as a confession of weakness, an admission that lie was no 
longer capable of properly discharging his prime function of 
defense against a foreign enemy. 8 Meanwhile, the monarch 
found himself almost wholly dependent on these same magnates 
even for the raising of the Danegeld; for without their aid and 
cooperation it was just as impossible to collect a sufficient amount 
of money as to raise an adequate number of troops. 9 Moreover, 
by their control of the collection of the Danegeld, the magnates 
were able not only to hold in leash or to embarrass the monarch; 
they were able also to develop new financial rights in relation 
to the peasants and others who dwelt upon their lands or were 
subject to their jurisdiction, thereby augmenting in a general 
way the power and authority which they already possessed over 
their dependents. 10 

It is in connection with the matter just mentioned that one of 
the most important results of the Danegeld must be sought. The 

5 Supra, chaps, vii, xiv. 

6 Ibid. 

7 Supra, p. 114 and n. IS, p. 126, mi. 45, 46. See also Baldamus, Heerwesen, 
pp. 17-33. 

8 On this matter .see Fustel de Coulanges, Les transf. de la royaute, 616- 
66; cf. Flach, Les orig. de Vane. France, I, 145 f£. 

9 Supra, pp. 50-53, 89-92, 196, 201-2. Cf. Flach, op. cit.. Ill, 155, 474 ff. 

10 Supra, pp. 81-85 and nn. 123-26, pp. 102-3 and nn. 69, 70, p. 108 and n. 
103. Cf. Flach, up. cit., I, 317-22. 



CHAPTER XVIII 


207 


Danegeld was not raised in strict accordance with the royal 
assessments issued for that purpose; it was exacted in a more or 
less arbitrary way by the agents of the seigniors, the purpose 
being to secure not only the exact quota demanded of each seign¬ 
ior by the monarch, but also an additional amount sufficient for 
the needs, or the avarice, of each individual magnate and his 
ministeriales , 11 The fact that the seigniors were charged by 
royal authority to collect the Danegeld from their dependents 
must have led to many abuses in the form of illegal and unjust 
exactions. 12 It is true that the seigniors had no legal right to 
collect Danegeld except when they had been instructed to that 
effect by the king. But it is doubtful whether they always con¬ 
sidered themselves bound by that limitation. 13 We know that 
the local authorities often entered into bargains with the Vikings 
on their own account, for the purpose of saving a town, a church, 
a monastery from destruction, or to ransom prisoners from cap¬ 
tivity. In such cases it was probably felt that counts, bishops, 
and abbots were as justified in raising by local taxation the sums 
they had bargained for as the king was in raising larger tributes 
by general taxation. In other words, the general Danegeld must 
have helped to legitimize the levies of local Danegeld. 14 Further¬ 
more, it was not difficult to find a pretext for levying an exac¬ 
tion. 15 The Vikings were all but ubiquitous in the West Frankish 
realm during the ninth century. Their presence in some locality, 
or the rumor of it, might easily be taken advantage of by a 
seignior to levy Danegeld on his own account, and without any 
intention of using it for the purpose indicated. 16 His subjects 
and dependents probably were wholly ignorant regarding the 
uses to which their money was put, once it left their hands. In 
any case it would have availed them little to question the legality 


11 Supra, pp. 192-93, 195-96, 201-2. 

12 Supra, pp. 82-83. Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 318 ff. 

13 M. Flach has the following to say as regards the contributions exacted 
from the peasants in this period (op. cit., I, 342): “Le chef eut droit a des 
contributions chaque fois qu’une depense exceptionelle s’imposait a lui. Or, 
qui done allait etre juge de l’utilite ou de la necessity de la depense,—on 
pourrait ajouter—de sa realite? L’obligation du sujet eut pour mesure l'in- 
teret du maitre et sa puissance.” 

14 Supra, pp. 183-88. 

15 The chicanery practiced by the magnates and the local officials is de¬ 
scribed by Hincmar; see supra, p. 130, n. 67. 

16 Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 384-86. 



208 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


or the justice of the exaction. 17 Meanwhile, the right of the 
seigniors to levy exactions on their dependents in times of need 
was being ever more firmly established. 18 When in the opinion 
of the seignior such need arose, and an exaction was levied to 
meet it, the seignior, or his officials, 19 prescribed the amounts 
that were to be collected from the individual tax-payers. On 
these occasions, therefore, the dependents of the seignior came 
to be regarded as taxable at any figure determined by their lord 
or his agents. 20 

We know that in the earlier feudal period the unfree peas¬ 
ants were held to be taillables a merci; they might be required 
to pay an arbitrary imposition known as the taille — the amount 
of which was determined by the lord — whenever the latter 
chose to impose it. 21 The taille is not referred to as such be¬ 
fore the eleventh century, but it must have come into existence 
much earlier. 22 The origin of the taille is a subject that is 
still veiled in much obscurity, but there seems to be a general 
consensus of opinion that it grew out of the illegal and unjust 
exactions which are so often referred to in the documents of 
the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries. 23 Of course there 
were illegal and unjust exactions long before the first levy of 
Danegeld in 845. 24 Yet the complaints about such exactions 
seem to increase in number after the middle of the ninth century. 

17 Cf. idicl., 342-43, 425 ff.; See, Les classes rurales et le reg. domanial 
en France, 107-11. 

18 Cf. Flach, op. cit., I, 414 ff. 

19 Doubtless many illegal exactions were originated by the ministeriales 
of the seigniors (Flach, op. cit., I, 380-81) and by the advocates, or lay de¬ 
fenders, of churches and monasteries (ibid., 435 ff.; See, op. cit., 474 ff.). 

20 See Flach, op. cit., I, 312-43; cf. 466, 467 and n. 1. 

21 See i bid., 343-44; Luchaire, Manuel, 206-7, 309-10, 336, 422; Vuitry, 
Etudes sur le regime financier, 104, 268-74; cf. See, op. cit., 177-78, 215, 356, 
357; Clamageran, Hist, de Vimpot, I, 199-201. For the later development 
of the taille, its regulation, and its connection with the feudal aids, see 
infra, pp. 210-11 and n. 35. I am now concerned only with one of its origins. 

22 See the authorities cited in the preceding note. So far as I know, the 
earliest reference to the taille, eo nomine, is found in a diploma issued in 
the year 1060 (quoted by Championniere, De la propri6te des eaux couran- 
tes , p. 496): “Quasdam injustas consuetudines, talliam videlicet et omnes 
alias oppressiones.” It is also mentioned about the year 1080 in the Pan¬ 
carte blanche de Saint-Martin de Tours, fol. 130 (quoted by Flach, op. cit., 
I, 419, n. 1) : “Hugo casteili S. Maurae dominus avariciae faucibus instinctus 
per violentiam suam homines S. Martini de S. Hyspano talliavit et talliam 
reddere coegit.” 

23 Flach, op. cit., I, 342-44; cf. 384-85, 408, n. 2, 421, n. 3, 433, nn. 1, 2. 
See also Glasson, Hist, du droit et des inst. de la France, IV, 439-41, 445 ff.; 
See, op. cit., 318-26. 

24 See infra, n. 30. Cf. Dopsch, Wirtschaftsentw. d. Karolingerzeit, I, 294, 
295 and n. 1. 




CHAPTER XVIII 


209 


In several of these complaints it is indicated that the exactions 
in question had not been levied before the period of the Viking 
invasions and the reign of Charles the Bald. 25 The methods used 
by the seigniors to raise their quotas of Danegeld 26 were not very 
different from those employed later in the exaction of the arbi¬ 
trary taille; 21 and the right of the seigniors to exact such tailles 
from their peasants, without being in any way obliged to them 
in return, save to protect them, could easily have been developed 
in connection with the levies — legal and illegal — of Danegeld. 28 

It cannot be affirmed that the taille grew out of the Danegeld 
exclusively, and still less that there would have been no taille , 
if there had been no Danegeld. Doubtless there would have been 
plenty of opportunities for levying exactions, even if there had 
been no Viking raids; 29 and the best corroboration of this state¬ 
ment is the fact that illegal exactions are mentioned long before 
the Viking period — even in Merovingian times. 30. But it is not 

25 Capitula Synodi Bellovac. [April, 845], M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 2, p. 
388, c. 5: “Ut ab ecclesia mihi commissa indebitas consuetudines et iniustas 
exactationes de caetero non exactetis, sed sic eas conservetis, sicut tempore 
avi et patris vestri conservatae fuerunt.” Epistola Synodi Carisiac. ad 
Hludovicum regem Germ. [Nov. 858], c. 14, ibid., p. 437: “Iudices denique 
villarum regiarum constituite, qui non sint cupidi . . . Et servos regios iu¬ 
dices non opprimant, nee ultra quod soliti fuerunt reddere tempore patris 
vestri ab eis exigent; neque per angarias in tempore incongruo illos affli- 
gant; neque per dolos aut per mala ingenia sive inconvenientes precationes 
colonos condemnent.” Flach explains (op. cit., I, 385, n. 1) that in the docu¬ 
ment just quoted it is a question not only of public (royal) officials, but 
also of powerful vassals (fortiores vassi), of seigniors and of protectors 
(domini vel patroni). Cartulaire de Saint-Etienne de Dijon, MS., fol. 17 
[circa 912], quoted by Flach, ibid., n. 2: “quidam homines servientes et 
fideles Ecclesiae S. Stephani Divionensis . . . conquesti sunt et reclama- 
verunt humiliter dicentes quod quidam eorum praepositi . . . novello tem¬ 
pore post Nortmannicam emersionem quoddam genus servitii ex XIII eorum 
colonicis per occasionem et potestatem ultra censurn solitum quod legitime 
debebant illis imposuerunt, modium videlicet musti ad opus praepositorum 
ex una quoque colonica vinum reddente, quod numquam antea fecerant nec 
ipsi, nec patres aut avi eorum, et per quosdam annos III et potestate hoc ab 
illis extorserint eosque in hoc facto afflixerint, etc.” The document goes on 
to say that the matter complained of was investigated, found true, and pro¬ 
hibited in the future. See also supra, chap, vi, n. 77. 

26 See the preceding chapter, pp. 192-97, 201-2. 

27 I. e. both the Danegeld and the tallia ad voluntatem were more or less 
arbitrarily exacted from the lower classes of the population. Cf. Luchaire, 
Manuel, p. 309. 

28 Cf. supra, pp. 207-8 and nn. 13, 21. 

29 On the whole subject of the origins of the various seigneurial rights, 
see Flach, op. cit., I, 315 ff.; cf. See, op. cit., 308-26. 

30 Clotharii II Edictum [Oct. 18, 614], M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 22, 
c. 8: “Ut ubicumque census novus impie addetus est et a populo reclamatur, 
iuxta inquaesitione misericorditer emendetur.” Pippini Capitulare Aquitani- 

Danegeld. l-j. 



210 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


too much to say that the Danegeld must have been a very im¬ 
portant factor in the development of the tattle, and particularly 
in the development of the legal theory that the unfree peasants 
were taillables a merci . 31 

The local Danegelds that were paid for the purpose of ransom¬ 
ing prisoners from captivity must have contributed something 
toward the development of the feudal aids. 32 Perhaps none of 
these aids appears earlier, or was more common, in France, than 
that one which was due from the vassals when a captive lord had 
to be ransomed. 33 Just as the ransom payments of the ninth 
century probably were raised by means of forced contributions 
from the peasantry, so we know that the feudal aids were secured 
by levying extraordinary tattles on the laboring classes. 34 

cum [768 \,ibid., p. 43, c. 4: “Ut ad illos pauperes homines magis non tollant 
nisi quantum legitime reddere debent.” Breviarum missorum Aquitanicum, 
ibicl., p. 65, c. 5: “ut ad illos pauperes nova aliqua consuetudo inposita fuit 
postea.” 

31 Objection to the argument presented above could perhaps be taken on 
the ground that the Danegeld was a tax on property and resources, while 
the arbitrary faille seems to have been, originally, a charge on persons. The 
difficulty thus raised is, however, more apparent than real, and results from 
drawing too sharp a distintion between charges resting on persons and 
those laid on land. The arbitrary faille, it is said, was exacted only from 
persons of servile status—the taillables —never from the so-called free vil¬ 
leins (See, op. cit., 177-78, 215, 357-58). But we are told also that the 
classification of a tenant, either a villein or a serf, depended more on the 
condition of his tenure than on the status of his person; that, speaking 
generally, condition was less personal than real (ibid., 157-58, 166-67, 171, 
216-17). It would seem, therefore, that the question as to whether the ar¬ 
bitrary faille should be classified as personal or as real, is at least not a 
matter of first importance. The Danegeld, it has been shown, was exacted 
from the holders of mansi ingenuiles, mansi serviles, accolae, and hospitia, 
without regard to the personal status of the respective tenants (cf. supra. 
chap, v, nn. 69-71, 123). The fact that they were tenants of such holdings 
made them taxable for the Danegeld. Probably the same fact made them 
subject to other exactions, legal and illegal; with the result that in the 
course of time they came to be regarded as taxable at will. It will be ad¬ 
mitted that this view is in harmony -with the generally accepted theory that 
the serfs of the feudal period—as distinct from the free villeins—were the 
descendants not only of the servi, but also of the coloni, who occupied de¬ 
pendent mansi in Carolingian times (See, op. cit., 157). A distinctive feature 
of the latter period was the degradation of the freeholders, most of whom 
became dependents of the great seigniors. That a small number of the later 
villeins were descendants of Carolingian freeholders who by various means 
had escaped degradation into serfdom, will not be denied; but by far the 
majority of the later villeins had reached that status by virtue of the eman¬ 
cipation movement in the twelfth century and thereafter. The emancipation 
of the serf meant, among other things, that he could no longer be subjected 
to the arbitrary faille (ibid., 219 ff., 239 ff.). The failles levied on villeins 
were limited to certain occasions, very much like the feudal aids due from 
vassals. On the relation between the two, see infra, n. 35. 

32 Cf. supra, p. 188. 

33 See Haskins, Norman Institutions, pp. 21-22; cf. pp. 19-20. 

34 Luchaire, Manuel, pp. 206-7. 



CHAPTER XVIII 


211 


Again, it is possible to show a more general connection between 
the Danegeld and the feudal aids. The latter, it is well known, in 
many cases were developed from the tattle; they represent the 
regulation and limitation of what was once a wholly arbitrary 
exaction. 35 Therefore, on the basis of a relation between the 
local abuses of the Danegeld and the origin of the tattle , 36 it may 
be asserted that the influence of the Danegeld is traceable in the 
development of the earlier feudal aids. Between the Danegeld, 
regarded as a money payment substituted for military service, 
and some of these feudal aids there was, in principle, little differ¬ 
ence. This is true particularly of the aide de Vost, which toward 
the close of the reign of Philip Augustus became an important 
source of royal revenue. 37 

In an illuminating article on the commerce of France in 
the ninth century, Professor Thompson has called attention 
to the influence of the Danegeld on trade and exchange: “The 
immense sums of money which the Northmen extorted ... in 
the form of Danegeld must sometimes have had a tonic effect 
upon trade. Since the decline of the Roman Empire Gaul, in 
common with all the West, had experienced an enormous reduc¬ 
tion in the amount of currency in circulation. Most of it had 
been drawn off to the East, or else hoarded. Now it was forcibly 
brought into the light of day. Clipped or counterfeited as much 
of the coin was, it yet seems to have stimulated exchange, and 
Charles’s (Charles the Bald is meant) endeavors to purify and 
to regulate the coinage and to establish a uniform system of 
weights and measures may reasonably be taken as the symptoms 
of an awakening trade.” 38 “The Norse armies were dogged by 
adventurous peddlers and merchants, and much of their booty 
must have been disposed of soon after its taking.” 39 “Evidently 
commerce could not have suffered everywhere, but on the other 
hand in many places must have been stimulated. The Northmen 
undoubtedly disturbed things seriously, but often sold their booty 
in the land. 40 New markets must have arisen through the decay 

35 Luchaire, loc. cit. 

36 Cf. supra, pp. 206-10. 

37 Luchaire, Manuel , pp. 579-80, 597-98; See, op. cit., 593 ff. 

38 Thompson, “The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," Journal 
of Political Economy, 1915, XXIII, p. 867. 

39 Ibid., pp. 865-66. 

40 An excellent example of this is given in Ann. Fuld., Ill, 882, ed. Kurze, 
p. 98. During a truce between the Franks and the Northmen at Elsloo (see 



212 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


of the old ones or by the change of location in the case of estab¬ 
lished places too greatly exposed.” 41 

To this general estimate of the effect of the Danegeld on com¬ 
merce perhaps only a few particulars need be added. 42 

So far as we know, the Vikings, while they were sojourning in 
France, engaged neither in agriculture nor the industrial arts; 
and it is difficult to see how they could have found time for such 
pursuits, since they were almost constantly occupied in raiding, 
plundering, and devastating. They could hardly have brought 
with them from Scandinavia either food or military equipment 
in any very large quantities. This consideration must be kept 
constantly in mind if one wishes to gain anything like a correct 
appreciation of the volume of trade between the Vikings and the 
Franks. It lends an added significance to the evidences of ex¬ 
change between the two peoples. 43 It indicates that the Vikings 
needed to purchase and did purchase, with the money which 
came into their possession through tribute and plunder, not only 
weapons, armor (bruniae ), horses, and other necessities of war, 44 
but also large quantities of foodstuffs, wine, cattle, etc. 45 The 

infra , appendix iv), the latter opened the gates of their camp and permitted 
the Franks to enter: “Nostrates autem calliditatis illorum expertes eandem 
munitionem ingressi sunt, alii quidem causa negotiandi, alii vero pro loci 
firmitate consideranda.” See also infra, n. 45. 

41 Thompson, op. cit., 866-67. Cf. v. Kalckstein, Robert cl. Tapfere, p. 93. 
For the new markets, see M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 318, c. 19. In 873 
the Northmen requested from Charles the Bald the privilege of having a 
market during the winter (see infra, n. 45). 

42 On the Vikings as traders, see also Bugge, “Die nordeuropaischen 
Verkehrswege im frtihen Mittelalter und die Bedeutung der Wikinger fur 
die Entwicklung des europaischen Handels und der europaischen Schiffahrt,” 
Vierteljahrschrift f. Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgesch., IV, 1906, 227 ff.; Vogel, 
417-18, is of the opinion that, in general, Bugge has overestimated the stim¬ 
ulating influence of the Vikings on the commerce and trade of the Frankish 
realm. See also Bugge’s Vesterlandenes Indflydelse paa Norclboernes og 
scierlig Norclmaendenes ydre Kultur, Levesaet og Samfundsforhold i Vi- 
kingetiden (Skrifter udgivne af Videnskabs-Sclskabet i Christiania. II. 
Historisk-filosofisk Klasse. 1904. No. 1), chap, iv; Vogel, 206, 233, 243, 293, 
294, 314, 376; Steenstrup, Normannerne, I, 367; II, 367; Weinhold, Altnor- 
disches Leben, 104-5, 114-17. 

43 Not only laymen, but even the clergy, monks and nuns, seem to have 
traded with the Northmen. Edictum Pistense, c. 25, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, 
t. 2, p. 325; see the varying manuscript (Cod. 3), printed in a note at the 
bottom of p. 325. 

44 Ibid., p. 321, c. 25. Cf. Thompson, op. cit., 866 and n. 1; Vogel, 233. 

45 The following may serve to illustrate the point referred to in the text. 
Ann. Bert.. 869, p. 107: “Karolus vero civitates trans Sequanam ab incolis 
firmari rogavit, Cynomannis scilicet ac Turonis, ut praesidio contra Nort- 
mannos populis esse possent. Nortmanni autem hoc audientes, multam 
summam argenti, frumenti quoque et vini ac animalium ab incolis terrae 



CHAPTER XVIII 


213 


fact is that the Vikings did not always evacuate the realm as 
soon as they had received the Danegeld. Ordinarily they simply 
proceeded to some other region, 46 and after the payment of 861 
they were permitted to spend the winter in various encampments 
along the Seine. 47 It seems obvious, therefore, that all the money 
paid to the Vikings in the form of Danegeld did not leave France; 
some part of it must have been used to purchase the necessities 
of life and of war. But the benefits derived from this temporary 
stimuation of trade must not be overestimated. As will be shown 
later, they were more than counterbalanced by the direct eco¬ 
nomic losses suffered as a result of the payment of tribute. 48 

The Danegeld must have intensified to some extent the labors 
of those engaged in agriculture and industry; for they produced 
or manufactured most of the things wanted by the Vikings. 49 
Peasants, artisans, and seigniors now found opportunities to 
dispose of more than was required for their own needs and for 
the ordinary market demand. 50 This is not merely additional 
evidence that the landed estate of the later Carolingian period 
was less “self-sufficient” and independent of the outside world 
than was formerly believed, and that the money economy of the 
ninth and early tenth centuries was considerable; 51 it also indi¬ 
cates that production for the market, in some places at least, 
must have been directly stimulated by the payments of Danegeld. 

Since huge payments of tribute and an increased volume of 
trade call for a larger supply of money, there can be little doubt 
— though direct evidence is wanting — that the mining of the 
precious metals, particularly of silver, had to be increased in 

ipsius quaesierunt, ut cum eis pacem facerent.” Ibid., 873, p. 124: “Petie- 
runt autem [Nortmanni], ut eis in quadam insula Ligeris fluvii usque in 
mense Februario residere et mercatum habere liceret, etc.” See also supra, 
p. 189, n. 4. 

46 Supra, pp. 44, 61, 91, 108-9, 136 ft., 152. 

47 Supra, pp. 55-56. 

48 See infra, pp. 216 ft. 

49 On this and the following, cf. supra, pp. 56-58 and notes. It is an in¬ 
teresting fact, though without any necessary relation to the Danegeld, that 
Frisian or North French cloth was used at the royal courts of Scandinavia 
in the ninth century, and that swords made in France by Frankish or Flem¬ 
ish artisans have been found in the Scandinavian lands (Bugge, “Die nord- 
europaischen Verkehrswege, etc.,” loc. cit., p. 254). 

50 That there was throughout the Carolingian period a production for the 
market, in agriculture as well as in manufactured articles, has been abun¬ 
dantly demonstrated by Dopsch, op. cit., I, 262 ff., 296 ff.; II, 155-79. 

51 See Dopsch, op. cit., II, 234-77; Thompson, op. cit., 872-73, 887. 



214 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


order to keep a sufficient number of coins in circulation. 52 Doubt¬ 
less the plate of the churches was sometimes used in the pay¬ 
ment of the Danegeld. 53 Yet most of the tribute probably was 
paid in specie, 54 ordinarily silver, though on a few occasions part 
may have been in gold. 55 

The steady and continued improvement in the quality of the 
West Frankish coinage during the latter half of the ninth cen¬ 
tury must be ascribed in part to the influence of the Danegeld. 56 
It would seem that the invaders accepted tribute money only 
after they had first counted and then weighed it ; 57 the weighing 
being done either by the Vikings on their own scales, 58 or by the 

52 See Soetbeer’s article on Carolingian coinage in Forsch, z. d. Gesch., VI, 
8-9, 53-54, 56. This scholar presumed (p, 54) that most of the silver in the 
West Frankish realm was mined at Melle in southern Poitou (now Melle-sur- 
Beronne in the departement Deux-Sevres—see Vogel, 123). 

53 Supra, chap, vi, n. 114; chap, xvi, n. 11. When it is said that drafts 
w T ere made on the church treasuries for the Danegelds of 860, 877, and 884, 
this does not necessarily mean that the contribution consisted of plate. 

54 Supra, p. 58 and nn. 77, 78. Cf. Dopsch, op. cit., II, 305. 

55 In 845 and in 861 part of the Danegeld may have been paid in gold (see 
supra, pp. 34-35 and n. 45, p. 37 and n. 55, pp. 52-53 and n. 54). The annalist 
of Fulda is probably inaccurate when he states that the Danegeld of 884 was 
paid in gold and silver (supra, p. 132, n. 76). On the other occasions the 
evidence indicates that the payments were made in silver. Though the 
later Carolingians appear to have retained the system .of bimetallism 
(Dopsch. op. cit., II, 279), it is probably true that by far the larger part of 
the money in circulation consisted of silver coins (ibid., 306). Still there 
was undeniably a large supply of gold in the Frankish realm (ibid., 138, 
173-74, 256-57, 306-8.) A very large monastic treasure of exclusively Arabic 
gold is mentioned in the Sermo de relatione corporis beati Vedasti, c. 4 
M.G.H., SS., XV, p. 402, lines 40-41). The Vikings doubtless secured through 
plunder and trade a considerable part of this supply of gold (supra, p. 55 
and n. 63; cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 22). For purposes of transportation 
gold, by reason of its lesser bulk and weight, must have been preferred to 
silver. 

56 That the quality of the West Frankish coinage was improved during 
the ninth century is well known (see Dopsch, op. cit., II, 303 ff.; Soetbeer, 
op. cit., VI, 9, 10, 13-14). I do not wish to deny that there were other 
reasons for this besides the Danegeld. My contention is simply that the 
Danegeld was one of several factors making for an improved coinage. The 
old theory of Diimmler (I, 470, 548), Steenstrup (op. cit., II, 367), and 
others, that the Danegeld led to counterfeiting and depreciation of the coin¬ 
age, is no longer tenable. 

57 At least that inference may be drawn from the following statement of 
Regino (Chron. 884, ed. Kurze, p. 122; cf. supra, p. 137, n. 105): “[Nort- 
manni] respondent se cum Carlomanno rege, non cum alio aliquo foedus 
pepigisse; quisquis ille esset, qui ei in regnum succederet, eiusdem numeri 
et quantitatis pecuniam daret, etc.” 

58 Supra , p. 71, n. 60, p. 132, n. 76. Cf. Montelius, Kulturgeschichte Schwe- 
dens, p. 277. According to Soetbeer (op. cit., VI, 55-56), the Scandinavian 
weights were four per cent, heavier than the Frankish. But Montelius (op. 
cit., 193, 278) believes that, in Sweden at least, the Roman libra of 327.5 



CHAPTER XVIII 


215 


Franks on Frankish scales under the careful supervision of the 
Vikings. 59 Moreover, on one occasion the latter are said to have 
demanded silver of pure and tested quality; 60 which probably 
means that they would accept only such coins as were of proper 
fineness. In any case these are indications that bad money could 
seldom if ever be pawned off on the Northmen. Accordingly, all 
coins that were clipped, or for other reasons below weight, or 
that contained too much alloy, must have tended to drop out of 
circulation, since they could not be used in the payment of the 
Danegeld. 61 Indeed, the latter must have been a very important 
factor in the development of a general demand for money of 
proper weight and fineness. 

Did the Danegeld have any effect on the coinage system of the 
West Frankish kingdom? It is a significant fact that in the time 
of Charles the Bald many persons, even among the lower classes, 
refused to accept in trade and otherwise coins that did not bear 
the stamp of the local mint. Evidently this fact reflects another, 
and preceding, fact; namely that the minister idles of the local 
authorities had been instructed by their superiors to accept in 
the payment of redevances and taxes — the Danegeld in partic¬ 
ular — only money whose weight and fineness could not be ques¬ 
tioned, that is to say, locally coined money. Doubtless the desire 
to avoid the task of having to weigh and test each coin might 
have prompted such an instruction; but probably it was dictated 
also, and in larger measure, by the economic interests of those 
seigniors who controlled or possessed the mints — some of which 
had never been authorized by the king and were illegal — and 
who wished to enrich themselves by the profits accruing to them 
from the process of recoinage. 62 The Danegeld, therefore, so far 
from having aided Charles the Bald in his efforts to control and 
unify the coinage of the realm, 63 on the contrary must have tended 
to frustrate those efforts. On the increasing tendency of the 
seigniors to establish private mints, sometimes with and some- 

grams had by this time been superseded by the medieval mark (= 200 
grams). In the last named work there is an illustration (p. 278) of a 
bronze scale found in Sweden and presumably of the type ordinarily used 
by the Vikings. See also Bugge, Vesterlandenes Indflyclelse, loc. cit., p. 306. 

59 Supra, p. 49, n. 32, p. 54, n. 61; cf. p. 95, n. 17, p. 147, n. 46. 

60 In 884; see supra , p. 132, n. 76. 

61 Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 8-11. 

62 See supra, p. 54, n. 62. Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 8-10. 

63 Edictum Pistense, cc. 8-24, M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 314-20. Cf. 
Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 9-22; supra, p. 54, n. 62. 




216 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


times without royal sanction — a very noticeable feature of the 
later ninth and especially of the tenth century 64 — the Danegeld 
must have had, if any, a stimulating effect. 

Finally it should be said that the Danegeld led to a very serious 
impoverishment of the West Frankish realm. 65 Between 845 and 
926, i. e. within a period of about eighty years, we have recorded 
twelve or possibly thirteen payments of general Danegeld. 66 The 
total sum of money represented by those payments cannot be 
determined, since on only seven occasions are we informed of the 
amounts paid. For the Danegeld of 853, and for the payments 
made by Odo and by Rudolph, we have no figures whatever, and 
we do not know how much was paid to the Vikings of the Loire 
in 877. The total of the seven known amounts aggregates the 
sum of 39,700 pounds of silver; 67 perhaps the remaining pay¬ 
ments would at least double that figure and possibly triple it. 68 
In the latter case, the general Danegeld alone would represent 
a loss to the Western Franks of over 100,000 pounds of silver 69 
or its equivalent in other commodities. 70 The amount of money 
paid to the Northmen in the form of ransom, or local Danegeld, 


64 On this see Flach, op. cit., Ill, 345-48 and notes; See, op. cit., 421-22. 
Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 23-37; Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., 663 and n, 1; 
Viollet, Les inst. polit. de la France, I, 331-33; v. Kalckstein, Gesch. d. franz. 
Konigtums, I, 165 and n. 2. 

65 Cf. supra, pp. 109-10, nn. 112, 114, p. 138 and n. 114. 

66 Supra, p. 189 and n. 3. 


67 


7,000 pounds 

in 845 

5,000 “ 

“ 861 

6,000 “ 

“ 862 

4,000 “ 

“ 866 

5,000 “ 

“ 877 

12,000 “ 

“ 884 

700 “ 

“ 886 


(to the Seine Vikings) 

(furnished by Charles the Fat from Germany) 


Total 39,700 pounds. 

68 In England each successive payment of tribute was as a rule larger 
than the preceding one (cf. supra, pp. 17-18 and notes). On this basis it may 
be conjectured that the Frankish Danegelds in the time of Odo and Rudolph 
were heavier than the payments made by Charles the Bald. I doubt, how¬ 
ever, for the reasons stated supra, p. 133, n. 77, that a Danegeld larger than 
that of 884 was ever paid by the Franks. 

69 Cf. Soetbeer, op. cit., VI, 56; Vogel, 216. According to Prou (Les mon- 
naies carolingiennes, Introd., p. XLV), the intrinsic value of the Carolingian 
denarius was about .45 modern French francs. One hundred thousand Caro¬ 
lingian pounds would then be equal to nearly eleven million francs, or more 
than two million dollars in American money. Such calculations, however, 
are of almost no value, for it has proved impossible to determine in any ac¬ 
curate way the purchasing power of money in the Carolingian period 
(Dopsch, op. cit., II, 299 ff.). 

70 Those commodities for which some part of the Danegeld had been the 
purchase price (see supra, pp. 211-13). 






CHAPTER XVIII 


217 


it is impossible even to conjecture. Of course, it must be admitted 
that the Danegeld, general and local, does not represent by far 
all the treasure secured by the Vikings. There can scarcely be 
any doubt that the invaders secured more treasure through 
plunder than through the payment of tribute; 71 and in the im¬ 
poverishment of the realm the Danegeld was certainly a less 
important factor than the destruction of property and the devas¬ 
tation of the land. None the less, the Danegeld does represent a 
very serious economic loss to the Western Franks. We know 
that all the money secured by the Vikings was not used up by 
them while they sojurned in France. 72 A considerable part of 
the supply of money and precious metals must have been drained 
off to Scandinavia or England. 73 Furthermore, even if it is 
admitted that the huge payments to the Vikings tended tem¬ 
porarily to stimulate trade and to encourage a somewhat larger 
output in agriculture, industry, and mining, the fact remains 
that the Vikings themselves produced little or nothing, that they 
were parasites on the native population in the West Frankish 
kingdom, and, as such, only used up the fruits of the labor of 
others. It is true that all parts of the kingdom did not suffer 
equally. Francia and Neustria probably were most affected, for 
the population there always was required to contribute toward 
the Danegeld. Burgundy, too, was taxed on most occasions; but 
it was less often subjected to devastation and pillage than Fran¬ 
cia and Neustria. As for Aquitaine, we do not know with cer¬ 
tainty whether the general Danegeld ever was levied in that 
country, but there probably were frequent payments of ransom. 74 


71 Of. supra, p. 55 and n. 63, p. 57, n. 73. 

72 See supra, p. 37 and nn. 55, 56, p. 55 and n. 63, p. 57, n. 73, p. 91 and n. 
163, p. 108 and n. 105, pp. 136 ff., p. 157 and n. 38; cf. appendix iv. See also 
Chronicon Britannicum, 873, Bouquet, VII, p. 222; Chronicon Monasterii S. 
Sergii Andegav., ibid., p. 53; Ann. Fuld. 873, loc. cit., pp. 80-81. 

73 The fact that only a few—less than fifty—Prankish coins dating from 
the eighth or ninth century have been found in the three Scandinavian 
countries (Montelius, op. cit., p. 269) does not, of course, prove the con¬ 
trary. In any case, no inference could be drawn from such finds as regards 
the influence of the Danegeld either on France or Scandinavia, since it 
would be impossible to distinguish the coins that reached Scandinavia 
through the ordinary channels of trade from those that were brought there 
as part of the Danegeld. It is an interesting fact that a very large amount 
of silver, in the form of ornaments and also in bars and ingots, and dating 
from the Viking period, has been found in Scandinavia. On this see Sophus 
Muller, Nordische Altertumskunde (German translation by 0. L. Jiriczek), 
II, 285 ff.; Montelius, op. cit., 273, 276, 285-88. 

74 Supra, p. 198. 



218 


GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


The Danegeld involved an inestimable economic loss to the 
church in the western kingdom. 75 The treasures of churches 
and monasteries 76 were frequently drawn upon to furnish what 
could not be raised by taxation. At the end of the reign of 
Charles the Bald many formerly wealthy ecclesiastical establish¬ 
ments had been completely exhausted, and this, according to 
Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, was due to the deplorable policy 
of paying tribute to the Vikings. 77 Probably many more churches 
had been forced to give up their treasures before the last Dane¬ 
geld was paid in 926. 78 In this connection we should remember 
also that priests were not exempt from the Danegeld ; 79 and that 
those peasants who were settled on the lands of the church were 
probably required to contribute more regularly than other peas¬ 
ants. A monarch like Charles the Bald, who pursued a policy 
of favoritism toward the higher clergy, 80 doubtless relied on the 
church to furnish the financial aid which, at critical moments, 
was often refused him by the lay magnates. 81 In this way the 
Danegeld must have served to increase the antagonism of the 
clergy toward the lay seigniors ; 82 the latter, as has been noted, 83 
usually preferred the policy of paying tribute; and their recre¬ 
ancy in the matter of defending the land against the pagan enemy 
is constantly, and very bitterly, emphasized by the contemporary 
chroniclers and hagiographers, 84 all of whom were ecclesiastics. 

We may agree with Diimmler 85 that if any direct public benefit 
was derived from the policy of paying Danegeld, it was a wholly 
negative one; the Danegeld served only to distribute over large 
portions of the West Frankish kingdom the burdens and losses 


75 It is also true, of course, that the church suffered more from the plun¬ 
dering raids of the Vikings than did the lay seignors (cf. supra, p. 47 and 
n. 18). 

76 For an interesting catalogue and description of the treasure of a mon¬ 
astery, see Hariulf, Chronique de Vabbaye de Saint-Riquier, II, c. 10, ed. 
Lot, pp, 67 ff.; III, c. 3, pp. 86 ff. 

77 Supra, pp. 109-10 and n 114; cf. p. 138, n. 114. 

78 By the middle of the tenth century most of the bishoprics in western 
France were without any appreciable resources (Lot, Etudes sur la regne de 
Hugues Capet, pp. 217, 232 and n. 3). 

79 Supra, p. 192. 

80 Supra, p. 42 and n. 19, pp. 46-47 and n. 17, p. 105 and n. 85. 

81 Cf. supra, p. 43 and n .25. 

82 Cf. supra, p. 47 and n. 18, p. 100, n. 47, pp. 109-10 and n. 114, pp. 116-17, 
p. 129, n. 61, p. 130, n. 67. 

83 Supra, pp. 205-6 and notes. 

84 See for example supra, pp. 26-27, nn. 6, 8, pp. 109-10, n. 114, p. 115, n. 
20, p. 129. n. 61. 

85 Op. cit., Ill, 42. 



CHAPTER XVIII 


219 


which the regions directly exposed to the Viking raids would 
otherwise have had to bear alone. The study of the Danegeld is 
a study of what in the economic sense must be regarded as a 
non-productive factor. The importance of such factors, how¬ 
ever, is not always wholly neglible. Their effect on contemporary 
institutions and conditions may often be at least a partial expla¬ 
nation of why those conditions and institutions disappear, or are 
metamorphosed into something that seems entirely new. Per¬ 
haps the following may be said as regards the importance of the 
subject that has been studied in the preceding pages: it would be 
impossible thoroughly to understand the general political and 
economic development of France during the transition period of 
the ninth and tenth centuries, if the influence of the Danegeld 
were left totally out of consideration. 


APPENDIX I. 


When and Where Was the Assessment for the Dane- 
geld Paid to the Vikings of the Seine 
in 877 Prepared? 

Most scholars who have touched upon the subject of the tribute 
promised the Northmen of the Seine in 877, are agreed that an 
assessment for this Danegeld was prepared at Compiegne on 
May 7. 1 The sole basis for this is the superscription of a docu¬ 
ment which gives the rates of the assessment. 2 Since, however, 
this superscription does not agree with the Annals of St. Berlin, 
which state that the assessment was made at Kiersy on June 14, 3 

1 See the following: Bouquet, VII, 123, note (e); Pertz in M.G.H., 88., I, 
503, n. 94; Dehaisnes, ed. Ann. Bert., p. 255, note (c) ; Waitz, ed. Ann. Bert., p. 
135, n. 4; Krause in M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 353, lines 28 ff.; Gfrorer, 
Ge.sch. d. ost- u. westfrdnk. Carolinger, II, 142; von Kalckstein, AM Hugo 
in Forsch. z. d. Gesch., XIV, pp. 73-74; Diimmler, III, 42, n. 1; Steenstrup^ 
Kormannerne, II, 185; Bourgeois, he capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 81 (last 
two lines), 82 and n. 1; id., L’assemblee de Quierzy-sur-Oise, in Etudes d'his- 
toire du moyen age dtidiees d Gabriel Monod, 139, n. 1; Lot, “Le pont de 
Pitres,” Le Moyen Age, 1905, IX, 14, 15 and n. 2; Vogel, 253-54. 

2 Edictum Comyendiense de tributo Nordmannico, B. M.G.H., LL., Sectio 
II, t. ii, p. 354: “Anno incarnationis dominicae DCCCLXXVIT, Nonis Maii 
in Compendio palatio de aliqua, sed non de tota parte regni, quod domnus 
imperator Karolus habuit, antequam iunior Hlotharius defunctus fuisset, 
haec constituta est exactio Nortmannis, qui erant in Sequana, tribuenda, ut 
a regno eius recederent.” Another and similar document, for the same year 
and the same purpose (A, ibid.), has the following superscription: “Haec ex¬ 
actio a Nortmannis, qui erant in Sequana tempore Karoli regis, de suo 
regno fuit facta, ut ab ipsius regno recederent.” In this appendix we shall 
be concerned primarily with document B. But see infra, p. 229. 

3 Ann. Bert., 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135: “Inde [Karolus] placitum suum gen- 
erale Kalendis Iulii [i. e. June 14 (see below)] habuit, ubi per capitula, 
qualiter regnum Franciae Alius suus Hludowicus cum fidelibus eius et regni 
primoribus regeret, usque dum ipse Roma rediret, ordinavit, et quomodo 
tributum de parte regni Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed 

et de Burgundia exigeretur, disposuit.Dominus autem imperator 

Karolus de Carisiaco Compendium, indeque per Suessionis ad Remum civi- 
tatem . . . peragens, etc.” Bouquet—VII, 123, note (c)—believing that 
Hincmar had committed an error, suggested that the date Kalendis Iulii 
(Bouquet has Kalendas Julii), in the above quotation, ought to be corrected 
to XVIII Kai Jul. Pertz (M.G.H., 88., I, 502, n. 92) was of a different 



APPENDIX I 


221 


some students have assumed that Hincmar, the author of this 
portion of the Armais of St. Berlin, confused, in so far as the 
levy of the Danegeld was concerned, the proceedings of the 
assembly at Kiersy on June 14 with those of the assembly at 
Compiegne on May 7. * * * 4 M. Bourgeois, on the other hand, un¬ 
willing to believe that Hincmar could have erred so grossly in 
matters on which he was so well informed as the levy of the 
Danegeld and the Assembly of Kiersy, has endeavored to recon¬ 
cile the superscription of the tax document with the statements 
of Hincmar, by arguing that there were two distinct assess¬ 
ments : the first at Compiegne on May 7, and the second at Kiersy 
on June 14. 5 

opinion. He had observed that when in the manuscript calendars the words 
Kalendae, Nonae, and Idus were written in majuscules they signified, not 
those days in each month which were specifically known as the calends, the 
nones, or the ides; but the first day of those periods in each month during 
which the days were numbered with reference to the calends, the nones, and 
the ides, respectively. Thus KALEND. IUL. meant, not July 1 (the day of 
the calends of July), but June 14 (the eighteenth day before the calends 
of July), the whole period from June 14 to July 1 being designated as (the 
period of) the calends of July. Hincmar, accordingly, when he wrote KA¬ 

LEND. IUL., evidently meant the beginning (first day) of the period of the 
calends of July, which is June 14, precisely the day on which the Assembly 
of Kiersy convened. Fustel de Coulanges (Nouvelles recherches , p. 417, 

n. 1), who is of the same opinion as Pertz, calls attention to another sen¬ 
tence of Hincmar which may illustrate how this manner of reckoning time 
originated (Schedula, t. II, c. 17, Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXVI, 587): “Plures 
kalendae mensis augusti pertransierunt, etc.” 

4 The assumption seems to have originated with Bouquet, whose dictum 
was accepted by Pertz, Dehaisnes, Waitz, Dummler, and Krause; and appar¬ 
ently also by Gfrorer, von Kalckstein, and Steenstrup. See the references 
cited for these supra, n. 1. That Hincmar should have been so misjudged 
is all the more striking, in view of the fact that a specific reference to the 
Danegeld in the Capitulary of Kiersy (cf. infra, n. 16), proves that the 
raising of this tribute was one of the important matters arranged at the 
assembly of June 14. 

5 This argument of Bourgeois (L’assemblee de Quierzy-sur-Oise, loc. cit.), 
though evidently accepted by Lot and Vogel (see the references given supra, 
n. 1) is, in my opinion, not convincing. The superscription of the tax docu¬ 
ment (cf. supra, n. 2) says that at Compiegne the tax was levied on part, 
but not on the whole, of the kingdom of Charles such as it was before the 
death of Lothaire II. This, it will be noted, is a very indefinite statement; 
one which really does not convey any information as to exactly what part 
of the realm of Charles was or was not taxed. According to Bourgeois’ in¬ 
terpretation, the statement means the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald 
as it was in 870 with exception of Burgundy. That is, to be sure, the only 
interpretation which the principal hypothesis of Bourgeois will permit. But 
it is obviously not the only interpretation possible. When it is said that 
only part of the realm of 870 was taxed, it does not necessarily follow that 
Burgundy was not taxed. It is quite possible that the writer meant to 
include Burgundy and to exclude some other division of the kingdom of 
Charles the Bald, as for example Neustria, where another Danegeld was 
being raised at the same time for the Vikings of the Loire (see supra, pp. 95- 



222 


APPENDIX I 


Both views, it will be noted, rest in last analysis on the assump¬ 
tion that the superscription of the tax document is a thoroughly 
reliable source of information. One group of scholars regards 
the authority of the superscription sufficient to controvert the 
evidence furnished by Hincmar in the Annals of St. Bertin; 
while Bourgeois and his followers, though they are not disposed 
to rule Hincmar out of court, none the less retain their confidence 
in the truth of what is said in the superscription. It is clear, 
therefore, that both views will be rendered untenable if it can 
be shown that the superscription is a less trustworthy source of 
information than Hincmar. And if it can be established that the 
evidence of the superscription is utterly unreliable, we must 
perforce fall back upon the Annals of St. Bertin and the CapiUt- 
lary of Kiersy as our only trustworthy sources of information 
on this point. * * * * * 6 

That an authentic document has higher testimonial value than 
a narrative account, is in historical science a canon which it 
would be stupid to challenge. What we are now concerned with, 
however, is, not a document proper, but the superscription of a 
document. Was this superscription originally part of the docu¬ 
ment at the head of which it now appears; or was it placed there 
by a later hand? 

To me it seems that the latter view must be adopted, and for 
several reasons. A careful study of the body of the document, 
i. e. the provisions of the assessment, reveals the fact that there 
the present and future tenses are used exclusively: 7 an indication 

96, 108). The fact is that this statement is too indefinite to admit of any con¬ 

clusions as to its exact meaning. Again, Bourgeois asserts that according to 

Hincmar, the tax at Kiersy was levied on the whole kingdom of Charles the 

Bald as it was in 870 and also on Burgundy. But this is not accurate. Hinc¬ 

mar does say that at Kiersy a tax was levied on that part of the kingdom 
of Francia which Charles had before 870 and also on Burgundy. The words 
of Hincmar certainly do not imply a previous assessment, from which Bur¬ 
gundy had been exempted, nor do they necessarily indicate a larger tax area 
than that referred to in the superscription. We may note, finally, that the 
superscription, whatever may be its meaning, has practically no historical 
value if it was, as I will attempt to show in the following, added to the tax 
document by a later hand. 

6 Cf. supra, nn. 3, 4; infra, n. 16. The later compilations, such as the 
Continuation of Aimoin (Historiae Francorum, V, [ed. Nicot, Paris, 1567]) 
and the Grandes chroniques cle St. Denis (Bouquet, VII, 146), are, of course, 
not reliable; the latter, in particular, are very inaccurate and confused. Cf. 
infra, pp. 226 ff. 

7 Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico. B, loc. cit.: “donent . . . sint . . . 
accipiant . . . sunt . . . pergent . . . remanserint . . . consistunt . . . accipiat 
. . . commanent . . . habuerint . . . exigatur.” 



APPENDIX I 


223 


that it was written before the actual collection of the Danegeld. 
Hincmar, on the other hand, in giving the substance of the docu¬ 
ment in the Annals of St. Bertin, used the past tense : 8 an indi¬ 
cation that he wrote after the Danegeld had been collected. The 
same holds true of the superscription, where the tenses (past 
and pluperfect) of the verbs are so employed as to prove beyond 
peradventure that it was not written until after the death of 
Charles the Bald and the departure of the Northmen . 9 Again, 
a comparison of the vague denotation, in the superscription, of 
the territory in which the Danegeld was to be levied — “de 
aliqua, sed non de tota parte regni, quod domnus imperator 
Karolus habuit, antequam iunior Hlotharius defunctus fuisset”— 
with the very specific statement of Hincmar — “de parte regni 
Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgun- 
dia” — shows unmistakably that Hincmar, who was a contem¬ 
porary, had much more accurate information on this point than 
the writer of the superscription, who for all we know may not 
have lived until long, possibly centuries, after the events he 
referred to . 10 

Moreover, while it may be true that Hincmar is not always an 
infallible authority on the events and conditions of his time, yet 
what he says in this connection must be given considerable 
weight . * 11 He was himself present at the Assembly of Kiersy , 12 
and therefore may be presumed to have known what was decided 
there. Another indication that he was particularly well informed 
as regards the levy of the Danegeld, is the fact that he wrote a 
letter on that subject to Louis the Stammerer . 13 Also, it is very 
significant that his statements in the Annals of St. Bertin rela¬ 
tive to the apportionment of the taxes levied at Kiersy, in the 


8 Ann. Bert., loc. cit.: “habuit . . . exigeretur, disposuit . . . erat . . . ac- 
ciperent . . . redderent . . . extitit . . . acceptum fuit . . . fuerunt.” 

9 See supra, n. 2. 

10 Cf. supra, nn. 2, 3, 5. 

11 Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 139. 

12 See the letter to Louis the Stammerer written shortly after the death 
of Charles the Bald (Migne, Patr. Lat., CXXV, 988). 

13 Plodoard, Historia Remensis ecclesiae, III, c. 19, M.G.H., SS., XIII, p. 
510. Evidently this letter (which is not the same as the one to which ref¬ 
erence was made in the preceding note) was written while Charles the Bald 
was in Italy, and certainly before the emperor’s death, for the latter event 
is mentioned by Flodoard a little farther on in the same chapter; the letter 
probably was composed during the collection of the Danegeld, and may have 
contained advice on that subject (cf. supra, chap, vi, n. 99). 



224 


APPENDIX I 


main agree with the provisions given in the body of the tax 
document. 14 

These various considerations lead me to believe (1) that the 
superscription was not part of the original document; (2) that 
the superscription was added to the document by some scribe of 
a much later period; (3) that the scribe in question did not 
possess accurate information concerning the territorial limits 
within which the Danegeld was levied; and, consequently, (4) 
that the statements of Hincmar in the Annals of St. Bertin are 
a much more trustworthy source of information than those of 
the scribe in the superscription, both as regards the territory in 
which the taxes for the Danegeld were levied and also with 
reference to the time and place at which the assessment of these 
taxes was prepared. 

From what has been said above it follows that if the Annals 
of St. Bertin and the superscription of the tax document disagree 
as to the time and place at which the taxes were assessed, the 
statements of Hincmar ought to be given greater credence. Now 
Hincmar, though he does speak of an assembly of bishops at 
Compiegne on May 1, fails to mention any meeting there on 
May 7. According to Hincmar, there was but one assessment 
for this Danegeld and it was prepared at the Assembly of Kiersy 
on June 14. 15 And belief in Hincmar’s accuracy here, far from 

14 Hincmar omits certain details given in the documents, regarding the 
levy of the taxes on the mansi and the resources of the priests; and he does 
not say anything about the taxation of the merchants, which is mentioned 
in document B and in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy, but not Jn 
document A (cf. supra, n. 2). On the other hand, Hincmar speaks of a 
contribution from the church treasuries, which is not referred to in either 
of the tax documents (cf. supra, chap, vi, n. 99); and he alone informs us 
that the bishops after collecting the money from the priests were to pay it 
over to the missi clominici. The documents, of course, were drawn up for 
the specific purpose of furnishing official instruction as to where, how, and 
by whom, the Danegeld was to be collected. Hincmar wrote his account 
after the Danegeld had been collected, and for historical purposes only; 
therefore, he did not consider it necessary to give all the details that ap¬ 
peared in the official documents, though he did think it worth while to give 
some additional information as to how the required sum was finally ob¬ 
tained. See also appendix ii. 

15 Ann. Bert., 877, p. 135: “Kalendis Mai episcopos Remensis provinciae, 
sed et aliarum provinciarum Compendio convocavit, et ecclesiam quam in 
eodem oratorio construxerat cum multo apparatu in sua et nunciorum apos- 
tolicae sedis praesentia ab eisdem episcopis consecrari fecit. Inde placitum 
suum generale Kalendis Iulii habuit, etc.” (cf. supra, n. 3). Evidently all 
the bishops did not reach Compiegne at the appointed time; in any case the 
church was not dedicated until May 5 (Bouquet, VIII, 660; Bohmer-Miihl- 
bacher, Die Regesten d. Kaiserreichs u. d. Karolingern, no. 1809; cf. Diimm- 
ler, III, 41, n. 1). 



APPENDIX I 


225 


I 


being undermined, is strengthened by the additional evidence 
furnished by chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy. 16 For while 
this does not give the details of the assessment, it proves none 
the less that the levying of the Danegeld was one of the important 
matters taken up at the Assembly of Kiersy. Nor may we over¬ 
look the significance of that clause in both of the tax documents 
which distinguishes those counts and royal vassals who were 
to accompany Charles to Italy from those who were to remain 
in France. Such a distinction would hardly have been made until 
after it had been arranged that some of the fideles were to go 
with the emperor, while others were to remain at home. And 
this we know was one of the arrangements made at the Assembly 
of Kiersy. 17 It is also worth noting that the collection of the 
Danegeld evidently did not begin until after the Assembly of 
Kiersy ; 18 which would be very strange if the assessment had been 
prepared and the levy ordered fully six weeks before. Surely 
this evidence, direct and indirect, outweighs the very question¬ 
able testimony of the superscription. 18a Indeed it seems there 
can be no room for doubt that this Danegeld was assessed at 
Kiersy on June 14; and that the old view of an assessment at 
Compiegne on May 7, must be discarded. 

But, it may be asked, how was the writer of the superscription 
led, or rather misled, to believe that the assessment took place 
at Compiegne on May 7? My present answer to this question, 
and particularly to the last part of it — i. e. the question of how 
the date May 7 was obtained — can be only hypothetical and ten¬ 
tative. There were produced during the middle ages a large 
number of historical compilations based more or less remotely 
on the Annals of St. Bertin , 19 all of which must be studied and 

16 M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, 361: “Qualiter hoc perficiatur et ad effec¬ 
tual perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto.” 

17 Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico, A, loc. cit.: “De ecclesiis vero, 
quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nos¬ 
tro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, etc.” B, ibid.: “De ecclesiis vero 
imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassallorum imperialium, tarn de 
illis, qui cum imperatore pergent, quam et illis, qui remanserint, etc.” Capi- 
tulare Carisiacense, c. 7, ibid., pp. 357-58: “[This is the reply of the assem¬ 
bled fideles to a point raised by the emperor] in vestra disposition erit, 
qui in isto regno remaneant, vel qui post vos in vestrum adiutorium per- 
gant.” Those whom Charles selected to follow him to Italy are named in 
chapter 25 (p. 360). The question of the Danegeld evidently was not dis¬ 
cussed at the assembly until after these other matters had been settled; it 
is the subject with which chapter 30 (p. 361) of the capitulary deals. 

18 Cf. supra, p. 107 and n. 97. 

19 A very good catalogue, and critical account, of these compilations is 
given by Bourgeois in his Le capit. de Kiersy-sur-Oise, pp. 155 ff. 

Danegeld. 15. 



226 


APPENDIX I 


collated before anything like a final opinion on this subject can 

t _ ■ - • ■ 

be formulated. To some of these works I have not yet been able 
to obtain access. I venture to believe, however, that careful 
examination of these various compilations will eventually estab¬ 
lish the correctness of at least the fundamental part of what is 
here set forth. 

An erroneous impression as regards the place and date at 
which the tribute for the Vikings of the Seine in 877 was 
assessed, may easily be acquired from a cursory, uncritical read¬ 
ing of the Annals of St. Bertin. In these annals Hincmar fails, 
it is true, to mention any meeting whatsoever on May 7. But he 
does state that for May 1 Charles the Bald had summoned an 
assembly of bishops to Compiegne, where a church recently con¬ 
structed was then to be dedicated. After having described this 
dedication ceremony at Compiegne on the calends of May, Hinc¬ 
mar proceeds at once to speak of the other assembly on June 14, 
but without indicating here in any way that this later assembly 
met at Kiersy. 20 Not until after he has related what took place 
at the assembly of June 14, does he give even the slightest inti¬ 
mation that this assembly met at a place other than that at 
which (Compiegne) the assembly of the calends of May had met. 
Indeed, all he says is that Charles now — i. e. after the assembly 
of June 14 — proceeded from Kiersy to Compiegne, and thence 
to Soissons, etc. 21 Hincmar, accordingly, does not expressly state 
that the assembly of June 14 met at Kiersy; this is a fact which 
must be inferred from what follows in his narrative. Even a 
careful reader of this passage in the Annals of St. Bertin is likely 
to gain from it the (erroneous) impression that two assemblies 
were held at Compiegne, one on May 1 and the other on June 14. 

It must be remembered, moreover, that until the eighteenth 
century, the “famous” Capitulary of Kiersy was practically un¬ 
known, and that during the middle ages most of the informa¬ 
tion, or rather misinformation, that was current concerning the 
reign of Charles the Bald, was obtained, not from the Annals 
of St. Bertin , but from either the Continuation of Aimoin* or, 
more often, the Grandes chroniques de St. Denis. 22 The Con¬ 
tinuation of Aimoin, though often inaccurate, is, so far as that 
portion of it which has to do with the dedication of the church 

20 See supra , n. 15. 

21 See supra , n. 3; cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 

22 For a good discussion of this whole subject, see ibid., 155 ff.; cf. 4 ff. 





APPENDIX I 


227 


at Compiegne and the Assembly of Kiersy is concerned, on the 
whole a fairly accurate reproduction of the Annals of St. Bert- 
in. 23 But tlie Grancles chroniques de St. Denis , on the other 
hand, are very misleading, as will appear from the following 
quotation: “Es Kalendes de May fist assembler concile a Com¬ 
piegne des evesques de la province de Rains et des autres pro¬ 
vinces: si fist dedier l’eglise de S. Cornile, que il avait fondee 
en son propre palais, en la presence des prelaz et des messages 
l’apostole. La meismes [i. e. at Compiegne] fist-il parlement 
de barons; et fu ordene comment Looys ses fiuz governeroit le 
roiaume par le conseil des barons jusques a tant que il fust 
retornez de Rome; et puis comment il recevroit le treu de Tune 
des parties du roiaume de France, qui estoit accostumez a rendre 
avant la mort le roi Lothaire, et du roiaume de Borgoigne. . . . 
Ces choses ensi ordenees, li empereres se parti de Compiegne 24 
et s’en ala a Soissons, de Soissons a Rains, etc.” 25 

• 

When one stops to reflect upon the meager facilities which 
the writer of the superscription had to learn the truth — and 
his abundant opportunity to secure misinformation — with 
reference to the occasion at which the assessment of the Dane- 
geld was prepared, the wonder is, not that this well-intentioned 
individual committed the errors he did, but that he failed to 
commit more. Knowledge of the fact that an important assem¬ 
bly had convened at Kiersy in the year 877 could never have 

been gained from a reading of the Grandes chroniques de St. 

Denis , where it is not even hinted at. And it will perhaps be 
agreed that even the most lynx-eyed of modern scholars would 
hardly be able to detect either in the Continuation of Aimoin 
or in the Annals of St. Bertin the obscure implication that the 
assembly of June 14 met at Kiersy, unless he were already 
acquainted with that fact. The scholar with a previous knowl¬ 
edge of the Assembly of Kiersy will doubtless find both in the 
Annals of St. Bertin and in the Continuation of Aimoin con¬ 
firmation of what he already knows. But it may be safely 

23 The Continuation of Aimoin, it is true, has Kal. Junii where the An¬ 
nals of St. Bertin have Kal. Iulii. See supra, n. 3, and cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 

158. One manuscript, however, of the Armais of St. Bertin (see ed. Waitz, 
p. 135, note b; ed. Dehaisnes, p. 255, note 1) also has Kal. Iuniis (or Junii). 

24 Here the redactor, by omitting Kiersy (cf. supra, n. 3), perhaps at¬ 
tempted to rectify what he may have regarded as an error in the Annals of 
St. Bertin or in the Continuation of Aimoin. 

25 Bouquet, VII, 146. Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., 159. 



228 


APPENDIX I 


asserted that a person not in possession of this information would 
never, by reading any or all of these narrative accounts, become 
aware that the assembly at which the Danegeld was assessed 
met at Kiersy; such a reader would, like the redactor of the 
Grandes chroniques de St. Denis and the writer of the super¬ 
scription, inevitably draw the conclusion that this assembly had 
met at Compiegne. 

With reference to the date of the assembly at which the 
Danegeld was assessed, the three narratives vary widely: ac¬ 
cording to the Grandes chroniques it was es Kalendes de May; 26 
according to the Continuation of Aimoin, Kalendas Junii; and 
according to the Annals of St. Bertin, Kalendis Iulii. 27 Yet 
none of these dates agree with that given in the superscription: 
Nonis Maii. 28 Whence or how the latter date was obtained, can 
for the present be only conjectured. So far as my observations 
go, the nones of May (May 7) are not given, as the date of the 
preparation of the assessment, in any source except the super¬ 
scription of the tax document. 29 If the writer of the superscrip¬ 
tion, like the redactor of the Grandes chroniques de St. Denis , 
was under the impression that the tribute was assessed at Com¬ 
piegne on the calends of May, 30 then obviously the word Nonis 
in the superscription is simply a clerical error — committed 
either by the original writer or by some later copyist — for 
Kalendis. It is also possible, though in my opinion unlikely, 
that the author of the superscription, in writing Nonis, was 
attempting to rectify what he may have regarded as a mistake 
on the part of the Continuator of Aimoin. According to the 
latter, as we have seen, the taxes were assessed, not Kalendis 

26 That must have been the belief of the redactor of the Grandes chro¬ 
niques de St. Denis, for he does not indicate that there was any interval 
between the dedication of the church and the parlement de barons (see the 
quotation on the preceding page). Bourgeois (op. cit., 159) is not quite 
accurate when he says that this redactor (a monk of St. Denis) confused 
the assembly held at Kiersy in June with that held at Compiegne in April; 
he did not confuse it with an assembly held at Compiegne in April. 
but with the one which met there on May 1, or rather, May 5 (cf. supra, 
n. 15). 

27 See supra, n. 23. 

28 See supra, n. 2. 

29 Nor have I, as yet, found it applied anywhere to the dedication of the 
church at Compiegne (which really took place on May 5; see supra, n. 15), 
or to the Assembly of Kiersy. It is not impossible, however, that further 
research on this point, in the sources referred to supra, p. 225 and n. 19, may 
yield results. 

30 Cf. supra, n. 26. 



APPENDIX I 


229 


Iulii as Hincmar says, but Kalendas Junii: i. e., if we accept the 
interpretations of Pertz and Fustel de Coulanges — mutatis 
mutandis — May 14. 31 But two weeks — from the dedication 
of the church on May 1 to the preparation of the assessment 
on May 14 — may have seemed to the writer of the superscrip¬ 
tion too long a time for a placitum to be in session; and, accord¬ 
ingly, he may have substituted, as the date of the assessment, 
Nonis Mail for Kalendas Junii, since the first of these dates 
would better comport with the usual duration of an assembly. 

To conclude: If Hincmar is right in indicating that the 
assessment of the tribute for the Vikings of the Seine was 
prepared at Kiersy on June 14 — and if what has been above 
set forth be accepted as a sound argument, there remains no 
valid reason for doubting the truth of Hincmar’s testimony 
on this point — then it follows that the two tax documents 
which heretofore have been referred to as the Edict of Com - 
piegne Concerning the Tribute to the Northmen,* 2 must in the 
future be regarded as part of, or at least as having a close con¬ 
nection with chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy.** More¬ 
over, the fact that the details of the assessment as given in the 
two tax documents essentially agree with the details as given 
by Hincmar in the Annals of St. Bertin , 34 is a further indication 
that these documents in their original form were drawn up at 
the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, and, consequently, that the 
assessment of this Danegeld took place there and then, 35 but not 
at Compiegne on May 7. 

31 Cf. supra , nn. 23, 3. 

32 See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, 353-54, where the two documents are 
classified respectively as A and B (cf. supra, n. 2). 

33 Cf. supra, n. 16, and see appendix ii. Though no longer extant, there 
were doubtless many other documents which, like the two tax documents 
above referred to, served to fill out such chapters in the Capitulary of Kiersy 
as have come down to us only in the form of a title or a summary (cf. 
Halphen, “A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise,” Rev. Hist., 1911, 
CVI, 288, 294). 

34 Cf. supra , n. 14. 

35 The preamble of the document known as Capitula excerpta in con- 
veniu Carisiacensi coram populo lecta (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, 361) is 
in accord with the view presented above: “XVI Kalendas praedicti mensis, 
d. imperator Karolus adnuntiavit generaliter in populam de suo itinere 
Roman et . . . quia ordinatum habebat, quomodo Nortmanni de isto regno 
expellantur et postea defendantur, etc.” This announcement referred, of 
course, to the measures just completed at Kiersy. 




APPENDIX II. 


The Two Tax Documents of 877 and the Capitulary 

of Kiersy. 

Attention has been directed several times in the preceding 
pages to two tax documents, designated respectively as A and B, 
and containing provisions for the assessment of the Danegeld 
due the Vikings of the Seine in 877. 1 These documents were, 
so far as I can tell, first published by Sirmond in 1623. 2 Un¬ 
fortunately, however, Sirmond did not indicate whence he had 
obtained them. The manuscript to which he presumably had 
access is now probably lost; in any case it has escaped the ex¬ 
ploratory efforts of all later editors, including Krause. 3 These 
have, consequently, been obliged simply to reprint the documents 
in the form in which they were originally published by Sirmond. 4 
Obviously, therefore, textual criticism is here out of question; 
we must be content to study these documents in the only form 
in which they now exist or are accessible. 

Concerning the date of the two documents little need be said 
here. The error of Sirmond, Pertz, and others, in referring 
document A to the Danegeld of 861, 5 was long ago made evident. 6 

1 Cf. supra, p. 97 and n. 33; and see appendix i. 

2 Sirmond, Capitula Caroli Calvi et successorum aliquot Franciae regum., 
pp. 421 ff. 

3 See M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 353, lines 14-15. 

4 The text of the documents as given by Krause, the latest editor, is 
quoted infra, n. 9. Cf. Duchesne, Historiae Francorum scriptores [1636], 
II, pp. 460-61; Baluze, Capitularia regum Francorum [1677; ed. de Chiniac, 
1780], II, pp. 257-58; Bouquet, VII, 697; Pertz, M.G.H., LL., I, 476, 536. In 
all these editions the text of the documents is identical, save for certain 
variations in punctuation and capitalization. 

5 Dummler (III, 42, n. 1) and Krause (M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. ii, 353, 
lines 16 ff.) are unquestionably wrong in making Pertz (M.G.H., LL., I, 476) 
the author of this error. It was Sirmond who, in a note to his edition of 
the Capitula (cf. supra, n. 2), first ascribed document A to the year 861. 
Sirmond’s note was quoted by Baluze (II, p. 806) and Bouquet (VII, 697, 
note a) ; a fact which makes the oversight on the part of Dummler and 
Krause the more surprising. 

6 See the references to Dummler and Krause in the preceding note. 



APPENDIX II 


231 


Perhaps no scholar familiar with the history of the ninth cen¬ 
tury would now venture to deny that each of the documents 
contains a draft of an assessment drawn up in 877 for the pur¬ 
pose of raising the tribute then due the Northmen of the Seine. 7 
But unless the argument which I have set forth in the preceding 
appendix is utterly false and misleading, this assessment was 
prepared, not at Compiegne on May 7 as most recent scholars 
have concluded, but at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14. 
Accordingly there must have been a very close connection be¬ 
tween the two tax documents and that part (chapter 30) of the 
Capitulary of Kiersy which has to do with the Danegeld. 8 

But what is the relation of these two tax documents to each 
other? 9 Comparing them, we note at once that the language 

7 von Noorden (Hinkmar, 334, n. 6, 335) argued that document A con¬ 
tained the assessment levied in Neustria (in 877) to raise the Danegeld for 
the Northmen of the Loire (cf. supra, pp. 67, 71). But Diimmler (loc. cit.) 
correctly signalized this as an unwarranted assumption. 

8 Cf. supra, p. 229 and n. 33. The question as to whether chapter 31 of 
the Capitulary of Kiersy has reference to the Danegeld is discussed infra, 
pp. 233 ff. 

9 For the superscriptions of the documents, see supra, appendix i, n. 2. 
These superscriptions, which differ on several points, are of no value in 
attempting to establish the relations of the documents to each other. It has 
already been pointed out (cf. supra, appendix i) that the superscription of 
B was added at a later period, and that it is inaccurate and misleading. 
The superscription of A, while correct so far as it goes, is very vague; the 
tenses of its verbs clearly indicate that it was written long after the docu¬ 
ment proper (cf. supra, p. 222 f.). The following is the text of the documents 
as given by Krause. A (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354): “Unusquisque 
episcopus, qui habet abbatiam, aut abbas, qui similiter habet abbatiam, aut 
comes, qui aeque habet abbatiam, de suo manso indominicato similiterque 
et de vassallorum accipiat de manso indominicato denarios duodecim, de 
manso ingenuili quatuor denarios de censu dominicato et quatuor de sua 
facultate, de servili vero duos denar-ios de censu et de sua facultate duos. 
De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus vel abbas de sua solum- 
modo potestate accipiant de presbyteris a quocumque plurimum solidos quin- 
que et de unoquoque iuxta quod possibile fuerit, ita ut a quo plurimum 
quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero, quas 
comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nostro per- 
gere debent, sive qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, 
secundum praetaxatum modum accipere procurabit. De ecclesiis vero im- 
peratricis episcopus similiter accipiet praetaxato modo.” B (iMcl.): “Epis- 
copi, abbates, comites ac vassi dominici ex suis honoribus de unoquoque 
manso indominicato donent denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuili quatuor 
denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassal- 
vero manso duos denarios de censu indominicato et duos de facultate man- 
suarii. De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus de suo episcopatu 
vel abbas de sua solummodo abbatia, .in cuiuscumque episcopi sint parro¬ 
chia, accipiant cum misso episcopi, in cuius parrochia sunt, de presbyteris 
secundum possibilitatem quinque solidos vel quatuor vel tres vel duos vel 
unum solidum; a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor 
denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassal¬ 
lorum imperialium, tarn de illis, qui cum imperatore pergent, quam et illis. 



232 


APPENDIX II 


of B is somewhat clearer and more concise than that of A. And 
while the provisions of the one in the main coincide with those 
of the other, yet they are not identical. The taxation provided 
for in B is more comprehensive than that contemplated in A. 
According to A, only mansi appertaining to monasteries were 
taxed, and apparently not all of these, for the document men¬ 
tions only the monasteries held by bishops, abbots, and counts, 
but not those held by royal vassals; while according to B taxes 
were due from royal vassals as well as bishops, abbots, and 
counts, and they were due for the mansi of all their konores, 
which included not only monastery lands but all lands given by 
the king in benefice. 10 B requires all priests, including those 
attached, to churches held by the emperor, to pay a tax; and it 
has a clause (at the very end) which prescribes a contribution 
from merchants and townsmen. In A there is no mention either 
of the priests of imperial churches or of merchants and towns¬ 
men. The provision in B, that when an abbot collects the taxes 
from the priests under his jurisdiction he must do so in con¬ 
junction with the missus of the bishop of the diocese, is also 
lacking in A. 

It would be very anomalous if the more comprehensive and 
more detailed document (B) had preceded the other (A). We 
must assume, on the contrary, that B is a revised version of A. 
This, it may be noted, was also the view of Dummler, who 
characterized A as “nur ein Entwurf, der, als nicht um- 
fassend genug, dem andern weichen musste.” * 11 Krause, though 
he accepts this view, adds that the words “cum seniore nostro” 
indicate, in his opinion, that this document was drawn up by 
the magnates. 12 I cannot convince myself of that. Royal offi¬ 
cials may very well, in drawing up a preliminary draft, have 
used such an expression. Moreover, it must be remembered that 
chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy — to which, in my opin¬ 
ion, both documents owe their origin 13 — dealt with one of those 

qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum prae- 
dictum modum coniectum accipiat. De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in 
civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de 
facultatibus, coniectus exigatur.” 

10 Cf. supra, chap, v, n. 138. 

11 Dummler, loc. cit. 

12 LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 353, lines 22 ff. 

13 See the preceding page and n. 8. 





APPENDIX II 233 

questions on which the assembled fideles did not give their 
opinion. 14 

These various facts and considerations appear from my point 
of view to justify the following hypothesis: (1) both tax doc¬ 
uments were drawn up by the king’s officials at the Assembly 
of Kiersy on June 14, and were intended to be inserted into 
chapter 30 of the Capitulary of Kiersy — a chapter which, in 
the version we have, consists merely of the following topical 
statement: “Qualiter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat, 
quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto”; 15 (2) document A was 
written first, but was, after some deliberation by the king and 
his officials, declared inadequate and therefore discarded; (3) 
a new document, B, more comprehensive in scope, was then 
drawn up; this was regarded as sufficient for the purpose, and 
therefore became part of the Capitulary of Kiersy in its final 
and completed form. 

Something remains to be said with reference to the second 
clause in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy: “Et de cappis 
et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut Iudaei dent decimam et nego¬ 
tiators christiani undecimam.” 16 It is of considerable import¬ 
ance to determine whether this clause deals with the same sub¬ 
ject and the same persons as the following sentence at the end 
of document B: “De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in civitatibus 
commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de 
facultatibus, coniectus exigatur.” 17 We know that document B 
refers to the Danegeld, but does chapter 31 of the Capitulary 
of Kiersy also refer to the Danegeld? That we do not know. 
Chapter 31 of the Capitulary contains two clauses, the first of 
which is concerned with the honores of Boso and others, the 
second with a tax on merchants. 18 Bourgeois 19 assumes that the 
tax on the merchants must have been for the purposes of the 
Danegeld, and then concludes that the first clause, which refers 

14 M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 358, lines 30-31. Cf. Bourgeois, Le ccipit. 
de Kiersy-sur-Oise, 27-68; Halphen, “A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur- 
Oise,” Rev. Hist., 1911, CVI, 287-88, 294. 

15 M.G.H.. LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361. See supra, appendix i, n. 33, and cf. 
Fustel de Coulanges, Nouvelles recherches, 434-35. 

16 Gapilulare Carisiacense, c. 31 (M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361): “De 
honoribus Bosonis, Bernardi et Widonis et aliorum illarum partium. Et de 
cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet' ut Iudaei dent decimam et negotia¬ 
tors christiani undecimam.” 

17 Cf. supra, n. 9. 

18 Cf. supra, n. 16. 

19 Op. cit., p. 82. 



234 


APPENDIX II 


to the honores of Boso et al., must have had a similar purport. 
The correctness of this conclusion may be questioned. In the 
first place, it need not be assumed that there was any connection 
between the raising of the Danegeld and the question of the 
honores of Boso and his associates. Charles may well have had 
other reasons for considering the latter question, reasons that 
grew out of the mounting ambition and the recent activities of 
Boso; he may have wished to take precautions against the ac¬ 
cumulation of too much power in the hands of vassals whose 
good faith there was reason to suspect. 20 In the second place, 
it is very strange that the clause concerning the merchants, 
if it really refers to the Danegeld, was not included in chapter 
30, which was devoted to that subject. We cannot suppose that 
in the case of Boso and his associates there was a closer con¬ 
nection with merchants than there was in the case of the other 
magnates. These considerations lead me to believe (1) that 
there is no connection whatever between the first and second 
clauses in chapter 31 of the Capitulary of Kiersy; and (2) that 
the second clause, which refers to a tax on merchants, was not 
originally part of chapter 31, but was wrongly inserted there 
by some scribe at a later time. Whether or not this second clause 
refers to the Danegeld, cannot be definitely determined. If it 
does, then it certainly belongs with chapter 30, just as the two 
tax documents above referred to. In that case, furthermore, 
this clause must be regarded as a revision and amendment of 
the last sentence in document B, for that does not specify the 
exact rate of taxation in the case of the merchants; it merely 

20 Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., pp. 83 ff. The fact that Boso is referred to as 
carissimus Dux noster in a diploma issued by Charles at Besangon on August 
11 (Bouquet, VIII, 672-3), does not necessarily invalidate the assumption that 
at the Assembly of Kiersy Charles had considered the advisability of reducing 
the number of honores held by Boso and some other powerful vassals. We 
know that soon after Charles had reached Italy, Boso and his associates entered 
into open revolt against the emperor (Ann. Bert., 877, p. 136). Boso was 
not present at the Assembly of Kiersy, (Bouquet, IX, 255), and very likely 
his relations with Charles had been strained since the spring. At most, the 
mention of Boso in the diploma of August 11 indicates a temporary, and 
probably only an apparent, reconciliation. Seeman (Boso von Nieclerbur- 
guncl, 37-43) apparently takes the view that Charles the Bald did not sur¬ 
mise any danger of revolt on the part of Boso until after he had reached 
Italy, and after the vassals had refused to come to his aid against Karlmann. 
In that case, it must be assumed that Charles at the Assembly of Kiersy 
raised the question of Boso’s honores for other reasons than those suggested 
above. Even so, however, there is nothing which proves a connection be¬ 
tween that question and the levy of the Danegeld; it seems to me that the 
reasoning which leads Bourgeois to this conclusion really has for its prin¬ 
cipal basis the rather dangerous argument post ergo propter. 




APPENDIX II 


235 


provides for a tax according to fortune. But no positive state¬ 
ment can be made on this point. The clause may not refer to 
the Danegeld at all. The taxation of merchants, Christian as 
well as Jewish, was certainly not limited to occasions when 
Danegeld had to be raised. 21 It is even possible that originally 
this clause had no relation whatever to the Capitulary of Kiersy. 

But how did the clause in question come to find a place in 
chapter 31 of the Capitulary? To this only a hypothetical an¬ 
swer can be suggested, for the original manuscript of the 
Capitulary of Kiersy is no longer in existence. 22 In medieval 
manuscripts marginal notes, or glosses, are matters of very 
frequent occurrence. It is not at all impossible that what now 
constitutes the second clause in chapter 31, was originally only 
a marginal gloss inserted by some scribe who knew or assumed 
that what he wrote pertained to the assessment of the Dane¬ 
geld. 2 ^ Now, it is well known that in the process of copying 
manuscripts scribes often incorporated glosses into the body 
of the text to which the glosses referred. 24 In this case, a gloss, 
applying to chapter 30, and written in the margin opposite that 
chapter, which is very brief, would probably have extended far 
enough down the page so as to be opposite chapter 31 as well 
as chapter 30. 25 A later scribe may, out of ignorance or care¬ 
lessness or both, easily have incorporated with chapter 31 what 
originally was a gloss applying to chapter 30. 26 


21 See Waitz, D. Verfassungsgesch., IV, 44-45. 

22 Bourgeois, op. cit., p. 11. At least that part of the manuscript which 
contained the text of the Capitulary has been lost. 

23 According to Palke (Die Geschichte des deutschen Handels, p. 36), 
merchants were taxed regularly, and not only for the Danegeld, at the rate 
of one tenth for Jews and one eleventh for Christians. He seems to indicate 
that these rates of assessment had applied at least as early as the reign of 
Louis the Pious. If this opinion were correct, any official would have 
known the rates at which merchants were taxed, and the clause in document 
B covering this point would have been quite sufficient for its purpose, even 
though it dicf not give the specific rates. Unfortunately, Palke does not 
support his statement by any reference to the sources, and it is probably 
an unwarranted generalization based only on the arrangement for 877. Cf. 
Waitz, op. cit., IV, 120, n. 1. 

24 Cf. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, ed. 1903, p. 343. 

25 This was called to my attention by Professor J. W. Thompson, of the 
University of Chicago. 

26 For a somewhat similar hypothesis, applying to chapter 25 of the Ca¬ 
pitulary of Kiersy, see Halphen, op. cit., p. 293, n. 3. 



APPENDIX III. 


The Danegeld in Frisia. 

The payment of tribute to the Vikings, which is a character¬ 
istic feature of the history of the ninth and tenth centuries both 
in the West Frankish kingdom and in England, appears to have 
had its origin in Frisia during the later period of the reign of 
Charlemagne. Between the years 810 and 852, there have been 
recorded five different instances of the exaction of Danegeld 
from the Frisians. 

In 810, while Charlemagne was tarrying at Aachen meditating 
on an expedition against King Godfrey of Denmark, news was 
brought him that a Danish fleet numbering two hundred vessels 
had landed in Frisia. The report went on to state that the 
Vikings, after having ravaged all the islands adjacent to the 
Frisian coast, had transported themselves over to the mainland, 
where they had defeated the Frisians in three successive engage¬ 
ments. Complete masters of the situation, the Vikings had then 
imposed a tribute on the conquered. Concerning the amount of 
this tribute we know only that when Charles was informed of the 
Viking raid, the Frisians had already liquidated the sum of 
100 pounds of silver. 1 This amount they had raised apparently 
by taxation. 2 

The next levies of Danegeld in Frisia took place during the 
later years of the reign of Louis the Pious, in 836 and 837 
respectively. In the former year the Northmen are said, after 
having set fire to Antwerp and the emporium of Witla, to have 

1 Einhard, Annales, 810, M.G.H ., SS., I, 197; Annales Maximiniani, 810, 
ibid., XIII, 24; Annales Mettenses, 810, Duchesne, Hist. Franc, scriptores, 
III, 295; Poeta Saxo, V, lines 403-4, M.G.H., SS., I, 274; Einhard, Vita Karoli, 
cc. 14, 17, ed. Garrod and Mowat, pp. 16, 20. 

2 Einhard, Ann., loc. cit.: “Danosque victores tributum victis inposuisse, 
et vectigalis nomine centum libras argenti a Frisionibus iam esse solutas.” 





APPENDIX III 237 

accepted tribute from the Frisians. The amount of this tribute 
is not indicated. 3 

In 837 Vikings were able, by reason of the unpreparedness 
or disloyalty of the Frisians, to effect a landing on the island 
of Walcheren. Several counts and other magnates were put 
to death, while others were taken prisoner and held for ransom. 
Then the invaders exacted tribute, or census, as they pleased; 
they are said to have obtained an infinite amount of money of 
diverse kinds. - Proceeding on to the mainland, the Vikings de¬ 
vastated Dorstadt in the same year, and received more tribute 
from the Frisians of that region. 4 5 

In 846 — the year following that in which Ragnar secured 
the first Danegeld in the West Frankish kingdom — when Frisia 
was included in the realm of Lothaire I, the Northmen, we are 
informed, made themselves masters of almost the entire prov¬ 
ince and collected as much census there as they desired. Lo¬ 
thaire, though fully aware of the outrage, was powerless either 
to prevent or to avenge it; and so the Vikings, having filled their 
vessels with booty and with captives, sailed away unmolested. 3 

The last Danegeld recorded for Frisia was exacted in 852. 6 
In that year the Northmen arrived in a fleet numbering 252 
ships. Large demands were made on the Frisians, who evidently 
paid or produced what was required of them. Whereupon the 
invaders lifted anchor and proceeded elsewhere. 7 

None of these payments, it will be noted, had been sanctioned 
by the ruler who at the time was vested with sovereign authority 
in Frisia. In that respect the Frisian Danegeld differs both 
from the West Frankish and the English Danegelds, which, 
whether tributary or stipendiary, were always paid by, or in 

3 Ann. Fulclenses, 836, ed. Kurze, p. 27. For the location of Witla, see 
Vogel, 70, n. 4. 

4 Ann. Fulcl., 837, p. 28; Ann. Bert., 837, p. 13; Ann. Xantenses, 837, 
M.G.H., 88., II, 226; Thegan, Vita Hludovici imperatoris, ibid., 604. 

5 Ann. Bert., 846, p. 33; Ann. Xant., 846, loc. cit., 228. 

6 In 873 the Viking leader Rodulf, through his envoys, demanded tribute 
from the population of the Ostergau. The demand, however, was refused 
by the Frisians, who declared they paid taxes only to their king, Louis the 
German, and his sons. In the hostilities which followed, Rodulf was killed 
and his forces were defeated. See Ann. Fuld., 873, loc. cit., p. 80; Ann. 
Xant., 873, loc. cit., 219; Ann. Bert., 873, p. 124. Cf. Vogel, 244 ff. On Dudo’s 
improbable statement (Be moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum, 
II, cc. 8-10, ed. Lair, pp. 148-50) that Frisia was by Rollo subjected to pay¬ 
ment of tribute, see Vogel, p. 279. 

7 Ann. Bert., 852, p. 41; cf. Miracula sancti Bavonis, Bouquet, VII, p. 153, 
note a. 



238 


APPENDIX III 


the name of, the monarch. Except for the payment of 810 there 
is, unfortunately, no evidence which throws any light on the 
method by which the Frisian Danegeld was raised. Nor is it 
possible to determine, in any instance, the limits of the region 
whence the tribute came; it is improbable, however, that any of 
these tributes was raised throughout all of Frisia. < 


APPENDIX IV. 

The Danegeld in Lorraine and the East Frankish 

Kingdom. 

Only one Danegeld has been recorded for the kingdom of 
Lorraine as such. It was raised in the year 864 by Lothaire II, 
who for this purpose exacted 4 denarii from every mansus in his 
whole realm. The entire sum of denarii (what this amounted 
to is not indicated) was paid, as a stipendiary Danegeld it is 
said, to the Northman Rodulf and his men. 1 In addition to the 
money, the Vikings received also a number of cattle and large 
quantities of flour, wine, and beer. 2 

Doubtless Lothaire was here following the example set by 
Charles the Bald, 3 who, it will be remembered, in 860 had for a 
similar consideration engaged the Vikings under Weland to 
expel another group of Northmen established on the island 
of Oscellus in the Seine. 4 But why Lothaire had found it neces¬ 
sary to resort to this measure is not made clear; nor do we 
learn of any services rendered by the Vikings in return for the 

stipend they had received. 5 

* * ❖ * 

In 882, several years after eastern Lorraine had by the treaty 
of Mersen been annexed to the East Frankish kingdom, Emperor 
Charles the Fat paid Danegeld to the Vikings encamped at Elsloo 

1 Ann. Bert., 864, p. 67: “Hlotharius, Hlotharii Alius, de omni regno suo 
quattuor denarios ex omni manso colligens, summam denariorum cum 
multa pensione farinae atque pecorum necnon vini ac sicerae Rodulfo Nor- 
manno, Herioldi filio, ac suis locarii nomine tribuit.” 

2 The word siceva (see the preceding note) is by Richter (Annalen des 
frdnJcischen Reichs im Zeitalter der Karolinger, II, 398, note a) said to mean 
“beer”; Vogel, p. 196, translates it “sherbet” (an intoxicating drink) ; Du- 
cange (Glossarium, s. v.), after indicating that the term, which is of Hebrew 
origin, was applied to any intoxicating drink except wine, explains how 
sicera was brewed. 

3 Cf. Diimmler, II, 76. 

4 See supra, pp. 48 ft. 

5 Vogel (loc . cit.) scouts the idea that this payment was a stipend and 
maintains it was pure tribute. 



240 


APPENDIX IV 


on the Meuse. The circumstances leading up to this payment 
are of sufficient interest and importance to be set forth in some 
detail. 0 

The first half of the year 882 was, with respect to the incur¬ 
sions of the Northmen, undoubtedly one of the most critical 
periods in the history of the East Frankish kingdom. Under 
the leadership of the two “kings” Godfrey and Siegfried, and 
of the two princes Vurm and Hals, the Scandinavian invaders 
had plundered, burned, and laid waste virtually every place of 
importance in the territory comprising the valleys of the lower 
Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. From the entire region most 
of the inhabitants, and in particular the monks and the clergy, 
had fled before the devastation of the Northmen. 6 7 

Though several attempts were made by the East Franks to 
check the enemy, they were all unsuccessful. To cap the climax, 
Louis the Younger, who was the stronger and abler of the two 
surviving sons of Louis the German, passed away on January 
20, 882. The news of his death served only to increase the 
audacity of the pagans, who now ascended the Rhine to plunder 
Coblenz, and made a feint on Mainz. They proceeded still 

6 The principal sources for the events to be here described are the third 
and fourth portions of the Annals of Fulda, Regino’s Chronicle, the Annals 
of St. Bertin, and the Annals of St. Vaast, to which may be added Helmold’s 
Chronicles of the Slavs, though the latter is not contemporary. The third 
part of the Annals of Fulda (Mogontiacensis), written by Meginhard, 
breathes hostility not only to Charles the Pat, but also to the principal ad¬ 
visers of the latter, in particular to Liutward, the archchaplain of the em¬ 
peror and bishop of Vercellae, and to Count Wigbert, of whose position and 
career we know very little. (He may have been a vassal of Hugo, the son 
of Lothaire II. Hugo certainly had a vassal by that name, whom he later 
put to death.—Regino, ed. Kurze, pp. 120-21; cf. Dummler, III, 202, n. 2.) 
Perhaps partly on account of hostility to the emperor and the latter’s en¬ 
tourage, and partly for other reasons, Meginhard expresses a very strong 
disapproval of the manner in which Charles dealt wih the Northmen. The 
Continuatio Ratisbonensis of the Annals of Fulda seems to have been writ¬ 
ten by a supporter of Charles and his policy. The value of each of these 
narratives, therefore, must be discounted in proportion to its author’s an¬ 
tipathies or sympathies. Regino does not attempt to pass judgment on 
Charles the Pat and his policy, but it is clear that he was not satisfied with 
the results of that policy (“conatus eius parum effectum obtinuit”—882, p. 
119). Hincmar, the author of that part of the Annals of St. Bertin with 
which we are here concerned, may have lacked complete information on 
what was actually done at this time; he is inclined to regard Charles as a 
coward. The author of the Annals of St. Vaast gives merely the main facts 
in the case and does not in any way reveal his own attitude toward the 
emperor and his policy. Helmold, writing almost three centuries after the 
events he describes, is somewhat inaccurate, and wishes to emphasize the 
inertia and foolishness of Charles. 

7 On this and the following, cf. Vogel, 281 ff. 





APPENDIX IV 241 

farther up the Moselle, attacked Treves, and even threatened 
Metz, in the heart of upper Lorraine. 

The only remaining son of Louis the German, Charles the Fat, 
was absent in Italy, whither he had gone to accept from the 
pope the imperial crown. Messengers despatched to Charles 
apprised him of the danger to which his realm was exposed, and 
urged him to hasten northward to defend his German subjects 
against the ravages of the Vikings. The emperor, indeed, lost 
no time in returning. In May he held a general assembly at 
Worms, where all the vassals of the East Frankish realm swore 
him allegiance. At the same assembly measures were devised 
for the expulsion of the Northmen, who in the meantime had 
established themselves in a fortified camp at Elsloo on the Meuse, 
just below Maastricht. 

In June or early in July was mobilized an immense army, in¬ 
cluding contingents from all the German stems within the realm 
of Charles. This force proceeded northward in two columns, 
one on each side of the Rhine, to Andernach, where the columns 
were united. From Andernach a detachment of Bavarians and 
Franks, under Arnulf of Carinthia and Henry of Saxony re¬ 
spectively, was sent forward to attack, and to capture if possible, 
those Northmen who might be found outside the fortifications 
of Elsloo. Though this preliminary maneuver was for some 
reason unsuccessful, the men engaged in it were able to rejoin 
the main army without having suffered serious losses. 8 

Thereupon Charles at once advanced with his entire army 
to Elsloo, laid siege to the Viking camp, and invested it for a 
period of twelve days in the month of July. On July 21 a veiy 
severe hailstorm wrought havoc among both besiegers and be¬ 
sieged, causing the death of many men and animals in both 
camps. This may have discouraged the emperor and some of 
the Franks, who very probably regarded the storm as evidence 
of divine wrath — God would punish the sins of his people 


8 This episode is mentioned only in the Cont. Ratisl). of the Annals of 
Fulda , the author of which attributes the failure of the movement to treach¬ 
ery on the part of certain Pranks who, according to current rumor, had been 
bribed. Vogel (p. 289, p. 290, n. 1; cf. pp. 293, 294) brands this rumor as 
false and ascribes the failure to the watchfulness of the Scandinavian spies. 


Danegeld. 17. 



242 


APPENDIX IV 


by refusing to grant them victory over their enemies. 9 At all 
events Charles was induced to enter into negotiations with the 
Northmen immediately or soon after the storm. 

The initiative to these negotiations had, I believe, been taken 
by the Northmen, and in particular by Godfrey, their most 
distinguished and most powerful leader. 10 It was certainly an 
opportune moment for a move of this kind, in view of the pre¬ 
vailing discouragement among the Franks, resulting from the 
effects of the storm. But Godfrey was probably too sagacious 
to rely exclusively on his opponents’ dejected state of mind 
for the success of his enterprise. He seems to have secured 
the intervention in his behalf of at least two men who stood 
close to the emperor, namely Bishop Liutward and Count Wig- 
bert. In any case, these men were later accused by their enemies 
of having accepted bribes from the Northmen; an accusation 
the truth of which may of course be challenged, but which can¬ 
not be definitely proved false. 

After it had been arranged that the Franks were to furnish 


9 Though the storm is mentioned only by the author of the Cont. Ratisl).. 
p. 108, there is no reason to doubt the truth of his statement. Regino tells 
us (p. 119) that the great effort of Charles to expel the Northmen met with 
little success, “indignatione caelesti super populum christianam religionem 
profanantem deseviente.” Hincmar, after having mentioned the arrival of 
Charles before the Viking camp, says significantly (Ann. Bert., p. 153): 
“concidit cor eius.” What we know in general of the character and courage 
of Charles the Fat, certainly lends color to the theory that it was this storm 
and its results, interpreted as an adverse sign from heaven, which, in part 
at least, undermined the earlier confidence of the emperor in the ability of 
his army to overcome the Northmen (cf. Diimmler, III, 201, n. 6). Besides 
it must be remembered that the statement in Part III of the Annals of Fulcla 
(p. 98) to the effect that the Northmen were at their last gasp, terror 
stricken, and despairing of their lives, is no doubt an exaggeration, the pur¬ 
pose of which was to belittle Charles and to emphasize his cowardice. In 
any case, Charles had at the time no means of ascertaining actual condi¬ 
tions among the Northmen. The Viking army was perhaps numerically 
inferior to the Frankish, but still it was a very large army. On its fighting 
qualities it is not necessary again to expatiate. On the other hand, it is 
very doubtful that the Frankish investment of Elsloo was complete; the 
Vikings may have been able to avail themselves of their ships on the Meuse. 
On this see Vogel, p. 290, n. 3, p. 291, n. 3. 

10 The Annals of St. Bertin, Regino, and the Cont. Ratisl). give no definite 
information as to whether it was the Northmen or the Franks that first 
suggested negotiation. But Part III of the Annals of Fulda gives us to under¬ 
stand that the initiative came from the Vikings, who had bribed Bishop 
Liutward and Count Wigbert to suggest to the emperor that he desist from 
the siege and enter into negotiations with Godfrey. The Annals of St. Vaast 
also indicate that it was Godfrey who first began to negotiate. 


Duneueld. 16. 





APPENDIX IV 


243 


hostages to the Northmen, Godfrey 11 went to meet the emperor 
at a place some six miles distant from Elsloo. The Viking 
leader offered to cease plundering the East Frankish kingdom 
during the lifetime of Charles, and to become a Christian and 
accept baptism, 12 on condition (1) that he be invested with the 
counties and fiefs in Frisia which had formerly been held by 
his countryman Rorich; (2) that Gisla, the daughter of Lothaire 
II, be given him in marriage; 13 and (3) that his fellow Norse¬ 
man Siegfried (and also Vurm and Hals?) be paid a sum of 
money amounting to 2,412 or 2,080 pounds of gold and silver. 
These terms were accepted by Charles, probably at the sugges¬ 
tion of his advisers, Liutward and Wigbert in particular. 

Charles the Fat has been severely criticized, by his contem¬ 
poraries and by modern historians alike, for what they call his 
pusillanimity in dealing with the Northmen on this occasion. 14 
Almost all those who have written on the subject are of the 
opinion that it was the manifest duty of Charles to annihilate 
the invaders by pressing the siege operations, or by forcing them 
to engage in a battle the outcome of which, it is assumed, could 

11 The statement in the Cont. Ratisb. that it was Siegfried, not Godfrey, 
who went to confer with Charles, appears to be an error (Diimmler, III, 203, 
n. 2; Vogel, 291, n. 6, 292, n. 2). I believe the error should be attributed to 
the original annalist rather than some later copyist; for in the enumeration 
of the various Viking leaders a few lines before, Siegfried is mentioned first 
and Godfrey second, which almost proves that in the mind of the annalist 
Siegfried was manu validior. But since all the other sources agree in stat¬ 
ing that the treaty was made with Godfrey, not with Siegfried, we must 
conclude that the author of the Cont. Ratisb. was misinformed on this point. 

12 On the baptism of Godfrey, see Diimmler, III, 203, n. 1. 

13 This marriage alliance is not mentioned at all by Hincmar (Vogel’s 
assertion, p. 292, n. 2, to the contrary notwithstanding) nor in Part III of 
the Annals of Fulda. The author of the Cont. Ratisb. states that it took 
place in the following year. Regino and the author of the Annals of St. 
Vaast , however, give it as one of the conditions on which Godfrey agreed 
to become a Christian in 882. Diimmler and Vogel, using the argument ex 
silentio, conclude that Regino and the author of the Annals of St. Vaast in 
some inexplicable way got the marriage alliance mixed up with the treaty 
of 882, that in reality this marriage was not agreed upon until the following 
year, and that it had nothing to do with the treaty of 882. But it seems 
preferable to avoid the argument from silence and to attempt to reconcile 
the statements of Regino and the author of the Annals of St. Vaast with 
those of the Cont. Ratisb. It is quite possible that the marriage had been 
agreed upon in connection with the treaty of 882, but was not consummated 
until the following year. Cf. Vogel, 292, n. 2; Diimmler, III, 203, n. 1. Vogel 
admits, p. 299, n. 4, that Charles the Fat may have proposed the marriage. 

14 Cf. Diimmler, III, 202 and n. 1; Bolimer-Miihlbacher, Regcsten, no. 
1639b. Vogel, p. 291, refers to the negotiations as “das jammervollste 
Schauspiel, das sich iiberhaupt in der Geschichte der normannischen Ein- 
falle den Blicken bietet.” Cf. supra, p. 147. 



244 


APPENDIX IV 


not have been doubtful; he should never have consented to enter 
into negotiations with the enemy at all, and the fact that he 
did so at a time when he might have destroyed them, is but 
too convincing proof of his cowardice. 15 

It may be admitted that Charles was lacking in valor and 
resoluteness. Yet, before passing too severe judgment on what 
he did at this time, we shall do well to reflect that Frankish 
victory need not necessarily have followed an armed conflict 
at Elsloo. 10 Moreover, was not the policy of converting the 
Northmen and of granting fiefs to one of their strongest leaders, 
precisely the method whereby the Viking problem in the West 
Frankish realm in the end was solved? 17 

The money consideration received by the Northmen was, we 
may note, comparatively small. It could not possibly have had 
the same importance as the other provisions of the treaty. That 
treaty itself was, so far as we can judge, a contract between 
Charles on the one hand and Godfrey on the other, as princi¬ 
pals. 18 There is no evidence to show that the other Viking leaders, 
such as Siegfried, Vurm, or Hals, engaged themselves to the 
emperor 19 in any way whatsoever. 20 The quid pro quo demanded 
and received by Godfrey for himself was (1) the counties and 
fiefs in Frisia, and (2) the marriage alliance with Gisla, daughter 

15 Cf. Dummler, III, 202, 203. 

16 See supra, n. 9. Cf. the defeat of the Saxons under Duke Brun (Vogel, 
276 ff.) and the failure of the Franks under Louis the Younger to force the 
Northmen at Nimwegen to capitulate (ibicl., 278 ff.). 

17 That Charles and his counsellors, especially Liutward, really intended 
to follow a policy of conciliation with the Northmen by which the latter 
might be brought under the softening influences of the Christian religion, 
may be gathered even from a source so hostile to Charles as Part III of the 
Annals of Fulda. Meginhard there tells us that Godfrey had been intro¬ 
duced to Charles by Liutward, and that the emperor, after the manner of 
Ahab, received the Norseman as a friend and himself raised him from the 
baptismal font. Later he tells us, in a very indignant tone, how Charles 
refused to take revenge or to break off negotiations with Godfrey on ac¬ 
count of some insults heaped on the Franks by the other Northmen in the 
meantime; and how severely Charles punished anyone of his soldiers who 
killed a Northman while the negotiations were pending, even if the North¬ 
man in question had tried to enter the Frankish camp; all of which seems 
to indicate that Charles had had in mind a rapprocliment with the pagans. 
Whether this was a wise policy, and whether it was likely to bring the de¬ 
sired results, are other matters which do not concern us for the moment. 
On the possibility of a “German Normandy,” see Vogel, p. 295. 

18 See supra, n. 11. 

19 This does not, of course, preclude an arrangement between Godfrey on 
the one hand and his fellow Northmen on the other. 

20 Dummler’s assertion (III, 203 and n. 1) to the contrary notwithstand¬ 
ing. The “Klausei” referred to by Dummler in the note contains the prom 
ise, not of Siegfried, but of Godfrey (see supra, n. 11). 



APPENDIX IV 


245 


of Lothaire II. It is true that Godfrey also accepted money, 
but this he used as a means of inducing the other Vikings to 
quit the territories subject to Charles the Fat. 21 Accordingly, 
the money payment must be regarded as the least important part 
of the treaty. 22 Undoubtedly Godfrey realized that the other 
Northmen would not have been content to see him in exclusive 
possession of all the fruits of the treaty; therefore, after a gen¬ 
eral understanding had been arrived at, he persuaded the em¬ 
peror to grant him this “subsidy” in order that with it he might 
secure the retreat of his fellow warriors. 

The exact amount of money received by Godfrey is somewhat 
doubtful. Some of our sources refer to it very indefinitely or 
say nothing about it. 23 Two sources are more specific, but do 
not agree. According to one of these it was 2,412 pounds of 
gold and silver ; 24 according to the other, 2,080 pounds or a little 
more. 25 The latter figure, it is said, was based on reckoning 
a pound as being worth 20 solidi. 

This Danegeld was not raised by taxation. Charles appears 
to have secured the entire amount by drawing on the treasuries 
of those churches which had escaped being plundered by the 

21 The author of the Cont. Ratisb. makes clear that the money was first 
paid to Godfrey, but gives no information as to how he used it. Meginhard 
(in Part III of the Annals of Fulda), speaking of Charles’s relations with 
Godfrey, says the money was paid to inimicis. Regino and Hincmar state 
explicitly that the fiefs were given to Godfrey, and the money to Siegfried. 
From these statements I draw the conclusion expressed above in the text. 

22 The money is referred to in Cont. Ratisb. as gifts (munera) presented 
by Charles to Godfrey just before the latter was about to return to the Vik¬ 
ing camp, and two days after the treaty proper had been concluded. In 
fact this writer gives the impression that the money payment was not really 
required by the terms of the treaty; that rather it was gratuitous on the 
part of Charles, who thereby wished to strengthen the bonds of friendship 
with Godfrey. Even Meginhard (Part III of the Annals of Fulda), who 
strongly disapproves of the treaty, does not speak of the money payment 
until after he has made clear the other and principal features of the treaty; 
he declares that the payment of the money was a greater crime than the 
handing over of the counties and benefices, since the money was taken 
from the church treasuries; to this writer it was tantamount to paying 
tribute, yet he explains that Charles in paying over the money, did so on 
the advice of some scoundrels—which seems to imply that it was not really 
necessary or required by the terms of the treaty. Regino and Hincmar do 
not speak of the money until after they have discussed the terms made with 
Godfrey, and then state that it was paid to Siegfried and the other North¬ 
men. The Annals of St. Vaast do not mention the money at all. 

23 Regino, p. 120, says quite indefinitely: “immensum pondus auri et 
argenti”; Ann. Bert., p. 153: “plura milia argenti et auri.” 

24 Ann. Fuld., Part III, p. 99. 

25 Ibid., Cont. Ratisb., p. 108. 



246 


APPENDIX IV 


Northmen in the preceding months. 20 The treasury of the 
church of Metz in particular seems to have been drawn upon. 27 
This was perhaps because at the time that see was vacant. 28 

The major part of the army of Charles had no doubt dis¬ 
approved of the policy of treating with the pagan Northmen, 
whose promises and pledges, it was felt, could not be trusted. 29 
The ecclesiastics naturally were indignant to see what remained 
of the church treasures presented as a gift to those who had 
but recently been plundering and destroying their property. 30 
However good the intentions of the emperor and his advisers 
may have been in concluding the treaty of 882, it is certain 
that Charles gained neither prestige nor popularity thereby. 31 

Again fortune had favored the Vikings. So far from having 
been forced to give up any part of the immense booty which 
they had gathered together in the past months, the freebooters 
were now furnished with more money or plate. A large part 
of this plunder, together with a number of captives, was by 
the Vikings sent off to Scandinavia on two hundred heavily 
laden vessels. 32 Godfrey and his men probably withdrew to their 
newly granted fiefs in Frisia; 33 while Siegfried, Vurm, and Hals, 
with their followers, repaired — after they had set fire to De¬ 
venter, a Frisian port, and had made some attempts at plunder¬ 
ing along the lower Rhine — to the West Frankish realm, to 
commence fresli plundering operations. 34 

* ❖ * 


26 Ann. Fulcl., Ill, p. 99. 

27 Ann. Bert., p. 153. 

28 The bishop hacl been killed earlier in the same year in a hostile en¬ 
counter with the Northmen. The revenues of the see during the period of 
the vacancy were by Charles the Fat allowed to Hugo, the son of Lothaire 
II — much to the disgust of Hincmar (Ann. Bert., p. 153). This fact taken 
together with the marriage of Godfrey to Hugo’s sister Gisla (cf. supra, p. 
243 and n. 13) leads one to suspect that Hugo had possibly been one of the 
intermediaries between the Northmen and Charles the Fat. The treaty of 
882 certainly redounded to the advantage of Hugo. 

29 Cf. Ann. Fuld., Ill, loc. cit. 

30 Cf. ibid.; Ann. Bert., loc. cit. 

31 See Regino, loc. cit.; Helmold, Chronica Slavorum, I, 7, M.G.H., SS., 
XXI, p. 17. Cf. Diimmler, III, 204. 

32 Ann. Fuld., Ill, p. 99. 

33 Ibid. In the following year (883) Godfrey entered into a close alliance 
with Hugo, whose sister he married about the same time (ibid., p. 100). 

34 See Vogel, p. 294. 




APPENDIX IV 


247 




That there were both in Lorraine and in the East Frankish 
kingdom numerous payments of local Danegeld, i. e. ransom 
payments for persons and places, can not be doubted. But only 
one instance thereof has, so far as my observations go, been 
chronicled. It is that of Count Eberhard, who in the year 880 
was ransomed at a “very great price” by his mother Evesa. 
How Evesa obtained this ransom money is not indicated. 35 Du- 
do’s story of the ransom of Reginar Langhals of Hainaut by his 
wife in the same year, in return for all the gold in the duchy, is 
probably legendary. 30 

35 Regino, 881, p. 117; cf. Vogel, p. 278. 

36 See Dudo, De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum, II, c. 10, 

ed. Lair, p. 150; cf. Vogel, pp. 279-80. 


\ 


I 



APPENDIX V. 


The Danegeld in Brittany. 

Whether a general Danegeld was ever paid to the Northmen 
in Brittany, must be regarded as doubtful. It is true, however, 
that in 847 the Breton duke Nominoe, after he had been thrice 
defeated by the Vikings and finally put to flight, opened nego¬ 
tiations with the invaders and was able, by the presentation of 
“gifts,” to induce them to evacuate his territory/ These gifts 
may or may not have consisted of money. That the Northmen 
were willing, on occasion, to accept considerations other than 
money, is certain. For in the year 869 Solomon, the second 
successor of Nominoe, could make peace with the pagans by 
furnishing them with five hundred cows. 2 

Local Danegeld was doubtless paid in Brittany, as elsewhere, 
on many occasions. But the recorded instances thereof are but 
few in number. Bishop Courantgenus of Vannes was in all 
probability ransomed from Viking captivity in the year 854. 3 
In the following year the monks of St. Sauveur de Redon ran¬ 
somed Count Pascwet of Vannes, by handing over to the North¬ 
men a chalice and a paten, both of gold, and weighing together 
as much as 67 solidi / Later, however, this same Pascwet did 
not hesitate to pay a stipendiary Danegeld — the amount of 
which is not indicated — to a group of Vikings whom he en¬ 
gaged to aid him as mercenaries against his rival Vurfand, count 
of Rennes. 5 


1 Ann. Bert.. 847.. p. 35: “Dani partem inferioris Galliae quam Brittones 
incolunt adeuntes, ter cum eisdem bellantes, superant; Nomenogiusque vic- 
tus cum suis fugit, dein [per] legatos muneribus a suis eos sedibus amovit.” 

2 Regino, 874, ed. Kurze, p. 108; cf. Ann. Bert., 869, p. 107. See Vogel, 
p. 232. 

3 See Cartulaire cle Saint-Sciuveur de Redon, ed. de Courson, XL, p. 369, 
and XXII, p. 19; cf. Vogel, p. 145. 

4 The sacred vessels were later redeemed from the pagans by Pascwet. 
Cart, de Sciint-Sciuveur de Redon, XXVI, p. 21; cf. Vogel, p. 150. 

5 Regino, 874, p. 107. 


TO THIS ESSAY TIIE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION AWARDED THE HERBERT 
BAXTER ADAMS PRIZE IN EUROPEAN HISTORY FOR 1921. 






































